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ABSTRACT 
 
Overcapacity has been a global concern in fisheries for many decades as it has created 
one of the most severe impacts on fisheries stocks. It i  commonly found in fisheries 
with open access system, limited regulations and inadequate controls on fishing 
capacity. Although the awareness of controlling fishing capacity is significantly 
growing worldwide, the problem of overcapacity is unlikely alleviated. It is due to a 
number of factors, including the lack of understanding of the concepts of fishing 
capacity and relevant terms, the lack of property user rights in fisheries and the 
inadequacy of effective management to address excess apacity and/or overcapacity 
issues based on the international standards. Thailand is one of the coastal States 
confronted with problems of overcapacity, and it has become the main obstacle for 
Thailand to achieve the sustainable fisheries.  
 
This thesis clarifies the concepts of capacity in fisheries and examines the issue of 
overcapacity both in Thailand and global level. The criteria derived from the 
international and regional fisheries instruments to manage fishing capacity and address 
excess capacity and/or overcapacity problems are also determined and used as a basis to 
evaluate the adequacy of current legal, institutional and technical management 
frameworks for managing fishing capacity of Thailand.  
 
Based on the analysis, the failure of fishing capacity management currently conducted 
by Thailand suggests the inadequacy of framework necessarily adopted to effectively 
manage fishing capacity and address overcapacity problem in Thailand. Gaps and 
challenges in managing fishing capacity are therefore identified. The lack of 
comprehensive legal and policy framework is found as one of the significant gaps, and 
the complexity of the nature of Thai fisheries (multi-gear and multi-species) is one of 
the big challenges confronted by Thailand in managig its fishing capacity. The thesis 
lastly provides options and recommendations for Thailand to address such gaps and 
challenges in order to achieve the effective management of fishing capacity for 
sustainable fisheries.  
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
 
In the past decades, overcapacity has become a great concern in global fisheries.1 
Overcapacity is a result of the lack of property user rights in fisheries.2 Overcapacity is 
a classic problem found in any common pool resource fisheries3 where fishers attempt 
to maximise their personal gain from fishing.4 Despite the growing global awareness in 
controlling fishing capacity, the magnitude of the problem of overcapacity continues to 
increase. 
  
Overcapacity primarily results from the fact that many States have not yet adopted 
and/or implemented adequate management frameworks for fishing capacity 
management at the national level. The key factors cntributing to this inadequacy 
include the lack of clear understanding of the concepts of fishing capacity, overcapacity, 
and the need to address them, taking into account various circumstances. Thailand, 
being one of the top global fisheries producers in the world faces the serious, 
longstanding, and worsening problem of overcapacity due to the open access nature of 
its fisheries. This thesis responds to this issue by reviewing the overcapacity problem in 
Thailand and examining the legal, policy and institutional gaps and challenges in 
managing fishing capacity in Thailand based on international and regional benchmarks. 
Lastly, options and recommendations to effectively manage fishing capacity towards 
sustainable fisheries in Thailand are presented. 
 
This introductory chapter provides the context for the thesis by discussing the 
fundamental principles related to fishing capacity, as well as by analysing the global 
concerns about overcapacity and how this relates to Thailand. The Chapter outlines how 
the thesis will be developed in the succeeding chapters and further provides the 
                                                
1 Indrani Lutchman and Daniel D Hoggarth, Net Losses: Untying the Gordian Knot of Fishing 
Overcapacity (IUCN, 1999) 2; FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, The State of World Fisheries 
and Aquaculture 2004 (FAO, 2004) 118. 
2 FAO, Regulating Fishing Capacity (27 May) FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14857/en>. 
3 Carsten Lynge Jensen, 'Reduction of the Fishing Capacity in "Common Pool" Fisheries' (2002) 26(3) 
Marine Policy 155. 
4 Colin W Clark, The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries Economic Models and Human Behavior (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 3. 
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objectives, the scope and limitation, and the significance of the thesis. The analytical 
framework used in the discussion of the legal and policy measures to promote effective 
fishing capacity management is also explained in this c apter and further elaborated in 
succeeding parts of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Fundamental Principles of Capacity in Fisheries 
 
The concept of ‘capacity’ in the fisheries context can be difficult to define and 
understand due to the complex of attributes of fishing units’ productivity. By way of 
explanation, this section examines the term ‘fishing capacity’ and other relevant key 
concepts such as excess capacity, overcapacity, overfishing, fishing capacity, capacity 
utilisation and overcapitalisation. 
 
1.1.1 Fishing Capacity 
 
‘Capacity’ is referred to as the maximum of potential production by a producing unit, 
company, or industry, given production factors (e.g. capital stock, technology).5 In 
general terms, ‘capacity’ in a company or industry, for instance, is normally defined as 
the capability of the company or industry to carry a flow of goods and/or services per 
period of time.6 This concept is much broader and slightly different from the term 
‘fishing capacity’, which is not clearly defined in literature, and hence has been 
understood and characterised by fisheries scientists, f heries economists, and fisheries 
managers in various ways7 based on their own concerns.8 For example, the technologists 
usually define the capacity of a vessel as its technological and practical capability to 
achieve an expected level of activity. It can be fishing days, catch or products from the 
processing. Fisheries biologists usually connect capa ity with fishing effort and the 
derivable fishing mortality rate, which is the ratio of the number of deaths of a particular 
                                                
5 Sean Pascoe et al, Measuring and Assessing Capacity in Fisheries: 2. Issues and Methods (FAO, 2003) 
8. 
6 Investopedia, Capacity <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capacity.asp>. 
7 John M Ward et al, Measuring and Assessing Capacity in Fisheries: 1. Basic Concepts and 
Management Options (FAO, 2004) 2. 
8 James E Kirkley and Dale Squires, 'Measuring Capacity and Capacity Utilisation in Fisheries' in 
Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts and 
Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 1999) vol 386, 206. 
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fish stock within a fishing period.9 The fishing effort theoretically refers to total inputs 
used in the fishing process. In general, measuring these inputs is not feasible, so 
substitute measures or indicators are applied, for example, total fishing days and the 
number of fishing gears used.10 This approach is then related to the relationship between 
the effort measured (e.g., fishing days) and fishing mortality (i.e., catch). In case the 
fishing mortality is beyond the desired target leve, which is normally a biological 
reference point, such as the Maximum Sustainable Yild (MSY) or alternate 
precautionary reference point, the rate of fishing mortality is therefore too high due to 
too much fishing effort. In this sense, if the fishing effort can be controlled as at a 
balanced level with the target rate of fishing mortality by using law enforcement, the 
capacity problem is not appeared.11 
 
The views of fisheries managers about fishing capacity is generally similar to that of 
fisheries scientists, but they often link fishing capacity to the number of fishing vessels 
in the fishery. This perspective is generally found i  the fishery that is governed by 
input controls, such as fleet size limitation.12 However, capacity can also be 
demonstrated as gross tonnage, or the total of fishing effort, such as days of fishing, and 
sometimes the vessel utilisation rate.13 
 
Economists, on the other hand, tend to define fishing capacity as the potential output 
that could be produced at maximum profit level (an output perspective)14 with given 
levels of inputs, e.g., vessel size, engine horsepow r, fuel, number of fishing gears, ice 
and bait.15 From an economic viewpoint, fishing capacity will be affected by several 
factors, such as price of fish, physical productivity and limitations of the market.16  
 
                                                
9 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 1; Ward et al, above n 7, 9; Kirkley and Squires, 
above n 8; OECD, Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries: Policies and Summary Statistics 2001 
(OECD Publishing, 2001) 57. 
10 Ward et al, above n 7, 9; OECD, Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries: Glossary (OECD, 1998). 
11 Ward et al, above n 7, 9. 
12 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 1; Ward et al, above n 7, 2; Peter N Ehlers et al 
(eds), Marine Issues: From a Scientific, Political and Legal Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff, 2002) 190. 
13 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 1; Ward et al, above n 7, 9. 
14 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 1, 119; Ward et al, above n 7, 3. 
15 FAO, Different Perspectives on Fishing Capacity FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14856/en>. 
16 OECD, Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries: Policies and Summary Statistics 2001 (OECD 
Publishing, 2001) 56. 
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These perspectives or concepts have different implications for fisheries management. 
For instance, based on the viewpoint of fisheries scientists, if fishing vessels operate for 
a less number of fishing days, the level of fishing effort will therefore reduce and 
overcapacity issue would be gone. For fisheries managers, the problem will still remain 
because the number of fishing vessels is not decreased. From an economist’s standpoint, 
however, the situation will be worse since reduced utilisation could result in lower 
profitability. Conversely, if the number of fishing vessels is reduced, which results in 
directly decreasing capacity from the fisheries manager’s perspective, the fishing effort 
level will be reduced as well. This would satisfy fisheries scientists. Since the remaining 
fishing vessels will more efficiently operate due to the reduced size of fishing fleet, 
capacity problem is also diminished according to the viewpoint of economists. While 
different considerations are taken into account depending on perspective, it can be seen 
that the different views towards capacity are not always inconsonant; in fact they can 
support each other.17 
 
Since fishing capacity can be defined in many ways, in order to capture various views of 
fishing capacity, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 
has defined fishing capacity as: 
 
‘Fishing capacity is, for a given resource condition, the amount of fish 
(fishing effort) that can be produced over a period of time (e.g., a year) 
by a vessels or a fleet if fully utilized. That is, if effort and catch were not 
constrained by restrictive management measures.’18 
 
In terms of fishing vessels, fishing capacity is defined as its capability, or power, to 
create the fishing effort per a time period.19 Hence, the factors comprising a fleet’s 
capacity may be divided into four components, i.e.,(i) the number of vessels, (ii) the 
                                                
17 Ward et al, above n 7, 3. 
18 This definition has been agreed by participants of FAO Technical Consultation Meeting on the 
Measurement of Fishing Capacity held in Mexico in 1999. See, FAO, 'Technical Consultation to Review 
Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and the International Plan of Action for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, 24-29 June 2004' (FAO Fisheries Report No. 753, FAO, 2004) 
6. 
19 Dominique Greboval and Gordon Munro, 'Overcapitalization and Excess Capacity in World Fisheries: 
Underlying Economics and Methods of Control' in Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing 
Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts and Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 386 
(FAO, 1999) 206, 2. 
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vessel size, (iii) the technical competency of fishing operation of the vessel, and (iv)  the 
fishing time potentially spent by a vessel, per a time period.20  
 
To fully understand the concept of capacity, it is essential to clarify the two related 
concepts of excess capacity and overcapacity.  
 
1.1.1.1 Excess Capacity 
 
Excess capacity is characterized by the level of the output potentially achieved relative 
to the output actually achieved in a certain period of time.21 In general, excess capacity 
is referred to the difference between the maximum otput potentially achieved and the 
output actually achieved. The maximum output is the output that can be produced, 
conditioned by factors such as the present status of resources, technology, full and 
effective use of the capital stock, and other various factors.22 Put simply, excess 
capacity occurs when the level of potential catch or effort is above the level of observed 
catch or effort in a period of time.23  
 
Excess capacity is considered as a short-term problem, which can correct itself, since 
fishers are capable to change the use of their inputs or outputs in the short term.24 
Excess capacity can be found when the changes of supply and demand create the 
imbalance of the market. The market can, however, adjust its capital and other inputs in 
order to increase or reduce the production25 a d then achieve the market equilibrium.  
Examples of these are lower prices of fish or temporarily increased costs of production 
(e.g., due to higher price of fuel), which may cause fewer fishing days of vessels than 
average fishing days under normal situations. When t se fish prices and production 
costs come back to normal level, the form of excess capacity may be subsequently 
corrected by itself.26 
                                                
20 Courtland L Smith and Susan S Hanna, 'Measuring Fleet Capacity and Capacity Utilisation' (1990) 47 
Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 2085, quoted in Greboval and Munro, above n 19. 
21 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 1, 119; Pascoe et al, above n 5, 14. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ward et al, above n 7, 4; Robert S Pomeroy, 'Managing Overcapacity in Small-scale Fisheries in 
Southeast Asia' (2012) 36(2) (3//) Marine Policy 520, 521. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Pascoe et al, above n 5, 14. 
26 Ward et al, above n 7, 4. 
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Excess capacity can also be caused by the application of some management measures. 
For instance, the programs of fish stock recovery that apply the limitation on the catch 
or fishing effort may create the underutilisation of fishing vessels during the operation 
of these programs, but when the fish stocks have improved, such fishing vessels are 
then allowed to fully operate. Under this condition, the occurrence of excess capacity 
may not be determined as an issue. Additionally, excess capacity can be an indicator of 
overcapitalization, which is a longer term problem in fisheries.27 The concept of excess 
capacity can be compared and contrasted with the concept of overcapacity. 
 
1.1.1.2 Overcapacity 
 
Overcapacity is considered as the main concern for resource managers as it could cause 
consequences in many aspects, including biological, economic, social and political 
aspects.28  Overcapacity is referred to the difference between the maximum potential 
output and a desirable level of the optimum output,29 such as the MSY30 or the 
Maximum Economic Yield (MEY).31 Simply put, overcapacity is a symptom of open 
access or common property fishery management.32 It is sometimes described as 
                                                
27 Greboval and Munro, above n 19; Ward et al, above n 7, 4. 
28 FAO, Fisheries Management: 3. Managing Fishing Capacity (FAO, 2008) 7-8. 
29 Pomeroy, above n 23. This is based on output perspective. For input perspective, on the other hand, 
overcapacity can be described as ‘there is more than t e minimum fleet and effort required to produce a 
given TAC or given output (harvest catch) level.’ See, FAO, above n 15.   
30 The MSY is considered as the average of the maximum catch or yield that can sustainably be harvested 
from a fish stock under current conditions of environments. Additionally, the MSY can be referred to as 
‘maximum equilibrium catch; maximum sustained yield; sustainable catch.’ See, NOAA's National 
Marine Fisheries Service: Northeast Fisheries Science Center, Definition of Fisheries Technical Terms 
(24 November 2004) <http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/techniques/tech_terms.html>. Alternatively, the MSY 
may be defined as the maximum catch level that can be sustainably exploited. See, Susan Singh-Renton, 
Introduction to the Sustainable Development Concept in Fisheries FAO 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4260e/y4260e0r.htm#b 27>. Additionally, if a fish stock is harvested 
beyond its MSY level, such stock is basically determined as an overfished stock. See, Ward et al, above n 
7, 5. 
31 Since the MSY concerns resource sustainability, it only primarily takes into account a biological 
viewpoint. However, fisheries economists have argued that the benefits in terms of economy must also be 
considered as fishing is a business. In order to serve this perspective, the Maximum Economic Yield 
(MEY) has been developed as another reference point. The MEY is determined by properly adjusting the 
difference between the fishing cost and the received ncome, and is usually found at a lower level of 
fishing effort than those needed for harvesting the MSY. See, Singh-Renton, above n 30. 
32 Martin Aranda, Hilario Murua and Paul de Bruyn, 'Managing Fishing Capacity in Tuna Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs): Development and State of the Art' (2012) 36(5) (9//) 
Marine Policy 985, 986. 
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overcapitalisation in harvesting fish for a number of easons, for instance, the deficiency 
of incentive to conserve fish, which generates overcapacity problem in the fishery.33  
 
Unlike excess capacity, overcapacity is a long-term phenomenon34 or a persistent 
problem which, unless addressed, will undermine fisheries management objectives and 
result in an inefficient use of fisheries resources.35 Generally, overcapacity exists when 
the allocation of inputs and outputs in the market is inefficiently done.  
 
To reduce capacity in fisheries the distinction between excess capacity and overcapacity 
needs to be understood clearly. However, overcapacity nd excess capacity are not 
always directly linked. Overcapacity may occur even there is no excess capacity.36 
There may also be a level of excess capacity that can persist with overcapacity.37  
 
In the past, although resource managers have been worried about the optimum level of 
the use of capital stock or number of vessels, capacity has not really been reduced. 
However, along with the concerns of production costs, resource managers have desired 
to measure the capacity by considering the inputs, such as a number of fishing vessels, 
which are capable to catch the MSY. Therefore, to apply the input-based concept in 
terms of excess capacity, the capacity can be referred to as the difference between the 
observed number of fishing vessels catching a given output and the number of fishing 
vessels needed to catch the capacity output. In the cas  of overcapacity, capacity can be 
referred to as the difference between the number of fishing vessels catching the 
resources with desirable conditions of such resources and the number of fishing vessels 
needed to catch a desirable level of optimum catch, he MSY for instance. The 
assumption of full input utilisation is required for these concepts. In other words, these 
concepts apply when a vessel or a fleet is extremely utilised.38        
                                                
33 John M Ward and Rebecca Metzner, 'Fish Harvesting Capacity, Excess Capacity, and Overcapacity: A 
Synthesis of Measurement Studies and Management Strategies' (FAO, 2002) 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y8169e/y8169e00.pdf> 56. 
34 Pascoe et al, above n 5, 14; Pomeroy, above n 23. 
35 Ward et al, above n 7, 10; The Fisheries Secretariat, Overcapacity (17 June 2014) 
<http://www.fishsec.org/the-issue/management-failures/overcapacity/>. 
36 Ward et al, above n 7, 6. 
37 Pascoe et al, above n 5, 14. 
38 Ibid 15. 
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Although the occurrence of excess capacity and/or overcapacity may cause the 
significant loss of benefits or alternate chances and ineffective production of a 
community, eliminating excess capacity and/or overcapa ity can also be expensive in 
terms of  socio-economic aspect. In several fisheries, the impact of capacity reduction 
results in the decreased rate of employment in fisher es sector. For example, when 
fishing vessels are removed from a fishery, vessel crews are therefore unemployed and 
need to find alternative career. Effective capacity management requires not only the 
measures or indicators to assess excess capacity and/or overcapacity, but also the 
appropriate measurement used for policy guidance in order to achieve the target 
biomass stocks and output levels (e.g., MSY). Moreover, in order to implement any 
formal capacity reduction programs, an appropriate tim line for capacity reduction must 
also be developed.39 
 
1.1.2 Overfishing and Overexploitation 
 
A fisheries management term, which is often used in relation to overcapacity is 
overfishing. When a fishery develops substantially, the catch per unit of effort (CPUE) 
tends to decline as more fishers share the catch.40 If there is excessive use of capital and 
labour in the fishery41 without specific actions undertaken to prevent such situation, the 
fishery resources would be led to an overfished stage.42 This has more impact on 
valuable species because the more valuable the fish are, the less costly it is to catch 
them.43 In order to determine overfishing, however, information on stock size and 
recruitment rates are needed.44 Simply put, overfishing exists when fishing operation 
decreases the fish resources to a level that is lower than the acceptable level. However, 
overfishing can take a number of forms. These forms include target overfishing, 
                                                
39 Ibid. 
40 Rosemary H Lowe-McConnell, Ecological Studies in Tropical Fish Communities (Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) 307. 
41 FAO, above n 2. 
42 Overfished valuable species are, for instance, the Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) in the 
Western Atlantic Ocean, see World Wildlife Fund, Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Overview 
http://www.worldwildlife.org/species/finder/tuna/atl ntic-tuna-overview.html#; bigeye tuna (Thunnus 
obesus) in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, see World Wildlife Fund, Bigeye Tuna Overview 
<http://www.worldwildlife.org/species/finder/tuna/bigeye-overview.html>; narrow-barred Spanish 
mackerel (Scomberomerus commerson) in the Western Indian Ocean, see FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2010 (FAO, 2010) 42. 
43 Clark, above n 4, 8. 
44 Lowe-McConnell, above n 40, 307. 
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economic overfishing,45 ecosystem overfishing, recruitment overfishing, and growth 
overfishing.46 Growth overfishing, which has been focused the most in the tropical 
regions, refers to a condition when the fish stocks are harvested before they are able to 
achieve their growth capability. The low CPUE obtained in such condition would 
probably be undesirable based on the economic perspective, except the catch provides 
big value due to the high market price of fish.47 However, it is critical to note that any 
type of overfishing is cognate to non-sustainable us of the resources48 and ultimately 
leads to resource depletion. 
 
Overexploitation exists when the fish resources are harvested at a rate that is greater 
than the maximum rate, which allows such resources to reproduce and maintain.49 
Overfishing is a significant factor of the occurrenc  of overexploitation. In the past 
decades, fisheries management has attempted to address the problems of overfishing 
and those concerning socio-economic issues in national and international fisheries, but 
it has been later recognised that these problems are r ther a consequence of 
overcapacity, which is a more severe issue.50 As overcapacity is an important cause of 
overfishing,51 it follows that fisheries, which are overfished, practically have an 
overcapacity problem. 
 
 
                                                
45 Andrew A Rosenberg, 'Precautionary Management Referenc  Points and Management Strategies' in 
FAO (ed), Precautionary Approach to Fisheries. Part 2: Scientific Papers. Prepared for the Technical 
Consultation on the Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries (Including Species Introductions). 
Lysekil, Sweden, 6–13 June 1995, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 350/2 (FAO, 1996) 210, 130. 
Economic overfishing exists when the resources are not efficiently harvested. The economic overfishing 
is generally referred to the point at which fishing effort surpasses the total profit generated in the fishery, 
i.e., the value of fish production does not cover the fishing costs. See, Reef Resilience, Overfishing 
(2014) <http://www.reefresilience.org/fish-spawning-a gregations/whats-the-problem/overfishing/>. 
46 It has been found that growth overfishing, recruitment overfishing, and ecosystem overfishing (all are 
called biological overfishing) occur in Southeast Asian waters. See, Daniel Pauly, Some Simple Methods 
for the Assessment of Tropical Fish Stocks (FAO, 1983) 39-40.  
47 Alain Fonteneau, 'Biological Overview of Tunas Stocks and Overfishing' in Judith Swan and 
Dominique Greboval (eds), Report and Documentation of the International Workshop on the 
Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments and Factors of Unsustainability and 
Overexploitation in Fisheries, Mauritius, 3-7 February 2003 (FAO, 2004) 117. 
48 FAO, Destructive Fishing Practices <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/12353/en>. 
49 GIWA, Challenges to International Waters; Regional Assessments in a Global Perspective (United 
Nations Environment Programme, 2006). 
50 FAO, Assessing Fishing Capacity and Overcapacity FAO 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14858/en>. 
51 Ibid. 
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1.1.3 Capacity Utilisation and Overcapitalisation 
 
Capacity utilisation represents the level to which a vessel is fully utilised.52 
Alternatively, it is the total of inputs and productive capital used to generate a given 
output, corresponding the output level that can be generated if the capital stock and 
varieties of inputs are extremely used.53 Based on an input based viewpoint, capacity 
utilisation may associate with the proportion of the number of actual operating days to 
the number of potential operating days under normal conditions, whereas capacity 
utilisation is the proportion of the fish production actually caught to the fish production 
potentially caught under full utilisation of vessels according to an output based 
viewpoint.54 
 
Overcapitalisation in fisheries is more complex than that encountered in industrial 
organisations.55 Overcapitalisation is a longer-term problem for the fisheries and 
contributes to overfishing as discussed above. Overcapitalisation refers to 
overinvestment in assets (capital).56 Therefore, overcapitalisation is considered to exist 
if the fleet size or the number of vessels is larger than the level required for harvesting a 
specified yield that is possibly larger than the prsent yield.57 If overinvestment of 
capital is occurred in the market, then such excessiv  use of capital and labour generates 
biological overfishing.58 
 
1.2 Overcapacity Problem in Global Context 
 
The main problem with regard to capacity in fisheries is overcapacity. In general, 
overcapacity causes not only the resource overexploitation but also the ineffective 
utilisation of resources, capital stock and other productive factors associated with the 
fishing operation. Overcapacity is, therefore, considered as an important factor of the 
overexploitation of global fisheries resources and creates a great loss in economic 
                                                
52 Ward et al, above n 7, 4. 
53 Pascoe et al, above n 5, 12. 
54 Ward et al, above n 7, 4. 
55 Greboval and Munro, above n 19, 2. 
56 FAO, above n 15. 
57 Ward et al, above n 7, 4-5. 
58 FAO, above n 15. 
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sector.59 The overcapacity problem in fisheries and the reduction of capacity to a level 
commensurate with the sustainable exploitation of resources have been internationally 
focused for many decades.60 Several States have developed and implemented the fishery 
policy to curb their fishing capacity and conserve fisheries resources.61  
 
According to the latest data estimates in 2011,62 28.8 per cent of global marine resource 
stocks are overexploited; hence the resource yield is lower than the maximum potential 
level because of the excess fishing activities. Furthermore, 61.3 per cent of these stocks 
are extremely exploited and, thus, produce the catch, which is at or close to the level of 
MSY. Only 9.9 per cent of stocks are reasonably harvested or underexploited, which 
has some potential to increase production. These figures affirm that the ratio of the 
underexploited stocks has continuously reduced, from 40 per cent in 197463 to 23 per 
cent in 2005,64 20 per cent in 2007,65 15 per cent in 2008,66 12.7 per cent in 200967 and 
then 9.9 per cent in 2011.68 This means non-fully exploited stocks have annually 
decreased about 0.8 per cent in average. On the contrary, the proportion of 
overexploited stocks has raised over time from 10 per cent in 197469 to 17 per cent in 
2005,70 19 per cent in 2007,71 28 per cent in 2008,72 29.9 per cent in 2009,73 and slightly 
                                                
59 Greboval and Munro, above n 19, 1. 
60 Fishing capacity management has been remarked as an urgent need under the March 1995 Rome 
Consensus on World Fisheries, the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the 1995 
Kyoto Declaration and Plan of Action. See, FAO, Fishing Capacity 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/2898/en>. 
61 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2008 
(FAO, 2009) 29. 
62 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2014: 
Opportunities and Challenges (FAO, 2014) 37. 
63 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2006 
(FAO, 2007) 29. 
64 Ibid. 
65 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 61, 7. 
66 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 42, 10. 
67 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2012 
(FAO, 2012) 11. 
68 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 62. 
69 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 67. 
70 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 63, 29. 
71 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 61, 7. 
72 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 42, 10. 
73 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 67, 11. 
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decreased to 28.8 per cent in 201174 or averagely increased about 0.5 per cent per year.
Thus, effective rebuilding plans undoubtedly need to be put in place. Moreover, among 
the top ten species of the global stocks,75 which, in terms of the amount, jointly 
contribute 24 per cent of the global production from marine capture fisheries, are 
extremely exploited, or overexploited.76 The species fully exploited include the 
anchoveta stocks in the Southeast Pacific, Alaska pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) in 
the North Pacific, Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Northeast Atlantic, Atlantic 
herring (Clupea harengus) stocks in the Northeast and Northwest Atlantic, and chub 
mackerel (Scomber japonicas) stocks in the Eastern Pacific and the Northwest Pacific. 
Some stocks, such as Atlantic cod (G. morhua) in the Northwest Atlantic, are 
considered to be overexploited.77 However, the production of such species could be 
increased if the restoring plans are implemented effectively. Overall, 90 per cent of the 
global fish stocks are found as fully or extremely xploited or overexploited and, 
therefore, both effective management and precautionary management are required.78  
 
Apart from concerns about the exploitation level of stocks, concerns about fishing 
capacity have also centred on the negative impact of certain fishing gears and increasing 
the number of fishing vessels. Issues associating wth the impact of fishing gears on the 
marine environment include: (i) the quantity of fuel or energy used for fishing the target 
species; (ii) the damages of marine environment; (iii) the loss of fishing capacity in 
terms of forsaken fishing gears called ‘ghost fishing’;79 (iv) the amount and number of 
bycatch species; and (v) the amount of discarded aquatic animals (e.g., turtles, 
                                                
74 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 62. 
75 They are, for example, anchoveta, Japanese anchovy (Engraulis japonicus), Alaska pollock (Theragra 
chalcogramma), Atlantic herring (Clupea harengus), Chilean jack mackerel (Trachurus murphyi), chub 
mackerel (Scomber japonicus), blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou), and largehead hairtail 
(Trichiurus lepturus). See, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 67, 53. 
76 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 62, 38. 
77 Ibid. 
78 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 42, 8. 
79 Ghost fishing is referred to the lost or abandoned fishing gears that continue to catch fish in the waters. 
It is harmful to environment and wastes the fish captured. Also, it is difficult to estimate the amount of 
fish caught. Generally, ghost fishing happens with passive fishing gears, including gill nets, traps, 
entangling nets, trammel nets. This issue was arisen for the first time at the 16th Session of the FAO 
Committee on Fisheries in April 1985. See, FAO, Ghost Fishing FAO 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14798/en>. 
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seabirds80). These issues have been arisen in the commercial fishing gears, such as purse 
seines, trawl nets, dredges, traps, lift nets, gillnets, hooks and lines, and entangling net.81  
 
In addition, the rapidly increasing number of fishing vessels is also a global concern. In 
2012, the estimated number of total fishing vessels82 in the world was 4.72 million. 
Among them, 3.23 million vessels that contributing 68 per cent of the world fleet are 
flagged in Asia. Sixty-eight per cent of the total number of vessels, or 3.2 million 
vessels, operates in marine waters;83 57 per cent of which have power engines. The vast 
majority of fishing vessels in the world are small-scale fishing vessels (less than 12 
metres in length overall), contribute 79 per cent of the world total. Such vessels govern 
the regions in Africa, Latin America, the Near East nd the Caribbean.84 These small-
fishing vessels are known to contribute to excess capa ity, which not only increase 
global overfishing but also produce global fishing effort that costs almost double the 
value of the catch. Based on estimates produced more than a decade ago,85 25-53 per 
cent of global fishing capacity would need to be removed in order to achieve economic 
sustainability (25 per cent for incomes from fisheries to shoulder the costs of operation 
and 53 per cent for incomes to shoulder the total costs). 
 
Concerns with regard to overcapacity or overcapitalisation occur in both EEZ and the 
high seas fisheries, particularly in shared stocks.86 This is mainly due to the prevalence 
of open access conditions and inadequacy of strong egulatory frameworks.87 The 
measures implemented to address the overcapacity problem in one country may be 
                                                
80 SEE Turtles, Fisheries Bycatch <http://www.seeturtles.org/fisheries-bycatch/>. 
81 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 61, 68. 
82 Some data and information, which are reported to the FAO, are generally based on the national 
registers. Nonetheless, such registers usually do not include small fishing vessels, particularly the vessels 
operating in inland waters. Furthermore, such regist rs usually include non-operational fishing units. A  a 
result, the existing information has limited usefulness for the purpose of monitoring the trends of glbal 
fishing capacity. Ibid 26. 
83 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 62, 32. 
84 Ibid 33. 
85 Serge M Garcia and Christopher Newton, 'Current Situation, Trends and Prospects in World Capture 
Fisheries' in Ellen K Pitkitch, Daniel D Huppert and Michael P Sissenwine (eds), Global Trends: 
Fisheries Management, American Fisheries Society Symposium (American Fisheries Society, 1997) 3. 
86 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 61, 26. 
87 Ward and Metzner, above n 33, 80. 
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weakened as another country that aims to fish the same fish stock may expand capacity 
in its area.88 
 
Another threat to global fisheries related to overcapacity is illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing (IUU fishing).89 IUU fishing that has greatly attracted global 
attention,90 can take place in any capture fisheries within any national waters and on the 
high seas.91 It is difficult for States and Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
(RFMOs) to obtain the successful outcome of fisheries management when confronting 
with IUU fishing. IUU fishing can lead to not only short-term loss but also long-term 
loss in socioeconomic aspects, and create negative impacts on both environments and 
food security.92 Moreover, IUU fishing may cause the depleted fishery, or substantially 
undermine the efforts to restore depleted stocks.93 Apart from the target fish stocks, IUU 
fishing can create the negative impact on other species stocks and destroy the marine 
ecosystem. The large amount of by-catch, including fish juveniles and non-target 
species clearly shows the negative impact on marine resource conservation of IUU 
fishing.94 
 
Overcapacity is a significant contributor of IUU fishing because overcapacity is a main 
cause of overfishing, which can easily lead to the problem of IUU fishing. Therefore, 
                                                
88 FAO, above n 2. 
89 According to definitions given by FAO, illegal fishing refers to activities conducted by national or 
foreign vessels in State’s water jurisdiction or RFMOs competent areas, without the permit or in 
contravention of the laws and regulations of the State or RFMOs. Unreported fishing refers to fishing 
activities that have not been reported, or have been misreported, to competent authority in contravention 
of national laws and regulations or to RFMOs in contravention of their reporting procedures. 
Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities operated in competent areas of RFMOs by non-flagged  
vessels or are not a member of RFMOs in contravention of the conservation and management measures of 
RFMOs; or in areas or for fish stocks with a manner i consistent with State responsibilities for marine 
resources conservation under international law. See, FAO, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter 
and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (FAO, 2001) 2-3. 
90 Alex G O Elferink and Donald R Rothwell (eds), Oceans Management in the 21st Century: Institutional 
Frameworks and Responses (Martinuss Nijhoff, 2004). 
91 David J Doulman, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Mandate for an International Plan of 
Action (FAO, 2000) vii. 
92 FAO, above n 89, 1. 
93 FAO, Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Deter, Prevent and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (FAO, 2002) 1. 
94 Environmental Justice Foundation, EJF Summary Conclusions on IUU Fishing (March) 
<http://www.ejfoundation.org/pdf/hstf_submission.pdf>. 
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implementing appropriate management tools to control fishing capacity will technically 
prevent IUU fishing.95  
 
At the regional level, Asia in particular, fishing capacity has increased in both large-
scale and small-scale fisheries, while fisheries production has continued to decrease. 
Several factors have conduced to this problem, including the lack of fisheries 
management plans,96 inadequate legislation, policies and operational measures. 
Ineffective systems of granting fishing gear and vessel licenses, inadequate catch and 
effort data collection, and the lack of efficient system of monitoring, control and 
surveillance (MCS) additionally diminish the success in addressing overcapacity in 
fisheries.97 
 
Many attempts, both at national and international levels, have been made to tackle this 
overcapacity issue by implementing programs to reduc  excess capacity, to eliminate 
negative incentives, such as fishing vessel subsidies aggravating the problems of 
overexploitation, and to promote positive incentives, such as the subsidies used to 
remove fishing vessels from the fishery.98 However, it is likely that there are not many 
capacity reduction programs effectively implemented.99 
  
1.3 Overcapacity Problem in Thailand 
 
Overfishing has been recognised as a major concern in several areas of the East Asia 
region, including Thailand.100 Overfishing generally occurs because of the excess 
fishing capacity of commercial fishing vessels purchased by investors in order to 
generate more income.101 In Thailand, trawling, one of the main types of commercial 
                                                
95 FAO, above n 18, 10. 
96 Only 50 per cent of major fisheries have management plans. See, Gary Morgan, Derek Staples and 
Simon Funge-Smith, 'Fishing Capacity Management and IUU Fishing in Asia' (RAP Publication 2007/16, 
FAO/RAP, 2007) iii. 
97 Ibid. 
98 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 61, 7. 
99 Ibid 140. 
100 Tegan C Hoffmann, Identifying Opportunities to Address Issues of Marine Fisheries and Biodiversity 
Conservation (MacArthur Foundation, 2010) 19. 
101 See, Peter Manning, Control and Reduction of Fishing Capacity 
<http://www.oceansatlas.com/world_fisheries_and_aquaculture/html/issues/govern/overcap/control.htm#t
opofdocument>. 
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fisheries has rapidly expanded since it was introduce  in 1961.102 Although the 
reduction of the size of trawl fleets has been observed for a decade,103 the widespread 
damage to marine fish stocks in Thai waters has remained because of prolonged 
overfishing. The drastic reduction of time series CPUEs obtained by trawling surveys in 
the Gulf of Thailand is one of the clear evidence of overfishing. The CPUE has 
significantly decreased from 297.8 kg/hr104 in 1961 to 63.12 kg/hr in 1972,105 22.37 
kg/hr in 2003,106 19.78 kg/hr in 2007,107 and then 18.23 kg/hr in 2012.108 A similar trend 
has been found with the CPUE obtained from the Andaman Sea. For example, the 
demersal fish‘s catch rate obtained in 1966 was 238.9 kg/hr, and it substantially reduced 
to 105.3 kg/hr in 1971, 64.6 kg/hr in 1978, 37.5 kg/hr (in average) during the period of 
1987-1988,109 and then 23.28 kg/hr in 2010.110 
 
Additionally, the results of MSY analysis of some drmersal species, such as big-eye, 
lizardfish, and threadfin bream, clearly show their overexploited status. To bring many 
of these stocks to recovery status would require a vast reduction of the existing fishing 
effort. For instance, in the Gulf of Thailand 40 per c nt of current fishing effort used to 
harvest purple-spotted big-eye (Priacanthus tayenus) should be removed,111 whereas 80 
per cent of current fishing effort needs to be reduc  for lizardfish (i.e., Saurida 
                                                
102 Klaus Tiews, 'The Development of Trawl Fisheries in Southeast Asian Countries as A Means of 
Increasing Marine Fisheries Production'  79.
103 Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 2003-2009. 
104 kg/hr = kilogram/hour. 
105 Samran Ritraksa, 'Summary of the Study on Demersal Resources Status in the Gulf of Thailand by 
Using Otter Board Trawl Gear During 1963-1972' (Department of Fisheries, 1973) 6-14. The CPUE 
obtained in 1966 and 1969 was 130.77 and 102.74 kg/hr, respectively. 
106 Kanit Chuapun et al, 'Marine Resources in the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea from Research 
Vessel during 2002-2005' (Department of Fisheries, 2008) 9-15. 
107 Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 2008' (Department of Fisheries, 
2009) 11-14.  
108 Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 2012' (Department of Fisheries, 
2012) <http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/FormDownload/ANNUAL%20REPORT%202012.pdf> 28. 
109 Somsak Chullasorn, 'Status of Fishery Resources in the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' in Donna J 
Nickerson (ed), Community-based Fisheries Management in Phang-nga Bay, Thailand. Proceedings of 
the National Workshop on Community-based Fisheries Management Organized by the Department of 
Fisheries of Thailand, FAO and the Bay of Bengal Programme, Phuket, Thailand, 14-16 February 1996, 
RAP Publication 1998/3, BOBP Report (FAO, 1998) vol 78, 72. 
110 Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 2011' (Department of Fisheries, 
2011) <http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/FormDownload/ANNUALREPORT2011.pdf> 23. 
111 Amnuay Kongprom et al, Stock Assessment of Purple-Sotted Bigeye (Priacanthus tayenus 
Richardson, 1846) in the Gulf of Thailand (the Department of Fisheries, 2010) 23. 
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elongata and S. undosquamis).112 Besides, the stocks of crustaceans (e.g., large-sized 
shrimps and oriental flathead lobsters), and cephalopods (e.g., squids and soft cuttlefish) 
have started to decline.113 For example, the annual production of shrimps from marine 
capture fisheries has reduced from 119,000 tonnes in 1993 to 84,700 tonnes in 2003 and 
then 45,500 tonnes in 2012, whereas squids and soft cuttlefish have decreased from 
188,200 tonnes from 1998 to 119,900 tonnes in 2012.114 Overfishing has impacted on 
pelagic fish stocks too. The production of pelagic fisheries which started in 1973, has 
increased by fourfold just within two decades from 141,608 tonnes in 1973 to 614,814 
tonnes in 1994.115 Many of the pelagic species such as Indo-Pacific ma kerel, sardine 
and anchovy, have been fully exploited, whereas round scad stocks are depleted.116 To 
sum up, the overall marine resources in Thai waters, particularly the Gulf of Thailand, 
have been fully exploited or exploited beyond their natural capacity, and hence effective 
management measures will need to put in place. 
 
Highly destructive fishing practices,117 which include the utilisation of non-selective 
fishing gears (e.g., trawlers), highly efficient gears and fishing methods, as well as 
fishing with targeting the brood stocks during the spawning seasons, have been 
identified as the causes of the worsening marine resource status in Thai waters.118 
Management measures, e.g., quota systems, bans on destructive fishing activities, and 
marine protected areas, have unlikely been effectiv in developing States119 including 
Thailand, due to various factors discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Moreover, inadequate 
MCS due to limited human resource, financial and technical capability, increases the 
problem of IUU fishing, which is known to contribute o the overcapacity problem in 
Thai fisheries.  
                                                
112 Piyachok Sinanun et al, Stock Assessment of Saurid elongata (Temminck & Schlegel, 1846) and S. 
undosquamis (Richardson, 1848) in the Gulf of Thailand (the Department of Fisheries, 2012) 30. 
113 Department of Fisheries, The Master Plan on Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand (Department 
of Fisheries, 2008).  
114 Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2012, Technical Paper No.9/2014 (2014) 16. 
115 Department of Fisheries, above n 113. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Destructive fishing gears and practices mean “the fishing gears and practices that have a destructive 
effect on ecosystems including environment, fishery resources, etc”. See, SEAFDEC, Responsible 
Fishing Operations, Regional Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries in Southeast Asia (SEAFDEC, 2000) 
10. 
118 Department of Fisheries, above n 113. 
119 GIWA, above n 49. 
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IUU fishing in Thailand is a significant threat owing to a growing level of marine 
resources exploitation and the inadequacy of effectiv  management over fishing 
vessels.120 IUU fishing, undertaken by large-scale and small-scale fishing vessels, is 
prevalent in both coastal areas and in the EEZ. In coastal areas, there is widespread law 
violation, particularly fishing in closed areas during closed seasons, using illegal mesh 
sizes of nets and destroying fish habitats (e.g., coral reefs, seagrass beds, mangroves) by 
some fishing practices (e.g., trawlers).121 The most common illegal fishing practices in 
the marine capture fisheries include push netters and trawlers operating within fisheries 
reserve zones.122 Lift-net vessels and purse seiners using lights to at ract fish at night 
have also been found to be using small mesh size nets contrary to fisheries 
regulations.123 However, to seize an illegal fishing vessel while committing an offense 
is difficult. The bulk of arrests are actually of smaller vessels as most of the larger and 
more powerful vessels are able to escape before a patrol vessel can reach them.124 In 
addition, the patrol vessels focus their enforcement efforts in closed areas or during 
closed seasons of fishing due to limited capabilities.125 Thus, a comprehensive record of 
illegal fishing incidents in Thai waters is difficult to obtain, and this can undermine 
enforcement against illegal fishing and hence inability to control fishing capacity in 
Thai fisheries.  
                                                
120 IUU fishing existed in Thai fisheries has put Thailand at risk of fishing trade sanctions to EU markets. 
To address this issue, the Thai government has developed immediate action plans to improve the systems 
of fishing vessel registration and fishing license, and to install Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) on 
fishing vessels. See, Apinya Wipatayotin, 'Pitipong Sure EU Won't Apply Sanctions ', Bangkok Post 
(Bangkok), 15 January 2015 <http://www.bangkokpost.c m/business/news/456873/pitipong-brushes-off-
eu-trade-sanctions-threat-in-fisheries>;  Prachachat Turakij, ' IUU 	
 30 . ...		

 [Violate IUU Has 30 Million THB of Maximum Fine Due to New Fisheries Act Aimed to Avoid 
EU's Santions]', Prachachat Turakij (Thailand), 19 January 2015 
<http://www.prachachat.net/news_detail.php?newsid=1421653459>. 
121 Department of Fisheries, ก
ก!"# ... ก"	 .$. 2490 !"%&'$#ก" 2555 [Violations 
Against the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) in Novemb r 2012] (17 December 2012) 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/secretary/pr_old/news_detail.php?news_id=399>; Department of Fisheries, 
ก
ก!"# ... ก"	 .$. 2490  ...("(#)#ก"	*ก"	+ .$.2482 !"%&)(" 2557 
[Violations Against the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) and the Act Governing the Right to Fish in Thai 
Waters B.E. 2482 (1939) in December 2014] (20 January 2015) 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/secretary/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17&news_id=56
6>. 
122 Sampan Panjarat, 'Sustainable Fisheries in the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' (Division of Ocean 
Affair and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, the United Nations, 2008) 44. 
123 Department of Fisheries, above n 121. 
124 David B Thomson, 'Post-Tsunami Rehabilitation of Small-scale Fisheries: Experiences from Thailand' 
(Paper presented at the Eighth Pacific Rim Fisheries Conference: Challenges Stewardship of Living 
Marine Resources in the Pacific Marine Ecosystem Hanoi, Vietnam, 22-24 March 2006). 
125 Department of Fisheries, above n 113.  
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There are also recorded incidents of Thai fishing vessels conducting illegal activities in 
areas under the jurisdiction of neighbouring States. This has created diplomatic tension 
between Thailand and those States, such as Indonesia.126 
 
The lack of accurate fisheries data also contributes to the inability of Thailand to 
address problems of overcapacity. The complex charateristics of Thai fisheries make it 
difficult for the fisheries authority to obtain accurate data and timely information.127 For 
example, small-scale fisheries in Thailand, by nature, are characterised by a great 
diversity of fishing methods, species caught and seasonal variability, as well as 
generally being carried out in a large number of dispersed villages,128 making it hard to 
collect comprehensive data from each type of fishing gears. In addition, data analysis is 
a significant problem for small-scale fisheries.129 Original methods of stock assessment 
largely rely on the analysis of single-species fisheries in relatively uniform 
environmental conditions, which cannot be applied easily to small-scale fisheries based 
on large number of species and environmental instability. 130 Non-powered and vessels 
less than six Gross Tonnage (GT) are also not legally required to be registered in 
Thailand, hence very little data is collected on the number and activities of such 
vessels.131  
 
1.4 Objectives of the Thesis 
 
This research will examine how Thailand implements i ernational and regional legal, 
policy and technical measures to manage fishing capacity. It further aims to evaluate 
options and provide recommendations for Thailand to effectively manage fishing 
capacity in order to promote sustainable fisheries. 
                                                
126 The issue of bilateral fisheries agreement between Thailand and Indonesia will be described under 
“Thai Marine Capture Fisheries beyond National Jurisdiction” section of Chapter 2.  
127 Department of Fisheries, above n 113. 
128 Ibid.  
129 It is because sampling and data collection used for collecting information on large-scale fisheries are
not practical for small-scale fisheries because of the widespread location of fishing villages. See, Drek J 
Staples, Benedict Satia and Peter R Gardiner, A Research Agenda for Small-scale Fisheries, RAP 
Publication 2004/21 and FIPL/C 10009 (En) (FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 
Thailand, 2004) 16.    
130 Robin L Welcomme and John A Gulland, 'Methods for Assessing the Resources Available to Small-
scale Fisheries' (Paper presented at the The Ninetee th Fisheries Symposium Kyoto, Japan, 21-30 May 
1980) 989. 
131 The process for the registration and concerned legislation will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
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1.5 Research Questions 
 
This thesis will address three key research questions: 
1. What are the standards and measures for fishing capacity management in the global 
and regional context? 
2. What are the gaps and challenges in the management of fishing capacity in Thailand 
vis-à-vis global and regional standards and measures? 
3. What are the options and recommendations for Thailand to promote effective fishing 
capacity management?  
 
1.6 Research Hypothesis  
 
The hypothesis of this study is that: “The current measures adopted by Thailand for 
fishing capacity management are inadequate and that there are gaps in the effective 
management of fishing capacity in Thailand.” 
 
1.7 Scope and Limitation of the Thesis 
 
This research will focus on fishing capacity in marine capture fisheries within the Thai 
EEZ, as well as Thai flagged vessels fishing in the national jurisdiction of other States 
and on the high seas. Inland or freshwater fisheries and aquaculture sectors are not 
within the scope of this study. The thesis will also examine Thailand’s national 
legislative framework and regulations, as well as relevant international and regional 
instruments, which are relevant and applicable to fishing capacity management.  
 
1.8 Analytical Framework 
 
In order to accomplish the objectives of this thesis, research into the relevant issues and 
the governing international and domestic framework n fishing capacity has been 
conducted. A set of criteria for fishing capacity management is developed based on 
relevant international and regional instruments, as well as significant technical 
measures. These criteria form the basis for assessing the measures implemented in 
Thailand on fishing capacity. 
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1.8.1 Desktop Research 
 
Existing literature from both primary and secondary sources regarding marine capture 
fisheries in Thailand, and more specifically on fishing capacity, which include 
government reports, official statistics, and national policies, laws, regulations are 
analysed. For the international framework, relevant global instruments, FAO guidelines, 
regional policies, and research studies and reports have been critically examined in 
order to develop an analytical framework on managing fishing capacity based on 
international standards.132  
  
1.8.2 Criteria to Determine the Adequacy of the Legal and Policy 
Framework to Manage Fishing Capacity 
 
A set of criteria, which will be used to test the adequacy of the Thai fisheries 
framework, is developed based on relevant internatio l and regional instruments 
analysed in Chapter 3.  In summary the international i struments include the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), the 1993 Agreement to 
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAO Compliance Agreement), the 1995 Agreement 
for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement), 
the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF), the International Plans of 
Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity), and the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. At the regional level, the 
Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices (including 
Combating IUU Fishing), SEAFDEC Regional Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries, and Conservation and Management Measures of the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission are analysed. 
 
A set of criteria for fishing capacity management based on the aforesaid instruments are 
summarised to determine how to measure and assess fi hing capacity (details discussed 
                                                
132 Such data and information used in this thesis is current as of 31 March 2015. 
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in Chapter 2); what the standards are for keeping the level of fishing capacity at a 
balanced level with the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources within the EEZ and 
beyond EEZ; and what the obligations are of States nd measures that need to be 
undertaken to manage fishing capacity and prevent overcapacity within the national 
EEZ and on the high seas, including in areas managed by RFMOs. Details of the 
discussion responding to these questions are presented in Chapter 3. Subsequently, the 
management instruments to be applied when fishing capa ity has exceeded sustainable 
levels are identified. These instruments, by considering how they change the incentives 
of fishers, are widely divided into two main groups, i.e., incentive blocking measures 
and incentive adjusting measures. Incentive blocking measures, which aim to restrict the 
fishing activities, are discussed in details in Chapter 4, whereas incentive adjusting 
measures, attempting to tackle the issue of property rights in fisheries and let the market 
to involve in fishing capacity reduction, are greatly discussed in Chapter 5. 
Additionally, supplementary measures that can indirectly control fishing capacity are 
analysed in Chapter 6.    
 
1.9 Thesis Structure 
 
This introductory chapter examines some of the key concepts related to fishing capacity, 
including excess capacity, overcapacity, overfishing, overexploitation, capacity 
utilisation, and overcapitalisation. It also discusse  the overcapacity problem in global 
fisheries and focuses on the nature of this problem in Thailand’s marine capture 
fisheries, and affirms the need for Thailand to effectively manage its fishing capacity. 
This chapter sets the scene for a more thorough examination of the extent of the 
problem of overcapacity in Thailand’s fisheries and the various measures available 
under international and regional instruments to address the problem. In succeeding 
chapters, a fisheries profile of Thailand is presented; the international legal and policy 
framework, as well as management tools for fishing capacity management are critically 
analysed; and the specific measures implemented to manage fishing capacity in 
Thailand are examined. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the profile of marine capture fisheries in Thailand, which includes 
fisheries in Thailand’s EEZ and fishing operation of Thai-flagged vessels beyond 
national jurisdiction. The profile categorises small-scale and large-scale fisheries in 
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terms of catch production, production value and number of fishing vessels. The chapter 
also discusses the legal and institutional framework with regard to the registration of 
fishing vessels and licensing of fishing gears. Chapter 3 analyses the international and 
regional instruments that are relevant to fishing capacity management, and subsequently 
develops a set of criteria based on the analysis. The criteria, together with the analysis in 
succeeding chapters concerning technical measures fo  fishing capacity controls, are 
later used to assess Thailand’s legal and policy framework on fishing capacity. 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine management measures which are widely used to control 
fishing capacity, as well as the implementation of such measures by Thailand. Chapter 4 
focuses on incentive blocking measures, i.e., input regulations (e.g., limited licensing, 
individual effort quota, gear and vessel restriction), and output regulations (e.g., vessel 
catch limits). The chapter also presents examples of quantitative and qualitative 
methods to measure fishing capacity. Chapter 5, discusses in detail incentive adjusting 
measures which are often used to manage fishing capacity including individual harvest 
quotas, territorial use rights, co-management and community-based fisheries 
management, taxes, and subsidies, whereas supplementary management measures such 
as ecosystem approach and multispecies fisheries management, closed seasons and 
closed areas, that can be applied to control fishing capacity are provided in Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 7 analyses the adequacy of the legal and policy framework in managing fishing 
capacity of Thailand by testing this existing framework against the criteria developed in 
Chapter 3. This chapter further identifies gaps and challenges confronted by Thailand in 
managing its fishing capacity. This chapter examines options and recommendations for 
Thailand to manage fishing capacity more effectively in order to ensure sustainable 
fisheries within and beyond its EEZ. These options a d recommendations comprise 
legal, policy, institutional, and management considerations. 
 
The synthesis of the results of each chapter is provided in Chapter 8. Based on the 
synthesis, it can be concluded that the legal, policy and institutional framework of 
Thailand is inadequate to effectively manage fishing capacity. Furthermore, 
management measures implemented by Thailand are also insufficient. The chapter 
suggests that Thailand should seriously take options and recommendations provided by 
this thesis into account in order to achieve the eff ctive management of fishing capacity.         
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1.10 Research Significance 
 
Thailand has been confronted with problems of overcapa ity in fisheries for decades, 
and such problems have been getting worse because of the inadequacy of the 
management, legal and policy framework on fishing capacity in the country. The 
significance of this thesis lies in its academic and practical application. First, by 
examining the international and regional criteria on fishing capacity, this thesis provides 
a comprehensive understanding of measures to address ov rcapacity which integrates 
not only the measures provided in the IPOA-Capacity but also those developed under 
other instruments. These criteria can form the basis of assessing domestic and regional 
framework on fishing capacity not only in Thailand but also in other countries. 
 
This thesis also makes a substantial academic contribution to this discipline and existing 
literature, particularly on fishing capacity management in Thailand and in the greater 
Southeast Asia, which is scant and out-of-date.  
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CHAPTER 2 CONTEXT SETTING OF THAI MARINE FISHERIES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to present the general profile of Thailand’s fisheries, with 
a view to demonstrating the overcapacity in its fishery. The chapter has five main 
sections. The first section presents the general profile of marine capture fisheries of 
Thailand within Thai waters and beyond national jurisdiction. The second section 
analyses the current state of marine capture fisheries in terms of volume and value of 
production, and characteristics of small-scale and l rge-scale fishing vessels, whereas 
the third section examines the exploitation rate of marine capture fisheries in Thailand. 
The fourth section analyses the process of registration of fishing vessels and licensing of 
fishing gears in Thailand, which are a basic element of fishing capacity controls. Lastly, 
the chapter discusses the Master Plan for Marine Fisheries of Thailand, which has been 
implemented to regulate marine fisheries in country.  
 
2.2 Profile of Marine Capture Fisheries of Thailand 
 
Thailand is located in the Southeast Asian Peninsula. It is surrounded by Laos in the 
north and northeast, Myanmar in the north and west, Cambodia in the east and Malaysia 
in the south. Thailand covers the area of 513,155 square kilometres.1 It is located 
between 5o and 20o North latitude, and between 97o and 106o East longitude (Figure 
2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Panu Tavarutmaneekul et al, Fisheries in Thailand, Extension Paper vol. 27 (National Inland Fisheries 
Institute, Department of fisheries, 1996). 
26 
 
 
              
Figure 2.1: Thailand and Thai Waters 
Source: United Nations, Map No. 3853 Rev. 2 (July 2009) Department of Field Support, 
Cartographic Section http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/thailand.pdf. 
 
Thailand has 2,614.40 kilometres of coastline in the Gulf of Thailand (1,874.80 
kilometres) and the Andaman Sea (739.60 kilometres).2 There are 23 coastal provinces 
located along these two fishing areas, i.e., 17 provinces along the Gulf of Thailand and 
six provinces along the Andaman Sea.3 The total area of the Thai Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) is approximately 420,280 square kilometres, which is composed 304,000 
                                                
2 Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2008 Based on the Sample Survey Technical 
Paper No.18/2010 (2010) 154. 
3 Peter Flewwelling and Gilles Hosch, 'Country Review: Thailand (Andaman Sea)' in Cassandra De 
Young (ed), Review of the State of World Marine Capture Fisheries Management: Indian Ocean, FAO 
Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 2006) vol 488, 175. 
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square kilometres of the Gulf of Thailand (86 metres of maximum depth and 45 metres 
of average depth) and 116,280 square kilometres of the Andaman Sea (3,777 metres of 
maximum depth and 870 metres of average depth4).5 As of 31 December 2013, the 
population of Thailand is about 64.8 million.6 
 
The bottom floor of the Gulf of Thailand is covered by sands and mud.7 It is recognised 
as a Large Marine Ecosystem (LME)8 Class I9 with unique oceanographic, biological, 
and ecological characteristics. Due to the shallow depths, and the inrush of several 
rivers,10 the Gulf of Thailand is, therefore, considered a highly productive water body in 
terms of marine fisheries and other aquatic resources. 
 
The Gulf of Thailand is biologically rich in both diversity and abundance11 due to the 
favourable environmental conditions. The important components of this ecosystem are 
mangrove forests, sea grass beds, coral reefs and fishery resources.12 In terms of fishery 
                                                
4 Andaman Sea <http://www.allthesea.com/Andaman-Sea.html>. 
5 Bay of Bangal Programme, 'Report of the Regional Workshop on the Precautionary Approach to Fishery 
Management' (Paper presented at the Regional Workshop on the Precautionary Approach to Fishery Management, 
Medan, Indonesia, 25-28 February 1997) <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/ad914e/AD914E00.pdf>. 
6 They are composed 31,845,971 of men and 32,939,938 of women. See, Department of Provincial 
Administration, Notification of General Register Office: Number of Population in Thailand by Provinces 
based on Civil Registration <http://stat.bora.dopa.go.th/stat/y_stat56.html>. 
7 Flewwelling and Hosch, above n 3. 
8 LMEs refer to regions of ocean and coastal area that contain river basins and estuaries and extend out to 
the sea, and have bound of continental shelves and the seaward margins of the systems of coastal current. 
LMEs are quite large in area and have been drawn based on their physical and biological characteristics, 
including inter alia: bathymetry, productivity, hydrography, and trophically populations.  
See, United Nations Atlas of the Oceans, Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) 
<http://www.oceansatlas.org/servlet/CDSServlet?statu =ND0xMjcyNyZjdG5faW5mb192aWV3X3Npem
U9Y3RuX2luZm9fdmlld19mdWxsJjY9ZW4mMzM9KiYzNz1rb3M~>. 
9 The Gulf of Thailand is considered a LME Class I, highly productive ecosystem (>300 gCm-2yr-1). See, 
Kenneth Sherman and Gotthilf Hempel (eds), The UNEP Large Marine Ecosystems Report: A 
Perspective on Changing Conditions in LMEs of the World's Regional Seas, UNEP Regional Seas Report 
and Studies No.182 (2009) 255. 
10 Many rivers in addition to the Chao Phraya river go to the Gulf of Thailand near its head, including Tha 
Chin, Mae Klong, and Bang Pakong rivers, whereas several rivers go along the coast. See, Zafar Adeel et 
al, 'Capacity Development Needs in the Chao Phraya River Basin and the Gulf of Thailand' (Paper 
presented at the Managing Shared Waters (MSW) Conferenc , Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, 23-28 June 
2002) <http://www.pollutionprobe.org/managing.shared.waters/chaophraya.pdf>.  
11 World Wildlife Fund, Andaman Sea Ecoregion <http://assets.panda.org/downloads/andamancoral.pdf>. 
12 Kungwan Juntarashote, Summary Report Management of the Andaman Sea Large Marine Ecosystem 
FAO <http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/BOBLME/website/sum_rep/THAILAND_SUMMARY.pdf>. 
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resources, there are more than 160 groups of species significantly found in catch 
composition obtained from marine resource surveys in the Gulf of Thailand.13  
 
The Andaman Sea, on the other hand, has a narrow continental shelf shelving deeper 
offshore.14 It is the southeastern part of the Bay of Bengal,15 which is situated in 
monsoon zone and receives substantial amounts of rainfall.16 It is considered an LME as 
well.17 The Andaman Sea also has a great marine biodiversity with more than 140 
groups of species significantly obtained in catch composition of marine resource 
surveys.18  
 
Based on the conditions mentioned above, these two areas of waters are considered 
important fishing grounds for Thai fisheries. Both small-scale and large-scale fisheries 
are widely conducted in the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea. 
 
Fisheries have played a very important supporting role in Thailand as can be seen from 
the increased contribution of product values from the fisheries sector to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of Thailand. The values from fisheries have increased from THB67,410 
million (USD2,107 million)19 in 1993 to a peak of THB117,796 million (USD3,681 
million) in 2000 and decreased to the lowest level within 10 years of the value 
THB94,033 million (USD2,939 million) in 2008.20 Later, fisheries product values 
continuously increased to the highest level of THB129,666 million (USD4,052 million) 
in 201421 with the equivalence of 1.1 per cent of Thailand’s GDP22 (Figure 2.2). 
                                                
13 The surveys are annually conducted by research survey vessels (using otter board trawl gear) of the 
Department of Fisheries, Thailand. See, Kanit Chuapun et al, 'Marine Resources in the Gulf of Thailand 
and Andaman Sea from Research Vessel during 2002-205' (Department of Fisheries, 2008) 9-15. 
14 Flewwelling and Hosch, above n 3. 
15 International Hydrographic Organisation, 'Limits of Oceans and Seas' (1953) <http://www.iho-
ohi.net/iho_pubs/standard/S-23/S23_1953.pdf> 22. 
16 Mark McGinley, Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (29 August 2008) 
<http://www.eoearth.org/article/Bay_of_Bengal_large_marine_ecosystem>. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Chuapun et al, above n 13, 32-37. 
19 At THB32 = USD1 as of 2014. The succeeding conversions are based on 2014 exchange rates, rounded 
off to the nearest baht and dollar. 
20 Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, Gross Domestic Product: Q4/2014 
Report (16 February 2015) Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board 
<http://eng.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=481>. 
21 Ibid. 
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Figure 2.2: National product values (at current market prices) coming from the fisheries 
sector in Thailand 
Source of data: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, 
Gross Domestic Product: Q4/2014 Report (16 February 2015) Office of the National 
Economic and Social Development Board http://eng.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=481. 
 
Additionally, exported products from the fisheries sector bring in substantial income to 
Thailand. In term of values, fisheries products, particular canned seafood products, have 
always been in the top 10 of exported products of Thailand, and tend to increase 
continuously.23 The value of canned seafood products significantly increased from 
THB71,408 million (USD2,232 million) in 2003 to THB99,053 million (USD3,095 
million) in 2006, THB125,054 million (USD3,908 million) in 2008, and to 
THB158,867 million (USD4,965 million) in 2012, whic represents 2.24 per cent of 
total values of exported products from Thailand (Table 2.1). However, it is essential to 
note that the raw products used in the canned seafood industry in Thailand are partly 
from imported fish, which are harvested by Thai fishing fleets and other States’ 
fisheries.24  
                                                                                                                                    
22 In 2014, the GDP of Thailand was THB12,141.1 Billion (USD379.4 Billion), whereas GDP per capita 
was THB176,958 (USD5,530). See, ibid. 
23 The Customs Department of Thailand, ‘Customs Report during 2004 to 2012’ (2005-2013). 
24 Thai Tuna Industry Association, Statistics 2012-2014 (18 July 2014) 
<http://www.thaituna.org/download/Thai_Import_and_Export_Statics_of_Tuna_Products_in_2012-
2014.pdf>. 
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Table 2.1: The value obtained from canned seafood products exported from Thailand 
Year 
Values of Canned Seafood 
Products (THB million) 
Total Values of Exported 
Products (THB million) 
2003 71,408 3,326,014 
2004 76,858 3,922,410 
2005 99,669 4,436,677 
2006 99,053 4,938,508 
2007 106,707 5,254,998 
2008 125,054 5,853,627 
2009 121,484 5,197,121 
2010 123,035 6,176,424 
2011 145,150 6,910,272 
2012 158,867 7,091,644 
Source of data: The Customs Department of Thailand, ‘Customs Report during 2004 to 
2012’ (2005-2013). 
With respect to employment in fisheries, based on the 2000 marine fisheries census 
survey, approximately 58,000 families engaged either in fulltime fishing or fishing 
supplemented with aquaculture.25 The number of fishing households increased by 8.8 
per cent in 2000 compared with the 1995 marine fisher es census.26 The great majority 
(82.2 per cent) of fishers was male. However, a rema kable drop in the number of young 
fisher group (20-30 years) from 32.5 per cent to 24.3 per cent compared to the 1995 
census shows less interest in fishing among the young generations, as fishing is 
considered as a hard job with low income.27 
 
2.2.1 Marine Capture Fisheries in Thai Waters 
 
Marine capture fisheries are defined as all types of capturing of natural living resources 
in the marine environment.28 Since 1945, marine capture fisheries have significantly 
                                                
25 National Statistical Office, The 2000 Intercensal Survey of Marine Fishery (Statistical Data Bank and 
Information Dissemination Division, National Statistical Office, 2001).   
26 National Statistical Office, 1995 Marine Fishery Census of Thailand (Statistical Data Bank and 
Information Dissemination Division, National Statistical Office, 1997). 
27 National Statistical Office, above n 25. 
28 David Lymer et al, A Review and Synthesis of Capture Fisheries Data in Thailand: Large versus Small-
scale Fisheries, RAP Publication 2008/17 (2008) 33. 
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developed and rapidly expanded in several developing countries of the South China Sea 
region, including Thailand.29 Such development is contributed by a number of factors 
including: (i) the introduction of modern fishing technologies and techniques, e.g., using 
gill nets made by monofilament nylon in small-scale fisheries, and using  trawl nets in 
large-scale fisheries; (ii) increasing the motorisation of fisheries vessels; (iii) technical 
assistance provided by international agencies, e.g., FAO, and other donors; (iv) capital 
investment supported for establishing necessary infrastructure; (v) the successful 
exploration of new fishing areas in deep sea waters; and (vi) the governments’ 
recognition of the importance of the fisheries sector in their economies, resulting in the 
strengthening the fisheries sector.30 
 
The fisheries development of Thailand has been accelerat d by the world market. This 
has been reflected in the speedy development of trawl fisheries in the 1970s, aiming to 
catch shrimps for exporting, and also by the relatively fast development of purse seine 
fisheries in the early 1980s, aiming for pelagic species.31 This resulted in the dramatic 
increase in the total annual production from marine capture fisheries of Thailand from 
about 200,000 tonnes before 1960 to about two million tonnes in 197732 and reaching a 
peak of 2.83 million tonnes in 1995.33 The production of marine capture fisheries 
stabilised at the level above two million tonnes for about a decade until it significantly 
dropped to 1.64 million tonnes in 2008.34 Such big reduction was due to not only the 
problems of resources overexploitation and economic crisis,35 but also the exclusion of 
some landing production obtained by Thai fishing vessels, which operated in Indonesian 
waters under the new fishing arrangements and were required to fly the Indonesian 
                                                
29 Ibid 20. 
30 Deb Menasveta, 'Fisheries Management in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Southeast Asia before and 
after Rio and the Prospects for Regional Cooperation' in Kheng Lian Koh, Robert C Beckman and Chia 
Lin Sien (eds), Sustainable Development of Coastal and Ocean Areas in Southeast Asia: Post-Rio 
Perspectives (National University of Singapore, 1995) 98. 
31 Lymer et al, above n 28, 1. 
32 Kachornsak Wetchagarun, 'A Small-scale Fisheries Plot roject in Thailand' (Paper presented at the 
The Nineteenth Fisheries Symposium Kyoto, Japan, 21-30 May 1980) 659. 
33 Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2004, Technical Paper No.4/2006 (2006) 13. 
34 Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2008, Technical Paper No.12/2010 (2010) 13. 
The fisheries statistics of Thailand are analysed an published by Fishery Statistics Analysis and 
Research Group under Information Technology Center of the Department of Fisheries.   
35 Office of Agricultural Economics, The Agricultural Economics in 2008 and Outlook for 2009 (2008). 
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flag.36 The production of marine capture fisheries slightly increased again to 1.66 
million tonnes in 2009,37 and then continuously decreased to 1.5 million tonnes in 2012 
with 87.2 per cent coming from Thai waters (73 per cent from the Gulf of Thailand and 
27 per cent from the Andaman Sea) and the remaining 12.8 per cent coming from 
adjacent seas.38 
 
With such prolonged high levels of production, marine capture fisheries have then been 
the biggest contributor to the fisheries production of Thailand in the past two decades 
(Figure 2.3). Throughout the period between 1985 to 2012, marine capture production 
represents more than 50 per cent of total fisheries production of Thailand with the 
maximum of 91.4 per cent in 1987 (Figure 2.4). However, due to its rapid development, 
the production from coastal aquaculture sector has increased progressively, shrimp 
culture in particular.39 
 
                                                
36 In 2008, Indonesia issued a new fisheries policy that allowed Thai fishing vessels to operate in 
Indonesian waters only under Integrated Capture Fisheries Scheme that requiring Thai fishing vessels to 
change to Indonesian vessels. See, Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 2011'
(Department of Fisheries, 2011) <http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/FormDownload/ANNUALREPORT2011.pdf> 
31.  
37 Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2009, Technical Paper No.9/2011 (2011) 13. 
38 Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2012 Based on the Sample Survey Technical 
Paper No.14/2014 (2014). 
39  In 2012 shrimp culture contributed 74.6 per cent of total aquaculture production of Thailand. 96.5 per
cent of shrimp culture was the culture of Vannamei shrimp (Penaeus vannamei). See, Department of 
Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2012, Technical Paper No.9/2014 (Department of Fisheries, 
2014) 18, 39. 
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Figure 2.3: Fisheries production in quantity by sub-sectors during 1985 to 2012 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2004, 
Technical Paper No.4/2006 (2006) 13; Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of 
Thailand 2012, Technical Paper No.9/2014 (2014) 13. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Proportion of fisheries production by sub-sectors during 1985 to 2012 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2004, 
Technical Paper No.4/2006 (2006) 13; Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of 
Thailand 2012, Technical paper No.9/2014 (2014) 13. 
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In terms of production value, the value of marine capture fisheries production has also 
increased relatively from THB14,077.3 million (USD439.9 million) in 1985 to 
THB64,169.5 million in 2003 (USD2,005.3 million), and substantially decreased to 
THB42,147 million (USD1,317.1 million) in 2008 (Figure 2.5), which reflected the 
significant decrease in marine capture fisheries recorded in 2008. However, although 
the production from marine capture fisheries contributes the majority of fisheries 
production in Thailand, its value, on the other hand, on the average contributes only half 
of the total value obtained from fisheries production (Figure 2.6). It is because the price 
per unit of fisheries production from coastal aquaculture, particularly shrimp culture, is 
generally higher than the price per unit of fisheries production from marine capture 
fisheries and other fisheries sectors. For example, the price of Vannamei shrimp from 
aquaculture is THB123.7 (USD3.9) per kilogram on aver ge,40 whereas the price of 
economic fish species from marine capture fisheries is mostly less than THB50 
(USD1.6) per kilogram.41 This makes the value from coastal aquaculture production to 
substantially contribute to the overall value. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Value of fisheries production by sub-sectors during 1985 to 2012 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2004 
Technical Paper No.4/2006 (2006) 14; Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of 
Thailand 2012, Technical paper No.9/2014 (2014) 14. 
                                                
40 Ibid 21, 24. 
41 Ibid 57. 
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Figure 2.6: Proportion of value of fisheries production by sub-sectors during 1985-
2012 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2004 Technical 
Paper No.4/2006 (2006) 14; Department of Fisheries, Fi heries Statistics of Thailand 
2012, Technical paper No.9/2014 (2014) 14. 
 
2.2.2 Thai Marine Capture Fisheries beyond National Jurisdiction 
 
The expansion of Thai fisheries beyond national jurisdiction started in 1965, after the 
introduction of trawl gear to Thailand in 1960.42 During this period, Thai fishing fleets 
roamed on the high seas under the principle of freedom of fishing.43 However, 
following the introduction of the EEZ concept in the international law, initially as 
fisheries zones and crystallised within the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (LOSC),44 Thai fishing fleets had to return to Thailand. There was a 
subsequent attempt to secure overseas fishing grounds with success. These fishing 
                                                
42 Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division, The Analysis and Assessment of Thai Fisheries Status in Distant 
Waters (2011). 
43 The concept of the freedom of the seas was introduced by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in the 1609 treatise 
Mare Liberum. See, Hugo Grotius, 'The Freedom of the Seas, or the Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take 
Part in the East Indian Trade' (1916)   <http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/552/Grotius_0049_EBk_v6.0.pdf>.  
44 LOSC part V. 
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grounds are in the EEZs of other coastal States and on the high seas. As a result, 
Thailand has become a distant water fishing nation (DWFN).45 
 
2.2.2.1 Thai Fisheries in EEZs of other Coastal States 
 
In the 1970s, neighbouring States of Thailand claimed EEZs expanding to 200 nautical 
miles from their baselines. This decreases about 300,00  square kilometres of fishing 
areas that had been utilised by Thai fishing fleets under the freedom of the high seas.46 
These fleets, therefore, had to come back to fish in t e national EEZ, and have increased 
the intensity of fishing efforts in Thai waters, both in the Gulf of Thailand and the 
Andaman Sea. This has compounded the problem of overexploitation of fisheries in 
Thai waters. The substantial decline of Catch Per Unit of Effort (CPUE) from the trawl 
surveys annually conducted in the Gulf of Thailand,47 as well as the species 
composition of the catch changing to less valuable nd smaller aquatic species in the 
past years confirm this problem.48 Consequently, the canned fish industry has been 
impacted by the lack of raw products. 
 
In addition, after the declaration of EEZs by neighbouring States, during 1986-1995 in 
particular, the number of Thai fishers arrested by neighbouring States increased from 
1,159 to 3,381 people49 because of increased enforcement by these States and the lack 
of knowledge by Thai fishers of the new developments i  the LOSC. However, this 
number significantly dropped since 1996 (745 people)50 as a number of bilateral fishing 
arrangements between Thailand and these States have been negotiated. For instance, 
three shared areas between Thailand and Cambodia, Th iland and Vietnam, and 
                                                
45 David J Doulman, 'Structure and Process of the 1993-1995 United Nations Conference on Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks' (FAO Fisheries Circular No. 898, FAO, 1995) 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/V9929E/V9929E00.htm>. 
46 Ted L McDorman, 'Thailand's Fisheries: A Victim of 200 Mile Zones' (1986) 16(2) (1986/01/01) Ocean 
Development & International Law 183. 
47 Thailand, by the Department of Fisheries, has conducted annual scientific surveys in Thai waters (i.e., 
the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea) by research vessels (trawlers) since the 1960s. Details about 
the decreased CPUE is greatly discussed in section 2.4. 
48 Amnuay Kongprom et al, 'Status of Demersal Fishery Resources in the Gulf of Thailand' in Geronimo T 
Silvestre et al (eds), Assessment, Management and Future Directions for Coastal Fisheries in Asian 
Countries (WorldFish Center, 2003) vol 67, 138. 
49 Sampan Panjarat, 'Sustainable Fisheries in the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' (Division of Ocean 
Affair and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, the United Nations, 2008) 21. 
50 Ibid. 
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Thailand and Malaysia, covering a total 55,200 square kilometres, have been 
established.51 
 
With the Thai government’s support, Thai fishers have explored the new fishing areas 
beyond Thai waters in order to increase their catch production and secure the food 
supply for domestic consumption and the fish processing industries. The fishing 
operations outside Thai waters are conducted throug a number of forms of 
arrangements,52 including fishing contracts between government andgovernment, or 
government and private sector, or private sector and private sector. Nonetheless, two 
forms of arrangements are mainly conducted, namely, licensing and joint venture. Thai 
distant water fishing fleets have operated under fishing arrangements in coastal States’ 
EEZs of four regions, i.e., Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia), South Asia (India and Bangladesh), the Middle East (Oman, Yemen, and 
Iran), and the Pacific (Papua New Guinea).53 
 
The Thai government have encouraged Thai fishers to legally conduct distant water 
fishing and carry the fish back to Thailand by giving either an exemption or decreased 
rate of duty to such imported fish, depending on fish species.54 For example, Yellowfin 
tuna, Bigeye tuna, Skipjack tuna, and Albacore fished in Bangladesh waters, are 
exempted from import duty.55 However, in order to receive this benefit, the fishers are 
required to register for distant water fishing licens s issued by the Department of 
Fisheries. In 2006, there were only 759 units of Thai vessels fishing in the EEZs of 
seven coastal States56 and reported to the Department of Fisheries. However, this figure 
                                                
51 FAO, 'Report of the National Seminar on the Reduction and Management of Commercial Fishing 
Capacity in Thailand, Cha-Am, Thailand, 11-14 May 2004' (FIP/FCR13, FAO, 2005) 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/j6419e/j6419e00.htm> 39. 
52 Wimol Jantrarotai, Global Issue on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and its Impacts on 
Thai Fisheries Development, Technical paper No.8/2004 (2004). 
53 Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division, above n 42, 5-6. 
54 Marine species mainly transferred back to serve domestic fisheries industry in Thailand include  
croaker, threadfin bream, bigeye, red snapper, lizardfish, round scad, king mackerel, grouper, Indo-
Pacific mackerel, squid, cuttlefish and octopus. See, Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 
'Annual Report 2012' (Department of Fisheries, 2012) 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/FormDownload/ANNUAL%20REPORT%202012.pdf> 33.   
55 See, Notification of the Ministry of Finance Re: The exemption of duty and the decrease of duty rate 
for goods originally come from Bangladesh, given on 31 December B.E. 2549 (2006). 
56 Seven States are Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Cambodia, India, Somalia and Bangladesh. See, 
Lymer et al, above n 28, 29.    
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is a substantial underestimate of the number of Thai vessels fishing outside Thailand’s 
EEZ. As a matter of fact, there were 3,000-4,000 Thai fishing vessels, mainly trawlers, 
operating in the EEZs of other countries during that period.57 Most of these vessels 
operated through the fishing arrangement between private sectors of the countries and 
thus were not required to report to the Department of Fisheries. Overall, they transferred 
1.15 million tonnes of annual catch back to Thailand.58 The most important fishing 
grounds of such fishing vessels were the EEZ waters of Indonesia and Myanmar.59 
 
Nonetheless, as some coastal States have recently changed the regulations for fishing 
arrangements in their EEZs, a large number of Thai fish ng vessels have difficulties to 
comply with the new regulations. For example, Indonesia has issued the new 
regulations stating that only fishing vessels flying I donesian flags can operate in its 
EEZ; all catch productions are required to be processed on land in Indonesia; and all 
fishing vessels need to be equipped with vessel monitoring system (VMS).60 Many Thai 
fishing vessels, which are mostly big trawlers, cannot comply with these rules, and thus 
they must seek other fishing grounds. Some of them r turn to fish in Thai waters, 
whereas some can arrange for new fishing contracts in other coastal States’ EEZs. For 
instance, some Thai fishing fleets, which used to fish in Indonesia’s EEZ, have moved 
to fish in Myanmar’s EEZ.61 There are around 1,000 Thai fishing vessels operating in 
overseas waters and transferring about 800,000-1,000,0  tonnes of fish back to 
Thailand each year.62 
  
Based on 2009 fisheries statistics of Thailand,63 only the amount of 283,277 tonnes 
were reported as the catch caught in adjacent water areas64 of Thai waters (Figure 2.7). 
                                                
57 Jantrarotai, above n 52. 
58 Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2004 Based on the Sample Survey, Technical 
Paper No.11/2006 (2006) 66-107. 
59 Jantrarotai, above n 52. 
60 Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division Department of Fisheries, 'The Potential and Status of Fisheries in 
Indonesia' (2010)   <http://www.fisheries.go.th/foreign/images/stories/fisheries/sarayut2.pdf>. See also, 
Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, above n 36.  
61 Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division Department of Fisheries, 'Fisheries Cooperation between Thailand 
and Myanmar' (2010)   <http://www.fisheries.go.th/foreign/images/stories/fisheries/sarayut1.pdf>. 
62 Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division, above n 42, 2. 
63 Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2009 Based on the Sample Survey Technical 
Paper No.1/2012 (2012) 68-106. 
64 Adjacent water areas include the EEZs of neighbouring States of Thailand. 
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The majority of them, accounting 81.46 per cent, came from otter board trawlers. For 
the remaining, they were the catch from purse seine (15.04 per cent) and pair trawls 
(3.50 per cent).           
 
 
Figure 2.7: Production from Thai fishing vessels operating in adjacent water areas in 
2009 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2009 Based 
on the Sample Survey, Technical Paper No.1/2012 (2012). 
 
It is interesting to note that the production obtained from trawlers operating in adjacent 
water areas substantially contributes 37.4 per cent to the total production caught by Thai 
trawlers.65 More regulations imposed by coastal States that would be enforced in the 
future, could make it more difficult for Thai fishing fleets to access their EEZs, 
especially trawlers since they are considered a destructive fishing gear, hence deemed as 
an example of IUU fishing.66 The catch obtained from adjacent water areas in 2012 
(191,686 tonnes) could reflect such constraints as it decreased 32.3 per cent compared 
with the amount reported in 2009. Further, only otter board trawls and purse seines 
                                                
65 This percentage is calculated by using 2009 fisheres statistics of Thailand. 
66 Department of Fisheries, The Master Plan on Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand (Department 
of Fisheries, 2008). 
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remained operating in adjacent water areas (Figure 2.8). Thus, the problem of the lack 
of raw material to supply domestic fish processing industries can possibly be confronted 
by Thailand. 
  
 
Figure 2.8: Production from Thai fishing vessels operating in adjacent water areas in 
2012 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2012 Based 
on the Sample Survey, Technical Paper No.14/2014 (2014). 
 
2.2.2.2 Thai Fisheries on the High Seas 
 
Thailand is the biggest tuna exporter of the world, particularly for canned tuna. But, at 
the same time, Thailand is one of the top world importers of frozen tuna as well. In 
2011, Thailand exported 594,751 tonnes of tuna products overseas with total value of 
approximately THB60 billion (USD1.88 billion).67 About 85 per cent of required raw 
materials are imported from abroad.68 In 2011, 787,088 tonnes69 of tuna were imported 
                                                
67 This decreased about two per cent by volume due to raw material constrained. See, Nareerat 
Wiriyapong, 'Tuna Exporters Downbeat on Growth', Bangkok Post (Bangkok, Thailand), 24 May 2012, 1 
<http://m.bangkokpost.com/business/294808>. 
68 Thai tuna industry requires about 70,000-80,000 tonnes of raw material. See, ibid. 
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to Thailand, mainly from Taiwan, the United States of America, South Korea, Vanuatu, 
Japan, the Marshall Islands, Europe and the Maldives.70 Therefore, in order to support 
the investment of tuna fisheries aiming to find raw material to serve Thai tuna canning 
industry, the Thai government, through the Department of Fisheries, has promoted tuna 
fisheries on the high seas starting with the Indian Ocean. In May 1996, with the support 
of the Department of Fisheries, Thai fishers who were interested in deep sea fisheries 
organised a fisher group called the Thai Tuna Oceani  Fishery Cooperative (TOTFIC) 
to engage in tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean.71 Thailand has also been a party of the 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) since 17 March 1997.72  
 
However, in 2000-2001 Thai tuna fisheries started to operate with the only one tuna 
purse seine.73 Its catch obtained in 2000 was 1,530 tonnes, and it reduced to only 763 
tonnes in 2001.74 This was considered unsuccessful and eventually ended. Later in 
2005, there were six new purse seiners operating in the Indian Ocean and their annual 
catch was 11,937 tonnes in total.75 Another type of tuna fishing gear employed in the 
Indian Ocean by Thai fishers is tuna longline. Tuna longline fisheries of Thailand have 
commenced in year 2000 with two vessels and expanded to six vessels in 2005.76 Both 
Thai tuna purse seines and longlines mainly operate in he Western Indian Ocean (i.e., 
Area 51 of FAO Statistical Areas).77 Currently, Thailand has 13 vessels authorised by 
                                                                                                                                    
69 It decreased about 5.3 per cent by volume based on the declining supply of tuna. Thai tuna industry also 
shoulders higher costs. For example, the cost and freight (CFR) price of Skipjack raw material in 
Bangkok has raised for 96 per cent within five years, from USD918 in 2006 to about USD1,800-2,025 per 
tonne in 2011. See, ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Poreeyanond Dhammasak, 'Review of Tuna Fishing in Thailand' (Paper presented at the IOTC 
Meeting, 1998) <http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/1998/ec/IOTC-1998-EC7-10.pdf> 58. 
72 IOTC, Structure of the Commission: Commission Contracting Parties (Members) (2015) 
<http://www.iotc.org/about-iotc/structure-commission>. Later, Thailand has become a cooperating non-
member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). See, The Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, About WCPFC (4 February 2015) <https://www.wcpfc.int/about-
wcpfc>. 
73 Panjarat, above n 49, 23. 
74 IOTC, Nominal Catch Data for IOTC Species (25 May 2012) 
<http://www.iotc.org/English/data/databases.php#dl>. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Panjarat, above n 49, 23. 
77 FAO, Indian Ocean, Western (Major Fishing Area 51) (2012) FAO 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/area/Area51/en>. 
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the IOTC to fish in the Indian Ocean. These include ten longliners and three research-
training vessels.78 
 
Apart from tuna fishing vessels mentioned above, Thailand has other fishing fleets 
operating in the Eastern Indian Ocean (i.e., Area 57 of FAO Statistical Areas).79 These 
fishing vessels (>18 metres in length overall) are small purse seines, gill nets, and 
trawlers. The annual catch obtained by all Thai fishing vessels operating in the Indian 
Ocean is presented in Table 2.2. Based on IOTC statistics during 2000-2013, important 
species caught from the Indian Ocean by Thai fishing fleets are composed of Kawakawa 
(31.6 per cent), Longtail tuna (20.4 per cent), Scomberomorini (19.7 per cent), and 
Skipjack tuna (14.9 per cent).80 
 
Thailand tuna fisheries are still in its primary development stage. The development of 
Thai tuna fisheries is apparently slow due to constraints in terms of modern fishing 
technology and private investors. Only new private investors have expressed their 
interest to engage in tuna fisheries as it is difficult for current fishers to modify their 
vessels and equipment to fish on the high seas.81 In order to strengthen the support for 
distant water fisheries, the Thai government, through the Department of Fisheries, has 
included strategic measures and guidelines to promote and develop distant water 
fisheries within the Master Plan for Marine Fisheries of Thailand.82   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
78 IOTC, Record of Currently Authorised Vessels (2015) <http://www.iotc.org/vessels/current>. 
79 FAO, Indian Ocean, Eastern (Major Fishing Area 57) FAO 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/area/Area57/en>. 
80 IOTC, Nominal Catch by Species and Gear, by Vessel Flag Reporting Country (1 October 2014) 
<http://www.iotc.org/documents/nominal-catch-species-and-gear-vessel-flag-reporting-country>. 
81 Panjarat, above n 49, 24. 
82 Department of Fisheries, above n 66. 
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Table 2.2: Annual catch by Thai fishing vessels operating in the Indian Ocean 
Year 
Catch (MT) 
Purse Seines 
Small Purse 
Seines 
Tuna 
Longlines 
Gill Nets 
Other Fishing 
Gears 
2000 1,530 12,377 385 1,295 2,753 
2001 763 8,500 387 1,944 3,393 
2002 - 9,247 94 2,322 4,040 
2003 - 12,205 254 2,374 3,920 
2004 - 11,559 514 778 5,212 
2005 11,937 13,582 281 386 6,322 
2006 23,492 13,596 530 438 7,191 
2007 11,656 14,753 461 645 5,506 
2008 9,615 12,824 269 1,036 4,055 
2009 11,084 14,795 295 979 3,405 
2010 3,629 10,226 608 611 1,826 
2011 - 27,524 374 868 1,509 
2012 - 18,306 469 619 1,105 
2013 - 17,848 344 496 475 
Source of data: IOTC, Nominal Catch by Species and Gear, by Vessel Flag Reporting 
Country (1 October 2014) <http://www.iotc.org/documents/nominal-catch-species-and-
gear-vessel-flag-reporting-country>. 
 
2.3 Production, Value and Fishing Effort of Marine Capture Fisheries in Thailand 
 
Marine capture fisheries in Thailand are characterised into small-scale fisheries and 
large-scale fisheries or commercial fisheries. The definition of small-scale fisheries and 
large-scale fisheries adopted in this thesis are applied from the definitions provided by 
the National Statistical Office and the Department of Fisheries, Thailand.83 The fishing 
vessels that are non-powered, or outboard powered, or inboard powered vessels less 
than or equal 10 GT, and normally fishing inshore, ar  defined as small-scale fisheries. 
Coastal fishing practices without vessels are also considered small-scale fisheries. On 
the other hand, fishing vessels of more than 10 GT and fishing practices conducted 
                                                
83 National Statistical Office, above n 25; Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 2009, 
Technical Paper No.2/2011 (2011). 
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offshore are considered large-scale fisheries. Based on these definitions, the fishing 
gears utilised for small and large-scale fisheries in Thailand are categorised in Table 
2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: Gear-based groups of large-scale and small-scale fish ries 
Large-scale fisheries Small-scale fisheries 
1.Otter board trawl 1. Mackerel gill net 
2. Pair trawl 2. Mullet gill net  
3. Beam trawl 3. Pomfret gill net 
4. Purse seine 4. Crab gill net 
5. Anchovy purse seine 5. Squid trammel net 
6. King mackerel drifting gill net 6. Shrimp trammel net 
7. Mackerel encircling gill net 7. Other gill nets 
8. Push net 8. Squid falling net 
9. Deep water set net 9. Other cast nets 
 10. Hand push net 
 11. Long line 
 12. Hand line and Pole & line 
 13. Set bag net 
 14. Squid trap 
 15. Fish trap 
 16. Crab trap 
 17. Shallow water set net 
 18. Other stationary gears 
 
2.3.1 Small-scale Fisheries 
  
Small-scale fisheries, which are, characteristically, small-scale and labour-intensive 
operations conducted by artisanal fishers whose levl of income is low,84 are widely 
practised in coastal areas of Thailand. They are significant not only for the fishing 
industry but also for the food security of Thailand.85 In the past days, small-scale 
fisheries were subsistence fisheries found in communities along the coastal areas of 
Thailand, and used simple environmentally friendly gears. But according to the fast 
                                                
84 Alfredo Sfeir-Younis, 'Small-scale Fisheries Development: a Challenge for the 1980s' (Paper presented 
at the The Nineteenth Fisheries Symposium Kyoto, Japan, 21-30 May 1980) 1,008. 
85 Plodprasop Suraswadi, 'Community-based Fisheries Management in Phang-nga Bay, Thailand' (Paper 
presented at the National Workshop on Community-based Fisheries Management, Phuket, Thailand, 14-
16 February 1996) 42. 
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development of large-scale or commercial fisheries, conflicts between small-scale and 
large-scale fisheries have arisen due to their fights over marine resources and illegal 
practices by large-scale fisheries in conserved zones,86 which, in many cases, destroy 
small-scale fishing gears deployed in these areas.87 Thus, in order to compete with 
large-scale fishers for marine resources, small-scae fishers tend to improve their fishing 
gears or practices, for example, modifying non-motored boat to long-tail boat or 
powered boat or increasing the amount of fishing gears used. This increases capacity in 
fisheries and marine resources will be exploited more rapidly. Unless capacity controls 
are properly implemented, the problem of overfishing in Thailand will worsen.88  
 
In the past, little attention was paid to the socio-ec nomic problems confronted by 
small-scale fishers in Thailand. This was partly because of a presumption that, due to 
influences of high technology in fisheries, small-scale fishers would eventually move to 
large-scale fisheries sector, either by operating or becoming labourers, in order to get 
more income.89 But, despite their apparently deteriorating standard of living, small-scale 
fisheries have largely been sustained. This could be ue to many reasons, for instance, 
the absence of alternative employment opportunities,90 fishers’ occupational and 
geographical immobility.91 
 
Because small-scale fisheries involve a large number of poor fishers in fishing villages 
along the coasts of Thailand, the Thai government has given high priority to projects 
that improve the living standards of small-scale fishers in rural coastal areas. Such 
remarkable projects are the Small-scale Fisheries Development Project developed by the 
                                                
86 Trawl nets and push nets equipped with powered vessels are banned to operate within the areas of three
nautical miles (or 5,556 metres) from the coast line  nine coastal provinces of Thailand. See, the 
Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas in which 
fishing appliances, i.e., trawls, and push nets used with motor vessels, are prohibited. 
87 Panjarat, above n 49, 39. 
88 Jate Pimoljinda, 'Small-scale Fisheries Management in Thailand' in Heiko E W Seilert (ed), Interactive 
Mechanisms for Small-scale Fisheries Management: Report of the Regional Consultation (Regional 
Office for Asia and the Pacific, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2002) vol RAP 
Publication 2002/10, 153. 
89 Suraswadi, above n 85. 
90 Theodore Panayotou, 'Economic Conditions and Prospect  of Small-scale Fishermen in Thailand' 
(1980) 4(2) Marine Policy 142, 146. 
91 Theodore Panayotou and Donna Panayotou, Occupational and Geographical Mobility in and out of 
Thai Fisheries, Fish. Tech. Pap. (FAO, 1986) 53. 
46 
 
Department of Fisheries,92 the Bay of Bengal Programme (BOBP) project,93 and the 
Coastal Habitat and Resources Management (CHARM) project.94 These projects 
integrated within the fisheries sector were primarily designed to increase the income of 
small-scale fishers, which comes from fishing and alternate sources.95 
 
Additionally, due to the high costs of fuel, the Department of Fisheries has established a 
project that promotes sail fishing to small-scale fishers for the purpose of fuel cost 
saving.96 A sail designed by the Department of Fisheries can be applied to use with 
outboard powered boats or long-tail boats, which are the dominant type of small-scale 
fishing boats in Thailand.  
 
Currently, the Department of Fisheries has adopted th  Master Plan for Marine Fisheries 
Management of Thailand in order to manage marine fisheries as a whole. Details of the 
Master Plan are discussed in Section 2.6. 
 
 
 
                                                
92 The Department of Fisheries started  a small-scale fish ries development project in the early 1990s. The
project aimed to provide essential infrastructure to fisheries communities along the coasts, such as landing 
places, piers, freshwater stocking tanks, gear-repairing shelter, etc. For enhancing the livelihood of 
fishers, cages and fish fry were supplied, and the fishers were also provided training courses on gear 
repairing, boat engine maintenance, fish cage culture practices and fish processing. Artificial reef 
installations were conducted in order to protect inshore areas for small-scale fishers. See, Pimoljinda, 
above n 84. Some activities of this project, such as artificial reef installations, are still ongoing under the 
strategies of the Master Plan for Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand adopted in 2010. See, 
Department of Fisheries, above n 66. 
93 During 1996-2000, the Department of Fisheries in collaboration with FAO/BOBP implemented a 
project focusing on Phang Nga Bay in the Andaman Sea. This project used the bottom-up approach, so 
that the objectives of the project were identified, and the confidence of the fishers in fisheries officials 
was established before the project commenced. The proj ct activities included, for instance, management 
of mangrove and sea grass resources, sea ranching act vity, extension of coastal aquaculture, fishing gear 
replacement, and establishing a community fish market. See, Pimoljinda, above n 88. 
94 CHARM was a collaborative project between Thailand  the EU, and had a project period of 5 years. 
It was managed by the Department of Fisheries (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives). This project 
operated from 25 November 2002 to 24 November 2007. The project was implemented in two project 
areas: Ban Don Bay in the Gulf of Thailand, and Phang Nga Bay in the Andaman Sea. The objectives of 
the project were to encourage better natural resource tilisation in Thai coastal areas. Particular emphasis 
was placed on improving management processes and the participation and involvement of stakeholders 
living in coastal areas or using coastal resources. S e, CHARM, 'Successes and Lessons Learned for 
Future Coastal Resource Co-Management from CHARM’s End-of-Project Workshop' (22-24 August 
2007) <http://www.charmproject.org/cms/Final_work/EOPWSproc.pdf> 47. 
95 Wetchagarun, above n 32, 658.  
96 Department of Fisheries, Experiment on Using a Sail with Fibreglass Boat for a Purpose of Fishing 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/Boat/TestBoat/Boat_Test.htm>. 
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2.3.1.1 Fishing Effort of Small-scale Fisheries  
 
The traditional feature of Thai fisheries is the large numbers with different sizes of 
fishing vessels, which employ multi-gear in multi-fisheries. This complexity is 
particularly found in small-scale fisheries, similar to the fisheries in other tropical 
areas.97 Unlike large-scale fisheries, small-scale fisheries are generally viewed as being 
on subsistence basis by using low-efficiency fishing gears, which have a low impact on 
fishery resources. Therefore, some small-scale fishing gears are not legally required to 
obtain fishing licenses and boat registration for the purpose of fee exemption.98 
Furthermore, there are always some occupational and geographical migrations in and 
out of the fishing industry by small-scale fishers. It is because they are more influenced 
by economic incentives and change careers in order to gain the most benefits.99 Thus, 
the accurate number of small-scale fishing units in Thailand is difficult to obtain. 
 
Based on fishing vessel statistics of Thailand published by the Department of Fisheries 
during 1999-2012 (Figure 2.9), the number of small-scale fishing vessels has 
demonstrated  a declining trend from 1999 to 2006. The number started to rise again in 
2007 and enormously increased in 2009 with 8,421 vessels.100 This is because small-
scale fishing gears, which were not legally required to obtain license due to their small 
size, now need to be licensed in order to avoid a violation of the EU-IUU Regulation101 
                                                
97 Theodore Panayotou, Management Concepts for Small-scale Fisheries: Economic and Social Aspects 
(FAO, 1982). 
98 Suraswadi, above n 85, 43. 
99 Panayotou and Panayotou, above n 91. 
100 Department of Fisheries, above n 83, 36. 
101 The EU-IUU Regulation stands for the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 
establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No. 2847/93, (EC) No. 1936/2001 and (EC) No. 601/2004 and 
repealing Regulations (EC) No. 1093/94 and (EC) No. 1447/1999. 
The ‘Community’ is referred to ‘a Contracting Party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS), has ratified the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation 
of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating 
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 4 
August 1995 (the UN Fish Stocks Agreement) and has accepted the Agreement to Promote Compliance 
with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas of 24 
November 1993 of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO Compliance 
Agreement). Those provisions predominantly set out the principle that all States have a duty to adopt 
appropriate measures to ensure sustainable management of marine resources and to cooperate with each 
other to this end.’ See, the EU-IUU Regulation para (1). 
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that has been implemented by the European Union since January 2010.102 The added 
number of vessels is for vessels employed with these small-scale fishing gears, such as 
gill nets, hooks and small traps.103 The registered number of small-scale fishing vessels 
has increased to 9,398 in 2012 with a majority of gill nets (75 per cent).104         
 
 
Figure 2.9: Number of small-scale and large-scale fishing vessels registered during 
1999 to 2012 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 1999-2012. 
 
Nonetheless, the figure mentioned above is considered an underestimate. The best 
estimate for small-scale fishing units employed in the marine capture fisheries of 
Thailand is 60,141 units of which 78.90 per cent are outboard powered boats or long-
tail boats (Table 2.4).105 The average number of crews per fishing vessel is depended on 
the size of the vessel, as is the profit obtained per fishing vessel. The average number of 
crews per small-scale fishing vessel is one to three p rsons, and the total number of 
                                                
102 The EU-IUU Regulation entered into forced for the European Union on 1 January 2010. This 
regulation aims to prohibit IUU fishing by ensuring that all traded fishery products imported into or 
exported from the Community have been fished in compliance with international conservation and 
management measures and other related rules applying to the fishing vessel concerned. A certification 
scheme applying to all trades in fishery products with the Community will therefore be put into effect. 
See, the EU-IUU Regulation para (13). 
103 Department of Fisheries, above n 83, 36. 
104 Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 2012, Technical Paper No.2/2014 (2014) 30. 
105 Lymer et al, above n 28, 28. 
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fishing households is 53,343. In peak fishing season, there are 94,229 fishers involved 
in small-scale fisheries106 (Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4: Numbers of fishing units, households and fishers of mall-scale fisheries in 
Thailand 
Type of 
fishing units 
Number of 
registered 
fishing 
vessels 
(2009)a 
Number of 
registered 
fishing 
vessels 
(2012)c 
Best 
estimated 
numberc 
Average 
crew per 
fishing 
unitc 
Number of 
fishing 
householdsc 
Number of 
fishers (peak 
season)c 
No boat   3,763 1 3,550 4,962 
Non-
powered 
boat 
  2,876 1 2,559 3,282 
Outboard 
powered 
boat 
5,873 7,539 
47,457 2 41,225 71,386 
Inboard 
powered 
boat 3,336 2 3,249 6,170 
< 5 GT 
5-10 GT 2,548 1,859 2,709 3 2,760 8,429 
Total 8,421 9,398 60,141  53,343 94,229 
Source of data: a Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 2009, 
Technical Paper No.2/2011 (2011) 36; b Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels 
Statistics 2012, Technical Paper No.2/2014 (2014) 30; c David Lymer et al, A review 
and Synthesis of Capture Fisheries Data in Thailand: Large versus Small-scale 
Fisheries, RAP Publication 2008/17 (2008) 28. 
 
Generally, the income of small-scale fishers in Thailand comes from two sources, i.e., 
from fishing and non-fishing activities. Income from fishing activities is obtained from 
three sources: their own fishing business, fishing labour, and fish processing, whereas 
non-fishing income is obtained from farming, hired labour and others.107 Thus, there is a 
variety of sources of income for small-scale fisher. However, the amount of their 
income is generally uncertain, particularly in monson seasons when fishers must 
suspend their operations because of bad condition at se . In terms of the costs of 
operation, fuel takes the greatest part for small-sca e fisheries. It is usually more than 50 
per cent of total cost.108 Based on the surveys conducted with fishers who use crab gill 
                                                
106 Ibid. 
107 Somying Rientrairut, Somying Rientrairut, Small-scale Fisheries Development in Thailand, 
FAO/UNDP South China Sea Fisheries Development and Coordinating Programme (UNDP/FAO, 1985). 
Additionally, in fishing villages located in rural reas, small-scale fishers usually have to buy fuel with 
higher price than it is in urban areas. See, Panjart, bove n 49. 
108 Panjarat, above n 49, 38. 
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nets, mullet gill nets, and shrimp trammel nets that are the dominant types of small-
fishing gears in Thailand,109 the average total cost is THB4,018 (USD125.6) per month 
per household, whereas the average total income is THB9,973 (USD311.7) per month 
per household.110 The average net profit gained by these small-scale fisheries is 
therefore only THB5,955 (USD186.1) per month or THB71,460 (USD2,233.1) per year 
per household. This is considered low income compared with the national income per 
capita of THB131,579 (USD4,111.8).111 
 
2.3.1.2 Production and Value of Small-scale Fisheries 
 
In 2009, the amount of marine fisheries production obtained from small-scale fisheries 
is 278,413 tonnes according to the fisheries statistics of Thailand,112 which contributes 
16.73 per cent to total marine capture production (1,663,846 tonnes).113 Among all 
types of small-scale fishing gears or practices, squid falling nets provide the highest 
production (26,260 tonnes) followed by collecting shellfish (22,395 tonnes) and various 
types of gill nets (7,718-19,811 tonnes) (Figure 2.10).114 
  
                                                
109 Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 1999-2012. 
110 National Statistical Office, above n 25. 
111 This is a national income per capita of Thailand i 2013. See, Office of the National Economic and 
Social Development Board, 'National Income of Thailand 2013, Chain Volume Measures' (January 2015) 
<http://eng.nesdb.go.th/Portals/0/eco_datas/account/ni/cvm/2013/Book_NI_2013ENG.pdf> 39. 
112 This data is collected from fishing gears or fishing practices, which are defined as small-scale fisher es 
by the Department of Fisheries. See, Department of Fisheries, Fishing Community Production Survey in 
2009, Technical Paper No.4/2011 (2011). 
113 Department of Fisheries, above n 63, 26. 
114 Department of Fisheries, above n 112.  
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Figure 2.10: Marine capture production obtained from important small-scale fishing 
gears in 2009 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fishing Community Production Survey in 
2009, Technical Paper No.4/2011 (2011). 
 
With regard to species composition of small-scale fisheries production, jellyfish is the 
dominant production (117,816 tonnes or 42.32 per cent), followed by pelagic fish 
(53,467 tonnes or 19.20 per cent), squids and cuttle fish (27,996 tonnes or 10.06 per 
cent), and crabs (22,723 tonnes or 8.16 per cent) (Figure 2.11). Apart from jellyfish and 
squids, important species from small-scale fisheries are anchovies (19,550 tonnes), 
Indo-Pacific mackerel (19,239 tonnes), blue swimming crabs (19,057 tonnes), and short 
necked clams (17,763 tonnes).115 
 
                                                
115 Department of Fisheries, above n 112. 
26,260
22,395
19,811 19,683
16,754
10,410
8,264 7,718
5,541
3,873
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
Squid 
falling 
nets
Collecting 
shellfish
Mackerel 
gill nets
Anchovy 
falling 
nets
Crab gill 
nets
Other gill 
nets
Mullet 
gill nets
Shrimp 
trammel 
nets
Crab traps Set bag 
nets
(tonnes)
52 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Composition of marine capture production obtained from small-scale 
fisheries in 2009 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fishing Community Production Survey in 
2009, Technical Paper No.4/2011 (2011). 
 
In value terms, small-scale fisheries production cotributes 20.03 per cent (THB8,564 
million or USD267.6 million)116 to total value of marine fisheries production 
(THB42,758.1 million or USD1,336.2 million).117 Among all types of small-scale 
fishing gears, squid falling nets generate the highest value (THB1,774.8 million or 
USD55.5 million), followed by crab gill nets (THB1,711 million or USD53.5 million), 
shrimp trammel nets (THB1,119.1 million or USD35.0 million), and crab traps 
(THB614.3 million and USD19.2 million) (Figure 2.12). 
 
In terms of species, small-scale fisheries obtain the highest value from crabs 27.89 per 
cent (THB2,388.7 million or USD74.6 million), followed by squids and cuttle fish 
24.13 per cent (THB2,066.3 million or USD64.6 million), and pelagic fish 17.65 per 
cent (THB1,511.4 million or USD47.2 million) (Figure 2.13). 
 
                                                
116 Ibid. 
117 Department of Fisheries, above n 37, 34. 
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Figure 2.12: The value of marine capture production obtained from important small-
scale fishing gears in 2009 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fishing Community Production Survey in 
2009, Technical Paper No.4/2011 (2011). 
 
Figure 2.13: Composition of the value of marine capture production obtained from 
small-scale fisheries in 2009 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fishing Community Production Survey in 
2009, Technical Paper No.4/2011 (2011). 
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2.3.2 Large-scale Fisheries 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1 above, marine fisheries, particularly large-scale fisheries, 
in Thailand have developed due to modern fishing gears and technologies, migration of 
fishing vessels to new fishing areas, improved fishing vessels, and support in terms of 
facilities and infrastructure.118 Marine fisheries of Thailand were basically artisanal until 
1961, when otter board trawlers were systematically introduced to Thai fishers based on 
the success of demonstrations of using a trawl net u der a project through bilateral 
agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Thailand.119 Since then, the 
growth of Thai marine fisheries greatly increased, both in the number of fishing units 
and catch production. In 1963, there were 2,327 regist red trawlers and 323,000 tonnes 
obtained from marine capture fisheries, which doubled from 1960 (146,000 tonnes) 
because of the high efficiency of trawlers.120 
 
Prior to the advent of otter board trawlers, the main composition of marine production 
consisted of small pelagic species caught inshore by stationary type of fishing gears and 
simple purse seines, as well as invertebrates and molluscs caught by traditional fishing 
methods.121 After expansion of trawlers, demersal species, which are target species of 
trawlers, significantly contributed the catch compositi n. Besides, there was another fast 
development in the early 1980s by purse seine fisheries aiming to catch pelagic species 
for fish canning industry.122 The remarkable developments of purse seine fisheries 
included the discovery of fishing grounds of round scads in the central part of the Gulf 
of Thailand in 1973, development of light luring fish ng techniques to catch small 
pelagic since 1978, development of large purse seine  for coastal tunas, hardtail scads 
and trevallies in deeper waters since 1982, and the dev lopment of anchovy fisheries 
                                                
118 Menasveta, above n 30, 98. 
119 The program was carried out in two phases from 23 May to 11 September 1961, and from 27 July 
1962 to 9 October 1964. A total of 23 research cruises, comprising 471 hauls amounting to 822 trawling 
hours, demonstrated that there were excellent possibilities for a commercial trawl fishery along the entire 
coast of the Gulf of Thailand in depths to 50 metres. See, Klaus Tiews, 'The Development of Trawl 
Fisheries in Southeast Asian Countries as A Means of Increasing Marine Fisheries Production'  79. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Wetchagarun, above n 32, 660. 
122 Pakjuta Khemakorn, 'Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the South China Sea Region' 
(The United Nations - The Nippon Foundation of Japan Fellowship, DOALOS, Office of Legal Affairs, 
the United Nations, 2006) 29. 
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with light luring since 1983.123 All of these developments have resulted in the increase 
of pelagic fish production shared in the total marine production of the Gulf of Thailand. 
This leads pelagic fisheries to be one of the most important fisheries in Thailand.124 
Based on all developments in Thai fisheries in the past decades, Thailand has then been 
one of the top ten global producers of fish and fisheries products.125 
 
2.3.2.1 Fishing Effort of Large-scale Fisheries 
 
The Thai Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) requires that large-scale fishing gears to be 
licensed and large-scale fishing vessels to be registered.126 But in practice, to avoid 
expenses of tax and fees of being licensed and registered, some large-scale fishers do 
not to comply. This makes the recorded number of large-scale fishing vessels in 
Thailand to be underestimated. According to the latst Thai fishing vessel statistics 
published by the Department of Fisheries, 8,691 large-scale fishing vessels are 
registered, of which 42.04 per cent are vessels sized between 20 to 50 GT (Table 2.5).127 
However, based on best estimates, it is found that there are 11,343 large-scale fishing 
vessels in total.128 The majority are also vessels in size between 20 to 50 GT (41.14 per 
cent or 11,343 units). Similar to small-scale fisheries, the average number of crews per 
fishing vessel is depended on the vessel size, as is the net profit per vessel. The average 
number of crews per large-scale fishing vessel is seven to 26 people. The total number 
of fishing households is 4,458. In peak fishing season, there are 73,911 fishers involved 
in large-scale fisheries (Table 2.5).129  
 
                                                
123 Somsak Chullasorn, 'Review of the Small Pelagic Resources and their Fisheries in the Gulf of 
Thailand' (Paper presented at the the First Session of the APFIC Working Party on Marine Fisheries, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 13-16 May 1997). 
124 Pakjuta Khemakorn et al, 'Fishery and Biological Information of Small Pelagic Fisheries in the South 
China Sea Case Study: Gulf of Thailand, 2002-2006' (2007) 11. 
125 FAO, 'Report of the Twenty-eighth of the Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission, 3-5 August 2004' (RAP 
Publication 2004/19, 3-5 August 2004) 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/ad510e/ad510e00.htm#Contents> 3; FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2006 (FAO, 2007) 11. 
126 The obligation is based on the Thai Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 26 and the Thai Vessels Act 
B.E. 2481 (1938) section 5(6). Details are discussed in Section 2.5. 
127 Department of Fisheries, above n 104. 
128 Lymer et al, above n 28, 28. 
129 Ibid. 
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Table 2.5: Numbers of fishing units, households and fishers of large-scale fisheries in 
Thailand 
Type of 
fishing units 
Number of 
registered 
fishing 
vessels 
(2009)a 
Number of 
registered 
fishing 
vessels 
(2012)b 
Best 
estimated 
numberc 
Average 
crew per 
fishing 
unitc 
Number of 
fishing 
householdsc 
Number of 
fishers 
(peak 
season)c 
10-20 GT 2,442 2,280 3,378 7 1,994 9,957 
20-50 GT 3,539 3,654 4,667 10 1,340 12,597 
50-100 GT 2,124 2,301 2,799 13 517 10,682 
100-200 GT 349 442 438 22 
607 40,675 200-500 GT 12 14 59 26 
> 500 GT 4 - 2 NA 
Total 8,470 8,691 11,343  4,458 73,911 
Source of data: a Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 2009, 
Technical Paper No.2/2011 (2011) 36; b Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels 
Statistics 2012, Technical Paper No.2/2014 (2014) 30; c David Lymer et al, A review 
and Synthesis of Capture Fisheries Data in Thailand: Large versus Small-scale 
Fisheries, RAP Publication 2008/17 (2008) 28. 
 
The average total cost and income of large-scale fisher es categorised by size are 
summarised in Table 2.6. Overall, it clearly shows that although fishing units with 
bigger size spend for both cash cost and non-cash co t more than smaller ones, they 
make more net profit too. The bigger the vessel is, the more net profit it gets. For 
example, fishing vessels of size 20-50 GT are able to make only 15.09 per cent of total 
cost for net profit, whereas fishing vessels of size 100-500 GT can make 126.52 per 
cent. This big profit is the most significant factor hat attracts fishers to enter large-scale 
fisheries.  
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Table 2.6: Cost and income of large-scale fisheries in Thailand 
Type of fishing units Cash cost130 Non-cash 
cost131 
Total 
cost 
Total 
income 
Net 
profit 
Large-scale fisheries 
(THB/month/vessel) 
     
10-20 GT 85,136 7,617 92,753 96,116 3,363 
20-50 GT 233,865 11,152 245,017 281,982 36,965 
50-100 GT 340,081 15,020 355,101 400,133 45,032 
100-200 GT 
353,352 13,415 366,767 830,800 464,033 
200-500 GT 
Note: Surveyed from otter board trawlers, pair trawlers, beam trawlers, and push netters  
Source of data: David Lymer et al, A Review and Synthesis of Capture Fisheries Data 
in Thailand: Large Versus Small-scale Fisheries, RAP Publication 2008/17 (2008) 28. 
 
2.3.2.2 Production and Value of Large-scale Fisheries 
 
Large-scale fisheries in Thai waters contribute 1,102 56 tonnes (66.24 per cent) to the 
total marine production of Thailand.132 Otter board trawl production contributes the 
highest production share of large-scale fishing gears, 371,720 tonnes, which in fact is 
the highest production among all types of fishing gears (22.34 per cent of total marine 
production).133 It is followed by purse seine and pair trawls fisheries, which are 354,194 
and 205,272 tonnes, respectively (Figure 2.14). 
 
                                                
130 Cash costs are costs that businesses pay for when using cash, or a check, but not credit. See, 
Investopedia, Cash Cost <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cashcost.asp#xzz21X4ErqfX>. In 
fisheries, cash costs can be cash expenses for ice, fuel, lubricants, groceries, crew share/wages, repai s 
and maintenance, etc.  
131 Non-cash costs are costs that business pay for when using credit, not cash or a check. In fisheries, non-
cash costs can be interest on capital (vessel, gearv hicle, others) and depreciation (vessel, gear, vehicle, 
others). 
132 Department of Fisheries, above n 63, 26. 
133
 Ibid. 
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Figure 2.14: Marine capture production obtained from large-scale fishing gears in 2009 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2009 Based 
on the Sample Survey, Technical Paper No.1/2012 (2012).  
 
In terms of catch composition of large-scale fisheries production, pelagic fish is the 
dominant production (527,904 tonnes or 38.11 per cent), followed by trash fish134 
(467,216 tonnes or 33.72 per cent) and demersal fish (161,208 tonnes or 11.64 per cent) 
(Figure 2.15). Important species caught by large-scale fishing gears are anchovies, 
sardines, Indo-Pacific mackerels, squids, threadfin breams, trevallies and round 
scads.135 
                                                
134 “Trash fish” refers to the catch of all sizes of uneatable fish (or true trash fish) and the catch of small 
sizes of commercial fish. Trash fish are generally used as raw materials for producing fish meal or feed 
for fish aquaculture (farming). See, Panjarat, above n 49, 12. 
135 Department of Fisheries, above n 63, 26-39. 
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Figure 2.15: Composition of marine capture production obtained from large-scale 
fisheries in 2009 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2009 Based 
on the Sample Survey, Technical Paper No.1/2012 (2012). 
 
In terms of production value, pelagic fish contributes the biggest share, at about 38.82 
per cent (THB13,273.1 million or USD414.8 million), of the total value generated by 
large-scale fisheries in Thailand.136 It is followed by squids and cuttlefish 15.86 per c nt 
(THB5,422.3 million or USD169.4 million), shrimps 14.90 per cent (THB5,093.3 
million or USD159.2 million), and demersal fish 13.90 per cent (THB4,754.7 million or 
USD148.6 million) (Figure 2.16). 
 
                                                
136 Department of Fisheries, above n 37, 34-6. 
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Figure 2.16: Composition of the value of marine capture production obtained from 
large-scale fisheries in 2009 
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2009, 
Technical paper No.9/2011 (2011) 91, 34-6. 
 
2.4 Catch Per Unit Of Effort of Marine Capture Fisheries in Thailand  
 
According to the national fisheries statistics of Thailand, the production of marine 
capture fisheries has declined in the past decades (in 1990s), whereas the number of 
fishing vessels increased. This resulted in the decreasing trend of CPUE of marine 
capture fisheries in Thailand. For instance, in 1960, there were only 99 trawlers 
operating in Thai waters, but five years later, the number of trawlers rapidly increased to 
2,392 units.137 The enormous increase of trawlers caused the CPUE to greatly decline, 
from 298 kg/hr in 1961 to 179 kg/hr in 1965.138 This phenomenon is important evidence 
demonstrating the overcapacity problem of marine capture fisheries in Thai waters. 
 
                                                
137 Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, above n 54, 27. 
138 Ibid. 
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The Department of Fisheries has conducted marine resou ces surveys using five 
research vessels (i.e., Research Vessel No. 1, 2, 4, 9, and 12) every year,139 covering 
115,270 square kilometres of the Gulf of Thailand a60,327 square kilometres of the 
Andaman Sea.140 The surveys are aimed to monitor the status of marine fisheries 
resources in Thai waters. The average CPUE obtained in recent years shows a consistent 
declining trend of overall marine resources both in the Gulf of Thailand and the 
Andaman Sea (Table 2.7). For the Gulf of Thailand, the CPUE decreased from 22.369 
kg/hr in 2003 to18.227 kg/hr in 2010 (18.5 per cent decreased), whereas the CPUE of 
the Andaman Sea reduced from 49.023 kg/hr in 2003 to 36.150 kg/hr in 2012 (26.3 per 
cent decreased). 
Table 2.7: Catch per unit of effort (kg/hr) obtained from marine resource surveys in the 
Gulf of Thailand (GOT) and the Andaman Sea (AS) 
 
Year 2003
a
 2004
a
 2005
a
 2010
b
 2011
b
 2012
c
 
Group GOT AS GOT AS GOT AS GOT AS GOT AS GOT AS 
 Pelagic 1.013 1.805 1.080 3.467 0.943 2.180 0.833 4.216 1.586 1.861 0.702 2.527 
 Demersal 6.852 21.377 8.522 22.335 6.398 25.926 6.347 23.277 9.948 26.284 5.863 26.474 
 Cephalopod 4.045 6.595 5.559 6.334 5.799 4.959 3.734 4.901 6.584 5.314 4.347 0.435 
 Shrimp 0.107 0.059 0.088 0.193 0.061 0.060 0.057 0.058 0.109 0.059 0.056 0.306 
 Crab 0.268 0.220 0.171 0.155 0.226 0.179 0.245 0.247 0.209 0.193 0.419 0.197 
 Shellfish 0.260 0.034 0.282 0.059 0.219 0.069 0.619 0.067 0.563 0.043 0.461 0.021 
 Others 0.239 0.111 0.142 0.083 0.174 0.068 0.109 0.076 0.119 0.967 0.096 0.467 
 True trash        
 fish 9.585 18.822 9.099 15.900 10.376 18.012 6.615 10.833 5.898 6.543 6.282 5.723 
 Total 22.369 49.023 24.943 48.526 24.196 51.453 18.559 43.676 25.015 41.263 18.227 36.150 
Source of data: a Kanit Chuapun et al, 'Marine Resources in the Gulf of Thailand and 
Andaman Sea from Research Vessel during 2002-2005' (Department of Fisheries, 2008) 
9-15, 32-37; b Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 
2011' (Department of Fisheries, 2011) <http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine 
/FormDownload/ANNUALREPORT2011.pdf> 22-23; c Marine Fisheries Research and 
Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 2012' (Departmen of Fisheries, 2012) 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/FormDownload/ANNUAL%20REPORT%202012.
pdf> 28-29. 
                                                
139 In 1963, the Department of Fisheries has commenced marine resources surveys in Thai waters by only 
two research vessels. However, since 1991 there hav been five research vessels annually conducting the 
surveys. 
140 There are totally 85 survey stations covering 175,597 square kilometres, consisting of 64 stations 
covering 115,270 square kilometres in the Gulf of Thailand, and 21 stations covering 60,327 square 
kilometres in the Andaman Sea. All of research vessels use otter board trawl gear (2.5 centimetres of cod 
end mesh size) to operate one hour per survey station during January to June. See, Marine Fisheries 
Research and Development Bureau, above n 36, 21. 
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Additionally, the exploitation rate of marine resources in Thai waters, particularly 
economic species in the Gulf of Thailand, has surpassed the sustainable level (Table 
2.8). This undesirable state of marine resources affirms the overcapacity issue in marine 
fisheries of Thailand. 
Table 2.8: Estimates of exploitation ratio for economic species in the Gulf of Thailand 
during the period 1971-1995 
 
Species\Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Atul mate 0.14 0.29 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.47 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.53 0.48 
Epinephelus sexfasciatus                       0.23 
Loligo chinensis 0.37 0.48 0.53 0.47 0.63 0.54 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.65 
Loligo duvauceli 0.26 0.35 0.4 0.34 0.5 0.41 0.52 0.5 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.53 
Lutanus lineolatus 0.3 0.53 0.4 0.47 0.48 0.32 0.44 0.53 0.38 0.51 0.49 0.32 
Megalaspis cordyla         0.07 0.09 0.04 0.1 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.21 
Nemipterus  nematophorus 0.31 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.43 0.39 0.46 0.56 0.48 0.44 0.5 0.54 
Nemipterus hexodon 0.18 0.34 0.4 0.4 0.28 0.25 0.3 0.39 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.37 
Nemipterus mesoprion 0.22 0.4 0.46 0.46 0.33 0.3 0.35 0.45 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.43 
Nemipterus peronii 0.19 0.35 0.41 0.41 0.29 0.26 0.31 0.41 0.32 0.3 0.34 0.38 
Portunus pelagicus 0.57 0.49 0.71 0.68 0.71 0.76 0.8 0.77 0.58 0.63 0.71 0.82 
Priacanthus tayenus 0.19 0.47 0.35 0.2 0.43 0.3 0.46 0.33 0.15 0.23 0.2 0.26 
Rastrelliger brachysoma 0.63 0.84 0.81 0.9 0.89 0.85 0.85 0.78 0.58 0.8 0.8 0.71 
Rastrelliger kanagurta   0.54 0.66 0.75 0.61 0.49 0.52 0.58 0.53 0.58 0.6 0.52 
Saurida elongata 0.31 0.38 0.45 0.37 0.45 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.27 
Saurida undosquamis 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.37 0.46 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.27 
Scolopsis taeniopterus 0.26 0.3 0.39 0.42 0.4 0.38 0.43 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.12 
Scomberomorus commerson         0.62 0.71 0.78 0.75 0.67 0.68 0.82 0.69 
Selar crumenopthalmus                       0.09 
Selaroides leptolepis 0.12 0.25 0.38 0.16 0.35 0.42 0.28 0.3 0.3 0.31 0.49 0.44 
Sepia aculenta 0.41 0.5 0.59 0.46 0.58 0.56 0.64 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.83 
Sepia recurvirostra 0.4 0.49 0.58 0.45 0.57 0.55 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.82 
Trichiurus lepturus 0.44 0.43 0.49 0.56 0.3 0.41 0.58 0.62 0.35 0.74 0.82 0.59 
Species\Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1993 1994 1995   
Atul mate 0.44 0.48 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.72 0.73 0.74   0.93 0.83   
Epinephelus sexfasciatus 0.21 0.26 0.42 0.47 0.7 0.65 0.81 0.76 0.91 0.98 0.96   
Loligo chinensis 0.7 0.58 0.61 0.68 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.94 0.87   
Loligo duvauceli 0.57 0.45 0.48 0.56 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.73 0.92 0.79   
Lutanus lineolatus 0.33 0.17 0.35 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.68 0.81 0.91 0.92 0.86   
Megalaspis cordyla 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.23 0.32 0.39 0.31 0.64 0.98 0.39   
Nemipterus  nematophorus 0.53 0.47 0.57 0.72 0.8 0.75 0.89 0.9 0.94   0.98   
Nemipterus hexodon 0.36 0.31 0.4 0.56 0.65 0.61 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.77 0.97   
Nemipterus mesoprion 0.42 0.37 0.46 0.62 0.71 0.67 0.86 0.87 0.93 0.81 0.96   
Nemipterus peronii 0.37 0.32 0.4 0.57 0.65 0.63 0.83 0.84 0.95 0.75 0.92   
Portunus pelagicus 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.87 0.81 0.8 0.83 0.78 0.69 0.85   
Priacanthus tayenus 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.31 0.5 0.52 0.61 0.63 0.82 0.81 0.95   
Rastrelliger brachysoma 0.77 0.84 0.79 0.8 0.86 0.74 0.96 0.95 0.72 0.77 0.95   
Rastrelliger kanagurta 0.61 0.49 0.5 0.57 0.62 0.81 0.9 0.92 0.75 0.95 0.94   
Saurida elongata 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.38 0.53 0.55 0.63 0.58 0.73 0.7 0.87   
Saurida undosquamis 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.38 0.53 0.56 0.64 0.59 0.72 0.79 0.89   
Scolopsis taeniopterus 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.19 0.2 0.17 0.09 0.02   0.02   
Scomberomorus commerson 0.79 0.81 0.74 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.77 0.95 0.87   
Selar crumenopthalmus 0.17 0.02   0.06 0.39 0.72 0.77 0.72 0.37 0.97 0.89   
Selaroides leptolepis 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.47 0.5 0.69 0.68 0.72   0.31 0.8   
Sepia aculenta 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.88 0.94   
Sepia recurvirostra 0.85 0.87 0.83 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.91   
Trichiurus lepturus 0.51 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.38 0.83 0.79 0.73 0.65 0.96 0.95   
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Source of table: Amnuay Kongprom et al, 'Status of Demersal Fishery Resources in the 
Gulf of Thailand' in Geronimo T Silvestre et al (eds), Assessment, Management and 
Future Directions for Coastal Fisheries in Asian Countries (WorldFish Center, 2003) 
vol 67, 146. 
 
2.5 Legislative Framework for Fishing Vessels Registration and Fishing Gears 
Licensing in Thailand 
 
In order to operate fishing in Thai waters, there is a legal requirement for fishing vessels 
to be registered and fishing gears to be licensed. The details concerning fishing vessel 
registration and fishing gear licensing are presented in the following sections.   
 
2.5.1 Fishing Vessels Registration 
 
In Thailand, the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) which was enacted on 7 April B.E. 
2482 (1939) and came into force since 7 October B.E. 2482 (1939),141 is the principal 
law governing all vessels or any kinds of water vehicl s142 and administered by the 
Ministry of Transport. This Act consists of nine chapters,143 containing 70 sections. It 
has been amended several times including in B.E. 2517 (1974),144 B.E. 2521 (1978),145 
B.E. 2528 (1985),146 B.E. 2534 (1991),147 and B.E. 2540 (1997).148 Based on this Act, 
                                                
141 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) came into force after the expiration of 180 days from 10 April 
B.E. 2482 (1939), which was the date of its publication in the Government Gazette (2482/-/230). 
142 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 5(3).   
143 Those nine chapters include Chapter 1: Registration of Thai Vessels; Chapter 2: Certificate of 
Registration of Thai Vessels; Chapter 3: Transfer o Ownership of the Registered Thai Vessels; Chapter 
4: Mortgage and Preferential Rights respecting to Registered Thai Vessels; Chapter 5: Names of Vessels, 
Modification of Vessels, Change in Registration Ports, Registration, Amendment and New Registration 
of Vessels; Chapter 6: Privileges and Duties of Thai Vessels; Chapter 7: Miscellaneous Provisions; 
Chapter 8: Penalty Provisions; and Chapter 9: Transitory Provisions. See, The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 
(1938).   
144 After using the fee rates prescribed in the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) for more than 34 years, 
those fees were needed to be increased in order to sui  the fisheries that have much developed, 
particularly large scale fisheries. Therefore, the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2517 (1974) was enacted. It was 
published in Government Gazette (2517/77/1p.) on 1 May B.E. 2517 (1974).       
145 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2521 (1978) was enacted in order to amend the provisions with respect to 
the qualification of the owner of registered Thai boats, the temporary registration of Thai boats in foreign 
countries, and the fee rates. This Act was published in Government Gazette (2521/156/27p.) on 31 
December B.E. 2521 (1974). 
146 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2528 (1985) was enacted for the purpose to decrease the portion of Thai 
partnerships in registered Thai fishing boat company in order to attract foreign investors. This Act was 
published in Government Gazette (2528/154/8p.) on 24 October B.E. 2528 (1985).   
147 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2534 (1991) was enacted for the purpose to add some provisions with 
regard to the penalties applied when violating Section 7 and 7 bis. This Act was published in Governmet 
Gazette (2534/211/1p.) on 4 December B.E. 2534 (1991). 
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Thai vessels must be registered with the vessel regist ar.149 Additionally, in order to be 
registered as a Thai vessel, a vessel must hold an inspection certificate to certify that it 
has already been inspected by the inspection officer of the Marine Department 
according to the Navigation in Thai Waters Act B.E. 2456 (1913).150 Such certificate 
must be presented to the Vessel Registrar.151 
 
Upon registration under the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938), the vessels for trading 
purposes in Thai waters, which shall be deemed a Thai vessel, include: (1) a powered 
vessel of 10 GT or greater; (2) a sea vessel152 of 20 GT or greater, which is not a 
powered vessel; and (3) a river vessel153 of 50 GT or greater, which is not a powered 
vessel. For fisheries purposes,154 on the other hand, a powered vessel of every size and a 
non-powered vessel of six GT or greater are required to be registered.155 This means 
that the non-powered vessels that are employed in Thai fisheries and smaller than six 
GT, are not obliged to be registered and they, therefore, are excluded from Thai fishing 
vessels statistics.156   
 
To apply for a registration, the applicant will follow the rules below: 
‘(1) To submit a statement manifesting an ownership in the printed form of 
the Marine Department; 
(2) To make a statement certifying that the conditions for being an owner of 
the vessel shall be in accordance with Section 7 and to produce the evidence 
thereof. If the applicant is a partnership or a limited company, the certificate 
of registration of such entity shall be produced; 
                                                                                                                                    
148 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2540 (1997) was enacted in order to improve the provisions with respect to 
the qualification of the owner of registered Thai boats, which was amended by the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 
2528 (1985). The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2540 (1997) was published in Government Gazette (2540/53k/1) 
on 7 October B.E. 2540 (1997). 
149 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 6. 
150 The Navigation in Thai Waters Act B.E. 2456 (1913) was enacted in 1913 in the period of King Rama 
VI, the sixth King of Chakri Dynasty. At that period Thailand was named ‘Siam’ and was governed by 
Monarchy. Thus, the original name of the Act was ‘The Navigation in Siam Waters B.E. 2456’. This Act 
came into effect on 1 September 1913. See, Th  Navigation in Thai Waters Act B.E. 2456 (1913).   
151 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 12. 
152 A sea vessel refers to a vessel having the structure for sea sailing. See, The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 
(1938) section 5(5). 
153 A river vessel refers to a vessel other than a sea vessel. See, The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) 
section 5(6).  
154 Fisheries mean fishing of any kinds of aquatic animals by either using a vessel or using a vessel as a 
vehicle for fishing. See, The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 5(8).   
155 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 8. 
156 Thai fishing vessels statistics are yearly published by the Department of Fisheries, Thailand. 
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(3) To submit the inspection certificate of the vessel issued by the inspection 
officer of the Marine Department;157 
(4) To submit a statement showing the date and place where the 
construction of the vessel is completed as it is possible; 
(5) If the vessel is used to belong to a foreigner, the previous name of the 
vessel shall also be stated; 
(6) To state the name of the vessel controllers.’158 
 
In terms of the certificate of registration for Thai vessels, Section 14 of this Act states 
that it will be in a printed form of the Marine Department, and will indicate the 
following information: 
‘(1) Names of the vessel,159 port where the vessel is registered, and the 
vessel controllers; 
(2) Type of the vessel, names of the shipyard where the vessel was 
constructed and also the shipyard owner; 
(3) Details of the inspection of the vessel; 
(4) Details regarding the acquisition of vessel ownership as shown in the 
statement thereof; 
(5) Names, addresses and occupations of the person registered as the owner 
of the vessel. In case the owner is partnership or limited company, the 
names and address of the managing director or the directors are required.’160 
 
In addition, ‘if a vessel has been registered as a Thai vessel at any port, such port will be 
a registration port of the vessel.’161 When the vessel registration has already been made, 
the vessel registrar will issue the certificate of registration of such vessel in a printed 
form of the Marine Department. This certificate is called the ‘registration certificate’,162 
and the vessel controller must keep it with the vessel at all times unless complying with 
this Act or other laws.163 Upon a request of the inspection officer, the vessel controller 
must present the registration certificate to him/her immediately.164 If such certificate has 
                                                
157 As required under Section 12 of the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938). 
158 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 10. 
159 A registered Thai vessel must not carry other name than that already been registered. The registered 
name of the vessel can be changed only with the permission of the Director General of the Marine 
Department. The change of a vessel name must be madin accordance with the provisions under the 
Ministerial Regulation. See, The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 38.  
160 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 14. 
161 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 15. 
162 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 16. 
163 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 17. 
164 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 17. 
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lost or substantially damaged by any reasons, the vessel controller must apply for the 
new certificate for replacement from the vessel registrar at the registration port. If such 
incident happens outside the registration port, the vessel controller must therefore apply 
for the temporary certificate at the next arrival port where having a vessel registrar or 
Thai consulate, as the case may be. Later, when the vessel arrives the registration port, 
the vessel controller must bring the temporary certifica e to the vessel registrar of the 
port within 10 days from the date of arrival in orde  to get a new certificate.165 
 
In terms of transferring the ownership of a registered Thai vessel by act in the law, the 
transfer shall be conducted by submitting an application to the vessel registrar or a Thai 
consulate official of the registration port for stating such transfer in the registration 
book. If the transfer has already been conducted outside the registration port, a vessel 
registrar or a Thai consulate official of the port, where the transfer has been conducted, 
will perform as the vessel registrar of the registration port, and state such transfer in the 
registration certificate, as well as urgently send the copy of the ownership transfer 
agreement with its certified translation, if necessary, to the vessel registrar of the 
registration port. After receiving these documents, the vessel registrar will state such 
transfer detail in the registration book.166 
 
As described above, it can be seen that the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) does not 
require all types of vessels in Thailand to be regist red, particularly the non-motorised 
fishing boats that are smaller than six GT. This presents an obstacle in obtaining the 
actual number of fishing vessels, especially small-scale fishing vessels that locate in 
fishing villages of coastal provinces in Thailand. Furthermore, the process in applying 
for vessel registration is quite complicated and takes a long time to be done, and then it 
might not convenient for applicants. Therefore, some owners might hesitate to register 
their fishing vessels because of such inconveniences that may occur. Besides, the 
penalties prescribed in this Act are not reasonable with the present state of Thailand’s 
economy, particularly in marine fisheries sector, which have been greatly developed 
since this Act was enacted. To specify this issue, for instance, the fine applied when 
violating the provision of Section 17, which states hat based on the request of the 
                                                
165 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 18. 
166 The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 27. 
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inspection officer, the vessel controller must present the registration certificate to 
him/her immediately, is just not more than THB200 (USD6.25). Since this very small 
amount of fine can be easily afforded by the owners of fishing vessels, having the 
vessels registered with currently complicated process in order to get the registration 
certificate could be intentionally ignored by the vessel owners. 
 
In order to solve the issues addressed above, the Thai Cabinet has submitted a new draft 
of the Thai Vessels Act to the National Assembly167 to consider on 7 August 2008. 
Under this Thai Vessels Bill, it requires all vessel  in Thailand, other than non-
motorized boats smaller than 1.5 GT, to be registered.168 With respect to vessel 
registration, this Bill suggests that it will be inline with the provisions under the 
Ministerial Regulation, which has more flexibility in changing if needed.169 Moreover, 
this Bill increases the prescribed fine for violating many provisions, such as the 
prescribed fine for violating Section 17, which will be increased from not more than 
THB200 to not more than THB20,000 (USD6.25 to USD625).170 At current stage, this 
Bill is still under consideration of the National Assembly. This process has taken a very 
long time due to the changes of Thai government in the past years. 
 
2.5.2 Fishing Gears Licensing 
 
The former Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947),171 amended in B.E. 2496 (1953) and B.E. 
2528 (1985), was the principal fisheries law of Thailand until it was repealed by the 
                                                
167 The National Assembly of Thailand is a bicameral legislature composed of a Senate (150 members) 
and a House of Representatives (HOR, 500 members). The Senate is non-partisan, sitting in 6-year term. 
77 Senators are elected, one of each province. The ot r 73 senators are selected from candidates 
nominated by the Senator Selective Committee. For the HOR, who sits in 4-year term, 375 members are 
directly elected by people who have the right to vote based on the national census. The other 125 
members come from the election on a party-list, represented by different political parties in accordance 
with the proportional representation through a popular vote that each party receives. See, Senate of 
Thailand, The National Assembly under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007) 
(26 February 2015) <http://thai.senate.go.th/in/english/national_assembly_1.php>. 
168 The Thai Vessels Bill B.E. 2551 (2008) section 8. 
169 The Thai Vessels Bill B.E. 2551 (2008) section 10. 
170 The Thai Vessels Bill B.E. 2551 (2008) section 63. 
171 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) is not the first fisheries law of Thailand. The first fisheries law of 
Thailand is the Fisheries Act enacted in B.E. 2444 (1901) and used for 46 years before being repealed and 
replaced by the 1947 fisheries law. At that period, marine fisheries in Thailand had not been developed. 
Fishers mainly used basic traditional fishing gears to catch freshwater fish. Within the first fisheries law, 
the stated fisheries management measure were, therefore, closing fishing areas due to spawning season of 
freshwater fish. However, the main objective of the Fisheries Act B.E. 2444 (1901) was to collect fishery 
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new Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015).172 The Fisheries Act was administered by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. It consisted of 6 chapters, with 73 sections in 
total. Those chapters included ‘Chapter 1 Fisheries; Chapter 2 Cultivation Pond; 
Chapter 3 Registration and Application for Permission; Chapter 4 Fisheries Statistics, 
and Chapter 6: Control, and Penalties.’ The provisin  concerning fishing vessels and 
fishing gears were stated under Chapter of Registration nd Application for Permission 
of this Act.173   
 
Chapter 3 contained the requirement for persons who engaged in fisheries sectors that 
were indicated in the Royal Decree to be registered, an  also required those persons to 
apply for a permit and pay fee before engaging in such occupation.174 For example, the 
person who wanted to conduct fishing career had to pay THB5 (USD0.16) for the 
annual fee.175 The period of validity of the license was one year.176 Fishing gears used in 
Thailand were categorised into two groups, fishing l cense implement and non-fishing 
license implement. The former group was required for registration,177 and the fishers 
who used these fishing gears, were obliged to pay the fishery tax.178 On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                    
tax from fishers. See, Choomjet Karnjanakesorn and Somboon Yen-Eng, 'Revision to Thai Fisheries Law 
and Opportunities for Community-based Management' in Donna J Nickerson (ed), Community-based 
Fisheries Management in Phang-nga Bay, Thailand. Proceedings of the National Workshop on 
Community-based Fisheries Management Organized by the Department of Fisheries of Thailand, FAO 
and the Bay of Bengal Programme, Phuket, Thailand, 14-16 February 1996 (FAO, 1998) vol RAP 
Publication 1998/3, BOBP Report No.78, 159. 
172 The new Fisheries Act of Thailand will come into force later in 2015. See, Legal Affairs Divisions, The 
New Fisheries Act (15 January 2015) <http://www.thaianti-humantraffickingaction.org/Home/?p=457>.   
173 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) chapter 3. 
174 Section 25 of the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) states that ‘The Minister shall have power to issue a 
notification requiring person in any locality who engage in fishing, trading in aquatic animals, fishery 
products or fishery industry as may be specified in the Royal Decree to be registered, and requiring them 
to apply to the competent official for permission before engaging in such occupation with or without the
license fee being charge under this Act’. The ‘Minister’ means the Minister taking charge and control of 
the execution of this Act, which currently means the Minister of Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives. See, the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 4(18); for the ‘competent official’, this 
means the Provincial Governor, Nai Amphor (district officer), fishery officers or person appointed by the 
Minister to carry out this Act. See, the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 4(16). 
175 The Ministerial Regulation No. 17 B.E. 2521 (1978) appendix table No. 4. 
176 ‘The period of validity of a license shall, for the purpose of applying for permission and paying fishery 
tax, commence from the 1st April to the 31st March’. See, the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 43. 
177 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947). Section 26 indicates that ‘The Minister shall have the power to 
issue a notification requiring owners or possessors of any kind of fishing appliance in any locality to have 
the fishing appliance in their possession registered with the competent official’.  
178 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947). Section 28 states that ‘Any person in entitled to use licensed 
fishing appliance only when the license specifying his name has been issued and the fishery tax under this 
Act has been paid. The Minister is empowered to issue a notification exempting the requirement of 
license of any kind of fishing appliance in any locality’. 
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the latter group, e.g., hook and line, traps, spears, was not required to be registered, so 
that the fishers using these gears were not obliged to pay fishery tax.179 The list of 
fishing gears needed to be registered, as well as their prescribed fishery tax, were 
specified in the Ministerial Regulation No. 1 B.E. 2490 (1947).180 The list had been 
revised in the Ministerial Regulation No. 17 B.E. 2521 (1978)181 due to the fact that the 
old rates of fishery tax were not reasonable to the income obtained from marine 
fisheries by using those fishing gears at that time. B sides, for the fishers who used 
stationary fishing gears, such as lift nets, set bag nets, they were required to pay 
additional tax for the areas where such gears were installed. This tax ranged between 
THB10-200 (USD0.31-6.25) per unit.182 However, considering the current income of 
fishers now, such amended rates of fishery tax were still very low.  
 
Based on the Fisheries Act, each particular fishing license could be used only by the 
entitled person. Furthermore, the fishers were requi d to carry the fishing permit and 
license while operating and would present it for inspection based on the request of the 
competent authority.183 If any fishers violated this Act or the restrictions prescribed in 
the fishing license or permit, or did not pay the fishery tax, the competent authority 
could withdraw such fishing license or permit.184 
 
Additionally, Section 32 of this Act empowered the Minister or Provincial Governor in 
his jurisdiction to promulgate a Notification, whic determined the elements including: 
(i) mesh sizes and dimension of all types of fishing gears, as well as sizes, types, 
number and components of fishing gears that were allowed to use;185 (ii) types of 
fishing gears that were strictly banned in fisheries;186 (iii) specified methods of using all 
                                                
179 Karnjanakesorn and Yen-Eng, above n 171, 163. 
180 The Minister of the Ministry of Agriculture Administration (changed to the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives on 1 October B.E. 2505 (1962)) issued the Ministerial Regulation No. 1 B.E. 2490 
(1947) on 14 April B.E. 2490 (1947) based on the power given in Section 4(13) and Section 5 of the 
Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947). 
181 The Ministerial Regulation No. 17 B.E. 2521 (1978) was issued by the Minister of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives on 6 July B.E. 2521 (1978). 
182 The Ministerial Regulation No. 17 B.E. 2521 (1978) appendix table No. 1. 
183 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 35. 
184 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 36. 
185 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 32(1). 
186 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 32(2). 
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types of fishing gears;187 (iv) specified spawning and breeding seasons, and fishing 
gears and practices that were allowed to use during these seasons;188 and (v) types, sizes 
and maximum amount of aquatic animals that were allowed to take.189 Thus, based on 
the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947), these provisions played the main role in managing 
fishing capacity in Thailand.    
 
Nonetheless, as this Act was an outdated law, some provisions were then impractical for 
current status of Thai fisheries, particularly the fine penalties.190 For example, the 
penalty imposed for person who violated the provisin  in Section 32, was fines from 
THB5,000 to THB10,000 (USD156.25 to 312.5), whereas the average net profit 
obtained from marine fisheries in Thailand is between THB36,965 to 464,033 per 
month per vessel (USD1,155.16 to 14,501.03 per month per vessel).191 Clearly, these 
fines are considered very small amounts of money compared with the fishers’ present 
income from marine fisheries. Therefore, some fisher  may not hesitate to take a risk by 
not complying with this law in order to catch fish as much as they can, for instance, by 
using the net that has smaller mesh size than is required by law. Moreover, although the 
fishery tax or fishery fee is considered as a small amount of money, some fishers still 
neglect to either apply for fishing gear license or be registered. It could also be because 
the complied fines are easily affordable,192 so that those fishers may not take it 
seriously. This results in difficulties to obtain the actual numbers of fishers, fishing 
gears and fishing vessels that are operating in Thai fisheries. 
 
Many enforcement problems have also surfaced, particularly the use of new destructive 
fishing gears and fishing methods, which are modifie  to take advantage of the 
loopholes in fisheries regulations. In addition, since there is no fishing zones legally 
                                                
187 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 32(4). 
188 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 32(5). 
189 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 32(6). 
190 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) chapter 6. 
191 The average net profit obtained by Thai fishing vessel sized 20 to 50, 50 to 100, 100 to 500 GT is 
36,965, 45,032 and 464,033 THB/month/vessel, respectively. See, Lymer et al, above n 28, 28.  
192 Section 63 of the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) states that ‘Any person who fails to comply with the 
Notification of the Minister issued under Section 25 or 26 shall be liable to a fine not exceeding one
hundred THB (USD3.13) or to imprisonment not exceeding one month, or to both’. Besides, Section 64 
states that ‘Any person who uses the fishing appliance without licence required by this Act under Section 
28, of fails to pay additional fishery tax under Section 23, shall be liable to a fine of three times the
amount of the tax…’. 
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arranged in Thai waters,193 hence fisheries management measures, for controllig 
fishing capacity in particular, cannot be implemented appropriately. As a consequence, 
the problem of fishing overcapacity in Thailand hasremained. 
 
To respond to the issues addressed above, the Departm nt of Fisheries, with the 
assistance from FAO in 1999, prepared a first draft of the new Fisheries Act that was 
hoped to solve such problems. The draft was reviewed by stakeholders several times 
and eventually submitted to the Cabinet for consideration. However, because of the 
instabilities of the Thai Cabinet and draft revisions required by each Cabinet, the draft 
of the new Fisheries Act could not be approved in pr ciple by the Cabinet until 12 June 
2007. Such draft was then sent to the Council of State of Thailand194 to be examined in 
detail. After amendment based on the comments given by the Council of State of 
Thailand, the Fisheries Bill was approved and returned to the Cabinet on 9 February 
2010.195 The same Fisheries Bill was submitted to the Nation l Assembly by the 
Cabinet for urgent consideration of enactment on 13 May 2012.196 Finally, it has been 
approved by the National Legislation Assembly on 9 January 2015, and will come into 
effect as from 60 days after its publication date in the Government Gazette.197 The 
succeeding discussions of the thesis will therefore ref r to provisions under this new 
Fisheries Act as they are provisions under the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015). 
 
The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) consists of 11 chapters with 101 sections. The 11 
chapters include Chapter 1 Fisheries Management; Chapter 2 Fishing Zones; Chapter 3 
Promotion of Aquaculture; Chapter 4 Food Safety of Fish or Fisheries Products; 
Chapter 5 Import and Export Fish or Fisheries Products; Chapter 6 Overseas Fisheries; 
                                                
193 At present, in terms of the types of fishing areas, Thai fisheries are categorised into four groups, i.e.
(i) preservation fisheries, (ii) leasable fisheries, (iii) reserved fisheries, and (iv) public fisheries. See, the 
Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 6. For public fisheries, everybody has its right to fish and conduct 
aquaculture of aquatic animals by complying with the restrictions issued by the Minister of Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives and published in the Government Gazette. See, the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 
(1947) section 16. 
194 The Council of State of Thailand is governmental legal institution performing both consultative and 
adjudicatory functions. See, The Council of State of Thailand, Background 
<http://www.krisdika.go.th/wps/portal/general/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A2cz
Q0cTQ89ApyAnA0__EIOAQGdXAwMLE30_j_zcVP2CbEdFAIfszEk!/dl3/d3/L3dDb0EvUU5RTGtBI
SEvWUZSdndBISEvNl9OMEM2MUE0MUlRQlJCMElPVDBQUUNFMDBOMw!!/>. 
195 Department of Fisheries, Background of the Fisheries Bill (2010)  
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/management/weblaws/r_pamong6.pdf>. 
196 Within this thesis, it is called the Fisheries Bill B.E. 2555 (2012). 
197 Legal Affairs Divisions, above n 172. 
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Chapter 7 Fees of Fisheries Permits; Chapter 8 Transfer of Fisheries Permits; Chapter 9 
Government Authorities; Chapter 10 Administrative Measures, and Chapter 11 
Penalties. There are a number of notably revisions u der this new Act, including 
provisions aimed to reform fisheries management scheme and promote public 
participation.  
 
In order to improve fisheries management of Thailand, this new Fisheries Act 
categorises fishing areas into three zones, i.e., ‘coastal fisheries zone’, ‘offshore 
fisheries zone’, and ‘freshwater fisheries zone’.198 ‘Coastal fisheries zone’, which is 
basically designated for small-scale fisheries,199 covers the sea areas extending to three 
nautical miles from the shoreline and to a limit nogreater than 12 nautical miles from 
the shoreline according to the authority of the Minister.200 The ‘offshore fisheries zone’ 
is mainly designated for large-scale fisheries201 and covers areas next to the ‘coastal 
fisheries zone’ and extends to the outermost limit of Thailand’s EEZ.202  Freshwater 
fisheries zone exclude the coastal and offshore fisher es zones,203 meaning inland waters 
within land boundaries.204 One of the main purposes of the designation of fishing zones 
is to determine the allowable catches (in terms of species and sizes of fish caught, 
maximum amount of catch),205 as well as to specify fishing gears and practices allowed 
and not allowed to be used (in terms of types, number, size of fishing gears)206 in a 
particular fishing zone.207 The fishers are also required to pay reasonable fishery tax in 
order to obtain such fishing licenses.208 These provisions are aimed to put in place an 
effective legal framework to control fishing capacity in Thai fisheries. 
 
With regard to public participation, the new Act encourages public participation in both 
national and provincial levels. In terms of the national level, the Act requires the 
                                                
198 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 37. 
199 Legal Affairs Divisions, above n 172. 
200 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 38. 
201 Legal Affairs Divisions, above n 172. 
202 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 39. 
203 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 40. 
204 Legal Affairs Divisions, above n 172. 
205 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 6(3). 
206 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 6(1). 
207 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 41-2. 
208 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 43. 
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establishment of the National Fisheries Policy Committee (consisting of both 
government and private sectors), whose mandate is to develop national policies with 
respect to capture fisheries within and beyond Thai w ters, aquaculture, and relevant 
fisheries industries, as well as to propose such policies to the Cabinet to consider for 
implementation.209 For fisheries in Thai waters in particular, the National Fisheries 
Policy Committee is required to issue the fisheries d velopment policy that supports the 
sustainable management of fisheries resources and cpacity.  Furthermore, the 
Committee is mandated to determine the maximum allow ble catch within Thai 
waters.210 This requirement has been stated in Thai fisheries law for the first time.211 
Clearly, these provisions under the new Fisheries Act provide the legal framework that 
supports Thailand to better manage its capacity in fisheries. At the provincial level, the 
Act encourages local fisheries communities to actively participate in managing fisheries 
resources, so that the government authorities will be able to implement the appropriate 
management measures that serve the actual needs of local stakeholders and, therefore, to 
achieve the effective results. To serve this purpose, the Provincial Fisheries Committee 
(also consisting of both government and local private sectors) has been established in 
each province. This Provincial Fisheries Committee has a mandate to propose policy or 
management and conservation measures that are in line with the state of fisheries 
resources and capacity in its competent areas to the National Fisheries Policy 
Committee and the Minister to consider.212 In this sense, the new Fisheries Act has also 
followed the current Constitution of Thailand promulgated in 2007, which strongly 
encourages the public to actively and appropriately participate in the activities 
concerning preservation, conservation and utilisation of natural resources and biological 
diversity.213 
 
In terms of penalties, the new Fisheries Act substantially increases both prison sentence 
and fines. For instance, the fine imposed for violat n of Section 32 under the Fisheries 
Act B.E. 2490 (1947) is only THB5,000 to 10,000 (USD156.25 to 312.5), whereas the 
                                                
209 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 16. 
210 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 16(6). 
211 This provision follows the LOSC art 61(1). 
212 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 20(1)(2). 
213 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007) part 8, section 85(4).  
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fine imposed for the violation of Section 6 under theFisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015)214 
is greatly increased to THB10,000 to 100,000 (USD312.5 to 3,125). The increased fine 
is one of the attempts to make the new Fisheries Act more effectively implemented for 
present fisheries of Thailand.  
  
However, as the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) is a very new fundamental fisheries law 
and needs a number of supplementary Notifications or regulations issued by the 
Minister of Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives or the Governor of provinces to 
support its implementation, several Notifications ad regulations that have been issued 
and applied to support the Thai Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) are therefore still in use. 
Such Notifications, concerning fishing capacity management in particular, are later 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
2.6 The Master Plan for Marine Fisheries of Thailand 
 
Apart from the fisheries laws that are used to govern marine fisheries in Thailand, the 
government of Thailand has also established a particular framework to specially manage 
marine fisheries, including their fishing capacity. 
  
The Department of Fisheries has been well aware that the depleted marine resources in 
Thai waters are the consequences of overcapacity in marine fisheries and the lack of the 
effective marine fisheries management. In order to solve these core problems in Thai 
fisheries, the Department of Fisheries appointed the Master Plan Formulation 
Committee and the four groups of Sub-committee, i.e. Small-scale Fisheries Sub-
committee, Commercial Fisheries Sub-committee, Distant Water Fisheries Sub-
committee, and Information for the Formulation Sub-committee, to develop the Master 
Plan for Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand i  2006.215 During the process of 
the Master Plan formulation, the brainstorming meetings among the representatives of 
stakeholders in fisheries were also arranged in order to supplement the inputs into the 
Master Plan first draft. Subsequently, that draft was proposed in public hearing 
                                                
214 Section 32 of the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) and Section 6 of the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) 
are quite similar in details.  
215 The Master Plan for Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand, hereinafter referred to as the Master 
Plan. 
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meetings participated by fisher representatives from 23 coastal provinces for further 
inputs. Later, the final draft of the Master Plan was submitted to the Cabinet for 
approval on 7 July 2008 and eventually approved in April 2009.216   
 
The Master Plan has been implemented since 2009 for a period of 10 years. This time 
frame is split into two five-year periods. The first period is from 2009-2013, while the 
second period is from 2014-2018. The objectives of the Master Plan include: i) to 
manage marine fisheries in a responsible and sustainable manner; ii) to rehabilitate the 
depleted fish stocks and damaged ecosystem; iii) to develop the efficiency of fisheries 
organisations and support the co-management, as well as establish the cooperation 
network among stakeholders in terms of marine fisher es management; iv) to strengthen 
the capability of fishery enterprises at all levels in order to support them to effectively 
operate under present fishery situations and regulations; v) to enhance the quality of life 
of fishers; and vi) to ensure food security and food safety of fish and fisheries 
products.217 
 
The Master Plan has set three targets, including: i) the sustainability of Thai marine 
fisheries is secured, and it is capable to maintain the annual landing of marine fish at the 
level of 1.7-2.0 million tonnes, consisting of at least 80 per cent of important economic 
species, obtained from the fishing grounds within te national EEZ, and 1.0-1.6 million 
tonnes obtained from distant water fisheries; ii) there is at least one fishers’ organisation 
established in each province, and it actively participates in marine fisheries management 
with government agencies. It also creates a network ith other organisations in adjacent 
areas; and iii) at least 10 per cent of total coastal fishing communities participate in 
community-based fisheries management.218 
 
To achieve the successful outcome of aforementioned bjectives and targets, the Master 
Plan establishes five strategies to cover the components of marine fisheries 
management, i.e., (i) effectively improving the system of marine fisheries management 
and the co-management; (ii) strengthening structure and capability of fisheries 
organisations; (iii) developing and promoting responsible and sustainable utilisation of 
                                                
216 Department of Fisheries, above n 66. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
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marine fisheries resources; (iv) rehabilitating marine ecosystem and fishing grounds in 
order to safeguard biodiversity and marine environme tal quality; and (v) promoting 
and developing distant water fisheries.219 Each strategy also provides measures and 
guidelines related to fishing capacity management in Thai fisheries. The first strategy, 
which concerns the effective improvement of marine f sheries management system and 
the co-management, has as one of its goals is to manage fishing capacity at the 
commensurate level with the current conditions of fish stocks. With the strategy, the 
guidelines and responsible bodies are suggested. The first guideline is to improve the 
effectiveness of granting and renewing the fishing licenses, and impose a reasonable fee 
for the resource rent. The responsible bodies of this task are the Department of Fisheries 
and the Ministry of Transport. Secondly, the Department of Fisheries also needs to 
define the number of fishing vessels and fishing gears, which are suitable for the size of 
sustainable fish stocks. Furthermore, the Department of Fisheries together with the 
Ministry of Transport should cooperate in reducing the number of fishing vessels, and 
controlling the construction of new fishing vessels. Additionally, all relevant agencies 
should develop and implement pilot projects that promote the alternative careers with 
initial supports for fishers. These agencies include the Department of Fisheries, th  
Fisheries Association of Thailand, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Commerce, 
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Social Development 
and Human Security, and the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center 
(SEAFDEC).220 
 
In addition, under the third strategy, the Master Plan provides the guidelines for 
development and promotion of fishing gears and fishing practices for sustainable 
fisheries, that the Department of Fisheries should specify types and sizes of fishing 
gears and practices that are allowed to use, and also promote research studies and 
improvement of fishing gears that are friendly with ecosystem and environment. 
Moreover, the Department of Fisheries and SEAFDEC should provide support, training 
and knowledge to stakeholders, particularly fishers, with regard to the use of fishing 
gears, equipments, and practices that ensure the sustainable fisheries. Additionally, this 
strategy includes the measures to control illegal fishing and destructive fishing practices 
                                                
219 Ibid.    
220 Ibid. 
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that are harmful to marine resources and environment. The guidelines given for such 
measures are to recognise and promote the use of fishing gears and ancillary equipment 
as stated by law, which is under the responsibility of the Department of Fisheries. The 
Department of Fisheries, the Fish Market Organisation, and the Ministry of Commerce 
are also required to cooperate in controlling the marketing of illegal catch. Particularly, 
the Department of Fisheries shall effectively improve laws and regulations needed to 
control the possession of certain types and sizes of some species, and protect the trade 
of fish obtained from illegal fishing. The legislation, which supports the use of fishing 
practices that enhance the reduction of bycatch221 and trash fish, and strengthens the 
punishment for fisheries law violation in order to promote its compliance, is also 
required. Lastly, it is needed to improve MCS measure , including the measures of Port 
State control and vessel monitoring system (VMS) installation, with the active 
participation of local governments and fishers’ organisations. These measures require 
the cooperation from many agencies to support, including the Department of Fisheries, 
the Fish Market Organisation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Ministry of Transport, the Royal Thai Navy, and the Royal Thai Police.222 
 
In the fourth strategy concerning marine ecosystem and fishing ground rehabilitation to 
safeguard biodiversity and marine environmental quaity, one of the measures needed is 
to promote closed areas and closed seasons for marine resource conservation with the 
participation of fisheries communities and fishers’ organisations. The Master Plan 
suggests the Department of Fisheries and the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment to corporately determine the conservation and protection measures for 
particular species by banning the use of certain fishing gears or practices during certain 
periods of year.223 
 
The aforesaid strategies are mainly for marine fisheries management in Thai waters. For 
the measures to promote and develop distant water fisheries, they are stated within the 
last strategy. Those significant measures concerning fishing capacity are to establish 
                                                
221 Bycatch can be characterized as catch that may be (i) prohibited to the gear that caught; (ii) too small 
to sell; (iii) smaller than legal size; and (iv) a t rget species for which the quota has already been 
achieved. See, Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas National Research Council, Sharing the 
Fish:Toward a National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas (The National Academies Press, 1999) 123.    
222 Department of Fisheries, above n 66. 
223 Ibid. 
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three distant water fishing (DWF) databases. The first database consists of information 
on fishing vessels, crews, and fishing gears gathered f om fisheries companies and 
relevant fisheries organisations. The second database contains the information on 
available fishing grounds, host countries’ fisheries policies and requirements, as well as 
the information on the operations of RFMOs. For the last database, it contains 
information on the demands of raw materials for fishing industries. The responsible 
agencies for the former two databases suggested by the Master Plan are the Department 
of Fisheries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transport, and the 
Fisheries Association of Thailand, whereas the Department of Fisheries, the Ministry of 
Industry, and the Ministry of Commerce take responsibility for the last one.224 
 
Another measure suggested by the Master Plan is to institutionalise distant water 
fisheries. It is essential to manage distant water fisheries as it is required by relevant 
laws, international conventions and agreements, as well as the conditions set forth in the 
agreements. It is also important to set the reasonable penalty for these law violations 
made by fishers and/or fishing companies. The main responsible bodies suggested for 
these tasks are the Department of Fisheries, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.225 
 
It can be seen that various stakeholders, both government and private sectors, are 
required to cooperate under the Master Plan. The effective implementation of those 
measures indicated by the Master Plan, therefore, truly depends on such stakeholders’ 
commitments in participation. It is necessary that fishers and concerned agencies must 
be motivated to endorse the development principles incorporated in the Master Plan, 
and then solicit their endorsement. Fund allocation for action plan implementation, as 
well as the monitoring and evaluation of those activities are then needed to carry out.226 
Action plans and their strategic measures respecting fishing capacity controls in 
Thailand, such as to delimitate the boundaries of fishing zones with due to the subject of equity 
and transparency, to promote marine fisheries co-management for right-based fisheries,227 and 
                                                
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid. 
227 These two measures are under Strategy 1 of the Master Plan. 
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to strengthen the capacity of fisheries organisations,228 are later reviewed together with 
the management tools discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter established the importance of the marine capture fisheries sector in 
Thailand. The chapter discussed marine capture fisheries in Thai waters and distant 
waters fisheries, and small-scale and large-scale fisheries. Clearly, marine capture 
fisheries play an essential role for Thailand, including securing domestic food supply, a 
source of income from exported seafood products, and providing occupation for 
fisheries communities. Nonetheless, due to the rapid development of marine fisheries 
without adequate management, Thailand has confronted many problems in its fisheries 
sector, particularly the issue of overcapacity. 
  
In order to control fishing capacity in Thailand, the legislative frameworks governing 
fishing vessel registration and fishing gear licensing are implemented. But, due to the 
loopholes and outdated provisions of the legislative framework derived from the 
Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947), the problem of overcapacity has remained. The 
Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) recently enacted and the Master Plan adopted are 
expected to provide a better legal and management framework in managing fishing 
capacity for Thailand. In order to address the capaity problem for desirable results, 
however, supplementary regulations (e.g., Notifications) and technical instruments that 
support this new legislation also need to be designd and implemented effectively.      
 
 
                                                
228 This measure is under Strategy 2 of the Master Plan. 
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CHAPTER 3 LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR FISHING 
CAPACITY MANAGEMENT IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to analyse the international and regional instruments that are relevant 
to fishing capacity management. It consists of three main sections. The first section 
provides legislative frameworks for fishing capacity management within national 
jurisdiction and on the high seas by examining relevant provisions of both legally 
binding and non-legally binding international instruments. International legally binding 
instruments include the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,1 the 
1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas,2 and the 1995 Agreement 
for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.3 This section also discusses 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measur s which increasingly 
impact fishing capacity management at all levels. For non-legally binding instruments, 
the chapter discusses the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,4 and the 
International Plans of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.5 The second 
section focuses on the legal and policy framework f fishing capacity management at 
the regional level. Under this section, the Conservation and Management Measures of 
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center 
(SEAFDEC) Regional Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and Regional Plan of 
Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing in 
the Region are mainly discussed. The last main section of this chapter identifies the 
criteria for fishing capacity management based on the findings in earlier sections. This 
                                                
1 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
ATS31 (entered in to force 16 November 1994). 
2 The 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, opened for signature 29 November 1993, ATS 26 (enter d 
in to force 24 April 2003). 
3 The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisi n of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 December 1995 (entered in to force 11 
December 2001). 
4 The 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted 31 October 1995. 
5 The International Plans of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, adopted February 1999. 
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set of criteria will be used to measure the adequacy of the legal and policy framework 
for managing fishing capacity of Thailand in succeeding chapters. 
 
3.2 Legislative Framework for Fishing Capacity Management at Global Level 
 
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/177 in 2008 underscored the 
current situation that many fish stocks of the world are overfished or partly regulated 
with enormous fishing efforts. It is in consequence of, among other things, IUU fishing, 
insufficiency of flag State control and enforcement particularly in terms of MCS, 
insufficient management measures, harmful subsidies in fisheries, and overcapacity 
problem.6 The global issue of overcapacity is recognised as a key fisheries management 
concern,7 which needs to be addressed. To effectively manage fishing capacity, 
therefore, requires the implementation of a wide range of policies and management 
measures that are aimed to ensure the appropriate balance between fishing inputs and 
outputs or production in fisheries. In order to develop an appropriate policy framework 
for managing fishing capacity within and beyond national jurisdiction, fisheries 
authorities should refer to the relevant international instruments,8 both legally and non-
legally binding. The significant international instruments are reviewed under the 
following sections. 
 
3.2.1 International Legally Binding Instruments 
 
There are several international fisheries instruments, which, either directly or indirectly, 
provide standards for coastal States to manage their fishing capacity within their 
national jurisdiction. The primary international legally binding instruments are 
discussed below. 
 
 
                                                
6 62/177 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: Sustainable Fisheries, Including Through the 
1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisi n  of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments, 2.  
7 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2008 (FAO, 
2009) 9. 
8 Steve Cunningham and Dominique Greboval, Managing Fishing Capacity: A Review of Policy and 
Technical Issues (FAO, 2001) 1. 
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3.2.1.1 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
The international instrument of most significant impact in fisheries is the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.9 The LOSC,10 which came into force on 16 
November 1994,11 has many revolutionary features, one of which is the regime of the 
EEZ12, which provides the framework for exploring, exploiting, conserving and 
managing marine living resources as well as non-livi g resources.13 In terms of living 
resources, States are required to determine their allowable catch in their EEZ14 and must 
ensure the implementation of appropriate conservation and management measures in 
order to protect the living resources in the EEZ from overexploitation. In order to 
achieve this goal, coastal States and international rganisations at all levels are also 
required to cooperate as appropriate.15 The coastal State is further required to promote 
the ‘optimum utilisation’ of living resources16 by determining its capacity to harvest 
such resources in national EEZ.17 It is entitled to reserve for its nationals the total 
allowable catch (TAC).18 However, if any coastal State does not have adequat  capacity 
to fish all of the TAC, such State will provide other States access to the surplus through 
agreements or fishing arrangements.19 This implies that coastal States are required to 
                                                
9 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, hereinafter referred to as LOSC. 
10 The LOSC was adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) 
on 30 April 1982 in New York. The negotiation on the LOSC that was aimed to establish a 
comprehensive constitution for the oceans took nine years. The LOSC was concluded and opened for 
signature on 10 December 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. See, United Nations, The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical persctive) United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm>; United 
Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 : Overview and Full 
Text (8 April 2009) United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm>. 
11 United Nations, above n 10. 
12 LOSC part V. 
13 LOSC art 56(1)(a). It provides ‘(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to 
the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and
winds;’ 
14 LOSC art 61(1). 
15 LOSC art 61(2). 
16 LOSC art 62(1). 
17 LOSC art 62(2). 
18 Jose A De Yturriaga, The International Regime of Fisheries: From UNCLOS 1982 to the Presential 
Sea, A Series of Studies on the International, Legal, Institutional and Policy Aspects of Ocean 
Development (Kluwer Law International, 1997) 116. 
19 LOSC art 62(2).  
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limit its fishing capacity in EEZ fisheries in order to discharge their conservation 
obligations under the LOSC. 
 
In addition, coastal States are required to adopt laws and regulations on the conservation 
and management of EEZ’s living resources consistent with the LOSC.20 Particularly, 
coastal States are required to ‘determining the species which may be caught, and fixing 
quotas of catch, whether in relation to particular stocks or groups of stocks or catch per 
vessel over a period of time or to the catch by natio ls of any State during a specified 
period’.21 Coastal States are further required to ‘regulating seasons and areas of fishing, 
the types, sizes and amount of gear, and the types, sizes and number of fishing vessels 
that may be used.’22 This clearly shows that the LOSC requires coastal States to control 
their fishing capacity, i.e., types, sizes and number of fishing gears and vessels, 
employed in their EEZs as at the level that is commensurate with the catch quota of the 
allowed species stocks during fishing seasons and areas assigned. Additionally, fishers 
and fishing vessels are obliged to be licensed and p y fees,23 so that the actual numbers 
of fishers and fishing vessels will be obtained and used for effective fishing capacity 
management.  
 
The rights and responsibilities of coastal States in regard to their fisheries on the high 
seas are also defined in the LOSC.24 States are required to cooperate with other States o 
conserve and manage living resource in the high seas areas, through subregional or 
regional fisheries organisations.25 Conservation and management measures of RFMOs, 
particularly the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), as a regional legislative 
framework for fishing capacity management, will be discussed in detail under Section 
3.3.1 of this chapter.26  
 
                                                
20 LOSC art 62(4). 
21 LOSC art 62(4)(b). 
22 LOSC art 62(4)(c) 
23 LOSC art 62(4)(a). It provides that coastal States shall conduct ‘licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels 
and equipment, including payment of fees and other forms of remuneration, which, in the case of 
developing coastal States, may consist of adequate compensation in the field of financing, equipment ad 
technology relating to the fishing industry;’. 
24 LOSC arts 116-20. 
25 LOSC art 118. 
26 To date, Thailand has been a member of only one RFMO, which is the IOTC, and has been a 
Participating Non-Member State of WCPFC. 
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For the purpose of conservation and management of the living resources on the high 
seas, the LOSC requires States to implement measures aimed to sustain or restore 
populations of fisheries species as at levels that provide the MSY of such species on the 
high seas.27 Thus, States, through RFMOs, are required to determin  the MSY of 
harvested species in areas concerned, as well as the commensurate fishing effort for that 
MSY. Therefore, participating States of RFMO harvest their catch based on allocated 
quota, and thus fishing capacity on the high seas is addressed within a catch quota 
system.28 However, the LOSC also provides that States should ‘ensure that conservation 
measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact against the 
fishermen of any State’,29 which implies that participating States cannot deny nationals 
of new participating or non-participating States to access the catch quotas. Thus, the 
existing participants possibly have no incentives to rebuild stocks if the benefits of 
rebuilding are to be shared with additional participants. As a result, the conservation 
goals on the high seas could be difficult to achieve,30 as well as fishing capacity on the 
high seas could not be controlled effectively. Therefore, the LOSC alone seems not 
adequate to be a framework for managing fishing capa ity on the high sea areas. 
 
3.2.1.2 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 
 
In an attempt to address the inadequacy of the management framework on the high seas, 
the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas31 was approved at the 27th 
Session FAO Conference.32 This FAO Compliance Agreement, which is consistent with 
the LOSC, is a significant international agreement, which supports a framework of 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral on the conservation and management of high sea 
                                                
27 LOSC art 119(1)(a). 
28 Christopher Newton, 'Review of Issues for the Control and Reduction of Fishing Capacity on the High 
Seas' in Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts 
and Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 1999) vol 386, 206, 55. 
29 LOSC art 119(3). 
30 Newton, above n 28. 
31 The 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, hereinaft r referred to as FAO Compliance Agreement. 
32 The 27th Session was held in Rome on 24 November 1993. The FAO Compliance Agreement was 
entered into force on 24 April 2003, upon deposit of he 25th instrument of ratification. See, William 
Edeson, Fisheries and Aquaculture topics. FAO Compliance Agreement. Topics Fact Sheets. (27 May 
2005) <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14766/en>. 
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fisheries. The FAO Compliance Agreement also develops a core component of the FAO 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries that provides principles and standards of 
behaviours for responsible fishing.33 
 
The FAO Compliance Agreement aims to prevent the reflagging of fishing vessels,34 
which has been conducted as a way to avoid the compliance with international 
conservation and management measures due to the fact that States inefficiently govern 
their vessels and/or that are not a member of, or do not cooperate with, RFMOs.35 The 
conduct of reflagging is normally connected with IUU fishing, as, for example, it is in 
violation of international obligations. It also undermines the effectiveness of controls on 
fishing capacity employed on the high seas. The FAO Compliance Agreement a tempts 
to tackle such issue by urging flag States to streng hen and enhance their responsibilities 
on their vessels operating on the high seas. Particularly, the FAO Compliance 
Agreement requires flag States to use an appropriate process to authorise the vessels to 
fish on the high seas.36 Furthermore, States are needed to make certain that their 
authorised fishing vessels will operate on the high seas with the conditions of the 
authorisation,37 which implies that States can legally exert control over the fishing 
vessels before authorising them to operate on the high seas. Flag States can therefore 
limit the level of their fishing capacity, e.g., types, sizes and number of fishing gears 
and vessels, employed on the high seas. Moreover, States are not allowed to authorise 
fishing vessels that have a history of non-compliance with international conservation 
                                                
33 Primary Production Committee, 'International Treaty Examination of the Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High 
Sea' (10 June 2005) <http://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-
nz/47DBSCH_SCR3137_1/105a01a5d53ee8c6145e80ed305e7736894bc403>. 
34 Re-flagging is the act of changing the national registration of a fishing vessel and hence its nationl 
flag, as a means of avoiding compliance with international conservation and management measures. See, 
Gerald Moore, 'The FAO Compliance Agreement' in Myron H Nordquist and John Norton Moore (eds), 
Current Fisheries Issues and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2000) 77.    
35 FAO Compliance Agreement art III(1)(a). It provides that ‘Each Party shall take such measures as may 
be necessary to ensure that fishing vessels entitled to fly its flag do not engage in any activity that 
undermines the effectiveness of international conservation and management measures.’; article V(1) 
provides that ‘The Parties shall cooperate as appropriate in the implementation of this Agreement, and 
shall, in particular, exchange information, including evidentiary material, relating to activities of fishing 
vessels in order to assist the flag State in identifyi g those fishing vessels flying its flag reported to have 
engaged in activities undermining international conservation and management measures, so as to fulfil its 
obligations under Article III.’    
36 FAO Compliance Agreement art III(2). 
37 FAO Compliance Agreement art III(2). 
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and management measures.38 Besides, the FAO Compliance Agreement introduces the 
process for data and information exchange of high seas fishing vessels, and gives the 
standard for enhanced international cooperation in order to achieve the effectiveness of 
international conservation and management measures complied on the high seas.39 Such 
measures are hoped to get rid of IUU fishing and control the level of fishing capacity 
that ensures not only the sustainability of fish stocks but also the protection of 
biodiversity40 from negative impacts of fishing activities on thehigh seas.41 
 
Based on the aforementioned provisions, the FAO Compliance Agreement, therefore, 
governs the control over fishing capacity of State parties’ fishing fleets, which operate 
on the high seas. Additionally, although there could be no identifiable incentives for 
flag States to restrict the capacity of their fleets provided in open access conditions in 
high sea fisheries, the data on fishing vessels authorised to operate on the high seas 
collated by FAO42 through the FAO Compliance Agreement would allow for monitoring 
of capacity among States.43 The FAO Compliance Agreement establishes this 
                                                
38 FAO Compliance Agreement art III(5)(a). 
39 FAO Compliance Agreement art VI. 
40 For example, the FAO Compliance Agreement, among multiple treaties, has reinforced the pledge to 
protect deep-sea biodiversity from high seas bottom rawling and to conserve and manage bottom 
fisheries on the high seas. See, Environment and Conservation Organisations of New Zealand, Deep Sea 
Conservation: UN General Assembly Process (20 July 2012) <http://www.eco.org.nz/main-
menu/publications/deep-sea-conservation.html>; 64/72 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: 
Sustainable Fisheries, Including Through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seaof 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments; 
61/105 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: Sustainable Fisheries, Including Through the 1995 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions f the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation nd Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments. 
41 Primary Production Committee, above n 33. 
42 A database called the High Seas Vessel Authorization Record (HSVAR) was developed for this 
purpose in 1994. However, the technology used for that database is now outdated and needs to be 
developed in a new environment, which provides an opportunity to expand the technical content to meet 
other information needs and fishery status and trends reporting in general. To serve these demands, FAO
has developed with extra-budgetary assistance a Fisherie  Global Information System (FIGIS) as a web-
based information management tool to exchange and disseminate fisheries information with partner 
organisations, such as international organisations, regional fishery bodies and national scientific institutes. 
See, Richard Grainger, 'High Seas Fishing Vessel Database' in Myron H Nordquist and John Norton 
Moore (eds), Current Fisheries Issues and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000) 93. Such organis tions, which are willing to report and share 
information on status and trends of fishery resources, have formed a partnership and collaborated within a 
formal agreement of the Fishery Resources Monitoring System (FIRMS). See, FIRMS, 'FIRMS 
Information Management Policy' (FIRMS FSC4/2007/Inf.3, FAO, 2007) 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/DOCUMENT/FIGIS_FIRMS/2007/inf3e.pdf>.      
43 Newton, above n 28, 63. 
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mechanism and, coupled with the development of its 24 hour a day electronic access to 
its world list of authorisations, provides a basic tool for compliance and enforcement of 
authorisations to all regional fishery organisations.44 This data bank, even it may not 
include vessels smaller than 24 metres in length that are exempted to comply with 
administrative provisions of this agreement,45 would provide the information necessary 
for assessing the capacity of the high seas fleets,46 which will be helpful in managing 
fishing capacity on the high seas. 
 
3.2.1.3 The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
 
To specifically address the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks,47 the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks48 was adopted on 4 August 1995, and entered into force n 11 
December 2001.49 The Fish Stocks Agreement is an elaboration of Articles 63(2)50 and 
                                                
44 Ibid 57. 
45 FAO Compliance Agreement art II(2). See, FAO, International Fisheries: Instruments with Index 
(Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs, 1998) 42-3. 
46 Newton, above n 28, 57. 
47 Straddling fish stocks are the fish stocks that straddle the boundary of a State’s EEZ and the high seas 
(some fish stocks might straddle out of an EEZ area, whereas some fish stocks might straddle into an EEZ
area). On the other hand, highly migratory fish stocks are fish stocks that normally travel covering large 
distances and can be found in a number of EEZs and the high seas. Highly migratory species are listed in 
Annex 1 of the LOSC. See, LOSC annex I. 
48 The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, hereinafter referred to as Fish Stocks Agreement. 
49 The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (In Force as from 11 December 2001): 
Overview (31 July 2013) 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm>. 
50 LOSC art 63(2). It suggests that ‘Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both 
within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and 
the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate 
subregional or regional organisations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these 
stocks in the adjacent area.’  
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64(1)51 of the LOSC, and was an effort to curb rising conflicts and unilateral actions 
regarding the rights and duties of States to exploit and manage straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks. It provides a legal basis for adopting management measures that 
incorporate new environmental principles, provision on compliance and enforcement, 
as well as the duty of states to cooperate.52 These measures are aimed to benefit species 
that are fished on the high seas and throughout the range of stocks in the medium to 
long term.53 
 
More importantly, the Fish Stocks Agreement provides a legal basis for eliminating 
excess fishing capacity, as it requires coastal States nd flag States operating on the high 
seas to ‘take measures to prevent or eliminate overfishing and excess fishing capacity 
and to ensure that levels of fishing effort do not exceed those commensurate with the 
sustainable use of fishery resources’.54 States are further required to adopt the 
precautionary approach to conserve, manage, and exploit straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks55 by setting precautionary reference points,56 as well as 
implement measures to make certain that the exploitati n level of these resources is not 
over the reference points.57 Precautionary reference points include limit refernce points 
and target reference points.58 Although no specifics are provided, it must be assumed 
that limit reference points should take into consideration excess fishing capacity. By 
setting limit reference points lower than biological requirements (e.g., MSY) to take 
                                                
51 LOSC art 64(1) suggests that ‘The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for 
the highly migratory species listed in Annex I shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international 
organisations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilisation f 
such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for 
which no appropriate international organisation exists, the coastal State and other States whose nationals 
harvest these species in the region shall cooperate to establish such an organisation and participate in its 
work.’ 
52 Tore Henriksen, Geir Honneland and Are Sydnes, Law and Politics in Ocean Governance: The Un 
Fish Stocks Agreement and Regional Fisheries Management Regimes A Series of Studies on the 
International, Legal, Institutional and Policy Aspects of Ocean Development (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2006) 1. 
53 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 7, 35. 
54 Fish Stocks Agreement art 5(h). 
55 Fish Stocks Agreement art 6(1). 
56 A precautionary reference point refers to ‘an estima ed value derived through an agreed scientific 
procedure, which corresponds to the state of the resource and of the fishery, and which can be used as a 
guide for fisheries management.’ See, Fish Stocks Agreement annex II(1). 
57 Fish Stocks Agreement art 6(4). 
58 Limit or conservation reference points set catch ceiling aimed to control the harvest to be under safe 
biological limits that the stocks can produce MSY, whereas target or management reference points are 
adopted to achieve management objectives. See, Fish Stocks Agreement annex II(2). 
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into consideration excess capacity, this would provide an incentive for flag States to 
adjust their capacity as a means to increase catch levels.59 For example, States should 
control their fishing capacity to not being above th level that can produce the MSY. 
 
However, to apply measures for fishing capacity by individual States under open access 
conditions would conflict the interest of any State, unless appropriate arrangement has 
been developed, and consented to, by a regional or subregional fishery organisation and 
applied to all participating States.60 For instance, if the programs to limit fishing 
capacity of tuna purse seines fisheries are needed,61 there could be a problem to enlist 
the cooperation of concerned States that want to expand their tuna fleets, particularly 
developing States who currently do not have any tuna fleets or have small ones.62 
Additionally, based on the experiences of RFMOs, there have been difficulties in setting 
TACs due to data limitations (e.g., under-reported data, uncertainty of data) for stock 
assessments.63 Thus, the MSY analysed from limited data could be unreliable.64 
Consequently, using such MSY as a reference point in managing fleet capacity by 
RFMOs would not truly achieve the effective results, and probably undermine the 
conservation of concerned stock. 
 
Additionally, in terms of controlling access of non-member vessels of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement within the competence areas of regional fishery organisations, the Fish 
                                                
59 Newton, above n 28, 67. 
60 Ibid 56. 
61 It has been found that, at global level, there is more purse seine fishing capacity than needed to harvest 
current level of tuna catch. See, James Joseph et al, 'Addressing the Problem of Excess Fishing Capacity 
in Tuna Fisheries' (Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 2006) 
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Fleet-capacity-Oct2006.pdf 7. 
62 Ibid. 
63 For example, the ICCAT has found that the catches of bluefin tuna from the East Atlantic and 
Mediterranean were seriously under-reported between th  mid-1990s through 2007. The Standing 
Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) has estimated the catches during this period could have 
been on the order of 50,000 to 61,000 tonnes per year based on the number of vessels operating in the 
areas. See, ICCAT, 'Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS)' (The 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlan ic Tunas, 3-7 October 2011) 
<http://www.iccat.es/Documents/Meetings/Docs/SCRC2011-Report-ENG.pdf> 78. 
64 For instance, the IOTC Scientific Committee (SC) reported that although the IOTC at its 15th Session 
did not request for a new assessment of albacore stck to be taken in 2011, there remains considerable 
uncertainty about the relationship between abundance and the standardized CPUE series of albacore. 
Therefore, the SC suggested that there should be an urgent need to carry out a revised stock assessment 
for the albacore resource in the Indian Ocean in 2012. See, IOTC, 'Report of the Fourteenth Session of the 
IOTC Scientific Committee' (IOTC-2011-SC14-R[E], IOTC, 12-17 December 2011) 
<http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2011/sc/IOTC-2011-SC14-R[E].pdf> para 32. 
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Stocks Agreement, under article 17, provides that ‘A State which is not a member of a 
subregional or regional fisheries management organisation or is not a participant in a 
subregional or regional fisheries management arrangement, and which does not 
otherwise agree to apply the conservation and management measures established by 
such organisation or arrangement, is not discharged from the obligation to cooperate, in 
accordance with the Convention and this Agreement, i  the conservation and 
management of the relevant straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks’65 
and therefore ‘Such State shall not authorise vessels flying its flag to engage in fishing 
operations for the straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks which are 
subject to the conservation and management measures established by such organisation 
or arrangement.’66 Moreover, States, who are parties of such organisations or 
participants in regional arrangements ‘shall take masures consistent with this 
Agreement and international law to deter activities of uch vessels which undermine the 
effectiveness of conservation and management measures.’67 This is presumed that the 
outcome of these actions is acceptance of the conservation and management measures 
by any States that fish for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. The 
international action that can be taken to ensure non-cooperating states revoke 
authorisations to fish is, however, not specified.68 The Fish Stocks Agreement further 
provides that ‘States shall assist each other in ident fying vessels reported to have 
engaged in activities undermining the effectiveness of ubregional, regional or global 
conservation and management measures.’69 This provision suggests that the 
international action is restricted to a form of ’blacklisting’ of non-complying vessels 
and/or their flag States.70 Such vessels would therefore be prohibited to operate and then 
the fishing capacity associated would be reduced. 
 
However, although the Fish Stocks Agreement requires flag States to record detail and 
information of any fishing vessels that are authorised to operate on the high seas,71 it 
                                                
65 Fish Stocks Agreement art 17(1) 
66 Fish Stocks Agreement art 17(2). 
67 Fish Stocks Agreement art 18(4). 
68 Newton, above n 28, 57. 
69 Fish Stocks Agreement art 20(4). 
70 Newton, above n 28, 57. 
71 Fish Stocks Agreement art 18(3)(c). It states that the measures should be implemented by a State with 
regard to vessels flying its flag will include ‘establishment of a national record of fishing vessels 
authorized to fish on the high seas and provision of access to the information contained in that record on 
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does not require States to provide the detail of such authorisations to a depository 
collating all states’ authorisations. This could be an obstacle in assessing the level of 
fishing capacity on the high seas.72 Moreover, although the Fish Stocks Agreement 
imposes the obligations on flag States to adhere to conservation and management 
measures required by regional fishery organisations, particular measures needed to 
address overcapacity in participating fishing fleets are not specified.73  
 
Besides, the expansion of fishing fleets beyond the areas of national EEZ into the high 
seas also raises questions when straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
are found on high sea areas, which are not the competence areas of any regional fishery 
organisation. This gap in the legal framework causes difficulties in effectively 
implementing the Fish Stocks Agreement.74 This similar issue also happens with species 
that are not either straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks but found on 
high seas areas. Currently, although there is an attemp  to address this gap, it concerns 
only particular high seas areas, e.g., high seas in the South Pacific.75 The conservation 
and management measures for non-highly migratory fish stocks should be widely 
implemented in all high seas areas.        
 
Overall, one of the most important contributions of the Fish Stocks Agreement was 
international acceptance of the need of flag States to authorise their high seas fishing 
vessels.76 Based on this empowerment provided by the Fish Stocks Agreement, flag 
States can control capacity of their high seas fishing fleets by applying regulations, such 
as gear and vessel restrictions. Nonetheless, as the Fis  Stocks Agreement provides 
States the guidelines that only focus on fisheries of traddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish Stocks on the high seas and do not concern the authorization of fishing 
                                                                                                                                    
request by directly interested States, taking into account any national laws of the flag State regarding the 
release of such information;’ 
72 It is unless States are parties of RFMOs that requi  participating States to provide such details.  
73 Newton, above n 28, 57. 
74 Ibid 64. 
75 Participating States of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO), 
which has entered into force on 24 August 2012, are committed to the long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of non-highly migratory fish species (pelagic and benthic) on the high seas of the South 
Pacific Ocean and in so doing safeguarding the marine ecosystems in which the resources occur. See, 
SPRFMO, South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) 
<http://www.southpacificrfmo.org/>. 
76 Newton, above n 28, 206. 
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vessels for other fisheries, using this instrument as an only legal framework, therefore, 
cannot control capacity of fishing fleets operating on the high seas as a whole. Adopting 
the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries has subsequently addressed this 
issue.77 
 
3.2.1.4 The World Trade Organisation Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
 
As some types of subsidy in fisheries can contribute to the problem of overcapacity and 
overfishing,78 another legally binding instrument that will play n important role in 
controlling fishing capacity at global level is the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
 
Subsidies refer to financial contributions that are p ovided by governments or any 
public agencies79 and give a private benefit.80 Subsidies provided in fisheries sector can 
be either direct, such as vessel buyback programs, or indirect, such as waived tax on 
fuel, and may be given for necessary materials and services, revenue or price support.81 
The fisheries subsidies can be categorised into eight groups, including ‘fisheries 
infrastructure’,82 ‘management services and research’,83 ‘subsidies for accessing to other 
States’ EEZs’,84 ‘removal of vessels and withdrawal of licenses’,85 ‘subsidies to capital 
                                                
77 Details in this regard are discussed under section 3.2.2.1. 
78 WTO, 'Annual Report 2014' (2014) <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep14_e.pdf> 
38. 
79 The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art 1. 
80 William E Schrank, Introducing Fisheries Subsidies (FAO, 2003) 2. 
81 Ibid 11-14. 
82 They include port facilities and free or low rates of moorage for fishing vessels; improvement of fishing 
port infrastructure, e.g., support to producer agencies – institution infrastructure. On the other hand, they 
exclude general infrastructures, e.g., roads and ports that are served for general public and all industries 
that are involved in trade. See, Anja von Moltke (ed), Fisheries Subsidies, Sustainable Development, and 
the WTO (Earthscan, 2010) 21-2. 
83 These programmes concern stock enhancement, e.g., fish habitat rehabilitation, release of fish seeds; 
fisheries management, e.g., MCS; fisheries enforcement, e.g., prosecuting of law violation; fish stock 
assessment; identification and development of new fisheries; Research and Development for new 
fisheries technologies; marine protection areas etc. See, ibid 23.    
84 They include partly financial support of the costs for accessing other EEZs’ waters based on 
international fishing access agreements. See, ibid 23. 
85 They include money compensation for the permanent withdrawal of fishing vessels and fishing permits. 
See, ibid 24. 
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costs’,86 ‘subsidies to variable costs’,87 ‘revenue support and unemployment 
insurance’,88 and ‘subsidies for price support’.89 
  
Since the 1990s, inappropriate fisheries subsidies have been recognised as a significant 
factor contributing to overfishing and to the overcapitalisation of fishing fleets.90 
Foreign and international governmental organisations (IGOs), for example, the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and non-g vernmental Organisations 
(NGOs), such as World Wildlife Fund (WWF), have brought increased intention to this 
issue,91 as well as some developed and developing States that together formed a 
coalition92 in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), calling themselves the ‘Friends of 
Fish (FoFs)’.93 This group has made efforts to put fisheries subsidie  on the WTO 
negotiation agenda in order to seek for significant reduction of fisheries subsidies that 
have led to the problems of overcapacity and overfishing.94  
 
Eventually, in 2001 when the WTO Ministers gathered at the 4th Ministerial Meeting in 
Doha, member States were called ‘to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries 
subsidies, taking into consideration the importance of fisheries sector to developing 
                                                
86 They include, for example, grants for fleet renewal and modernization; expedited depreciation that 
decreases taxation of fishing vessels and fishing gears; grants for fisheries company development; 
assistance to dockyards that support fishing vessel construction. See, ibid 25. 
87 They include, for instance, the subsidies for fuel tax waiver or drawback for vessels; income tax 
postponement for fishers; vessels insurance and reisurance programmes; subsidies to decrease prices of 
baits; compensation for damaged gear; and subsidies for transport. See, ibid 25. 
88 They are, such as supplementary incomes for fishers and fisheries workers; payments for unemployed 
fisheries workers; and payments to vessel owners for temporary stop of fishing. See, ibid 26. 
89 They are, for example, the government support to guarantee minimum prices of fish or to keep fish 
prices in domestic markets above the prices in world markets. See, ibid 26. 
90 UNEP, 'The WTO Fishery Subsidies Negotiations: Update and Introductory Briefing for New 
Delegates' (1 April 2009) 
http://www.unep.ch/etb/events/WTO%20FS%20workshop%201%20Apr%202009/Meeting%20Report%
20UNEP-WWF%20Briefing%201April09.pdf. para 8. 
91 Ibid. 
92 A number of States have formed coalitions in the WTO. Each group normally speaks with one voice 
using a single coordinator or negotiating team. See, WTO, Groups in the Rules Negotiations (10 
September 2014) <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/rules_groups_e.htm>. 
93 FoFs consists of 11 WTO members, i.e., Argentina, Australia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru and United States of America. See, ibid. 
94 FoFs claims that estimated subsidies to the fisheries sector are about USD14-20.5 billion annually, or 
20-25 per cent of revenues that have contributed to overcapacity and overfishing problems. See, WTO, 
Rules: AD, SCM including Fisheris Subsidies: Negotiations to Clarify and Improve Disciplines WTO 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/brief_e/brief08_e.htm>. 
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countries.’95 The fisheries subsidies negotiations thus become one of the subjects in the 
core agenda of the WTO rules at Doha Ministerial Meeting.96 The international 
diplomatic pressure for a strong outcome to the fisheries subsidies negotiations grew 
steadily. Therefore, to re-emphasise the Doha Declaration’s call, in 2002 heads of States 
gathered at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, called on 
governments to eliminate fisheries subsidies, which contribute to overcapacity, through 
effective new WTO rules on fisheries subsidies.97 
 
However, when a major UNEP workshop held in Geneva in 2004 moved the 
negotiations from the question of ‘whether’ to the question of ‘how’ fisheries subsidies 
could be reformed through WTO rules,98 the focus of the discussions is therefore on the 
approach to new disciplines and their structure.99 Later in 2005, the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong issued a significantly strengthened negotiating mandate that 
expressly called for a ban on subsidies, which leadto the problem of overcapacity and 
overfishing, with special and differential treatment (S&DT)100 for developing States.101 
Furthermore, this conference assigned the chairperson to draft consolidated texts of the 
                                                
95 Peter  Manning, World Inventory of Fisheries. Subsidies in Fisheries. Issues Fact Sheets (27 May 2005) 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/13333/en>. 
96 At the Doha Ministerial Conference, WTO Members agreed to start negotiations in the area of ‘WTO 
Rules’. These negotiations concern the matters of: the Agreement on Implementation of article VI of 
GATT 1994 (or better known as the Anti-dumping Agreement); the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, particularly WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies; and WTO provisions that 
apply to regional trade agreements. See, WTO, The Rules Negotiations (26 February 2015) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/rulesneg_e.htm>. 
97 Manning, above n 95. 
98 UNEP, above n 90, para 29. 
99 WTO, above n 94. 
100 In the context of globalization, special and differential treatment (S&DT) is the product of the 
coordinated political efforts of developing countries to correct the perceived inequalities of the post-war 
international trading system by introducing preferential treatment in their favour across the spectrum of 
international economic relations. See, Murray Gibbs, 'Special and Differential Treatment in the Context 
of Globalization' (UNCTAD, 10 December 1998). Under the WTO Agreements, there are special 
provisions that provide developing countries special rights and give developed countries the possibility to 
treat developing countries more favourably than other WTO Members. Such special provisions include 
extended periods for implementing Agreements and commitments, measures to support trading 
opportunities for these countries, provisions that require all WTO members to protect the interests on 
trade of developing countries, support for developing countries to build the infrastructure for WTO work, 
handle disputes, and implement technical standards, nd provisions related to least-developed country 
(LDC) Members. See, WTO, Work on Special and Differential Provisions (2015) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm>. 
101 UNEP, above n 90, para 9. 
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Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreements that will be used as a foundation of 
negotiations in final stage.102 
 
Steady progress has been achieved since the negotiations were launched. In 2007, the 
chairman103 of the Negotiating Group on Rules tabled his ‘Draft Consolidated Chair 
Texts of the Anti-Dumping (AD) and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
Agreements’ containing new WTO fishery subsidies diciplines.104 This draft, for the 
first time in GATT/WTO, proposes a broad range of prohibitions in fisheries subsidies 
that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity, such as subsidies for repair or 
modification of fishing vessels and construction of new fishing vessels105 and subsidies 
that benefit to operating costs of fishing or service vessels (including licence fees or 
similar charges, ice, fuel, baits, workers, social expenses, insurance, gears, and support 
in the sea).106 It also proposes general exceptions to the prohibitions for all WTO 
members and S&DTs for developing States, especially for small-scale fishing in their 
territorial waters.107 However, these general exception and S&DTs are conditi al on 
WTO members who have in place a fishery management system designed to prevent 
overfishing.108 The draft further requires that WTO members who wish to grant a 
subsidy that would fall under the general exception or S&DT provisions, must notify 
FAO of their management system. FAO is then proposed to undertake a peer review of 
the management system prior to the granting of the subsidy.109 Nevertheless, many 
elements in this draft raised controversy and uncertainty.110 One of the issues concerns 
                                                
102 WTO, Rules <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_brief04_e.doc>. 
103 The chairman of the Negotiating Group on Rules wasAmb. Guillermo Valles Galmés of Uruguay. 
See, ibid. 
104 WTO, Rules Negotiations: Chairperson's Texts 2007: Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and 
SCM Agreements (30 November 2007) WTO 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/rules_chair_text_nov07_e.htm>. 
105 Ibid annex III Fisheries Subsidies art I.1(a). 
106 Ibid annex III Fisheries Subsidies art I.1(c). 
107 Ibid annex III Fisheries Subsidies art III.2(a)(1). With this regard, small coastal States, i.e., Antigua 
and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominican, Republic, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Solomon Islands, and Trinidad and Tobago, have together asked several 
exemptions from any new disciplines, considering the importance of fisheries in their economic affairs, 
and the characteristics of their artisanal and small-sc le fisheries. See, WTO, above n 94. 
108 WTO, above n 104, annex III Fisheries Subsidies art III.2(a)(3). 
109 Ibid annex III Fisheries Subsidies art III.2(b)(3). However, at this stage the negotiations in the WTO 
are still going on. When the fisheries subsidies negotiations have been concluded, the agreed text will 
clarify FAO’s intended role and the nature of the per view. See, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Department, above n 7, 79. 
110 UNEP, above n 90, para 10. 
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the subsidies to be prohibited. In the WTO subsidie n gotiations, there are two main 
negotiating positions, i.e., ‘top-down approach’ by FoFs, who argue that all fisheries 
subsidies should be prohibited apart from certain exemptions, and ‘bottom-up approach’ 
which argues that all subsidies should be allowed, apart from those, which are 
specifically prohibited. Members of the latter group include Japan, the Rep. of Korea, 
Chinese Taipei and the EU.111 Japan, the Rep. of Korea and Chinese Taipei have also 
doubted about the link between subsidies and overfishing. They have claimed that the 
depletion of fish stocks is largely caused by the inadequacy of fisheries resources 
management.112 Other controversial issues include the criteria to be used in identify 
eligible fisheries for S&DT; territorial limits on the use of S&DT; the need for effective 
management of subsidies fisheries; and issues about transparency and enforcement.113  
 
As a consequence, in December 2008, the chairman recognised the need for continuing 
discussion about the issues raised, and accordingly issued new draft texts of the AD and 
SCM Agreements,114 which reflect a new bottom-up approach115 and contain a 
‘roadmap’ to guide the further discussions on the strengthening of disciplines, 
particularly through a prohibition, on subsidies that contribute to overcapacity or 
overfishing.116 The roadmap identifies the key questions needed to be addressed in 
fisheries subsidies, including questions about which particular subsidies that should be 
or should not be prohibited and why,117 what measures that should be included in a list 
of general exceptions,118 if S&DT is allowed for developing States, which exemption 
should be conditional on fisheries management,119 whether there are other 
conditionalities that should be applied to exceptions (general and S&DT), either in 
                                                
111 MRAG Limited, Policy Brief 9: Fisheries Subsidies and the WTO negotiations 
<http://www.mrag.co.uk/Documents/PolicyBrief9_Subsidies_insert_Apr09.pdf>.  
112 WTO, above n 94.  
113 MRAG Limited, above n 111. 
114 WTO, New Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements: Fisheries Subsidies-
Roadmap for Discussions (19 December 2008) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/rules_dec08_e.doc>. 
115 This is based on the suggestions of member States on Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and 
SCM Agreement proposed in November 2007. See, ibid. 
116 Ibid, Roadmap for discussions, para 3. 
117 Ibid, Prohibition para 11. 
118 Ibid, General Exceptions para 13.  
119 Ibid, Special and Differential Treatment para 15. 
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addition to or instead of fisheries management conditionalities,120 and what notification 
mechanisms that should be formulated for members to rep rt on subsidies they are 
providing,121 and for other issues as well.122 
 
This roadmap was used as the basis for discussions in 2009.123 These discussions 
provided participants an opportunity to discuss current issues of fisheries subsidies in 
‘off the record’ and informal workshop.124 At the workshop, some elements, fuel 
subsidies in particular, still raised controversy. It has been recognised that fuel subsidies 
are difficult to manage because of their combination of very high environmental 
relevance, direct impacts on livelihoods, market competitiveness, and political 
factors.125 In order to address this issue, there were possible solutions proposed, 
including the use of transition periods, subsidy ceilings, stand-still agreements and roll-
backs, or other limitations on time and relative level of subsidisation.126 Although many 
proposals and ideas respecting fisheries subsidies were submitted by the WTO members 
and they were useful and constructive, such proposals and ideas revealed widely 
divergent views including the technical issues.127 Thus, at this stage the Chairman of the 
Negotiating Group on Rules is still unable to table a new bottom-up, convergence legal 
text on fisheries subsidies.128 Therefore, the negotiations in the WTO are still in 
                                                
120 Ibid, Fisheries Management Conditionalities para 20. 
121 Ibid, Transparency art 22. 
122 Ibid para 23-7. 
123 The roadmap was used as the basis for discussions of ‘the WTO Fishery Subsidies Negotiations: 
Update and Introductory Briefing for New Delegates’, which was supported by UNEP and WWF experts 
and held at the WTO on 1 April 2009. See, Jariya Kankamnerd, 'Progress of WTO Negotiations and 
Regional Policy Directives and Common Positions on Fisheries Subsidies' (Paper presented at the 
ASEAN-SEAFDEC Regional Technical Consultation on Inter ational Fisheries Related Issues 2010, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 2-4 February 2010) 
<http://www.seafdec.org/cms/index.php?view=article&catid=82%3Aevents-calendar&id=152%3Aasean-
seafdec-rtc-on-international-fisheries-related-issue -2-4-february-2010-bangkok-
thailand&option=com_content&Itemid=118> 2. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Fuel subsidies are widely employed based on a large percentage of fisheries subsidies. In the 
discussions at the WTO, however, countries reported vast differences in the way fuel subsidy programs 
were administered and structured, and this makes it difficult to determine direct impacts. See, Manlee 
Dugal and Hugh Walton, 'WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations and Pacific Island States' (2011) 10(8) 
(November) Trade Negotiations Insights 20, 15. 
126 UNEP, above n 90. 
127 WTO, 'Annual Report 2012' (2012) <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep12_e.pdf> 
32. 
128 The members of the WTO mainly want only Chair-produced text with a bottom-up nature. See, 
Negotiating Group on Rules WTO, 'Communication from the Chairman' (21 April 2011). 
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progress.129 However, once the AD and SCM Agreements are finalised and put into 
effect, they will be an instrument that plays an important role to control fishing capacity 
both in member countries and global level.   
 
3.2.2 International Non-Legally Binding Instruments 
 
Apart from the international legally binding instruments mentioned above, a number of 
non-legally binding instruments are further adopted as a fundamental framework to 
manage fishing capacity in broader scope. The remarkable instruments are the 1995 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the International Plans of Action for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity. 
    
3.2.2.1 The 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
 
The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) was adopted by more than 170 
FAO member States on 31 October 1995 during the 28th session of the FAO Conference 
that was held in Rome between 20 October and 2 November 1995.130 The CCRF,131 
which is a voluntary instrument, has a goal to develop principles for responsible fishing, 
in response to the pertinent rules of international laws, and support as a reference 
instrument to assist States to develop or improve the arrangements on legal, institutional 
and administrative frameworks that are needed for responsible and sustainable fishing. 
The CCRF applies to all types of fisheries, including fisheries within the national 
jurisdiction, as well as fisheries on the high seas. It is also applied through the process 
of fishing, which includes capture, post-harvest production and trade.132  
 
As overcapacity is identified as a key issue in the CCRF, fishing capacity management 
is one of its main provisions. However, although the terms ‘overfishing’ or 
                                                
129 The Chairman of Negotiating Group on Rules produce a detailed and analytical report on the 
challenges faced in negotiations on fisheries subsidies in order to use it as a tool to frame future 
negotiations. See, ibid. 
130 FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995) annex 1 para 24. 
131 The CCRF recognizes that fisheries, including catching, processing, marketing, and managing of fish 
stocks and aquaculture, give an significant food source, employment, and income for people all over th 
world. Thus, all people involved in fisheries have to conserve and manage the fisheries. See, FAO, What 
is the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries? (FAO, 2001) 1.  
132 Ibid. 
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‘overcapacity’ are not specifically defined in the CCRF, there are references to related 
terms such as ‘excessive fleet size’ or ‘excessive fishing effort’. The CCRF links 
overexploitation of the fish stock to the problem of excess capacity. The CCRF requires 
States to deter overfishing and excess capacity or eliminate excess capacity by applying 
effective management measures to ensure that the curr nt level of fishing capacity is 
balanced with the potential capacity of the fisheries resources and their sustainable 
utilisation.133 Such requirement means that States should not allow their fleet size and 
fishing effort to grow beyond levels, which are considered commensurate with 
sustainable use.134 In this regard, MSY has been adopted as a limit reference point by 
the CCRF.135 Thus, the level of fishing effort, which is suitable for the sustainable use 
of fisheries resources, is the level that can produce MSY. This requirement is applicable 
to all fisheries, independent of their exploitation status.136 The CCRF also requires 
States to establish such management measures through suitable policy, legal and 
institutional frameworks, and based on the best scientif c evidences currently available 
in order to achieve effective conservation and sustainable utilisation of fisheries 
resources.137 Remarkable management measures for fishing capacity will be greatly 
discussed in Chapters 4 to 6. 
 
Additionally, the CCRF establishes a further link between sustainability and economic 
factors, as article 7.2.2 suggests that ‘Such measur s should provide inter alia that: (a) 
excess fishing capacity is avoided and exploitation of the stocks remains economically 
viable; (b) the economic conditions under which fishing industries operate promote 
responsible fisheries.’138 It means that the CCRF calls for measures aimed at avoiding 
the economic waste which overcapacity represents, ad provides for both sustainability 
                                                
133 CCRF art 6.3, 7.1.8. 
134 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 8, 7. 
135 FAO, 'Technical Consultation on the Measurement of Fishing Capacity: Mexico City, Mexico, 29 
November-3 December 1999' (FAO Fisheries Report No. 615, FAO, 2000) 47. 
136 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 8, 7. 
137 The CCRF art 7.1.1 provides that ‘States and all those engaged in fisheries management should, 
through an appropriate policy, legal and institutional framework, adopt measures for the long-term 
conservation and sustainable use of fisheries resouces. Conservation and management measures, whether 
at local, national, subregional, or regional levels, should be based on the best scientific evidence available 
and be designed to ensure the long-term sustainability of fishery resources at levels which promote th
objective of their optimum utilisation and maintain their availability for present and future generations; 
short-term considerations should not compromise these objectives.’    
138 CCRF art 7.2.2. 
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and economic viability.139 In this sense, based on the viewpoints of economists, the 
maximum economic yield (MEY), which is the level ofcatch that provides the 
maximum net economic benefits or profits for a fishery as a whole,140 could be set as a 
target reference point for such management objective.141 MEY is usually less than 
MSY,142 thus, theoretically, using MEY would conserve marine stocks better. 
 
In terms of fishing vessel authorisation, the CCRF requires States to implement 
measures to ensure that none of fishing vessels are allowed to operate unless they are 
authorised in accordance with the international lawfor the high seas or with national 
law and regulations for the areas of national jurisdiction.143 The CCRF, therefore, 
requires the authorisation for all fishing vessels including vessels operating within 
national jurisdictions and on the high seas, whereas the Fish Stocks Agreement requires 
States to authorise their fishing vessels only when operating on the high seas.144 It 
results in empowerment of fishery administrations with control over national fishing 
fleets, which facilitates States to control their fishing capacity.  
 
However, it should be noted that although the CCRF was promulgated since 1995, the  
overall compliance with the CCRF has not achieved the effective results,145 particularly 
in many Asian States who contribute huge amounts to he fish production of the world, 
                                                
139 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 8, 8. 
140 Chris Reid, 'An Analysis of Maximum Economic Yield in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery' 
(FISHERIES OCCASIONAL PUBLICATION No. 60, Department of Fisheries, Government of Western 
Australia, February 2009) <http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/Documents/occasional_publications/fop060.pdf>. 
141 Currently, MEY has been widely considered and adopted as a target or management reference point. 
For example, Australia by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) released the 
Commonwealth Fisheries Harvest Strategy: Policy and Guidelines in September 2007, which provide a 
framework for managing Commonwealth fisheries with an aim to maintain fish stocks, on average, at a 
target biomass equal to the stock size required to produce MEY. Therefore, in order to achieve this goal, 
the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) is required to seek for harvest strategies that are 
able to maintain fish stocks at such level. See, Tom Compas, R Quentin Grafton and Nhu Che, 'Target 
and Path: Maximum Economic Yield in Fisheries Management' (July 2011) 
<http://adl.brs.gov.au/data/warehouse/pe_abares99010704/TR11.03MEYfish_hr.pdf>. 
142 This is referred to Gordon-Schaefer static model. S e, Juan Carlos Seijo, Omar Defeo and Silvia Salas, 
Fisheries Bioeconomics: Theory, Modelling and Management (Rome, 1998). 
143 CCRF art 7.6.2. 
144 Fish Stocks Agreement art 18(2) indicates that ‘A State shall authorize th  use of vessels flying its flag 
for fishing on the high seas only where it is able to exercise effectively its responsibilities in resp ct of 
such vessels under the Convention and this Agreement.’ 
145 The total of 53 States all over the world was evaluated. See, Tony J Pitcher, Daniela Kalikoski and 
Ganapathiraju Pramod (eds), Evaluations of Compliance with the FAO (UN) Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries (Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, 2006). 
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and their fisheries sector plays an essential role as a source of income and food for their 
nationals.146 Particularly the compliance with the CCRF in terms of fishing capacity 
controls, New Zealand and Japan have been found as the only two States in the Asia 
Pacific region that have good performance.147 An urgent action to control fishing 
capacity is therefore needed in this region. It is also important to note that although 
excess capacity is referred at various points in the CCRF, the CCRF does not provide 
States any explicit guidelines for fishing capacity management in order to prevent or 
eliminate excess capacity. Hence, in 1998 the FAO called for meetings to clarify issues 
that are related to excess fishing capacity and prepare such guidelines, and the 
International Plans of Action for Fishing Capacity Management was subsequently 
adopted in 1999. 
 
3.2.2.2 The International Plans of Action for Fishing Capacity 
Management 
 
The International Plans of Action for Fishing Capacity Management or IPOA-
Capacity,148 which was endorsed by the FAO Council in June 1999, is a voluntary 
instrument applies to all States149 where their fishers involve with capture fisheries. It 
has been elaborated within the framework of Article 2(d),150 as well as applied to the 
interpretation and application with the provisions of Article 3.1151 of the CCRF.152 The 
immediate objective of the IPOA-Capacity is for States and RFMOs to implement 
                                                
146 Ibid. 
147 FAO APFIC, 'APFIC Regional Consultative Workshop Managing Fishing Capacity and IUU Fishing 
in the Asian Region, Phuket, Thailand, 13-15 June 2007' (RAP Publication2007/18, FAO/RAP, 13-15 
June 2007 2007) <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ah999e/ah999e00.pdf> 16. 
148 At its session in 1997, the Committee on Fisheries (COFI) requested FAO to address fishing capacity 
issue. A Technical Working Group on the Management of Fishing Capacity was therefore organised in La 
Jolla, USA during 15-18 April 1998. After that the FAO consultation was organised in Rome during 26-
30 October 1998, followed by a preparatory meeting during 22-24 July 1998. In February 1999, the
IPOA-Capacity was adopted by the 23rd session of COFI, after they were endorsed by the FAO Council in 
June 1999. See, IPOA-Capacity para 1. 
149 ‘States’ in the context of IPOA-Capacity include members and non-members of FAO, as well as 
fishing entities. See, IPOA-Capacity footnote 7. 
150 One of the objectives of the CCRF is to ‘provide guidance which may be used where appro riate in the 
formulation and implementation of international agreements and other legal instruments, both binding and 
voluntary;’ See, CCRF art 2(d). 
151 CCRF art 3.1 states that ‘The Code is to be interpreted an  applied in conformity with the relevant 
rules of international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. 
Nothing in this Code prejudices the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under international law as 
reflected in the Convention.’ 
152 IPOA-Capacity para 4. 
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effective, equitable and transparent measures for fishing capacity management by 2003, 
and not later than 2005. It also requires States and RFMOs, who are faced with the 
problem of overcapacity that undermine the achievement of long-term sustainability 
outcomes, to firstly try to freeze fishing capacity at its current level and gradually 
decrease it, particularly the capacity of impacted fisheries.153  
 
To achieve such objective, the IPOA-Capacity suggests a series of actions for States to 
take in managing their fishing capacity. These actions are fallen into four main 
strategies as follows:- 
‘(i) the conduct of national, regional and global assessments of capacity and 
improvement of the capability for monitoring fishing capacity;154 
(ii) the preparation and implementation of national plans to effectively 
manage fishing capacity and of immediate actions for c astal fisheries 
requiring urgent measures;155 
(iii) the strengthening of regional fisheries organis tions and related 
mechanisms for improved management of fishing capacity t regional and 
global levels;156 and 
(iv) immediate actions for major transboundary, straddling, highly 
migratory and high seas fisheries requiring urgent measures.’157 
 
The IPOA-Capacity further suggests that States may implement the four strategies 
aforementioned through mechanisms to promote this IPOA implementation, the 
establishment of awareness and education, the international technical cooperation and 
coordination.158 
 
The IPOA-Capacity requires States to take urgent action to support in measurement159 
and assessment160 of fishing capacity at national, regional and inter ational levels. 
Therefore, States should establish appropriate and compatible standards for records of 
                                                
153 IPOA-Capacity para 7. Put simply, the IPOA-Capacity aims to achieve a balance between fishing fleet 
size (inputs) and sustainable production (output). 
154 IPOA-Capacity part III, section I. 
155 IPOA-Capacity part III, section II. 
156 IPOA-Capacity part III, section III. 
157 IPOA-Capacity part III, section IV. 
158 IPOA-Capacity para 8. 
159 IPOA-Capacity paras 11-2. 
160 IPOA-Capacity paras 13-5. 
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national fishing vessels,161 including their fishing vessels operating on the high seas.162 
States are further required to manage the fishing capa ity of their fleets on the high seas, 
as well as ensure that they support multilateral co-operation to manage fishing 
capacity163 and/or reduce overcapacity on the high seas.164 Therefore, the IPOA-
Capacity suggests States to appropriately cooperate through regional fisheries 
organisations or other arrangements of cooperation in order to ensure the effective 
management of fishing capacity.165 States should also consider becoming parties of 
RFMOs or arrangements, or implement the conservation and management measures 
required by these organisations or arrangements on their fishing vessels.166 Further, as 
many provisions under the IPOA-Capacity are in line with other international 
agreements, particularly the FAO Compliance Agreement and the Fish Stocks 
Agreement, States are then encouraged to consider participating in such international 
agreements as well.167 
 
In terms of national plans of action for fishing capacity management (NPOA-Capacity), 
States are required to develop, implement and monitor such plans by taking into 
consideration the consequences of various resource management systems on fishing 
capacity.168 
 
Additionally, the IPOA-Capacity suggests States, by concerning the needs of artisanal 
fisheries, to assess the possible impact of all factors, such as subsidies in fisheries, 
economic incentives and others, that directly or indirectly cause the accumulation of 
                                                
161 IPOA-Capacity para 16. 
162 IPOA-Capacity para 18. This provision supports what is provided under the FAO Compliance 
Agreement in particular. 
163 IPOA-Capacity para 33. 
164 IPOA-Capacity para 31. Specially, States should ensure that ‘no transfer of capacity to the jurisdiction 
of another State should be carried out without the express consent and formal authorization of that Stte’, 
as well as ‘avoid approving the transfer of vessels flying their flag to high seas where such transfers are 
inconsistent with responsible fishing under the Code f Conduct.’ See, IPOA-Capacity para 37-8. 
165 IPOA-Capacity para 27. 
166 IPOA-Capacity para 34. 
167 IPOA-Capacity para 29. 
168 IPOA-Capacity para 19. Thus, ‘States should develop, adopt and make public, by the end of 2002, 
national plans for the management of fishing capacity and, if required, reduce fishing capacity in order to 
balance fishing capacity with available resources on a sustainable basis and review such plans at least 
every four years. See, IPOA-Capacity para 21, 24. 
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excessive fishing capacity that weakens the sustainabil ty of marine living resources.169 
These subsidies are, for instance, subsidies for building new vessels, fishing gears, fuel, 
and infrastructure. The adoption of the IPOA-Capacity has then resulted in increased 
attention toward the issue of subsidies and their impact on sustainability and trade.170 
FAO, therefore, organised a consultation of experts on economic incentives and 
responsible fisheries in 2000 in order to assess the s ate of knowledge of fisheries 
subsidies and their likely effect on trade and resource sustainability.171 The experts 
categorised the subsidies based on their effects into three groups, including i) revenue-
enhancing group; ii) cost-reducing group; and iii) m scellaneous/unspecified group.172It 
was recommended that more accurate information on the number and value of such 
three groups of subsidies is needed before proceeding quantitative work. The empirical 
knowledge about the impacts of subsidies on trade in fish and fishery products is also 
needed to collect.173 In this respect, the Committee on Trade and Enviroment of the 
World Trade Organisation has addressed the issue, with special reference to fisheries.174 
Currently, the decision over how to use of subsidie in fisheries rests ultimately with 
State governments that are engaged in related negotiations in the WTO.175 
 
However, it can be clearly seen that most of States w re not able to achieve the 
timeframe for such immediate objective set by the IPOA-Capacity, as of 2015, there are 
only three States, namely the United States, Namibia, and Indonesia, have officially 
adopted the NPOA-Capacity,176 and only two Regional Plans of Action for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity are established, i.e. Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Organisation (LVFO) Regional Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity 
in Lake Victoria and Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) Regional 
                                                
169 IPOA-Capacity paras 25-6. 
170 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 8, 11. 
171 This expert consultation was held at FAO Headquarters in Rome, Italy on 28 November-1 December 
2000. See, FAO, 'Report of the Expert Consultation on Economic Incentives and Responsible Fisheries: 
Rome, Italy, 28 November-1 December 2000' (FAO Fisheries Report. No. 638, FAO, 28 November-1 
December 2000 2000) <http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/x9143e/x9143e00.pdf> 24. 
172 Ibid iv. 
173 Ibid 12. 
174 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 8, 11. 
175 Details are discussed under section 3.2.1.4 of this c apter. 
176 The United States have adopted the NPOA-Capacity in 2004, whereas Namibia and Indonesia have 
adopted the NPOA-Capacity in 2007 and 2008, respectively. See, FAO, National Plans of Action for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity (2015) <http://www.fao.org/fishery/ipoa-capacity/npoa/en>. 
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Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.177 The difficulties in achieving 
this immediate objective could be based on the fact that other timeframes set within the 
IPOA-Capacity were hardly achieved by most of States. Such timeframes were, for 
instance, States should assess the national fishing capacity in terms of all fishing fleets 
of important fisheries and should periodically reanalyse the capacity assessment by the 
end of 2000;178 States should systematically identify the fisheries and fishing fleets that 
require urgent measures, and review this determination periodically by the end of 
2001;179 and States should develop, adopt and make public the NPOA-Capacity and, if it 
is necessary, decrease fishing capacity in order to sustainably limit fishing capacity at a 
commensurate level with existing resources the end of 2002.180 
 
It should also be noted that fishing capacity and overcapacity have themselves remained 
relatively uncertain concepts throughout the preparation of this IPOA, as well as of the 
CCRF,181 which may cause difficulty in interpreting the instruments. More importantly, 
although the IPOA-Capacity systematically addresses the issues related to fishing 
capacity management, it does not provide specific measures on how to implement its 
many provisions, particularly in measurement, assessm nt and management of fishing 
capacity either in national waters or on the high seas. Therefore, such technical 
measures used to manage fishing capacity are identified and discussed in succeeding 
chapters. 
 
3.3 Legislative Framework for Fishing Capacity Management at Regional 
Level 
 
The use of a regional framework on fishing capacity is necessary at the regional level in  
order to establish a collaborative approach to address a common problem. Additionally, 
the States directly involved can define priorities that reflect the regional issues, 
environmental/geographic conditions, and socio-economic circumstances.182 Concerns 
                                                
177 FAO, Regional Plans of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (2015) 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/ipoa-capacity/rpoa/en>. 
178 IPOA-Capacity para 13. 
179 IPOA-Capacity para 14. 
180 IPOA-Capacity para 21. 
181 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 8, 10-1. 
182 Lee K Kimball, International Ocean Governance: Using International Law and Organisations to 
Manage Marine Resources Sustainably (IUCN, 2003) 51. 
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on fishing capacity issue may also be more successfully addressed through sound 
institutional arrangement. In the Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean regions, where 
Thailand is located, a number of institutional arrangements have been established to 
address fisheries problems, including overcapacity. The significant arrangements 
include Conservation and Management of the IOTC, SEAFDEC Regional Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the Regional Pl n of Action to Promote 
Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region. The 
first instrument is legally binding, whereas the rest is more voluntary. 
 
3.3.1 Conservation and Management Measures of the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission 
 
As States are required to cooperate through subregional or regional fisheries 
organisations in the conservation and management of the living resources, therefore 
there are 51 regional fishery bodies (RFBs)183 established worldwide, 21 of which are 
RFMOs.184 For the competence on the high seas in particular, the e are 27 of existing 
fisheries organisations, 17 of them are RFMOs.185 These RFMOs established by area186 
or for species187 have regulatory powers for conservation and management, subject to 
                                                
183 Regional Fishery Bodies (RFBs) are ‘a mechanism through which States or organisations that are 
parties to an international fishery agreement or arrangement (agreement is fundamental, and different 
from arrangement) work together towards the conservation, management and/or development of 
fisheries.’ Some RFBs, especially those with an ecosystem mandate, work with seabirds etc. that are 
connected with fisheries but are not fish stocks per se. The mandates of RFBs vary. Some RFBs have an 
advisory mandate, so that they provide advice, decisions or coordinating mechanisms, which are not 
binding on their parties. Some RFBs, on the other hand, have a mandate on management. These 
organisations are called Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs). They adopt the 
measures on fisheries conservation and management, which are binding on their parties. See, FAO 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, Regional Fishery Bodies (RFB) - Web Site. What are Regional 
Fishery Bodies (RFBs)? (17 October 2013) FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/16800/en>. 
184 FAO, Search Fishery Governance Fact Sheets (2015) FAO 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/search/en>. 
185 Ibid. 
186 RFMOs in this group include the Western and Central P cific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), 
Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), North East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), Southeast Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO), Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), and South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA). 
187 RFMOs in this group include Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), International Pacific Halibut Commission 
(IPHC), International Whaling Commission (IWC), North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission 
(NPAFC), Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), Convention on the Conservation and Management of 
Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea (CCBSP), Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), and North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organisation (NASCO). 
 107 
 
certain procedures. The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)188 is one of the 
RFMOs established by concerning the species managed. 
 
The IOTC is an intergovernmental organisation, which is established under Article XIV 
of the FAO Constitution. It was adopted at the 105th session of the FAO Council held in 
Rome on 25 November 1993. The IOTC Agreement189 entered into force on 27 March 
1996 due to the accession of the 10th member.190 The mandate of the IOTC is to manage 
tuna and tuna-like species191 in the Indian Ocean and adjacent sea areas. The main 
objective of this organisation establishment is to pr mote cooperation among its parties 
in order to assure the conservation and optimum utilisation of concerned stocks through 
suitable management and encourage the development of sustainable fisheries of these 
stocks.192 For the objective to conserve and manage the stock migrating into or out of 
the Indian Ocean, the area of competence of the IOTC covers the FAO statistical areas 
51 and 57 and adjacent seas.193 As of 5 June 2014, the IOTC has 32 member States and 
three Cooperating Non-Contracting parties.194 Thailand has been an IOTC member 
State since 17 March 1997.195 
 
To achieve the aforementioned objectives, the functio s and responsibilities of the 
IOTC are in line with the principles revealed in the applicable provisions of the 
LOSC196 that States should regularly review the status and trends of the stocks and 
collect, analyse and circulate scientific information, catch and fishing effort data and 
other required data for the conservation and management of concerned stocks and their 
                                                
188 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commission’ too. 
189 The IOTC Agreement, hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Agreement’. 
190 IOTC, IOTC - Basic Texts (2015) <http://www.iotc.org/about-iotc/basic-texts>. 
191 The species under the management mandate of IOTC are, for instance, yellowfin tuna, skipjack, 
bigeye tuna, albacore tuna, and Southern bluefin tuna, longtail tuna, Kawakawa, frigate tuna etc. See, 
IOTC, Competence: Area & Species (2015) <http://www.iotc.org/about-iotc/competence>. 
192 IOTC Agreement art V(1). 
193 IOTC Agreement art II. 
194 IOTC, Structure of the Commission: Commission Contracting Parties (Members) (2015) 
<http://www.iotc.org/about-iotc/structure-commission>. 
195 IOTC, 'Report of the Eighteenth Session of the India  Ocean Tuna Commission' (IOTC–2014–S18–
R[E], IOTC, 1-5 June 2014) <http://www.iotc.org/documents/report-eighteenth-session-indian-ocean-
tuna-commission> 4. 
196 IOTC, The Commission: Objectives, Function and Responsibilities, and IOTC Performance 
Monitoring (2015) IOTC <http://www.iotc.org/about-iotc>. 
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fisheries;197 encourage, suggest, and coordinate research and development activities 
with regard to concerned stocks and their fisheries, and other activities as appropriate 
and feasible, including activities related to technology transfer, training and 
improvement. These activities must be carried out by concerning the equitable 
participation of IOTC’s parties in the fisheries and the special interests and needs of 
those who are developing States.198 Additionally, the IOTC is responsible to adopt the
conservation and management measures based on scientific evidences, in order to make 
certain of the conservation of the concerned stocks and to promote the objective of 
optimum utilisation of these stocks in the area of competence;199 and to regularly review 
the economic and social perspectives of concerned stocks’ fisheries, taking into account 
developing coastal States’ interests in particular.200 In each session, the Commission 
takes decisions on the management of tuna and tuna-like species covered by the 
Agreement. Unless some members particularly object, such decisions are agreed and 
passed in a form of IOTC resolutions that are binding on all parties. Recommendations, 
on the other hand, are slightly different in that they are adopted on voluntary basis, not 
binding the members.201 
 
The Agreement also requires the establishment of a permanent scientific 
committee.202The scientific committee was formally created at the first session of the 
Commission.203 This committee advises the Commission and sub-commissions on 
research and data collection, on the condition of st cks, and on issues of stock 
management. The meetings of the scientific committee ar  held conjointly with those of 
the Commission.204 In addition, if it is necessary, the IOTC may establish working 
                                                
197 IOTC Agreement art V(2)(a). 
198 IOTC Agreement art V(2)(b). 
199 IOTC Agreement art V(2)(c). 
200 IOTC Agreement art V(2)(d). 
201 IOTC, Conservation and Management Measures (CMMS) (2015) IOTC <http://www.iotc.org/cmms>. 
202 IOTC Agreement art XII(1). 
203 The first session of the IOTC was held in Rome, Italy on 3-6 December 1996. At that meeting, the 
Commission decided to establish a scientific committee pursuant to Article XII(1) of the Agreement and 
assigned functions, composition, operation, as wellas financial responsibilities. The Commission decid 
that it was premature to create sub-commissions. Seychelles was also selected to host the secretariat of the 
Commission. See, IOTC, 'Report of the First Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission' (FAO 
Fisheries Report No. 551, IOTC, 3-6 December 1996) <file:///C:/Users/pk207/Downloads/IOTC-1996-
S01-R[EN+FR].pdf>. 
204 IOTC, Structure of the Commission (2015) IOTC <http://www.iotc.org/about-iotc/structre-
commission>. The working party on fishing capacity 
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parties as subsidiary bodies for specific purposes of the Agreement.205 The most 
common objective is to provide the scientific committee with analyses of the situation 
of the stocks as well as an assessment of possible management actions.206 Currently, the 
IOTC has eight working parties, including the working party on fishing capacity 
(WPFC).207  
 
Establishment of the WPFC is necessary due to the fact that the Commission has 
requested the information on fishing capacity employed in the area of competence of 
IOTC in order to make decisions on stock management. The first WPFC was 
established in the 2009 session of the IOTC208 and has been required to determine the 
level of fishing capacity and provide necessary information that will enable the IOTC to 
effectively implement the capacity controls. The WPFC is expected to undertake the 
tasks including: (i) review methods used to estimate and manage fishing capacity that 
have been reviewed by the FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Tuna Fishing 
Capacity, other RFMOs, national management organisations, and other institutions; (ii) 
examine the most appropriate methods that can be used to assess fishing capacity in the 
Indian Ocean, as well as additionally review any further data requirements to use such 
methods in IOTC; (iii) identify the factors that affect the fishing capacity and can be 
managed by the IOTC; (iv) determine existing fishing capacity of tuna fishing fleets 
concerning the state of tuna and tuna-like resources; and (v) determine the fishing 
capacity level of different groups of fishing vessel  and gears.209  
 
In terms of IOTC Resolutions, due to the recognitio by member States that excess 
capacity in the Indian Ocean has probably existed, the IOTC resolutions, therefore, call 
                                                
205 IOTC Agreement art XII(5). 
206 Some working parties, such as the working party on tagging or the working party on data collection 
and statistics, are established with the purpose of analysing and producing recommendations on a specific 
technical problem. The working parties are constituted by scientists attending in their individual capacity 
and they do not represent any particular member or non-member countries. Their meetings are open to all 
interested parties with expertise in the relevant issues under the working party consideration. See, IOTC, 
Working Parties (13 January 2011) IOTC <http://www.iotc.org/English/meetings/wp/allwp.php>. 
207 IOTC, 'Report of the Seventeenth Session of the IOTC Scientific Committee' (IOTC-2014-SC17-R[E], 
IOTC, 8-12 December 2014) <http://www.iotc.org/documents/report-17th-session-iotc-scientific-
committee> 88. 
208 IOTC, 'Report of the 1st Session of the IOTC Working Party on Fishing Capacity' (IOTC-2009-
WPFC-R[E], 22 October 2009) <http://www.iotc.org/documents/report-1st-session-iotc-working-party-
fishing-capacity-0> 3. 
209 IOTC, About the Working Party on Fishing Capacity (WPFC) (13 October) IOTC 
<http://www.iotc.org/English/meetings/wp/wpfccurrent.php>. 
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for States to limit fishing capacity at certain levels pertaining to particular years.210 The 
significant resolutions include Resolution 03/01,211 Resolution 06/05,212 Resolution 
07/05,213 Resolution 09/02,214 and Resolution 12/11.215 However, only Resolution 03/01 
on the limitation of fishing capacity of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-
Contracting Parties (CPCs)216 and Resolution 12/11 on the implementation of a 
limitation of fishing capacity of CPCs are currently active.217 
 
In particular, Resolution 12/11 recognises the importance of the appropriate 
implementation of the resolutions concerning fishing capacity management (e.g., 
Resolution 03/01) in order to stabilise the fishing capacity level employed on high 
economic value stocks within the area of competence of the IOTC, and to facilitate the 
tasks of the scientific committee to enable to provide the Commission with scientific 
advices. It also requires CPCs to submit the IOTC Secretariat the lists of vessels, by 
gear type, over 24 metres overall length and under 24 metres if they fish outside their 
national EEZs by 31 December 2009. This requirement applies to vessels fishing for 
tropical tunas during the year 2006 and for swordfish and albacore during the year 2007. 
Further, within the period of application of this resolution during the years 2010 and 
2011, if CPCs change the number of their vessels, CPCs are required to demonstrate to 
the Commission that the modification of the number of vessels, by gear type will not 
create an increase of fishing effort on the fish stocks involved. However, for other CPCs 
who have had the purpose to develop their fishing fleets and submit the IOTC a fleet 
                                                
210 IOTC, above n 208, 3. 
211 Resolution 03/01 on the Implementation of Limitation of Fishing Capacity of Contracting Parties and 
Cooperation Non-Contracting Parties.    
212 Resolution 06/05 on the Limitation of Fishing Capacity, in Terms of Number of Vessels, of IOTC 
Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. This resolution has been superseded by 
Resolution 09/02. See, IOTC, 'Compendium of Active Conservation and Management Measures for the 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission' (8 October 2014) <http://www.iotc.org/cmms>. 
213 Resolution 07/05 on the Limitation of Fishing Capacity of IOTC Contracting Parties and Cooperating 
Non-Contracting Parties in Terms of Number of Longli e Vessels Targeting Swordfish and Albacore. 
This resolution has been superseded by Resolution 09/02. See, ibid. 
214 Resolution 09/02 on the Implementation of a Limitation of Fishing Capacity of Contracting Parties and 
Cooperation Non-Contracting Parties. This resolution has been superseded by Resolution 12/11. See, ibid. 
215 Resolution 12/11 on the Implementation of Limitation of Fishing Capacity of Contracting Parties and 
Cooperation Non-Contracting Parties. 
216 Resolution 03/01 requires CPCs, which have more than 50 vessels on the 2003 IOTC record of 
vessels, to limit, in 2004 and following years, thenumber of their fishing vessels larger than 24 metres 
length overall to the number of its fishing vessels r gistered in 2003 in the IOTC record of vessels.   
217 It is as of 8 October 2014. See, IOTC, above n 212.
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development plan in accordance with the provisions of IOTC Resolution 03/01, they are 
required to confirm the type, size, gear and origin of the vessels indicated in the fleet 
development plans and the programming to the Commission by 31 December 2009. The 
IOTC Compliance Commission will verify the implementation, in accordance with the 
notified programming, of such fleet development plans. This Resolution is applicable 
during 2012 and 2013, and the implication of these plans is reviewed at the 2014 IOTC 
Session.218 So far, many CPCs have introduced their fleet development plans including 
Thailand.  
 
Additionally, for the estimates of fishing capacity n the IOTC area to be useful in a 
management context, the information required should include detailed information on 
the fleets for which fishing capacity is to be estimated, in particular vessel unique 
identification, vessel length and gross tonnage, levels of activity and gear used for each 
individual vessel in the fleets under consideration, a d target species.219 Due to the 
importance of aforesaid information, the IOTC requires all CPCs with vessels fishing 
for tunas and swordfish in the area of competence of IOTC to submit a list of their 
respective vessels that were active in such area during the previous year to the IOTC 
secretary by 15 February every year. The respective vessels are larger than 24 metres in 
length overall or less than 24 metres and operating in waters outside the EEZ of the flag 
State. The information of each vessel, such as the IOTC number, name and registration 
number, type, length, and gross tonnage of vessel, name and address of owner or 
operator, main target species and period of authorisation, must be included in the list 
submitted.220 Also, CPCs are required to provide the estimates of the total annual catch 
by species and gear for all species covered by the mandate of the IOTC, as well as 
annual catch weight by species and effort data of previous year from all types of tuna 
fisheries in the IOTC area (i.e., surface fisheries, longline fisheries, coastal fisheries).221 
                                                
218 The Commission agreed to extend the applicability of Resolution 09/02 for an additional two years 
period. Thus, Resolution 12/11 has been issued to super ede Resolution 09/02. See, ibid.  
219 IOTC, above n 208. 
220 IOTC, 'Report of the Fourteenth Session of the India  Ocean Tuna Commission' (IOTC-2010-S14-
R[E], IOTC, 1-5 March 2010) <http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2010/s/IOTC-2010-S14-R[E].pdf> 
85. 
221 According to the timeliness of data submission to the IOTC Secretariat, longline fleets operating on 
the high seas will provide provisional data for thepr vious year no later than 30 June. Final data will be 
submitted no later than 30 December, and all other fle ts (including supply vessels) will submit their final 
data for the previous year no later than 30 June. Se, Resolution 10/02 Mandatory Statistical 
Requirements for IOTC Members and Cooperation Non-Ctracting Parties (CPC's). 
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However, based on the discussions at the First Session of the IOTC WPFC,222 it was 
agreed that in order to understand the actual fishing pressure directed at tuna resources, 
estimates of fishing capacity should include the fishing vessels under 24 metres 
operating exclusively inside the EEZ of participating States,223 particularly the catches 
of these fleets are already included in the IOTC datab se.224 Furthermore, it has been 
found that fishing capacity of vessels between 15-24 metres (length overall) in the 
Indian Ocean has substantially increased in recent y ars.225 To address this issue, the 
Scientific Committee recommended that the Commission hould extend requirements 
for the vessels in IOTC Resolution 10/02 to equally pply to all of the authorized 
vessels.226  
 
The use of only two vessel-length categories to assess input capacity, less than 24 
metres and 24 metres or greater, may be insufficient. Therefore, the WPFC 
recommended that narrower vessel length categories should be used for assessment of 
future estimates of input capacity.227 Nonetheless, it is important to note that multi-
species fisheries operated by these fleets may make the estimates of tuna-directed 
capacity very difficult to assess. Systematic records of catches by species from such 
vessels at local levels are then essential. Moreove, although input-based measures of 
fishing capacity has been suggested because they are more practical for management 
purposes, such measures should be further developed in t rms of the methods to relate 
fishing mortality levels and the effective effort measures, which will be helpful for 
giving advice with regard to fishing capacity limits.228  
 
The measures for vessels over 24 metres overall length and under 24 metres if they 
operate beyond their EEZs would make it difficult for an IUU vessel to operate in the 
IOTC area, but such measures unlikely create a reduction of vessels authorised to fish in 
                                                
222 The First Session of the IOTC WPFC was held at Mombasa, Kenya on 22 October 2009. 
223 This only refers to inboard powered fishing vessel. See, IOTC, above n 208, footnote 7. 
224 Ibid para 31. 
225 Vessels of this size that operate within the EEZ of coastal countries are not required to provide catch-
and-effort and size data as per the same resolution as vessels in the IOTC Record of Authorized vessels. 
See, IOTC Secretariat, 'Summary: Estimation of Fishing Capacity by Tuna Fishing Fleets in the Indian 
Ocean' (IOTC–2013–SC16–19[E], 14 November 2013) <http://www.iotc.org/documents/summary-
estimation-fishing-capacity-tuna-fishing-fleets-indian-ocean>. 
226 Ibid. 
227 IOTC, above n 208, para 32. 
228 Ibid para 37. 
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the Indian Ocean.229 Furthermore, apart from the nature of multi-species f sheries of 
tuna fleets, other complexities, such as the increase in fishing power, shifting targeting 
practices, could also be an obstacle in obtaining accur te information needed for the 
estimation of optimal fishing capacity. Due to these constraints, the WPFC has been 
unable to provide optimal levels of fishing capacity as requested by the Commission 
yet.230 As there has been no new document presented since 2010,231  the WPFC was 
consequently amalgamated into the Working Party on Tropical Tunas as a theme 
session.232 This clearly undermines the effectiveness of a management tool applied. 
 
Moreover, based on a performance review of the IOTC conducted in 2009, it was found 
that the IOTC Agreement is not up to date as it does not contain modern principles for 
fisheries resource management, such as the precaution ry approach233 and the 
ecosystem-based approach,234 that can be helpful in managing fishing capacity in their 
area of competence. In addressing this issue, the Commission adopted the conservation 
and management measure on the implementation of the precautionary approach235 that 
is in line with relevant internationally agreed stand rds, particularly with the Fish Stocks 
Agreement. The reference point and harvest control rules used for this approach will be 
supplied by the SC.  
 
The performance review also showed that the quantitative data of many stocks that are 
covered by the IOTC mandate is quite limited due to an inadequacy of compliance, a 
large amount of catches being harvested by artisanal fisheries, which small data and 
information is available, and cooperation of non-memb r countries of the IOTC is 
inadequate. Additionally, several developing States have had serious constraints in 
                                                
229 Joseph et al, above n 61, 16. 
230 IOTC, above n 208, 8. 
231 Some member countries have not provided all the data required by the Commission, causing 
difficulties for the WPFC to achieve their tasks asigned. 
232 A review and compliance to Resolution 12/11 on fishing capacity resolution will be included in the 
second performance review of the IOTC. See, IOTC, above n 195, appendix XV.  
233 IOTC, 'Report of the IOTC Performance Review Panel' (January 2009) 
<http://www.iotc.org/files/misc/performance%20review/IOTC-2009-PRP-R%5BE%5D.pdf> 
Recommendation 37. 
234 Ibid Recommendation 10. 
235 Resolution 12/01 on the Implementation of the Precautionary Approach. Some elements of 
precautionary approach, i.e., interim target and limit reference points for albacore, bigeye tuna, skipjack 
tuna, yellowfin tuna and swordfish, were also adopted. See, Resolution 13/10 on Interim Target and Limit 
Reference Point and a Decision Framework. 
 114 
 
terms of their national capacity and/or infrastructure, which obstruct their capability to 
comply with binding obligation, particularly regarding collecting, reporting and 
processing data.236 As a response to these shortcomings, the IOTC has adopted a 
number of resolutions, for instance, Resolution 10/07,237 10/08,238 10/09,239 and 
11/04,240 as well as established projects related to capacity building in data collection 
and reporting for developing country CPCs.241 However, the urgent actions are still 
required to improve the performance of the ITOC, particularly application of methods 
for scientific assessment (based on the data and information available) for the optimal 
fishing capacity and TACs. Strengthening the capability of the compliance committee to 
effectively monitor non-compliance and developing sanction mechanisms for non-
compliance are also needed.242    
 
3.3.2 SEAFDEC Regional Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
 
Since the adoption of the CCRF by FAO members in 1995, SEAFDEC has supported  
the CCRF implementation and upheld the general principles and standards given, with 
the effort to initiate a comprehensive program know as the Regionalisation of the 
CCRF,243 which covers a wide range of fisheries sectors such as fishing technology and 
practices, aquaculture, post-harvest technology and trade and fisheries management. 
The original framework of the program on the Regionalisation of the CCRF in 
                                                
236 IOTC, above n 233. 
237 Resolution 10/07 Concerning a Record of Licensed Foreign Vessels Fishing for Tunas and Swordfish 
in the IOTC Area. 
238 Resolution 10/08 Concerning a Record of Active Vessel  Fishing for Tunas and Swordfish in the 
IOTC Area. 
239 Resolution 10/09 Concerning the Functions of the Compliance Committee. 
240 Resolution 11/04 on A Regional Observer Scheme. 
241 IOTC, above n 195, appendix XV. 
242 In fact, there have been concerns in failing to adpt management measures even with best scientific 
advice available. The notable concern has been on the slow process in addressing matters such as the 
establishment of equitable and transparent allocatin procedures, capacity control and management based 
on scientific advice. This failure is bringing the role and work of RFMOs into disrepute and jeopardizing 
their credibility. On this matter, there was criticism by Pacific Island parties and civil society in 
December 2007 concerning the failure of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC) to reach the management decisions on bigeye and yellowfin stocks. This situation has led to a 
souring of relations between Pacific Island States nd the distant-water fishing nations that are members 
of the WCPFC. See, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 7, 71. 
243 The Regionalization of the CCRF has been implemented by SEAFDEC since 1998 with the support 
from the Japanese Trust Fund. See, SEAFDEC, SEAFDEC in Support of CCRF in Southeast Asia (2010) 
SEAFDEC <http://www.seafdec.org/cms/index.php?view=article&id=74%3Aseafdec-in-support-of-ccrf-
in-southeast-asia&option=com_content&Itemid=63>. 
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Southeast Asia covers two components: (i) mainstreaming the Regional Guidelines,244 
and (ii) capacity building for the implementation of the CCRF in the Region. The 
Regional CCRF is used by Member States as a framework for the promotion of 
responsible fisheries. Subsequently, the Member States are requested to make full use of 
the Regional Guidelines on the CCRF in Southeast Asia as a guiding principle, and for 
States to continue to promote the implementation of the CCRF at the national level.245 
These regional guidelines have been recognised by the ASEAN States as important 
tools in bridging the gaps between internationally dopted initiatives and the actual 
implementation of the CCRF at the national and local levels.246  
 
The Regional CCRF, which was prepared on the basis of FAO CCRF, provides 
measures to address fishing capacity issues.247 Mainly, it suggests States to deter the 
accumulation of excess fishing capacity where fisheries resources are still under-
exploited. Where overcapacity exists, States are suggested to establish mechanisms to 
eliminate overcapacity in order to make certain of the sustainable utilisation of fisheries 
resources. Suggested steps are: (a) implementing an enhanced system of local and 
national registration of fishing vessels; (b) limiting the number of fishing vessels at 
current levels; (c) decreasing the number of vessels, at the proper rate respecting socio-
economic impacts, by implementing measures, such as buyback scheme, reallocating of 
fishing vessels, alternative careers in other economic sectors with the support from 
subsidy programs; (d) continuously monitoring the impact of vessel reduction on the 
fisheries resources, and preventing any new applicants to the overexploited fisheries; (e) 
providing training on alternative occupational skills to fishers engaged in over-exploited 
fisheries and encourage them to leave such fisheries; and (f) developing and using 
                                                
244 The four Regional Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries (Fishing Operations, Aquaculture, Fisheries 
Management, and Post-harvest Practices and Trade), were published from 2000 to 2005, and the 
Supplementary Guidelines (Co-Management Using Group User Rights, Fishery Statistics, Indicators, and 
Fisheries Refugia) were published in 2006. See, ibid.
245 Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, 'Promoti nal and Following Up Program on the 
Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in Southeast Asia' 
(SEAFDEC/C09/WP6, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, 7-10 April 2009) 
<http://www.seafdec.org/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=129:41th-meeting-of-
the-seafdec-council&catid=38:news&Itemid=63> 1. 
246 FAO, 'Report of the Thirtieth Session of the Asia-P cific Fishery Commission' (RAP Publication 
2008/11, 11-13 August 2008) <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0327e/i0327e00.pdf> 41. 
247 SEAFDEC, 'Regional Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries in Southeast Asia Fisheries Management' 
(MFRDMD/SP/3, April 2003) 
<http://www.seafdec.org.ph/pdf/Responsible_Fisheries_Management_MFRDMD.pdf>  19. 
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proper indicators for the management of fishing capa ity.248 Based on the uncertainty of 
the condition of fisheries resources, States should also adopt a precautionary approach 
for fishing capacity management.249 Furthermore, States should develop a NPOA 
through a consultation process with relevant stakeholders, taking into consideration the 
specific issues and types of fisheries in the region, as well as consider the applicable 
issues suggested by the IPOA-Capacity.250 
 
SEAFDEC has further conducted initiatives on fishing capacity management by 
organising five consultations and meetings on this issue under the Sida-SEAFDEC 
Collaborative Project.251 The first meeting aimed to introduce the IPOA-Capacity252 and 
to identify related opportunities and constraints, a  well as actions required for fishing 
capacity management in Southeast Asia.253 The second one aimed to discuss the 
practical steps towards development and promotion of Human Resources Development 
(HDR) activities for fishing capacity management in the region.254 The next two 
meetings focused on the identification of problem areas, possibilities and target groups 
for various HDR interventions to alleviate problems caused by excess fishing 
capacity.255 The fifth meeting was consultation organised as the project-end meeting of 
Sida-SEAFDEC Project and had objectives to review and conclude majors outputs from 
the project, to review other relevant initiatives together with the experiences and lessons 
                                                
248 Ibid 19-20. 
249 Ibid 21. 
250 Ibid 20. 
251 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) by the Swedish Board of Fisheries 
(SBF) has supported the ASEAN member States in facilitating programs/activities related to fisheries 
management for sustainable fisheries achievement throug  this project during the period 2003-2006 for 
first phase. This project conducted various activities, such as the preparation of training materials using 
the Regionalization of the CCRF, organizing Regional Technical Consultations related to fisheries human 
resource development and management of fishing capacity, nd collecting regional information on the 
fisheries management and management of fishing capacity. See, SEAFDEC, 'Report of the Regional 
Technical Consultation on Management of Fishing Capacity and Human Resources Development in 
Support of Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia' (SEC/SP/86, 19-22 September 2006) 38-9.       
252 SEAFDEC in collaboration with FAO organized a Regional Workshop on the Excess Fishing Capacity 
held in Malaysia in November 2000. See, ibid 6. 
253 Judith Swan, 'Summary Information on the Role of International Fishery Organisations or 
Arrangements and other Bodies Concerned with the Conservation and Management of Living Aquatic 
Resources' (FIPL/C985, FAO, 2003) <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4455e/y4455e00.htm#Contents> 
47. 
254 The ASEAN-SEAFDEC Regional Technical Consultation on HDR in Fisheries Management was held 
in Cambodia on 3-6 June 2004. See, SEAFDEC, above n 251, 7. 
255 The two meetings were the Preparatory Expert Meeting on Fishing Capacity and Related HRD Needs 
in the ASEAN Region held on 14-16 September 2004 in Thailand and the Expert Meeting on 
Management of Fishing Capacity in Southeast Asia held on 27-29 July 2006 in Cambodia. See, ibid. 
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learned for coastal fisheries and resources management and fishing capacity 
management in Southeast Asia, as well as to identify future direction, works, from 
SEAFDEC and relevant initiatives in managing fisheries, particularly fishing capacity in 
the region.256 Although the management measures concluded from these five 
consultations and meetings on approaches and direction towards management of excess 
fishing capacity were generally in line with the Regional CCRF aforementioned, there 
were some specific measures suggested to manage fishing capacity. Such management 
measures are, for example, to limit access regime of fisheries, to promote co-
management and rights-based fisheries, to limit catch nd fishing effort, to ban the use 
of certain fishing gears, to promote and harmonise action plans through good 
governance, and to exchange information and share experi nces through policy 
dialogues, networking and partnership.257 However, means to implement these measures 
are not provided.       
 
In addition, the future regional collaboration in fisheries management by five sub-
regional management areas has been proposed as well. The five areas include the Gulf 
of Thailand,258 the Malacca Strait and Andaman Sea, the South China Sea, Sulu Sea or 
Celebes Sea, and Mekong River.259 Some of these areas, e.g., the Gulf of Thailand, were 
later overlapped with the areas covered by the Regional Plan of Action to Promote 
Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region 
(RPOA).260 In order to promote the sub-regional arrangements, SEAFDEC has 
organised meetings in the context of fisheries management on the Gulf of Thailand area 
in 2008 and 2009.261 This initiative was pointed out by the RPOA Coordinating 
                                                
256 The Regional Technical Consultation on Management of Fishing Capacity and Human Resource 
Development in Support of Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia was held on 19-22 September 2006 
in Thailand. See, ibid 8. 
257 Ibid 10-1. 
258 In this context, the area of the Gulf of Thailand covers sub-areas within the FAO fishing area 71. See, 
FAO, FAO Major Fishing Areas: Pacific, Western Central (Major Fishing Area 71) FAO 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/area/Area71/en>. These sub-areas are composed: (i) sub-area 71 a: marine 
fishing area of Thailand (the Gulf of Thailand); (ii) sub-area 71 b: marine fishing area of Cambodia; (ii ) 
sub-area 71 c: marine fishing area of Vietnam (Southwest Vietnam); and (iv) sub-area 71 e: marine 
fishing area of Malaysia (East coast of Peninsular M laysia). See, SEAFDEC, above n 251, 2. 
259 SEAFDEC, above n 251, 12. 
260 This instrument is discussed in next section. 
261 The first sub-regional meeting on the Gulf of Thailand was held on 24-26 March 2008 and the second 
meeting was held on 24-26 February 2009. Both meetings were held in Bangkok, Thailand. See, 
SEAFDEC, 'Programs under the ASEAN-SEAFDEC FCG Mechanism: Support to the Implementation of 
the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries' (SEAFDEC/PCM32/WP03a-i, SEAFDEC, 16-18 
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Committee in April 2008 as a case that could be studied by other sub-regions.262 As a 
response to this suggestion, SEAFDEC, with the support of Sida, organised the first 
meeting of the Andaman Sea sub-region in 2009, which a med to propose the options 
for strengthening capacity and improving system to monitor record and control active 
fishing effort around the Andaman Sea area.263 
 
After the first phase of Sida-SEAFDEC Project, SEAFDEC has continued to initiate 
various activities concerning fishing capacity management.264 For instance, SEAFDEC 
organised the expert meeting on fishing vessel registrat on265 in order to facilitate the 
process of improving and/or establishing systems for registration of vessels in the 
ASEAN region. The objectives of this meeting was to review the existing registration 
systems in the region of both large-scale and small-sc le fisheries, to discuss problems 
and benefits linked to these systems and to follow up on the requirements for fishing 
vessel registration within respective State.266 This activity addressed the fundamental 
issue in managing fishing capacity in the region.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
November 2009) 2. At these meetings, the issues related to fishing capacity were mainly discussed 
including the cooperation on vessel registration, port monitoring and monitoring of landings by vessel 
from neighbouring States in the area, development of MCS network, and IUU fishing. See, SEAFDEC, 
'Report of the Sub-Regional Meeting on the Gulf of Thailand' (SEC/SP/99, 24-26 February 2009) 2-5. 
262 SEAFDEC, 'Provisional Prospectus of the First Meeting of the Andaman Sea Sub-region 20-22 
October 2009, Phuket, Thailand' (INF01, 20-22 October 2009 2009) 3. 
263 This meeting was organised on 20-22 October in Phuket, Thailand. The relevant States in the 
Andaman Sea sub-region attending the meeting were India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand. 
See, SEAFDEC, The First Meeting of the Andaman Sea Sub-region organized in Phuket 
<http://www.seafdec.org/cms/index.php?view=article&catid=38%3Anews&id=146%3Athe-first-
meeting-of-the-andaman-sea-sub-region-organized-in-phuket&option=com_content&Itemid=63>.  
264 The SEAFDEC Governing Council has supported the establi hment in April 2008 of the Regional 
Scientific Advisory Committee (RSAC) for Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia for the need to 
improve fisheries management, including to address issues relevant to fishing capacity and IUU fishing, 
as well as to enhance information collection for fisheries management. To facilitate such initiative, 
SEAFDEC has also supported the establishment of ASEAN Regional Fisheries Management Mechanism 
(ARFMM), which was agreed to develop by ASEAN in May 2008. See, FAO, above n 246, 18. 
265 It was held on 30 June-2 July 2008 in Phuket, Thailand. 
266 SEAFDEC, 'Report of the Expert Meeting on Fishing Vessel Registration, Phuket, Thailand, 30 June-2 
July 2008' (SEC/SP/95, October 2008 2008) 1. 
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3.3.3 Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices 
including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region 
 
The Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including 
Combating IUU Fishing in the Region267 was adopted by the Ministers of States in the 
region as a commitment to improve fisheries management and address IUU fishing.268 
The RPOA covers the areas of the South China Sea, Sulu-Sulawesi Seas (Celebes Sea) 
and the Arafura-Timor Sea. The ministerial meeting hat signed the RPOA was held on 
2-4 May 2007 in Indonesia. Representatives of 11 States, i.e., Republic of Indonesia, 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam, attended the meeting, and 
these States continue to cooperate to implement the objectives of the RPOA. For the 
purpose of following-up the activities, the Ministers also agreed to form a Coordination 
Committee who has a role to monitor and review the eff ctive implementation of the 
measures suggested in the RPOA, as well as to provide strategic advice and direction to 
member States on coordination and implementation of RPOA measures.269  
 
The RPOA is a voluntary instrument, and has the basic principles in accordance with the 
international instruments that have been established, including the LOSC (especially 
articles 61-64, 116-119 and 123), the Fish Stocks Agreement, the Compliance 
Agreement, the CCRF, and the FAO IPOAs (e.g., IPOA-Capacity). The main objectives 
of the RPOA are ‘to enhance and strengthen the overall level of fisheries management in 
the region’ and ‘to optimise the benefit of adopting responsible fishing practices.’270 
The actions provided under the RPOA concern the conservation of fisheries and their 
environment; fishing capacity management; and combating IUU fishing. 
 
                                                
267 The Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU 
Fishing in the Region, hereinafter referred to as RPOA. 
268 The Republic of Indonesia, along with Australia, hs initiated this RPOA. It is the first regional plan of 
its kind in the world and is a response to the call for States to take cooperative measures to implement th  
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
Fishing (IPOA-IUU). See, FAO, above n 246, 2. 
269 RPOA Secretariat, 'Report to Ministers on the Implementation of the Regional Plan of Action (RPOA) 
to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices Including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region' (May 2008) 
<http://www.rpoa.sec.kkp.go.id/images/pdf/minister/may_2008.pdf>. 
270 RPOA Secretariat, 'Report to Ministers on the Implementation of the Regional Plan of Action (RPOA) 
to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices Including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region' (5 November 
2009) <http://www.rpoa.sec.kkp.go.id/images/pdf/minister/november_2009.pdf>. 
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In terms of managing fishing capacity, the RPOA provides guidelines used to control 
States’ fishing capacity on a basis of cooperation within the region. The RPOA requires 
States to manage fishing capacity of their fleet by conducting a series of actions:271 (i) 
assessing the state of their fisheries resources and the capacity of fishing fleet; (ii) 
introducing management measures to deter fishing capacity from being above the level 
that reduces sustainable fish stock; (iii) reducing overcapacity without transferring the 
capacity to other fisheries that have already exploited at maximum sustainable rate; (iv) 
cooperating to assess, conserve and manage straddling fish stocks occurring both within 
EEZs and adjacent areas to the EEZs; (v) developing and implementing national plans 
of action that aims to reduce overcapacity; (vi) collecting and sharing information on 
fishing capacity management; and (vii) respecting tradi ional, artisanal and small-scale 
fisheries, as well as providing them assistance in fisheries resource management.272 
These actions of the RPOA affirm the guidelines introduced by the IPAO-Capacity, and 
extend the concerns on artisanal and small-scale fish ries as they are ones of the main 
fisheries sector in this region. Additionally, with regard to coastal and flag States 
responsibilities, the RPOA suggests States to maintain their comprehensive and updated 
vessel registers, catch and fishing effort data, as well as develop an appropriate regional 
approach to exchange such information among States.273 The RPOA further required 
States to collaboratively work with regional organisat ons, such as FAO/APFIC, 
SEAFDEC, IOTC, WCPFC, in order to develop and implement conservation and 
management measures for optimum utilisation of fishstocks.274 Specially, States are 
encouraged to ratify the LOSC and the Fish Stocks Agreement.275 
 
Since its adoption, the RPOA has played a significant role on fishing capacity 
management in the region. At the FAO/APFIC Workshop on ‘Managing Fishing 
Capacity and Combating IUU Fishing in Asia’ organised in Phuket, Thailand on 13-15 
June 2007, the RPOA was used as a main reference to prioritise the regional actions 
required in managing fishing capacity and combating IUU fishing in Asia. According to 
the results of the workshop, the five key steps that St tes should take in order to manage 
                                                
271 RPOA, Action Plan, para 6. 
272 Ibid. 
273 RPOA, Action Plan, para 5. 
274 RPOA, Action Plan, para 3-4. 
275 RPOA, Action Plan, para 2.1. 
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fishing capacity include: (i) carrying out the assessment of existing fishing capacity 
according to enhanced vessel registers of fishing vessels and/or updated census of 
fishing vessels and fishing effort; (ii) initiating a program for capacity management by 
starting with major fisheries, such as trawl fisheries, and setting a reference point of 
capacity reduction for the fisheries facing overcapacity problem; (iii) developing the 
NPOA for capacity management through consultations of stakeholders with the support 
of relevant agencies; (iv) introducing management measures with the concern of socio-
economic conditions. The measures should include rights-based measures where it is 
feasible, and ensure that excess capacity will be eliminated, not transferred; and (v) 
gaining support from regional or international organis tions, and establishing 
cooperation in the region to harmonize initiatives.276 These steps concluded from this 
workshop are expected to be undertaken by States in the region. 
 
In addition, at the first meeting on implementation f the RPOA organised by RPOA 
Secretariat277 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in August 2007, priority strategic areas that 
should be further strengthened were identified, i.e. (i) MCS systems; (ii) coastal States 
responsibilities; (iii) capacity building in the region; (iv) current status of resources and 
management in the region; and (v) Port State Measurs. It was also agreed to separate 
the areas covered by the RPOA into three sub-regions due to their different maritime 
geography.278 The three sub-regions include the Southern and Eastern Areas of the 
South China Sea and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, the Arafura nd Timor Seas, and the 
Gulf of Thailand.279 The work programs to implement actions against these five 
priorities are therefore arranged based on these sub-regions.280 
                                                
276 FAO APFIC, above n 147, 2. 
277 The Secretariat arrangements were hosted by Indonesia for the first two years and then extended for 
another two years. See, RPOA Secretariat, above n 269; RPOA Secretariat, above n 270. 
278 RPOA Secretariat, above n 269.  
279 The subregional MCS Networks have been established based on these three sub-regions. The MCS 
Network for the Southern and Eastern Area of the South China Sea and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas is 
participated by Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam. The Arafura and Timor Seas 
MCS Network is participated by Australia, Indonesia, Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea, whereas the 
Gulf of Thailand MCS Network is participated by Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia and Vietnam. See, 
RPOA Secretariat, 'Report to the Committee on Fisher es (COFI) of the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation on the Implementation of the Regional Pl n of Action (RPOA) to Promote Responsible 
Fishing Practices Including Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in the South 
East Asia Region' (January 2011) <http://www.rpoa.sec.kkp.go.id/images/pdf/cofi/cofi_jan2011.pdf>. 
280 There have been a series of workshops at regional a d sub-regional levels that concern such five 
priorities. For example, the regional workshops included port monitoring techniques workshop in Penang, 
Malaysia on 15-17 June 2009, capacity building and MCS curriculum development workshop in Manado, 
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At the meetings of the RPOA Coordination Committee in 2009 and 2010,281 work plans 
focusing on emerging priorities were adopted. They included to improve data and 
information sharing on licensed fishing vessels, carrier vessels and port monitoring 
among member countries, to enhance capacity building o  MCS implementation to 
promote responsible fisheries and to combat IUU fishing practices, as well as to 
accelerate harmonisation of fisheries legal framework.282 In terms of harmonising 
fisheries legislation, an RPOA study produced a Framework for Model Fisheries 
Legislation in South East Asia,283 which provides not only an in-depth analysis of the
gaps, weaknesses and strengths of fisheries legislation of each member State284 but also 
a framework for model fisheries legislation to promote regional harmonisation of 
fisheries management legislation through compatible and comprehensive fisheries 
management legislation in RPOA member States.285 Member States have found this 
model legislation useful as a basis to frame or amend their legislation for the framework 
of responsible fishing management practices.286 Member States are then required to 
                                                                                                                                    
Indonesia on 12-14 August 2009. The sub-regional workshops included three sub-regional MCS 
workshops, i.e., the Southern and Eastern area of the South China Sea and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas 
workshop in Malaysia on 26-28 August 2008, the Arafu  and Timor Seas workshop in Darwin, Australia 
on 28-29 April 2009, and the Gulf of Thailand workshops in Bangkok on 28-29 March 2008 and 24-26 
February 2009.  
281 The second meeting of the RPOA Coordination Committee was held in Lombok, Indonesia on 4-5 
November 2009, whereas the third meeting was held in Da Nang, Vietnam on 1-2 December 2010. See, 
RPOA Secretariat, above n 270; RPOA Secretariat, 'Report to Ministers on the Implementation of the 
Regional Plan of Action (RPOA) to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices Including Combating IUU 
Fishing in the South East Asia Region' (December 2010) 
<http://www.rpoa.sec.kkp.go.id/images/pdf/minister/d cember_2010.pdf>. 
282 RPOA Secretariat, above n 270. 
283 William Edeson et al, 'Framework Study for Model Fisheries Legislation in South East Asia: Report 
on Australia Legislation' (Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), 
November 2010) <http://www.apip-apec.com/au/plan/files/37d230b932323ba22c2d2d5afc17378f.pdf>. 
284 The legislation of each of the 11 member States has been assesses against a set of benchmarks to 
identify the current strengths and weaknesses of each in terms of its ability to implement responsible 
fishing management practices. These benchmarks include ecosystem approach to fisheries management, 
data collection, monitoring and research, management plans, fishing vessel legislation, flag State 
authorisations to fish and effective control over nationals, authorisations to fish by the coastal State, 
MCS, port State controls, catch certification and other trade measures, tracking proceeds of illegal fishing 
and reporting requirements. Based on assessments, there are a number of gabs and weaknesses identified 
in the study. They are, for example, weak vessel registration systems, absence of measures to exercise 
effective port state controls over fishing vessels, lack of requirements in some States’ laws to enforce 
their vessels to comply with international agreements or the laws of other States, absence of articulae 
principles of data collection, compilation, collection and exchange in most of fisheries laws of member 
States. See, ibid.   
285 RPOA Secretariat, above n 281.    
286 RPOA Secretariat, 'Report to the Committee on Fisher es (COFI) of the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation on the Implementation of the Regional Pl n of Action (RPOA) to Promote Responsible 
Fishing Practices Including Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in the South 
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continue providing the updates on their work to strengthen their fisheries legislation 
based on the findings of this study, as appropriate.287  
   
Furthermore, a Capacity Development Framework for Marine Capture Fisheries 
Management in South East Asia has been prepared to provide structured guidelines on 
building human capacity for the management of marine capture fisheries.288 There are 
eight components, including fishing capacity management, under this framework.289 
Under fishing capacity management that has been idetified as a national priority, 
capacity building to strengthen vessels registration and licensing schemes was 
considered the highest priority across the RPOA member States in order to support 
better management of fishing capacity. It is due to the fact that effective vessel licensing 
and registration is an essential component to manage and monitor fishing capacity. 
Additionally, right-based fisheries management (RBFM) has been accepted by the 
participating States to be a possible management tool to control fishing capacity, as 
RBFM might be effectively applied in tropical multi-species and multi-gear fisheries, 
and those with a large number of participants.290 The planning and implementation of 
alternative livelihoods programs to support capacity reduction are also required by 
RPOA participating States.291 In terms of implementation of this study’s findings, 
however, member States concluded to continue the imple entation of their particular 
                                                                                                                                    
East Asia Region' (January 2012) 
<http://www.rpoa.sec.kkp.go.id/images/pdf/cofi/cofi_juli%202012.pdf>. 
287 Ibid. 
288 This Framework was commissioned by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry, with funding from the Public Sector Linkages Program of the Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID). A participatory, bottom-up approach was taken to identify 
capacity development needs for fisheries management agencies at the national level. Regional priorities 
were then formulated through a workshop held in Da Nang, Vietnam in November 2010, of participating 
country representatives. See, Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, Net Returns - A Human 
Capacity Development Framework for Marine Capture Fisheries Management in South East Asia 
(Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2011) 3. 
289 Other seven components include fisheries management pla ning, strengthening the scientific and 
economic basis for fisheries management, strengthening MCS, strengthening legal, policy and 
administrative support, strengthening information systems, effective decentralisation, and strengthening 
legal, policy and administrative support. The first four components, including fishing capacity 
management, are considered as regional priorities, whereas the last three components are dependent on 
the individual circumstances of the participating State. See, ibid 4-5.    
290 Ibid 17. 
291 Ibid 18. 
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priorities rather than to have a follow-up workshop that brings together key partners to 
develop a plan of action to progress the agreed priorities of this Framework.292    
 
Regional organisations playing as advisory bodies of the RPOA consist of FAO/APFIC, 
SEAFDEC, InfoFish and Worldfish Center.293 The guidelines provided under the RPOA 
have been recommended by these advisory bodies to be used to manage fishing 
capacity.294  
 
However, although this RPOA has been recognised as a useful framework for managing 
fishing capacity, there are still some tasks that require organisations and arrangements 
to undertake. Such tasks include identifying positive and negative impacts of reducing 
fishing overcapacity, in particular strategies for mitigating negative human impacts, 
developing effective and practical methods for asses ing fishing capacity and strategies 
for encouraging capacity reduction, and developing re ional cooperation to manage 
fishing capacity.295 Currently, the most significant challenge for States in the Southeast 
Asian region is the implementation of their NPOA for ishing capacity management. It 
is imperative that States should assess their current status in capacity reduction and 
prepare an action plan to address such issues, as well as determine whether the 
instruments can achieve their goals. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
292 RPOA Secretariat, above n 286. 
293 RPOA Secretariat, above n 269. 
294 At the thirtieth session of the APFIC meeting held in Manado, Indonesia on 11-13 August 2008, the 
meeting concluded that the RPOA is a useful framework for States and regional organisations to apply 
coordinated approaches in order to manage fishing capacity and IUU fishing. See, FAO, above n 246, 12; 
At the ASEAN-SEAFDEC Regional Expert Consultation o Future Roles of SEAFDEC in Fisheries 
Management in Southeast Asia held in Bangkok on 26-28 June 2007, it was concluded and recommended 
that the principles of the RPOA should be considere by the Regional Scientific Advisory Committee for
Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia (RSAC), which would be established by SEAFDEC. See, 
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Indonesia, RPOA: An Initiative and a 
Regional Commitment of the Countries Bordering the South China Sea, Sulu-Sulawesi Seas and Arafura-
Timor Seas to Manage Fisheries Resources <www.apfic.org/modules/xfsection/download.php?fileid=249 
>.  
295 FAO RAP, 'APFIC Second Regional Consultative Forum Meeting: Adapting to Emerging Challenges-
Promotion of Arrangements for the Management of Fisheries and Aquaculture in Asia-Pacific' (RAP 
PUBLICATION 2008/12, 6-9 August 2008) xi. 
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3.4 Criteria for Fishing Capacity Management based on International and 
Regional Legal and Policy Framework 
 
Based on discussions above, a set of criteria for the management of fishing capacity in 
accordance with international and regional legal and policy frameworks is developed 
and summarised in Table 3.1. Based on the criteria presented, a series of actions for 
States to take in order to manage their fishing capa ity can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. States should determine their current fishing capacity by implementing 
systematic measurement plan in their national policy framework; 
2. States should assess the level of their fishing capacity whether there is excess 
capacity and/or overcapacity problem, as well as examine the factors 
contributing to it; 
3. Where excess capacity and/or overcapacity exist, States should immediately 
address the problem by implementing proper management tools; 
4. Where overcapacity issues have not yet arisen, precautionary management tools 
should be implemented in order to prevent their occurrence. States should 
develop national plans of action for fishing capacity management; and 
5. State should participate in relevant international agreements and cooperate with 
other States through RFMOs or arrangements to address overcapacity problems. 
 
These criteria should be applied on marine capture fisheries of States at the national, 
regional and international levels. In Chapter 3.1, these criteria will be used to test 
whether Thailand has adequate management for fishing capacity. 
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Table 3.1: Criteria for the management of fishing capacity based on relevant international and regional instruments 
 
Criteria Scope Measures Instruments 
(1) Measurement and 
assessment of fishing 
capacity (including vessel 
registration and licensing) 
Within 
national 
jurisdiction 
-determine capacity to harvest living resources in EEZ at the level of optimal utilisation or TAC 
 of such resources 
-specify required information of fishing vessels, such as catch and effort statistics and fishing 
 position reports 
-license fishers, fishing vessels and equipments 
-require authorization for all vessels 
-establish records of fishing vessels 
-implement an improved system of local and national registration of fishing vessels 
-LOSC(art 62(1,2)) 
 
-LOSC(art 62(4)(e)) 
 
-LOSC(art 62(4)(a)) 
-CCRF(art 7.6.2) 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 16) 
-Regional CCRF 
 High seas -provide information necessary for assessing the capacity (e.g., records of fishing vessels) and 
international cooperation 
-implement the appropriate procedures of authorization for fishing vessels and ensure the 
authorized fishing vessels will fish with conditions of the authorization 
-authorize fishing fleets only where States can exercis  effectively responsibilities on them 
 
-establish records of fishing vessels 
-FAO Compliance 
Agreement(art IV,V,VI) 
-FAO Compliance 
Agreement(art III(2)) 
-Fish Stock Agreement(art 
18(2)) 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 18) 
 Regional 
level 
-require CPCs that have more than 50 vessels on the 2003 IOTC record of vessels, to limit, in 
2004 and following years, the number of their fishing vessels larger than 24 metres overall 
length to the number of fishing vessels registered in 2003 
-require CPCs to notify the lists of vessels (over 24 metres overall length and under 24 metres if 
they operate outside their EEZs) by gear type that fish for tropical tunas in 2006 and fish for 
swordfish and albacore in 2007, applicable during 2012 and 2013, will be reviewed in 2014 
-assess the state of fisheries resources and fishing fleet capacity 
-maintain comprehensive and updated vessel registers, catch and fishing effort information, as 
well as develop an appropriate regional approach to exchange such information among States 
-IOTC Resolution 03/01 
 
 
-IOTC Resolution 12/11 
 
 
-RPOA(para 6) 
-RPOA(para 5) 
 
 All levels -support in measurement of fishing capacity 
-conduct national, regional and global assessments of capacity 
-support in assessment of fishing capacity 
-improve capability for monitoring fishing capacity 
-IPOA-Capacity(paras 11-2) 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 7) 
-IPOA-Capacity(paras 13-5) 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 8) 
(2) Prepare and implement 
the management measures 
Within 
national 
jurisdiction 
-implement the management measures ensuring that the living resources in the EEZ are not 
endangered by overexploitation 
-regulate seasons and areas of fishing, types, sizes and amount of gear, as well as types, sizes 
and number of fishing vessels that are allowed 
-LOSC(art 61(2)) 
 
-LOSC(art 62(4)(c)) 
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Table 3.1: Cont. 
 
Criteria Scope Measures Instruments 
(2) Prepare and implement 
the management measures 
High seas -take measures through RFMOs to maintain harvested species at levels that can produce MSY 
(to determine commensurate fishing effort for such MSY) 
-take measures to deter or eliminate overfishing and excess capacity and ensure levels of fishing 
effort do not exceed those commensurate with the sustainable use of fisheries resources 
-immediate actions for important transboundary, straddling, highly migratory and high seas 
fisheries that require urgent measures 
-manage fishing capacity of vessels and cooperate with other States in reducing overcapacity 
-LOSC(art 119(1)(a)) 
 
-Fish Stock Agreement(art 
5(h)) 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 8) 
 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 31) 
 Regional 
level 
-strengthen RFOs and related mechanisms to improve fishing capacity management 
-become members of RFOs or arrangements or agree to adopt the conservation and 
management measures established by such RFOs or arrangements to fishing vessels 
-prevent the build-up of excess capacity 
-prepare NPOA taking into account of the regional specific issues, types of fisheries, and 
appropriate issues recommended by the IPOA-Capacity 
-establish management measures to prevent fishing capacity from the exceeding level that 
obstruct the capability of fish stocks to sustainably reproduce  
-cooperate to assess, conserve and manage fisheries resources where they straddle national 
boundaries or occur both within EEZs and in areas beyond and adjacent to the EEZs 
-work on the collection, management and sharing of inf rmation on the management of fishing 
capacity 
-provide assistance to traditional, artisanal and small-scale fisheries in terms of fisheries 
resource management 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 8) 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 34) 
 
-Regional CCRF 
-Regional CCRF 
 
-RPOA(para 6) 
 
-RPOA(para 6) 
 
-RPOA(para 6) 
 
-RPOA(para 6) 
 
 All levels 
 
-eliminate fisheries subsidies contributing to overcapacity by adopting new WTO rules on 
fisheries subsidies 
-prevent overfishing and excess fishing capacity; implement management measures ensuring 
fishing effort commensurate with fishery resource and their sustainable use. 
-implement measures that avoid economic waste and provide both sustainability and economic 
viability 
-establish measures through appropriate policy, legal and institutional framework based on best 
scientific evidence available 
 
-WTO rules on fisheries 
subsidies 
-CCRF(art 6.3,7.1.8) 
 
-CCRF(art 7.2.2) 
 
-CCRF(art 7.1.1) 
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Table 3.1: Cont. 
 
Criteria Scope Measures Instruments 
(2) Prepare and implement 
the management measures 
All levels 
 
-implement an efficient, equitable and transparent management measures for fishing capacity by 
2003, not later than 2005 
-prepare, implement and monitor national plans by taking account the consequences of different 
resource management systems on fishing capacity, make public NPOA by 2002, review at least 
every 4 years 
-implement strategies through complementary mechanisms to promote IPOA implementation, 
awareness building and education, technical cooperation t the international level, and 
coordination 
-assess possible impact of all factors, e.g., subsidies, economic incentives, that contribute, 
directly or indirectly, to the accumulation of excess fishing capacity, concerning the needs of 
artisanal fisheries 
-consider participating in relevant international agreements, e.g., the Compliance Agreement, 
the Fish Stocks Agreement 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 7) 
 
-IPOA-Capacity(paras 
8,19,24) 
 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 8) 
 
 
-IPOA-Capacity(paras 25-6) 
 
 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 29) 
(2.1) Overcapacity/excess 
capacity exist 
Regional 
level 
-establish mechanism  to eliminate overcapacity ensuri g the sustainable use of fisheries 
resources 
-freeze the number of fishing vessels at current levels 
-reduce the number of fishing vessels at the suitable rate respecting socio-economic impacts 
-monitor the impact of vessel reduction and prevent n w entry into overexploited fishery 
-provide training on alternative occupational skills and encourage fishers to leave overexploited 
fisheries 
-develop appropriate indicators to assist fishing capacity management 
-implement management measures, such as limit access regime of fisheries, promote co-
management and right-based fisheries, limit catch and fishing effort, ban particular fishing gears   
-reduce overcapacity without transferring such capaity to other fully exploited fisheries, taking 
account potential socioeconomic impacts 
-develop and implement NPOA that aims to decrease overcapacity and get rid of illegal fishing 
activities where these problems have been arisen 
-Regional CCRF 
 
-Regional CCRF 
-Regional CCRF 
-Regional CCRF 
-Regional CCRF 
 
-Regional CCRF 
-Regional CCRF 
-RPOA(para 6) 
 
-RPOA(para 6) 
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Table 3.1: Cont. 
 
Criteria Scope Measures Instruments 
(2.1) Overcapacity/excess 
capacity exist 
All levels -States and RFMOs are required to limit fishing capacity at current level and then gradually 
decrease fishing capacity 
-decrease fishing capacity, if required, in order to balance the level of fishing capacity with 
available fisheries resources on a sustainable basis 
1.1.1 -IPOA-
Capacity(para 7) 
 
-IPOA-Capacity(para 21) 
 
(2.2) Overcapacity/excess 
capacity are not yet arisen 
High seas -apply precautionary approach for conservation, management and exploitation of straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks by setting precautionary reference points (take into 
consideration excess capacity) and implement measurs to ensure that such point will not be 
exceeded, suggest to use MSY as reference point 
-Fish Stock Agreement(art 
6(1),annex II(1),art 6(4)) 
 Regional 
level 
-apply precautionary approach in accordance with the guidelines stated in the Fish Stocks 
Agreement 
-apply the provided interim target and limit referenc  points for albacore, bigeye tuna, skipjack 
tuna, yellowfin tuna and swordfish 
-apply a precautionary approach in case of uncertainty regarding the state of fishery resources 
-IOTC Resolution 12/01 
 
-IOTC Resolution 13/10 
 
-Regional CCRF 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided the criteria for the management of fishing capacity in areas within 
national jurisdiction, the high seas and in the regions where Thailand is located in 
particular. These criteria, which aim to prevent and eliminate overcapacity problem in 
marine capture fisheries, were developed in accordance with provisions adopted by both 
legally and non-legally binding relevant international and regional instruments. The 
international instruments examined were the LOSC, the Compliance Agreement, he 
Fish Stocks Agreement, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, the CCRF and the IPOA-Capacity. For regional instruments, the IOTC 
Resolutions, SEAFDEC Regional CCRF, and the RPOA, were discussed. Based on the 
analysis of the abovementioned instruments, a set of criteria for fishing capacity 
management can be summarised as a series of actions, including,  (i) measuring current 
fishing capacity; (ii) assessing the level of fishing capacity whether they are in the status 
of excess capacity and/or overcapacity; (iii) when the problem of excess capacity and/or 
overcapacity exists, addressing this problem immediat ly and implement proper 
management tools; (iv) where excess capacity and/or ove capacity issues have not yet 
arisen,  implementing precautionary management tools to prevent these issues, as well 
as developing the NPOA for fishing capacity management and implementing it at all 
levels; and (v) participating in relevant international agreements and cooperating with 
RFOs or arrangements to address overcapacity problem. States should apply these 
criteria at all fisheries levels. 
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CHAPTER 4 FISHING CAPACITY MEASUREMENT, INCENTIVE 
BLOCKING MEASURES FOR MANAGING FISHING CAPACITY AND  
IMPLEMENTATION BY THAILAND 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
After a discussion of the legal and policy requirements to manage fishing capacity, it is 
paramount to examine the technical measures that will enable the implementation of 
relevant State obligations under global and regional agreements. This chapter first 
describes the details on measuring and assessing overcapacity in fisheries by 
quantitative and qualitative methods. It additionally provides the standards and 
measures widely used to manage fishing capacity, focusing on incentive blocking 
measures. These measures are categorised into two groups, i.e., input regulations and 
output regulations. Input regulations include limited licensing programs, individual 
effort quota programs, as well as gear and vessel re triction programs, whereas vessel 
catch limits measure is discussed as output regulations. This chapter further examines 
the application of such measures by Thailand concerning legislation and institutional 
aspects.     
 
4.2 Measuring and Assessing Overcapacity in Fisheris 
 
According to the criteria analysed and presented in Chapter 3, the initial steps in 
managing fishing capacity is that States should examine the current level of their fishing 
capacity and assess it whether there actually is the problem of excess capacity and/or 
overcapacity. Thus, systematic assessment of capacity, of overcapacity in particular, is 
essentially established at all fisheries levels.1 The level of fishing capacity can be 
determined by both quantitative measures and qualitative indicators. Details of both 
methods are analysed in the following sections. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 They include national, regional and global levels. See, Rebecca Metzner, Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Topics. Different Perspectives on Fishing Capacity. Topics Fact Sheets. (27 May 2005) FAO 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14856/en>. 
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4.2.1 Quantitative Measures for Overcapacity 
 
The definition of the target level of capacity is required for quantitative measures, so 
that overcapacity can be defined as the difference or ratio of the potential level to the 
target level.2 Further, fishing capacity can be determined either on input or on output 
base and in response to a wide range of indicators. The Technical Consultation on the 
Measurement and Assessment of Fishing Capacity organised by the FAO3 has 
suggested that any State should estimate its fishing capacity on both input and output 
bases for the purpose of broad international comparison.4 Examples of the measures of 
capacity on input and output bases are presented below. 
 
4.2.1.1 Input-based Capacity 
 
Measures of capacity on input basis can be applied w th a tacit assumption that output 
level is relevant to physical inputs used in the fishery. If such inputs are entirely used, 
the fleet capacity will therefore be a function of these inputs.5 In this case, the utilisation 
level will connect with the activity level, such asdays of fishing operation. Thus, the 
fleet capacity is connected with the fixed inputs that are used in the fishery.6 The fixed 
inputs typically involve the number or characteristics of the vessels, or the capital stock. 
Measures of capacity base should concern different characteristics across vessels or 
fleet segments in order to achieve effective management. The different level of 
productivity of a variety of inputs must be concerned and measured for proper capacity 
analysis.7 In this sense, it can be carried out by identifying the characteristic of a 
particular vessel, which determines the total fishing power of such vessel. Then, the 
                                                
2 Rebecca Metzner, Fisheries and Aquaculture Topics. Assessing Fishing Capacity and Overcapacity. 
Topics Fact Sheets. (27 May 2005) FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14858/en>. 
3 This consultation meeting was held in Mexico on 29 November-3 December 1999. See, FAO, 
'Technical Consultation on the Measurement of Fishing Capacity. Mexico City, Mexico, 29 November - 3 
December 1999' (FAO Fisheries Report No. 615, FAO, 2000). 
4 Steve Cunningham and Dominique Greboval, Managing Fishing Capacity: A Review of Policy and 
Technical Issues (FAO, 2001) 1. 
5 John M Ward et al, Measuring and Assessing Capacity in Fisheries: 1. Basic Concepts and 
Management Options (FAO, 2004) 16; Sean Pascoe, Louisa Coglan and Simon Mardle, 'Physical Versus 
Harvest-based Measures of Capacity: the Case of the United Kingdom Vessel Capacity Unit System' 
(2001) 58(6) ICES Journal of Marine Science / Journal du Conseil 1243, 1243. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Sean Pascoe et al, Measuring and Assessing Capacity in Fisheries: 2. Issues and Methods (FAO, 2003) 
36. 
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utilisation of capacity may be separately estimated for fishing units with the same 
characteristics in terms of fishing activity, such as gear type applied, fishing ground, 
and target species.8  
 
The key indicator of fixed input capacity is a measure of the capital stock, which can 
basically be the number of vessels. However, there was an argument that using the 
number of vessels as such indicator is inadequate for fisheries.9 Therefore, other 
measures that take into account not only the number of fishing vessels but also the size, 
total gross tonnage, total engine power of these vessels, have been developed. These 
measures recognise that harvesting potential of a small fleet of large vessels could be 
similar in effect to (if not bigger than) a large fl et of small vessels.10 
 
At the FAO Technical Consultation Meeting in Mexico (1999), a list of main capacity 
characteristics by gear type was developed.11 Such list, which captures the difference of 
possible characteristics of gear types, is presented i  Table 4.1. Apart from the fixed 
inputs, there are also variable inputs applied to capa ity. Variable inputs could be used 
to determine the potential output that can be generated from the current capacity base.12 
If taking variable inputs into consideration as well, the key indicator of this capacity 
measure is effort.  
 
Fishing effort is a theoretical concept and consisted of a number of components, i.e., 
fishing period, level of inputs, level of technology and the expertise of a vessel master 
and crews. Basically, effort is explained as a combined measure of fixed (i.e., vessel) 
and variable (e.g., crews, fishing days, fuel) compnents.13 Effort, therefore, can 
                                                
8 Ibid. 
9 James E Kirkley and Dale E Squires, 'A Limited Information Approach for Determining Capital Stock 
and Investment in a Fishery' (1986) 86(2) Fish. Bull. 339, quoted in Pascoe et al, above n 7, 37. 
10 Pascoe et al, above n 7, 37. 
11 FAO, above n 3, 41. 
12 Pascoe et al, above n 7, 36; James E Kirkley and Dale Squires, 'Capacity and Capacity Utilisation in 
Fisheries Industries' in Sean Pascoe and Dominique Greboval (eds), Measuring Capacity in Fisheries, 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 2003) vol 445, 314, 39. 
13 The concept of fishing effort originates from the biological literature on fisheries; the notion that a 
single variable, such as fishing effort, represents the influences of all inputs on output is related o the 
economic concepts of separability and aggregation. The notion of fishing effort may also be viewed as 
though it is an intermediate output of a two-stage production process. See, Robert A Pollak and Terenc J 
Wales, 'Specification and Estimation of Nonseparable Two-stage Technologies: the Leontief CES and the 
Cobb-Douglas CES' (1987) 98(2) (April) J. Political Econ. 311, quoted in Pascoe et al, above n 7, 39. 
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possibly be expressed as a total input, called fishing effort. Effort is commonly 
measured in terms of time used for fishing or days t ea (e.g., fishing days or fishing 
hours per vessel).14 
 
Table 4.1: Main characteristics of capacity by gear type 
 
Gear type Characteristics of capacity 
All gears Number of vessels, licences, participants, or gear units 
(whichever is relevant); trip duration; actual number of trips per 
year or season; potential number of trips per year or season; total 
catch including discards; level of mechanization 
Beach nets As for all gears, plus total length of nets 
Handline As for all gears, plus number of lines used 
Set nets As for all gears, plus total length of nets, average set time 
Traps As for all gears, plus number of traps, averag  soak time 
Diving As for all gears 
Purse seine As for all gears, plus time searching for fish; use of fish 
aggregating or fish-finding aid, e.g., fish aggregating devices 
(FADs), airplanes and sonar; average sets per trip; vessel gross 
tonnage or other volumetric measures; engine power (kW); fish 
hold capacity 
Longline As for all gears, plus average hooks per set, average sets per trip; 
average soak time; use of fish-finding aid; vessel gross tonnage 
or other volumetric measures; fish hold capacity 
Gill nets As for all gears, plus type of nets, total length and depth of nets, 
mesh size; average set time; average sets per trip; use of fish-
finding aid; vessel gross tonnage or other volumetric measures; 
engine power (kW); fish hold capacity 
Trawl/Dredge As for all gears, plus gear dimensions (e.g., head-rope length, 
beam length);15 mesh size; tow time; average tows per trip, use of 
fish-findings aid; vessel gross tonnage or other volumetric 
measures; engine power (kW); fish hold capacity 
 
Source of table: FAO, 'Technical Consultation on the Measurement of Fishing 
Capacity' (FAO Fisheries Report No. 615, FAO, 29 November-3 December 1999) 41. 
 
In most fisheries, some long-term potential yield (LTPY), such as MSY and MEY, can 
be determined based on an assessment of the fish stock. Associated with a target yield is 
                                                
14 Pascoe et al, above n 7, 39  
15 Ibid 37. 
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a target effort level, which is used to determine th  most appropriate fleet size.16 A level 
of effort may be generated by a larger number of underutilised vessels or a smaller 
number of fully utilised vessels, which is preferable from an economic perspective.17 
However, using input-based measures for measuring overcapacity is very complicated. 
It is because these measures involve not only the vessel used to harvest fish, but also 
other factors, such as labour, capital and fish stock . Furthermore, seasonality and 
fluctuation of stocks, the condition of multi-specis and multi-gear fisheries can 
increase the complexity when determining the optimal ix of inputs needed in 
producing a desired output level.18 
 
4.2.1.2 Output-based Capacity 
 
Capacity measures on output basis directly determine the potential output and/or the 
level of capacity utilisation. This measurement is usually conducted for the individual 
vessel.19 The relationship between fixed input level, utilisat on level or such inputs and 
output level is not directly expressed in the estima on of the output-based capacity 
measure.20 Such estimation, however, does not mainly adopt the similar assumptions, 
which are tacit in the input-based measures. Consequently, the output-based measures 
are not impacted by the distribution of inputs.21  
 
The capacity output refers to the maximum catch level that can be generated in a time 
unit (e.g., fishing season or fishing year) by existing vessels and equipments under 
given working conditions, that factors of production can possibly be changeable.22 In 
the case of fisheries, the variable factors of production are, for instance, fishing days (or 
hours), labours, quantities of gear. These variable factors are independently determined, 
not identified together with the capital or capacity base determined in terms of the 
                                                
16 Ward et al, above n 5, 17. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid 17-8. 
19 Ibid 16; Sean Pascoe et al, 'Measuring and Appraising Capacity in Fisheries: Framework, Analytical 
Tools and Data Aggregation' (FAO Fisheries Circular No. 994, FAO, 2004) 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/y5443e/y5443e00.htm> 6-7. 
20 Ward et al, above n 5, 17-8. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Pascoe et al, above n 7, 42; Niels Vestergaard, Dale Squires and James E Kirkley, 'Measures of 
Capacity in a Multispecies Danish Fishery' in Sean P scoe and Dominique Greboval (eds), Measuring 
Capacity in Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 2003) vol 445, 314, 170. 
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characteristics of vessel.23 Capacity output is, therefore, basically defined by the 
capacity base and is correspondingly connected with the full utilisation level of variable 
inputs, this relationship, however, is not necessarily p oportional.24 
 
The methods used to estimate capacity, both output-based and input-based measures, 
and capacity utilisation depend greatly on the level of available data.25 For output-based 
measures, there are various methods, including (i) rapid appraisal (RA) techniques, 
which has been largely used in developing States where formal data collection is not 
practical or information needed is not available. These techniques focus on the 
collection of local knowledge gained from informal interviews with key participants, 
such as fishers, fisher representatives, in the fishery;26 (ii) surveys and expert opinion, 
which is useful to estimate fishing capacity and potential overcapacity when fisheries 
data is limited. Many surveys may be needed to separately conduct with participants, 
i.e., fishers;27 (iii) peak-to-peak analysis, which is conducted based on an assumption 
of a direct relationship between the input level (with an index of CPUE) and the output 
level. In this sense, lower CPUEs are assumed to indicate the capacity 
underutilisation;28 (iv) stochastic production frontiers (SPF), which are used based on 
the assumption that ‘output is a function of the leve  of inputs and the efficiency of the 
producer in using those inputs. Lower levels of output derived from this method would 
suggest a combination of inefficient input use and capacity underutilisation’;29 and (v) 
data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is ‘a mathematical programming technique 
for estimating technical efficiency and capacity utilisation. It is similar to SPF in that it 
estimates a frontier level of production and measure  incapability and capacity 
utilisation as deviations from the frontier.’30 Likely, when necessary data is available, 
                                                
23 Pascoe et al, above n 7, 42. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid 47. 
26 Ibid 48; Tony J Pitcher, 'Rapfish, a Rapid Appraisal Technique for Fisheries, and Its Application to the
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries' (FAO Fisheries Circular No. 947, FAO, 1999) 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/x4175e/X4175E00.pdf> 1. 
27 Pascoe et al, above n 7, 48. 
28 Ibid 50; C T Hsu Timothy, 'Simple Capacity Indicators for Peak-to-Peak and Data Envelopment 
Analyses of Fishing Capacity - A Preliminary Assessment' in Sean Pascoe and Dominique Greboval 
(eds), Measuring Capacity in Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 2003) vol 445, 314, 236. 
29 Pascoe et al, above n 7, 50; Andrew I L  Payne, John Cotter and Ted Potter (eds), Advances in Fisheries 
Science (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) 37 
30 Pascoe et al, above n 7, 52; Payne, Cotter and Potter, above n 29, 37 
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DEA is favourable to be used as it has been applied in many fisheries, such as 
Malaysian purse seine fishery, United States Pacific salmon fishery, Northwest Atlantic 
sea scallop fishery and Atlantic coastal groundfish fi ery.31 
 
Although output-based measures provide a good estimate of capacity and capacity 
utilisation in fisheries,32 they are not as useful for a number of current management 
schemes. It is because fisheries managers in several States (e.g., Thailand) have 
developed the measures that use capacity indicators m stly depending on the physical 
characteristics of the fishing vessels,33 and have applied fishing capacity reduction 
programs according to these capacity measures,34 or they are defined as input controls. 
The key indicators mainly used are gross tonnage (a me sure of the vessel volume), the 
power of vessel engine, and the number of vessels. These measures are then defined as 
input-based measures of capacity. If the management system is not changed, the only 
way to reduce capacity under such system is to remov  s me inputs from the fishery, 
and thus the input-based measurement is essential.35 As a result, both input-based and 
output-based measures are apparently needed in fisherie  management. Furthermore, for 
a purpose of general comparison at international level, the FAO Technical Consultation 
on the Measurement and Assessment of Fishing Capacity has also suggested States to 
obtain their national fishing capacity estimates on both input and output basis.36 
However, distinguishing the relationship between these different measures is also a 
significant part of the management information system.37 
 
4.2.1.3 Reference Point for the Management of Fishing Capacity 
 
According to aforesaid sections, key quantitative indicators are measures of the current 
and potential fishing effort produced by the current fleet, and the current and potential 
catch that could be taken by such current fleet. Thus, the definitions of target level of 
                                                
31 Ibid.  
32 FAO, above n 3, 43. 
33 Ibid appendix H, I.  
34 Pascoe et al, above n 7, 35. 
35 Ward et al, above n 5, 16. 
36 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 1.    
37 Ward et al, above n 5, 16. 
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capacity (e.g., fishing effort, catch or number of vessels) are required.38 For the purpose 
of general comparisons at the global level, the FAO Technical Consultation on the 
Measurement and Assessment of Fishing Capacity has suggested that MSY (or fishing 
effort employed to catch MSY) should be adopted by all States as a common reference 
point for fishing capacity management at national and international levels.39 However, 
there has been an argument that catching at the MSYlevel is still not safe as MSY is 
considered a semi-stable equilibrium. Harvesting below MSY is safer to the population 
of fisheries resources. Furthermore, catching at a r te proportional to stock size is also 
safer than catching a fixed amount of fish since all equilibriums are stable.40 Therefore, 
some States (e.g., Australia) widely use MEY as a reference point of their harvest 
strategy. It is due to the fact that the equilibrium stock level associated with MEY is 
bigger than that associated with MSY for most cases. Then, theoretically MEY is more 
environmentally conservative than MSY.41 Besides, at the MEY level, the sustainable 
catch or effort would generate the maximum profits. But, it is essential to note that in 
multi-species fisheries the reference point, either MSY or MEY, should be determined 
by considering the different biology and economic characteristics among species.42   
  
4.2.2 Qualitative Indicators for Overcapacity 
 
Clearly, to quantitatively determine capacity needs a great amount of information on a 
fishery or fisheries that may not be available, particularly in open access or regulated 
open access fisheries. Thus, subjective measures and qualitative indicators of 
overcapacity levels might be beneficial to fisheries managers in terms of capacity 
management.43 Some remarkable qualitative indicators are summarised below. 
 
Biological status of the fishery: In many States, stock assessments are undertaken for 
key species. These assessments basically have a purpose ‘to estimate the stock 
                                                
38 Ibid 20. 
39 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 2.    
40 Eleanor J Milner-Gulland and Ruth Mace, Conservation of Biological Resources (Blackwell Science, 
1998) 49. 
41 Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Harvest Strategy: For the Torres Strait Prawn Fishery 
(2010) i. 
42 Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, Commonwealth Fisheries Harvest Strategy: Policy 
and Guidelines (2007) 31. 
43 Metzner, above n 2. 
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abundance and level of fishing mortality over recent years, and often predict yields and 
biomass in the short term based on assumptions about continuing levels of fishing 
effort’.44 The advice, based on these assessments, is often provided to fisheries 
managers in terms of either target catch levels or effort levels of the fisheries. For 
instance, Japan has conducted stock assessments for seven commercially important 
species (i.e., saury, walleye Pollock, jack mackerel, sardine, mackerel, common squid, 
and snow crab) that contribute 35 per cent of annual catch landing in order to determine 
TACs of these species.45 In general, the stocks are identified as overfished, fully utilised 
or underutilised based on a set of biological reference points.46 If concerned species are 
overfished, then overcapacity almost certainly exists. It is because either overfishing or 
overcapacity is a consequence of similar management problem. However, although the 
biological state of a fish stock could be a reasonable and useful indicator of 
overcapacity, it must be applied appropriately.47 
 
The ratio between total allowance catch (TAC) and the length of fishing season: 
TAC is basically defined as ‘a catch limit set for a particular fishery, generally for a 
year or a fishing season.’ TACs are generally set in tonnes of live-weight equivalent, 
but can also be set in numbers of fish.48 The purpose of TACs is to prevent fishers to 
overexploit the resource. The ‘race for the fish’ where TAC is fully fished before the 
end of the fishing season, can be an indicator of overcapacity. In other words, the 
proportion of the level of TAC to the season length may be used as a qualitative 
indicator of overcapacity.49 In case the season length reduced continuously for some 
years, this may also be used as an indicator of overcapacity. Although this is not a very 
                                                
44 Ward et al, above n 5, 22. 
45 Japan has considered the target species for TACs based on three criteria, including i) species that have 
catches in the top 30 ranking; ii) species that are considered overexploited; and iii) species that are caught 
by foreign vessels in Japan’s EEZ. See, Irina Popescu and Toshihiko Ogushi, 'Fisheries in Japan' 
(European Parliament, December 2013) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/529044/IPOL-
PECH_NT(2014)529044_EN.pdf> 25. 
46 Ward et al, above n 5, 22. 
47 Ibid. 
48 OECD, Total Allowable Catch (TAC) (18 November 2001) 
<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2713>.    
49 Ward et al, above n 5, 23; FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, The State of World Fisheries 
and Aquaculture 2004 (FAO, 2004) 121. 
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good one to indicate overcapacity, it could show the possibility of having overcapacity 
problem in such fishery.50 
 
Latent permits: The trend of unused or latent permits or licenses in the fisheries is 
another indicator of overcapacity. These fishing permits or licences are issued to fishers 
but have never been used, or have been used earlier but are inactive now. The 
proportion of active permits to total permits (i.e., active and latent) could be applied as 
an indicator of overcapacity, that overcapacity potentially exists when a large ratio of 
latent permits to total permits, or a small ratio of active permits to total permits, is 
found.51 This indicator is not perfect either, though. 
 
Catch per unit of effort (CPUE): The appearance of a decrease of CPUE over time 
may suggest overfishing and, potentially, overcapacity,52 such as the case of Thai 
marine fisheries.53 But this CPUE indicator must be used carefully, as CPUE could be 
stable or increase for a schooling type of fish even though the abundance of such fish 
stock is decreasing. However, in a fishery, which TACs and catch level are quite stable, 
a decreasing trend in CPUE over a period of time possibly suggests overcapacity.54 
 
Value per unit of effort (VPUE): When CPUE decreases, the VPUE will also decrease 
as the catch production decreases, potentially suggestin  overcapacity.55 But, there are 
also many circumstances where VPUE may decrease although CPUE is quite stable. For 
instance, an increased proportion of juvenile fish in catch composition, which generally 
have a lower price on the market due to their smaller size, will result in lower revenue 
per trip even if total catch remains quite constant.56 This would be an indicator that the 
stocks are being overfished and excess capacity is likely to exist. In addition, the 
changes in species composition of the catch will affect the VPUE. Generally, fishers 
will try to catch the most valuable species first, a drop of VPUE, therefore, could 
suggest that these high valuable species had been depleted, and thus the less valuable 
                                                
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid 24; FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 49, 121. 
53 Details are discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2. 
54 Ward et al, above n 5, 24. 
55 Ibid; FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 49, 121. 
56 Ward et al, above n 5, 24. 
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species had been caught instead. VPUE can be a useful indicator for highly mixed 
fisheries where catch weight of each species is difficult to record, but the total value of 
catches is possible to get.57 
 
Apart from the indications abovementioned, there ar other qualitative indicators for 
overcapacity that can be used. They include the ratio of harvest to target catch, the 
degree of conflict in a fishery over the catch allocation, decreased economic profits and 
increased fleet age.58 It could be possible that these subjective measures may sometimes 
be the only feasible method to determine the estimates of overcapacity, and then using 
qualitative assessments depending on verifiable indicators could result in a better use of 
available information.59 Nonetheless, it is clearly seen that no one indicator can be 
adequate to indicate overcapacity in a fishery. A set of combined indicators analysed 
over time is required to measure levels of qualitative capacity in fisheries.60 It is also 
important to note that even when qualitative indicators suggest overcapacity at that 
particular time, they do not show either the intensity of such problem or the direction its 
change. Furthermore, the application of aforesaid indicators can be varied based on the 
expertise of the analyst.61 Therefore, these qualitative indicators must be car fully used. 
 
Currently, quantitative and qualitative methods of capacity assessment, as well as 
monitoring mechanisms are applied in many States du to the implementation of NPOA 
and regional plans of action on fishing capacity management.62 
 
4.3 Standards and Measures for Fishing Capacity Management 
 
When a fishery has confronted unacceptable levels of excess and overcapacity, the 
implementation of regulations to control fishing capacity in a short run and decrease 
fishing capacity in the long run needs to be implemented.63 To achieve such goals, the 
                                                
57 Ibid. 
58 Metzner, above n 2. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ward et al, above n 5, 22. 
61 Ibid 24. 
62 Metzner, above n 2. 
63 John M Ward and Rebecca Metzner, 'Fish Harvesting Capacity, Excess Capacity, and Overcapacity: A 
Synthesis of Measurement Studies and Management Strategies' (FAO, 2002) 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y8169e/y8169e00.pdf> 74. 
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connection between fishing capacity and relevant perspectives of fisheries management, 
particularly the factors that influence fishing behaviour and fleet dynamics, need to be 
understood.64 However, the existing legal framework for fishing capacity management 
both within the global and regional contexts mentioned in the previous chapter, clearly 
suggest for States to eliminate overcapacity or control fishing capacity at levels that are 
appropriate with the sustainable utilisation of fisheries resources. Nonetheless, they do 
not provide any explicit measures as solutions to manage fishing capacity in such 
circumstances. However, several measures or tools have been widely adopted as 
technical instruments used to control fishing capacity. This section clarifies and 
analyses these tools in order to provide a technical framework from which State or 
regional measures can be measured against. Additionally, the current implementations 
of such tools by Thailand are also examined. 
 
In order to address the problem of overcapacity effectively, tools or measures should be 
used to manage the fishing fleet rather than fish stock  and correct incentives of 
fishers.65 These measures can be categorised into three main groups, namely, incentive 
blocking measures, incentive adjusting measures and other relevant management 
measures. The first two groups consider how these measures change the incentives 
facing fishers,66 whereas the last group includes other management masures that could 
be applied to control fishing capacity in indirect ways. Details of measures under each 
group are discussed in the following sections.    
 
4.3.1 Incentive Blocking Measures 
 
In fisheries where property right management system are deemed not to be appropriate, 
such as in multi-species fisheries, explicit management systems for fishing capacity 
need to be introduced.67 Put simply, they can be a set of policies and tools designed to 
control the fleet size or catch in order to achieve some desired level of exploitation.68 
Such tools are then called direct controls or incentiv  blocking measures as they aim to 
                                                
64 Rebecca Metzner, Fisheries and Aquaculture Topics. Regulating Fishing Capacity. Topics Fact Sheets. 
(27 May 2005) FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14857/en>. 
65 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 15. 
66 Ward et al, above n 5, 25. 
67 Ibid 2. 
68 Ibid. 
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prevent the economic incentives, which are nature of open access fisheries and usually 
lead to the increase of fishing fleet capacity. These ‘command-and-control’ tools 
efficaciously limit the capability of the market to function.69 Incentive blocking 
measures can be categorised into two subgroups, i.e., input regulations and output 
regulations. 
 
4.3.1.1 Input Regulations 
 
Input regulations, which could be referred to as physical measures,70 are conceptualised 
on the assumption that if inputs are decreased, the resource will regenerate and lead to 
along-term increase in CPUE and in total catches. The expected results are the greater 
profit and the generation of resource rent.71 Additionally, input control might ensure 
more effective compliance and improve social stability of the fishing communities.72 
The most significant input regulations are discussed as follows:  
 
4.3.1.1.1 Limited Licensing 
 
The objective of limited licence programs is to seta highest number or capacity of 
fishing units that are allowed to operate in a fishery73 in order to control fishing 
mortality by restricting access to the fishery and ensure the conservation of stocks.74 
The licences that may be either transferable, or non-transferable, are granted by either 
giving or selling, to fishing units or fishers or companies. The fishing units include 
                                                
69 Ibid 26. 
70 FAO, above n 3, 44. 
71 Costs include all components employed to create an xploitation level in a fishery together with an 
accepted level of return on capital, and the resource rent is any income obtained in excess of this amount. 
Due to the fact that costs and prices vary, the resource rent is therefore not fixed but variable too. 
Resource rent does not only change over time, but also change depending on the level of fishing effort. 
See, Tim Bostock et al, Fiscal Reform in Fisheries: 2. Resource Rent (May) Overseas Development 
Institute <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2286.pdf>; Reasons to collect resource rent (also 
commonly known as economic rent) are including to ensure a return to the owner of a resource, avoid 
inefficient allocation, and achieve ethical objectives. See, Jim Sinner and Jorn Scherzer, 'The Public 
Interest in Resource Rent' (2007) 11(Journal Article) New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 279.     
72 David Symes, 'Institutional Change and the Reform f Fisheries Management: Some Outstanding 
Questions' in David Symes (ed), Alternative Management Systems for Fisheries (Fi hing News Books, 
1999) 242, 184. 
73 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'Synthesis Report for the Study on the 
Economic Aspects of the Management of Marine Living Resources' (AGR/FI (96) 12, OECD, 1996). 
74 John R Beddington and R Bruce Rettig, Approaches to the Regulation of Fishing Effort (FAO, 1984) 
13. 
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fishing vessels and fishing gears. The number of fishers or capacity is then restricted by 
limiting the number of licences. The purpose of this scheme is mainly to control the 
increase of excess capacity.75 Since this limited entry scheme was initiated to not favour 
the policy of incentive subsidisation for vessel construction and improvement, fishery 
industry did not usually support this scheme in the past.76 Many States have 
implemented restricted-access programs through the forms of licensing.77 For example, 
Australia has implemented the scheme of limited licensing as one of the main 
management tools in many fisheries, e.g., the Northern Prawn Fishery (NPF), the 
Western Rock lobster Fishery, and the South East Trawl Fishery (SEF).78 In the United 
States, the Maryland Limited Entry Program for commercial fishing licenses was 
introduced through a delayed entry program that a new entrant had to register with the 
Maryland Department of Natural Resources two years before receiving a license to 
catch finfish, crabs, oysters, or clams.79 A moratorium on new entrants of sea scallop 
fisheries is also put in place in the United States.80 China has also attempted to reduce 
fishing effort by implementing a blanket moratorium in coastal waters.81 
 
Often, variation of licensing programs reflects social, economic, and political 
environments.82 For instance, due to unclear political decision in the European Union 
(EU) in terms of fishing capacity reduction, the two ays adopted by the EU Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) have been alternatively implemented to limit fishing effort,83 i.e., 
                                                
75 Dominique Greboval and Gordon Munro, 'Overcapitalization and Excess Capacity in World Fisheries: 
Underlying Economics and Methods of Control' in Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing 
Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts and Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 386 
(FAO, 1999) 206, 26. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Symes, above n 72, 184. 
78 FAO, Information on Fisheries Management in Australia (October 2003) < 
http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/AUS/body.htm>. 
79 Maryland Department of Natural Resources, Commercial Fisheries Licenses & Fees: Limited Entry for 
Commercial Fishing Licenses (2012) <http://www.dnr.state.md.us/fisheries/commercial/license/limited.asp>. 
80 FAO, Information on Fisheries Management of the United States of America (February 2003) 
<http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/USA/body.htm>. 
81 FAO, Information on Fisheries Management in the People's Republic of China (November 2001) 
<http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/CHN/body.htm>. 
82 Beddington and Rettig, above n 74, 15. 
83 Based on article 3(h) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation 
and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, fishing effort is defined 
as fishing capacity x activity. Fishing capacity can be measured in terms of the number of licensed fishing 
vessels or the size (gross tonnage) or the power of ngine (kW) of fishing vessels. Presently, the EU measures 
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(i) maintaining fishing effort (and/or fishing capacity) of certain fisheries at the present 
level or not beyond historic level;84 and (ii) reducing fishing efforts until they reach 
precautionary levels and the levels that produce a long-term high yield.85 However, 
these methods seem insufficient as the EU fishing fleets’ capacity has been still 
increased over time.86  
 
Since limited licensing schemes aim to protect the increase of excess capacity, when 
combining it with TACs schemes, the license limitation scheme will control the 
accumulation of excess capital. This outcome is similar with the consequence of 
applying TACs-only policy.87 It is because TACs-only policy is focused on the 
rehabilitation of the resource only, and hence the conventional capital stock will be 
accumulated above the optimal level. It eventually results in significant overcapacity in 
fishing fleet and leads to economic waste. Thus, the TACs-only policy is not 
recommended as a measure to control fishing capacity.88 However, when applying 
limited licensing with TACs, the licences allowed will equal a fixed number of fishing 
units (or fishers) that are able to harvest the specified TACs.89 For example, the CFP 
sets TACs and fishing effort for fisheries on deep sea species every two years.90 
However, there might be difficulties confronted when implementing a TAC regulation 
system in multi-species and no discard fisheries. It is based on the fact that fishers 
within this system have incentives to misreport thecatch to avoid penalties, which 
would consequently distort the information needed for biological advice.91 Due to this 
constraint, a TAC regulation system is unlikely to be effectively implemented in multi-
species fisheries such as tropical fisheries. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
fishing effort in terms of either GT days, or kW days. See, European Commission, Fact Sheet: Fishing Effort 
(2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/cfp_factsheets/fishing_effort_en.pdf>.  
84 This method has been implemented in the Western Waters nd the Plaice Box in the North Sea. See, 
ibid. 
85 This method has been applied on other fisheries in EU. See, ibid. 
86 Sebastian Villasante and Ussif Rashid Sumaila, 'Estimating the Effects of Technological Efficiency on
the European Fishing Fleet' (2010) 34(3) Marine Policy 720, 721. 
87 Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 21. 
88 Ibid, 21-2; Gary R Morgan, Individual Quota Management in Fisheries - Methodolgies for 
Determining Catch Quotas and Initial Quota Allocation (Rome, 1997). 
89 Colin W Clark, The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries Economic Models and Human Behavior (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 9. 
90 European Commission, above n 83. 
91 Symes, above n 72, 183. 
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The schemes of license limitation are generally applied by granting licenses to fishing 
units that rightfully claim in a fishery, either by their historical involvement in the 
fishery or by substantially investing in the fishery’s development.92 To reduce the 
licenses, there have been three main approaches to u e. The first one, which is the 
simplest way, is attrition. This method, however, can be possible if the licences cannot 
be transferred.93 Furthermore, it usually takes a long time to be eff ctive and unlikely 
increase an economically efficient outcome. It could also be an issue of unfairness to 
future entrants.94 The second approach, which is for only transferabl licences, is to 
apply the regulations that ensure the reduction of capacity after transferring licences.95 
 
The last approach, which is increasingly used in today’s fisheries,96 is to implement a 
buyback scheme. Typically, the goal of a vessel buyback scheme can be categorised 
into three main areas, i.e., social alteration, fleet rationalisation and conservation of 
fisheries resources.97 This scheme is approached by authorities by purchasing licenses 
and vessels in order to remove them from the fishery and the fishing capacity will then 
be decreased.98 But it is important to note that a buyback scheme applied when the 
incentives are still unaltered cannot achieve a purpose of long-term capacity reduction, 
as the capacity would be soon reversed.99 In other words, a buyback scheme may 
decrease fishing capacity in a short period but as far as the incentives of open access 
fisheries continue, the improvement of stock abundance will still appear to fishers to 
create more fishing capacity in the fishery.100 It is due to the fact that buyback program 
has actually renewed the economic incentives for fleet expansion. The owners of 
remaining licensed vessels tend to gradually increase the efficiency of their vessels in a 
                                                
92 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 22. 
93 Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 22. 
94 Cunningham and Greboval, above n  4, 34. 
95 Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 22. 
96 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 75; Daniel Holland, Eyjolfur Gudmundsson and John Gates, 'Do 
Fishing Vessel Buyback Programs Work: A Survey of the Evidence' (1999) 23(1) Marine Policy 47. 
97 Holland, Gudmundsson and Gates, above n 96, 59. For the goal of social adjustment, there are 
including transfer payments, such as disaster aid to the fishing industry or aboriginal rights. See, Ward 
and Metzner, above n 63; Dale Squires et al, 'Fisheries Buybacks' in R Quentin Grafton et al (eds), 
Marine Fisheries Conservation and Management (Oxford University Press, 2010) 507. 
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99 John Gate, Dan Holland and Eyjolfur  Gudmundsson, 'Theory and Practice of Fishing Vessel Buyback 
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process, which is termed as ‘capital stuffing’.101 The examples of capital stuffing 
include increased engine horsepower, improved navigational systems, upgraded fishing 
gears, increased freezer capacity,102 and increased length or breadth of vessels.103 As a 
result, these improvements can, over time, substantially increase the fishing capacity of 
total fleet, and a new buyback program would then b necessary.104 Therefore, to 
effectively use a buyback scheme, it must ensure that the proper buyback programs are 
designed and removed fishing capacity will not return to the system, so that the buyback 
does not result in an expensive transfer payment program.105 
 
Currently, many States have implemented buyback programs with huge amounts of 
money allocated, including Australia, Japan, the European Community, the United 
States, Canada, Norway, Taiwan, and Malaysia.106 For instance, Australia allocated 
AUD150 million (USD160 million)107 for a one-off fishing concession buyout to 
approximately 800 Commonwealth fishing concessions in 2006.108 Malaysia reserved 
MYR28.8 million (USD9.6 million)109 for the compensation paid to the owners of 
16,051 small vessels and mini trawlers, which were bought out of the fishery 
industry.110 Canada spent about USD1.88 billion for a vessel buyback program (VMP) 
in order to control the catch of pelagic fish in the Atlantic,111 whereas Norway allocated 
about NOK230 million (USD41.07 million) for VMP.112 
 
                                                
101 Clark, above n 89, 3. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 75. 
104 Clark, above n 89, 3. 
105 John Walden, James Kirkley and Rolf Fare, 'Measuring and Managing Fishing Capacity' in R Quentin 
Grafton et al (eds), Marine Fisheries Conservation and Management (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
546. 
106 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 75. 
107 At AUD0.94 = USD1 as of 2014. The succeeding conversions are based on 2014 exchange rates, 
rounded off to the nearest THB and USD. 
108 Monica Minnegal and Peter D Dwyer, 'Mixed Messages: Buying Back Australia's Fishing Industry' 
(2008) 32(6) Marine Policy 1063. 
109 At MYR3 = USD1 as of 2014. 
110 Mohd Ibrahim Hj Mohamed, 'National Management of Malaysian Fisheries' (1991) 15(1) Marine 
Policy 2, 6. 
111 FAO, 'Report of the National Seminar on the Reduction and Management of Commercial Fishing 
Capacity in Thailand. Cha-Am, Thailand, 11-14 May 2004.' (FIP/FCR13, FAO, 2005) 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/j6419e/j6419e00.htm> 49. 
112 Ibid 50. 
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Clearly, based on experiences to date, it is difficult to achieve the goal of fishing 
capacity reduction by applying the licence limitation scheme, particularly buyback 
program, without being prohibitively expensive.113 It has been identified that a cause of 
overcapacity in fleets is due to the non-malleable nature of capital. The flexibility of 
large vessels, which usually have specific gears, is achieved through opportunistic 
fishing activities in any oceans of the world. Lay-up is costly alternative.114 On the 
contrary, fishing areas of small-scale fishing vessels are confined and it is not expensive 
in changing their fishing gears or lay-up. Thus, there is more possibility to successfully 
mitigate overcapacity problem if applying this licens  limitation scheme with small-
scale fisheries. This particular scheme, however, can be more fractious due to socio-
economic conditions115 based on the fact that small-scale fisheries are mainly for 
livelihood, not for commercial purposes. Furthermore, if targeting to remove only 
legally registered vessels out of the fisheries, the effect of this measure on capacity 
reduction might not be significant.116 Therefore, the appropriate design of limited entry 
schemes remains important for capacity control in fisheries.    
 
Overall, the desirable outcome of a limited licensing scheme will depend on the degree 
of scheme’s restrictiveness and the intensity of complexity of the fishery.117 But, it is 
important to note that the more restrictive the scheme, the more expensive it is to 
apply.118 Furthermore, a limited licensing scheme does not pr vide an incentive to 
fishers to avoid overcapacity as the remaining fisher  still tend to develop their capacity 
to maximise their fishing.119 This scheme by itself is not adequate to address 
overcapacity issue, and therefore other measures, particularly those concerning fishing 
rights,120 are required to limit the increased rate in capacity, which can be the forms of 
                                                
113 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 34. 
114 Christopher Newton, 'Review of Issues for the Control and Reduction of Fishing Capacity on the High 
Seas' in Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts 
and Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 1999) vol 386, 206, 62. 
115 Ibid. 
116 FAO, above n 111, 51. 
117 Ralph E Townsend, 'Entry Registrations in the Fishery: A Survey of the Evidence' (1990) 66 Land 
Economics 359; Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 20. 
118 Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 25. 
119 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 27. 
120 FAO, above n 111, 52. 
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capital stuffing or changes of fishing seasons or areas.121 Otherwise, the threat to 
resource conservation will constantly remain.122 
 
There is a situation where this scheme could curb the fishers’ incentives in depleting the 
stock. It is where license holders, particularly within a small group, agree to adopt their 
own management measures, which remove the need to race for the fish among them. 
But with this kind of arrangement, the fishers need to cooperate and build trust between 
one and another, as well as need a mechanism, either formal or informal, to enforce the 
agreed measures. In order to encourage cooperative behaviour among fishers, it may 
then be feasible to establish limited licensing programs over small fishing areas.123 
 
4.3.1.1.2 Limited Licensing in Thailand’s Context 
 
Due to the drastic decline of marine resources in Thai waters, particularly in the Gulf of 
Thailand, in the past decades, the Department of Fisheries has attempted to address this 
decline by implementing a limited licensing scheme to cut down fishing capacity in 
Thai fisheries. To achieve this goal, the Department of Fisheries has suggested that 
eliminating a number of push netters and trawlers would be the most desirable approach 
to generate the positive impact on marine resources.124 This suggestion was given due to 
the fact that these fishing gears are considered highly destructive fishing gears because 
they catch big amounts of fish juveniles and destroy seafloor ecosystem, such as corals 
and sea grasses.125  
                                                
121 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 75. 
122 Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 25. 
123 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 27. 
124 Theo Ebbers and Rick Gregory, 'Capacity Development for Improving the Knowledge Base for 
Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia - a Regional Initiative, Implemented Locally' (APFIC Ad Hoc 
Publication, FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, 2009) 
<http://www.apfic.org/uploads/wfd_124079351849f50185b51a1--capacity.pdf> 13. 
125 Some of the most common fishing gears have been known to have damaging impact on the resources, 
the deep sea marine habitat, and the broader marine environment, such as bottom trawling (including 
dredgers and scrapers). See, Serge M Garcia, World Inventory of Fisheries. Destructive Fishing 
Practices. Issues Fact Sheets. (27 May 2005) FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/12353/en>. 
However, in a fisheries management perspective, a wider and more useful definition of destructive fishing 
practices could cover overfishing exceeding reasonable recovery limits, destroying a large amount of 
bycatch, and extremely fishing in important habitats, such as spawning and nursery grounds. See, Jon 
Nevill, Destructive Fishing Practices: Definitions (28 March 2007) 
<www.tucs.org.au/~cnevill/marineDFP_definitions.doc>. 
150 
 
Push nets, which were modified from marine shrimp nets used by hands since 1967, 
were not required to be registered until 1970.126 Since then, push nets were greatly 
developed both in number and effectiveness. As a result, marine resources and 
environments have been increasingly destroyed. To address this problem, the Thai 
government through the Department of Fisheries has controlled the number of push 
netters by firstly stopping the issuance of the fishing licenses to new participants in 
order to freeze numbers at the current level, and lter implementing push net reduction 
programs, buyback programs in particular. The Department of Fisheries has started 
buyback programs of push netters in 1997 and conducte  quite a number of programs 
over time (Table 4.2). During the period 1997-2003, the Thai government allocated 
THB19,310,388 (USD603,450) for compensation to push net fishers, who voluntarily 
changed to use less destructive fishing gears or conduct aquaculture.127 These efforts, 
however, unlikely achieved the desired outcome as the number of push netters was not 
reduced. 
 
The Department of Fisheries made a further attempt by implementing another buyback 
program for push netters in Ranong Province under the Fishery Resource Rehabilitation 
Project. Under this program, more than THB19 million was spent for compensation to 
about 1,300 push netters, who voluntarily quitted from push net fisheries.128 These 
fishers were required to sign an agreement with the Department of Fisheries stating that 
they would not return to push net fisheries in the future.129 This project has been 
considered as the biggest push net reduction program conducted by the Thai 
government. Apart from government sector, private organisations, such as Rotary 
International, also provided some funds to support ush net fishers who voluntarily left 
push net fisheries for environmentally friendly careers.130 
 
                                                
126 FAO, above n 111, 38. 
127 Mala Supongpan, Direction and Challenges in Reducing Capacity of Trawlers and Push Netters in the 
Gulf of Thailand (21 September 2011) 
<http://www.apfic.org/uploads/smartsection/369_Fisheries_management_Thailand.pdf>. 
128 Ebbers and Gregory, above n 124, 44. 
129 Ibid. 
130 The Rotary International provided THB1.0 Million through Provincial Fisheries Office for the project 
supporting the alteration of fishing gears and fishing careers to fishers in Ranong Province who were 
affected by Tsunami attack in 2004. See, Manager Online, '	
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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 [Push Net Fishers in Ranong Province Shifted to Aquaculture Sector Because of the High Cost of 
Fuel]', 6 September 2005  <http://www.nicaonline.com/webboard/index.php?topic=2901.0>. 
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Table 4.2: Push net reduction programs implemented by Thailand during 1997-2003 
Year Province 
Number 
Quit 
Budget 
(THB) 
Substituted Fishing Gears and/or Careers 
1997 Songkhla 
Phuket 
45 
60 
39,120 
1,627,350 
Trammel net, shrimp trap 
Shrimp gill net, cockle culture, trammel 
net 
1998 Phuket 
Phang-nga 
Satun 
 
Krabi 
Pattani 
10 
65 
59 
 
20 
62 
879,680 
1,109,000 
240,000 
 
80,000 
1,260,000 
Fish cage culture 
Cockle and oyster culture 
Trammel net, snapper gill net, sand 
whiting gill net 
Trammel net 
Trammel net, swimming barb gill net 
1999 Satun 
Ranong 
53 
107 
276,620 
2,280,000 
Trammel net 
Trammel net and fish cage culture 
2000 Trang 157 1,620,000 No information 
2001 Krabi 76 815,000 Weighted fish net, Indo-Pacific gill net, 
trammel net, bamboo stake trap 
2002 Satun 
 
 
Ranong 
 
 
Phuket 
 
Trang 
 
22 
 
 
58 
 
 
40 
 
140 
 
493,974 
 
 
759,010 
 
 
920,337 
 
2,513,517 
Trammel net, grouper culture, mussel 
culture (hanging type), mud crab trap, 
soft shell crab, white snapper culture 
Mussel culture (hanging type), mud crab 
trap, soft shell crab, white snapper 
culture 
Bottom long line, weighted fish net, 
sardine gill net, red snapper culture 
White snapper and grouper culture, crab 
gill net 
2003 Chumphon 
Ranong 
 
Phang-nga 
Satun 
 
Trad 
Nakhon Sri 
Thammarat 
30 
15 
 
91 
151 
 
11 
40 
96,400 
360,600 
 
300,000 
2,832,700 
 
35,000 
420,000 
Increase mesh size of crab trap 
Fish cage culture, e.g., red snapper cage 
culture 
Increase mesh size of crab trap 
Set net, red snapper cage culture, crab 
trap 
Increase mesh size of crab trap 
Gill net 
 Total 1,312 19,310,388  
Note: At THB32 = USD1 as of 2014. 
Source: Mala Supongpan, Direction and Challenges in Reducing Capacity of Trawlers 
and Push Netters in the Gulf of Thailand (21 September 2011) 
<http://www.apfic.org/uploads/smartsection/369_Fisheries_management_Thailand.pdf. 
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Although it is clearly seen that the Thai government has put great efforts to eliminate 
the capacity of push netters in Thai fisheries by implementing a lot of reduction 
programs, the number of push netters is unlikely decreased. This could mainly be 
because there was no explicit follow up activities o monitor whether these push netters 
participated in the programs would really stop or change to use less-destructive fishing 
gears or conduct other alternate careers as they stated. Additionally, all of the reduction 
programs were established on a voluntary basis, and thus no fines or penalties were 
imposed on push netters who reneged on the agreement. B sides, Thailand had never 
established any systematic plan of action for fishing capacity management at the 
national level. This critical deficiency of essential mechanisms also contributed to the 
unsuccessful results of capacity reduction programs in Thailand. 
 
Therefore, in 2006 the Department of Fisheries, with assistance from FAO, put a great 
attempt to form a policy framework and plan of actions in managing fishing capacity, 
focusing on the capacity reduction of trawlers and push netters in the Gulf of 
Thailand.131 This project was conducted through consultation process among 
stakeholders in order to consider the findings from background studies, discuss their 
implications, and seek recommendations that could be used to reduce fishing capacity in 
the Gulf of Thailand.132 The consultation process consisted of a series of actions, 
including (i) clarifying target groups/stakeholders that should be covered in consultation 
process. The stakeholders included trawl and push net owners and crews, small-scale 
fishers, government officers, university academics, regional organisation (e.g., 
SEAFDEC) and representatives from fishery processing industry (e.g., canned fish 
company); (ii) conducting opinion poll on trawler and push net reduction with identified 
stakeholders; (iii) conducting stakeholder consultations.133 Stakeholders were provided 
information about alternative employment in coastal areas for labors leaving the fishery; 
                                                
131 It was under the FAO project titled “Strengthening the Capacity in Fisheries Information Gathering for 
Management” (FAO/GCP/RAS/199/SWE). This project was financially supported by the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). It provided the framework and the necessary 
financial support for this initiative implementation. This project was ‘designed to contribute to FAO’s 
long-term strategic goal of changing national and regional perceptions of how fishers can be effectively 
incorporated into fisheries management mechanisms. The project’s development objective encapsulated 
this strategic goal and was stated as, enhanced management of fisheries resources through effective 
decision-making and policy development, based upon appropriate information and facilitation of 
stakeholder dialogue.’ See, Ebbers and Gregory, above n 124, 1-2. 
132 Ibid 47. 
133 The consultations were conducted based on four areas of the Gulf of Thailand, i.e., the Eastern, Inner, 
Upper Southern and Lower Southern Gulf of Thailand. See, ibid 44.  
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(iv) conducting consultation for decision-maker on follow-up actions needed to be 
taken;134 (v) taking follow-up actions by Department of Fisheries, as well as conveying 
the outcome of consultations to broader groups of stakeholders.135 According to the 
results of decision-maker consultation, small push netters, which severely destruct 
marine resources and environments of coastal areas136 and, among other sizes of vessels, 
gain less profit, were agreed to be the first to be decommissioned.137  
 
In 2007, the Department of Fisheries has taken this recommendation by putting a 
project of capacity reduction of push net and trawl fisheries in the action plans under the 
Master Plan on Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand. There were 320 fishing 
vessel crew members and 388 vessel owners from push net and trawl fisheries that were 
willing to leave such fisheries at that time.138 Nonetheless, the project was not pursued 
until the Master Plan was officially implemented in 2009.  
 
Under the Master Plan, the measurement plan of fishing capacity reduction was put 
under the first Strategy, namely the Strategy on Efficiency Enhancement of Marine 
Fisheries Management System and Co-Management. This measurement plan aims to 
control overall fishing capacity at the level that is commensurate with the prevailing 
conditions of fish stocks.139 To achieve such goal, a number of projects were caried 
out, including the projects on: (i) the development of handling online system for marine 
fishing licenses, covering all types of fisheries at district level;140 (ii) the study on 
optimum fishing capacity (i.e., number of fishing vessels) as at the commensurate level 
with the current conditions of fish stocks;141 (iii) the survey for the actual number of 
marine fishing vessels operating in Thai fisheries;142 (iv) the reduction program of 
                                                
134 The decision was made by considering the information of fishing livelihoods and related issues of the 
Gulf of Thailand. These findings helped to prioritize the type of gears and size of vessels that should be 
removed from Thai fisheries in order to address overcapacity problem effectively.   
135 Ebbers and Gregory, above n 124, 47. 
136 Small push netters destroy marine benthos and catch the big amount of trash fish which is mostly 
composed juveniles of economically important species, due to the nature of their practice in coastal areas. 
See, ibid 47.    
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid 49. 
139 The Master Plan, strategy 1, measure 4.  
140 The Master Plan, strategy 1, measure 4, project 1. 
141 The Master Plan, strategy 1, measure 4, project 2.    
142 The Master Plan, strategy 1, measure 4, project 3. 
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trawlers; (v) the layoff of push netters; and (vi) the encouragement and development of 
alternative livelihoods for fishers. The alternative careers that have been supported by 
the Department of Fisheries include aquacultures (e.g., blue swimming crab culture) and 
fish processing.143 Four hundred people from fisheries communities are aimed to have 
training in aquaculture under this project.144 
 
The project of trawler reduction aims to reduce at le st 234 trawlers annually, whereas 
the project on the layoff of push netters targets to decrease at least 74 push netters every 
year.145 The layoff of push netters has turned out well as the project’s target was hit. For 
example, in Trad Province alone, fifty fishers have voluntarily left push net fisheries, 
and now use less destructive fishing gears, e.g., fish gill nets, crab gill nets, shrimp 
trammel nets.146 However, it is essential to note that the effective cooperation among 
government agencies (within the same and between different Ministries) and the private 
sector (e.g., fishers, fisheries communities and fisheries organisations) are critically 
required to prolong this successful outcome. Thus, unless sound arrangements have 
been made, it is quite challenging to achieve such goal.                    
           
For trawl fisheries, on the other hand, there was none of explicit reduction program 
conducted by the Thai government. Although there have been the attempts made by the 
Department of Fisheries in the past decades (e.g., in 1980, 1982, 1989, 1996)147 to limit 
the number of registered trawlers by freezing it at the current level and not opening for 
new registries, these initiatives have not achieved success. It was because after such 
arrangements were announced by the Department of Fisheries, there were always 
protests made by trawl fishers and fisheries industries which were directly impacted. 
Due to this social pressure, and often together with political pressure, the Department of 
                                                
143 The Master Plan, strategy 2, measure 3, project 4-6. 
144 The Master Plan, strategy 2, measure 3, project 6. 
145 The Master Plan, strategy 1, measure 4, project 4-5. For each project, key performance indicators have 
been set to assess the success of project implementation.     
146 These substituted fishing gears are initially supported by the Department of Fisheries. See, Office of 
Secretary Department of Fisheries, 'กก$%	ก&'(
ก)$*
 
[Department of Fisheries Implemented the Measure on Changing Push Net Fisheries in order to Solve the 
Problem of Depleted Marine Resources]' (2012)   
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/fish/pr/news_detail.php?news_id=366>.     
147 Supaporn Anuchiracheeva, 'ก*
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Manager Online 26 May 2012 
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Fisheries has unavoidably granted amnesties to unregistered trawlers (and thus illegally 
operating in Thai waters), as well as allowed them to register to become legal fishing 
vessels before the new registration was closed. The amnesties were granted based on the 
reason that having such vessels registered and become part of national records would 
result in obtaining the actual number of fishing vess ls operating in Thai fisheries, 
trawlers in particular. This number would be beneficial in managing overall fishing 
capacity in Thai waters. 
 
The most recent attempt in granting amnesty to unregist red trawlers was made in 2012. 
This amnesty, however, aimed to allow 2,107 unregist red trawlers to become legal 
fishing vessels, so that the fish caught by these vssels could be exported to the EU. It is 
due to the IUU Regulation imposed by the EU, stating that ‘only marine fisheries 
products validated as legal by the relevant flag State or exporting State can be imported 
to or exported from the EU’.148 The government claimed that this arrangement would 
not affect the state of marine resources in Thai waters as there are still some rooms for 
the fleet expansion.149 Unsurprisingly, this attempt has been very controve sial in Thai 
fisheries society, particularly among small-scale fishery communities. Small-scale 
fisheries organisations, together with academics, have strongly argued that trawlers are 
always considered as highly destructive fishing gears, thus government authorities 
should eliminate illegal trawlers instead.150 Due to these big protests, the proposal in 
granting such amnesty has been suspended by Parliament.151 This incident affirms the 
difficulty in balancing national interests, between supporting livelihoods of local fishers 
and increasing national incomes from exportation of fishery products. 
 
Apart from the aforesaid capacity reduction programs, the Thai government has 
imposed a regulation to control capacity of some types of fishing gears used for 
                                                
148 European Commission, Illegal fishing (IUU): The EU Rules to Combat Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (26 November 2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/illegal_fishing/i dex_en.htm>. 
149 Natdanai Maison, 'ก. 1ก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)1& [NHRC Reviews the Amnesty Made by 
the Department of Fisheries Whether It Worsens Small-sc le Fisheries]', Isra News 31 July 2012 
<http://www.isranews.org >. 
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/ก. [The Network of Marine Conservations Protests the 
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anchovy fisheries, i.e., falling nets or lift nets with electricity generators and 
surrounding nets operating at day time.152 This regulation allows only the operation of 
such gears which are previously registered (no new licenses granted) in order to protect 
anchovy stocks from overexploitation. This regulation seems to be the only legislation 
clearly imposed on fishing capacity of a particular fishing gear in Thai fisheries. It does 
not indicate the quantity of fishing capacity (e.g., number of fishing gears) that is 
permitted though. 
 
However, no limited licensing scheme is applied on small-scale or artisanal fishing 
gears used in coastal areas of Thailand. It is basically because these gears are used to 
fish mainly for livelihood, and fishing licenses ofthese fishing gears are not legally 
required. Thus, there is no control on the enormous number of small-scale fishing gears 
and vessels in Thai fisheries, which could possibly harm the state of fisheries resources 
in coastal areas. For example, a great number of collapsible crab traps is increasingly 
deployed within conservation zones (3,000 metres from shoreline) as this gear is 
considered small-scale, and allowed to use in such area. As a result, this excessive 
fishing has gradually overexploited the crab population in the areas, by 10 per cent more 
than the carrying capacity. Furthermore, a lot of immature crabs have been harvested, 
which can eventually deplete parent stocks.153       
 
Overall, it can be seen that the attempts made by Thailand to limit entry into the 
fisheries are inadequate as the number of fishing vessels operating in Thai waters has 
not reduced, and some fishing gears bought out fromisheries have returned to operate 
due to the lack of enforcement or appropriate alternative livelihoods. The urgent task for 
Thailand is therefore to implement more effective lic nsing programs. For instance, in 
large-scale fisheries, only fishing vessels that have registered and been granted fishing 
license, are allowed to operate in Thai waters with no exceptions. Strengthening 
enforcement is also an important key to improve the eff ctiveness of this scheme. 
 
                                                
152 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determining the use of certain kinds 
of fishing appliances in fisheries, given on 1 February B.E. 2543 (2000). 
153 Supaporn Anuchiracheeva, '5,6&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Crab Bank: Innovation and Local Knowledge of Artisanal Fishers in Marine Resources Rehabilitation]', 
Manager Online 18 June 2012 
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4.3.1.1.3 Individual Effort Quota 
 
Individual effort quotas (IEQs) set a maximum on the amount of effort that each 
producer can apply to the fishery during a year. Effort units are defined as the amount of 
time that each unit of fishing gears use per year.154 If the gear is mobile, its effort is 
defined as the amount of fishing time. It can be expr ssed as fishing days or trips. But if 
the gear is fixed, the limitation on the number of units is applied instead (e.g., pots, 
traps).155 The initial allocation of IEQs can be limited by various mechanisms, such as 
historic catch levels or vessel size.156 IEQs may or may not be transferable.157 Where 
IEQs are transferable, they can be bought or sold by fishers.158 Since this measure 
ignores productivity of gear units, the effect of this measure depends on the link 
between effort and catch, whether it is fixed. If such connection is flexible, fishers will 
try to increase the catch production by raising productivity of their gear units or fishing 
time.159 Therefore, this measure will be effective if there is an explicit and inflexible 
link between effort and catch, and if effort can be clearly defined.160 
 
But, IEQs are generally capable to slightly block capital stuffing or the race for the 
fish.161 It is because input substitution, which is common ccurrence under IEQ 
programs, would be likely to undermine the effectiveness of this measure just as it also 
would with limited licence programs.162 For example, while fishing days remain the 
same, the operating power of a fishing vessel can be i creased by replacing other factor 
inputs, such as modernised navigational systems, increased engine horsepower or 
improved fishing gears. The fleet capacity can then b  increased over the long run.163 
Thus, to achieve a chance of success, the IEQs must be combined with restrictions on 
                                                
154 Symes, above n 72, 184. 
155 Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 27. 
156 Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas National Research Council, Sharing the Fish:Toward 
a National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas (The National Academies Press, 1999) 118. 
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158 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 76. 
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160 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 38. 
161 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 73. 
162 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 38. 
163 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 76. 
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the number of harvesters (e.g., limited licensing) or TACs,164 otherwise there would be 
no control imposed on total potential effort.165 But the enforcement might be difficult 
and costly since the fishing effort is operated away from fishing port and regulations 
could be avoided hence.166 
 
IEQs, however, have been widely implemented in some States, such as the United 
States.167 One of the oldest individual harvest quota programs in the United States is the 
Florida spiny lobster trap certificate program (TCP), which has been implemented since 
1992. This program aims to decrease the total number of traps in order to increase 
CPUE and then maintain or increase overall catch of spiny lobster fisheries.168 Under 
the TCP, commercial fishers, who are licensed, will ho d certificates that allow them to 
use an equivalent number of traps. The initial certifica es were allocated according to 
the recorded number of traps used during 3-year period before the TCP started. The 
total number of certificates or the total effort level is specified by the Florida Fish and 
Wildlife Conservation Commission.169    
 
4.3.1.1.4 Individual Effort Quota Scheme in Thailand’s Context 
 
Thailand has not had any IEQs implemented in their fisheries. It could be mainly 
because of the high complexity of Thai fisheries, which are multi-fisheries type. This 
means one fisher or one fishing vessel can have or operate with more than one type of 
fishing gears. Furthermore, one target species can be captured by many types of fishing 
gears, both small-scale and large-scale fishing gears. Besides, fishing gears or fishing 
vessels can be used in any areas of Thai waters as long as they do not conduct illegal 
fishing. Taking these factors into account, to effectively implement individual effort 
quota scheme in Thai fisheries would need to overcome a number of difficulties, 
particularly in terms of determining the total allowable effort for each fishing gear and 
                                                
164 Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 27. 
165 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 38. 
166 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 76. 
167 Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas National Research Council, above n 156, 118. 
168 Sherry L Larkin and J Walter  Milon, 'Tradable Effort Permits: A Case Study of the Florida Spiny 
Lobster Trap Certificate Program' (Paper presented a  the IIFET 2000: Microbehavior and Macroresults, 
2000) <http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1957/30630/136.pdf?sequence=1> 1. 
169 Ibid 2. 
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developing a proper design of effort quota allocations that would vary based on the 
types of fishing gears, and providing the adequacy of enforcement for such complicated 
fisheries of Thailand.  
  
4.3.1.1.5 Gear and Vessel Restriction 
 
Gear and vessel restrictions include measures that aim to reduce or curb the fishing 
effort productivity of individual fishing units.170 The measures can limit the dimension 
of vessels and number of crews, as well as restrict the catchability of fishing gears171 by 
limiting the number and size of gears,  uch as length of gill nets, number of hooks, 
pots, or traps. In addition, this regulation may apply to entirely ban the use of certain 
gears and equipment.172 
 
Mesh size regulations and gear restrictions are very similar in their effects.173 Both of 
them are used to reduce fishing pressure on juvenile stocks, as well as to provide an 
opportunity to such stocks to grow in size.174 If combined with TACs, however, these 
regulations are expected to slightly mitigate the capital stuffing. They do not make big 
changes because fishers try to avoid the regulations by substituting their factor inputs. 
For example, vessel length restrictions can be evaded by lengthening the beam of a 
vessel or increasing the horsepower of vessel’s engin .175 Furthermore, these 
restrictions might raise questions in terms of economic impact.176 It is because they 
might decrease profitability in the short run177 since catch rates will immediately drop 
after applying mesh size regulations.178 In the case of long-lived species with a low 
                                                
170 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 75. 
171 Catchability is the proportion of a fish stock taken by a unit of fishing effort. Therefore, catchability is 
a measure of fishing gear’s efficiency. See, Daniel D Hoggarth et al, Stock Assessment for Fishery 
Management: A Framework Guide on the Stock Assessment Tools of the Fisheries Management Science 
Programme (FMSP) (FAO, 2006) 59.    
172 Symes, above n 72, 242. 
173 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 73. 
174 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 39. 
175 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 76. 
176 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 38. 
177 Ibid 39. 
178 Beddington and Rettig, above n 74, 12. 
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mortality rate, the benefits from this scheme might possibly occur after several years.179 
Besides, such benefits in terms of increased yields to fi hers are difficult to detect.180 
 
Mesh size restrictions are commonly imposed on trawl fisheries. However, in multi-
species fisheries, both in tropical areas (e.g., Malaysia and Indonesia) and other areas 
(e.g., Australia181), a great concern in mesh size regulations, on trawle s in particular, 
has been raised. It is due to the fact that trawlers in such areas typically catch a large 
number of species and each species would have different optimum mesh size. Thus, a 
single mesh size could be sub-optimal for the majority f species.182 As a consequence, 
it is important to ensure that the mesh size used i not too small; otherwise this will 
increase the proportion of juveniles in the catch and could eventually deplete the fish 
population. 
 
Apart from trawl fisheries, gear and vessel restrictions are also applied on other 
fisheries. For example, Australia has imposed this scheme on the Northern Prawn 
Fishery and the Eastern tuna and billfish fishery.183 The United States has implemented 
a regulation to control fishing effort on sea scallop fisheries in the northeastern areas by 
imposing a larger mesh-ring size of dredges,184 which likely contribute to the success of 
the management measures on sea scallops as they have not been overfished.185   
 
4.3.1.1.6 Gear and Vessel Restriction Scheme in Thailand 
Context 
 
Gear and vessel restrictions are one of the main regulations applied in Thai fisheries. 
The dramatic increase in the number of large-scale fishing vessels over the past three 
decades, from approximately 5,000 fishing vessels in the 1960s to approximately 
20,000 fishing vessels in the 1980s, has primarily caused the Thai government to 
                                                
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Lisa Elliston et al, Economic Efficiency in the South East Trawl Fishery (2004). 
182 Beddington and Rettig, above n 74, 13. 
183 FAO, above n 78. 
184 FAO, above n 80. 
185 NOAA Fisheries, Atlantic Sea Scallop 
<http://www.greateratlantic.fisheries.noaa.gov/sustainable/species/scallop/>. 
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impose fishery regulations, particularly gear and vessel restrictions, for the purpose of 
minimising the impacts of large-scale fisheries on small-scale fisheries.186 The incidents 
regularly found are that trawlers and push netters come to operate within inshore areas, 
which are the main fishing grounds of small-scale fisheries, e.g., crab traps and gill nets. 
Thus, these large-scale fishing vessels not only take he fish out from the areas but also 
damage such small-scale fishing gears deployed in the same areas. Unavoidably, 
fisheries conflicts have been arisen.   
 
In an attempt to address this issue at the national leve , the Thai government, through 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, has promulgated a number of 
Notifications to determine the areas in which trawls and push nets employed with motor 
vessels are banned. These include areas within 3,000 metres from the coast line and 400 
metres surrounding the stationary fishing gears.187 The necessity of this regulation is not 
only because trawlers and push netters are highly destructive fishing gears but also these 
areas are recognised as nursery grounds of aquatic animals, such as fish and 
invertebrates. However, the scientific evidence obtained from recent studies by the 
Department of Fisheries suggest expanding conservation zone from three kilometres to 
three nautical miles in order to cover the actual nursery grounds of aquatic animals.188 
This recommendation has unsurprisingly raised controversial responses from large-scale 
fisheries, particularly trawl fisheries as they usually fish in coastal areas. A series of 
consultation meetings among stakeholders including small-scale and large-scale fishers, 
government officers from relevant authorities, and academics were then arranged to 
resolve this issue. Finally, based on the solid technical evidences on the current status of 
marine resources in Thai waters, the regulations that prohibit trawls and push nets 
employed with motor vessels to operate in the areas within three nautical miles (or 
5,556 metres) from the coast line have been imposed in the areas of nine coastal 
provinces of Thailand.189 These provinces include Trang,190 Krabi,191 Prachuab 
                                                
186 Plodprasop Suraswadi, 'Community-based Fisheries Management in Phang-nga Bay, Thailand' (Paper 
presented at the National Workshop on Community-based Fisheries Management, Phuket, Thailand, 14-
16 February 1996) 45. 
187 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of Areas in which 
Fishing Appliances, i.e., Trawls, and Push Nets used with Motor Vessels, are Prohibited, given on 20 July 
B.E. 2515 (1972). Notification(s) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, hereinafter referred to 
the Notification(s).   
188 Wirat Sanitmajjaro et al, Marine Resources in 5 Nautical Mile Inshore Area, Nkhon Si Thammarat 
Province, Technical Paper No.18/2006 (2006) 63. 
189 Thailand has totally 23 coastal provinces. 
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Kirikhan,192 Rayong,193 Narathiwat,194 Pattani,195 Satun,196 and Nakhon Si 
Thammarat197 Provinces. Particularly Pattani Province, push netters are prohibited to 
operate in the areas up to 12 nautical miles from the coast line.198 For other coastal 
provinces, this new regulation has not yet been imposed due to the unsettled 
controversies among stakeholders. 
 
In an effort to expand restricted fishing areas natio wide, the Department of Fisheries 
has proposed the provisions under the new Fisheries Act, concerning fishing zone 
establishment. Based on the provisions, three fishing zones are delimitated, including (i) 
coastal fisheries zone, which is the areas within tree nautical miles from shore line or, 
if necessary in some areas, within 12 nautical miles from shore line; 199 (ii) offshore 
fisheries zone, which is the areas next to coastal fi hing zone and no further than the 
areas of Thai waters;200 and (iii) freshwater fisheries zone, which is fishing areas within 
Thai waters but not included in coastal and offshore fishing zones.201 The Act also 
                                                                                                                                    
190 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas of 
Trang Province in which fishing appliances, i.e., trawls, and push nets used with motor vessels, are 
prohibited, given on 9 October B.E. 2550 (2007). 
191 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas of Krabi 
Province in which fishing appliances, i.e., trawls, and push nets used with motor vessels, are prohibited, 
given on 9 October B.E. 2550 (2007). 
192 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas of 
Prachuab Kirikhan Province in which fishing appliances, i.e., trawls, and push nets used with motor 
vessels, are prohibited, given on 9 October B.E. 2550 (2007). 
193 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas of 
Rayong Province in which fishing appliances, i.e., trawls, and push nets used with motor vessels, are 
prohibited, given on 3 January B.E. 2551 (2008). 
194 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas of 
Narathiwat Province in which fishing appliances, i.e., trawls, and push nets used with motor vessels, are 
prohibited, given on 3 January B.E. 2551 (2008). 
195 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas of 
Pattani Province in which fishing appliances, i.e., trawls used with motor vessels, are prohibited, given on 
3 January B.E.2551 (2008). 
196 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas of Satun 
Province in which fishing appliances, i.e., trawls, and push nets used with motor vessels, are prohibited, 
given on 29 January B.E. 2551 (2008). 
197 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas of 
Nakhon Si Thammarat Province in which fishing appliances, i.e., trawls, and push nets used with motor 
vessels, are prohibited, given on 17 July B.E. 2552 (2009). 
198 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas of 
Pattani Province in which fishing appliances, i.e., push nets used with motor vessels, are prohibited, given 
on 14 July B.E. 2546 (2003). 
199 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 38. 
200 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 49. 
201 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 40. 
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empowers the Minister or the Provincial Committee in his jurisdiction with the approval 
of the Minister to issue regulations to govern the fisheries in each fishing zone.202 The 
regulations include, for example, specifying types, sizes, numbers and components of 
fishing gears that are prohibited to operate203 and identifying fishing practices that are 
forbidden to be conducted.204          
 
In terms of fishing gear restrictions, a number of the regulations are currently imposed 
on marine capture fisheries. The notably regulations include a regulation to prohibit any 
fishing surrounding nets having mesh size smaller than 2.5 centimetres to operate at 
night time (between sun rise and sun set).205 Subsequently, any fishing gear having 
mesh size smaller than 2.5 centimetres and employed with electricity generators are 
banned in Thai waters. But this regulation is not imposed on falling nets or lift nets 
employed with electricity generators to fish anchovies in the areas farer than 3,000 
metres from shore lines.206 However, anchovy falling nets or lift nets with electricity 
generators and surrounding nets with less than 0.6 centimetres of mesh size are 
prohibited.207 Additionally, there are some regulations that prohibit certain fishing gears 
to operate in particular areas. These prohibited fishing gears are mainly trawls, push 
nets, and shellfish dredges employed with powered vessels. For example, these gears 
are prohibited in some areas of Prachuab Kirikhan208 and Trad Provinces.209 For push 
nets used with any powered vessels in particular, they are banned in all areas of Pattani 
Province.210 Beam trawls are also banned in particular areas of Chonburi Province.211 
                                                
202 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 6. 
203 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 6(1). 
204 The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 6(2). 
205 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Prohibition of surrounding nets 
having meshes of smaller than 2.5 centimetres in width in fishing at night, given on 14 November B.E. 
2534 (1991). 
206 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Setting mesh sizes of nets to be used 
in fishing with electricity generators (second edition), given on 6 October B.E. 2543 (2000). 
207 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determining of mesh sizes of nets in 
fishing anchovies, given on 1 February B.E. 2543 (2000).  
208 Notification of Prachuab Kirikhan Province Re: Determining the area in which certain kinds of fishing 
appliances are prohibited in fishing in some localities of Prachuab Kirikhan Province, given on 19 
October B.E. 2542 (1999). This regulation also prohibits purse seines used with powered vessels to 
operate in these areas (except anchovy purse seines operating in day time). 
209 Notification of Trad Province Re: Determining the area in which trawls, push nets and shellfish 
dredges are prohibited, in fishing at strait of Chang Island, Trad Province, B.E. 2543, given on 28 March 
B.E. 2543 (2000).  
210 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Prohibition of push nets used with 
motor vessel in fishing in the locality of Pattani Province, given on 26 February B.E. 2541 (1998). 
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All of these restrictions primarily aim to protect juveniles and young fish from being 
caught in coastal areas that may lead to fish extinctio , as well as to preserve coastal 
fishing grounds for small-scale fishing gears as they cannot compete over fisheries 
resources with large-scale fishing gears. Thus, these r gulations have not been issued to 
directly address overcapacity problem in Thai fisheries, but rather for fisheries resources 
conservation in coastal waters. 
 
Further, the problem of overcapacity in Thai waters still exists not only because several 
fisheries restrictions are mainly designed for the purpose of marine resources 
conservation, but also there is no output controls in Thai fisheries. These gear and 
vessel restrictions alone make small effect on capital stuffing as fishers still have 
incentives to modify their fishing gears or vessels based on the loopholes of current 
regulations in order to increase or maintain their catch, such as increasing the 
horsepower of the vessel. Moreover, the inadequacy of the MCS system has magnified 
this problem as illegal fishing has been regularly found in Thai waters. Most of the 
cases are the violations of trawlers against the Thai fisheries laws, particularly the 
regulations governing the prohibited zone for trawlers.212 
 
In order to strengthen the regulations imposed on fishing gears and vessels, the Master 
Plan provides the action plan of fishing gears development for the purpose of 
sustainable fisheries. The projects under this action plan include compiling and 
promoting the fishing gears and practices that support sustainable fisheries in Thai 
waters.213 For this objective, set net has been recommended.214 This recommendation 
has been provided based on the result of pilot project of set net implementation 
conducted by SEAFDEC/TD and the Department of Fisher es, which showed the 
success in terms of increased catch production and creating the collaboration among 
fishers to conserve marine resources.215 Additionally, the Department of Fisheries has 
                                                                                                                                    
211 Notification of Chonburi Province Re: Determining the area in which beam trawls are prohibited in 
some localities of Chonburi Province, given on 23 March B.E. 2542 (1999). 
212 Department of Fisheries, 3,/.1ก	36&ก
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214 The Master Plan, strategy 3, measure 1, project 3. 
215 This pilot project was funded by Japanese Trust Fund Program. The objectives of the project are ‘to 
reduce fishing pressure on coastal fishery resources through the introduction of set net fishing gear, to 
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promoted community-based fisheries management for set net fisheries in a number of 
fishing communities, such as fishing community in Bang Sapan Subdistrict of Prachuab 
Kirikhan Province.216 Details of community-based fisheries management under this 
project will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
The Master Plan also supports the development of gear r strictions on trawlers, 
particularly mesh size control of trawl nets, which has never been enforced by Thai 
fisheries laws.217 This project originally aims to decrease the propotion of juveniles in 
the catch of trawlers by enlarging the cod end mesh size of trawl nets (e.g., from 2.5 
centimetres to 4.0 centimetres). The project has been carried out by using a participatory 
approach where stakeholders are greatly involved in conducting every step of the pilot 
projects (e.g., conduct experiments of using 4.0 centimetres of cod end mesh size on 
fishers’ trawlers) in order to assure that the project results (and probably the mesh size 
restrictions later enforced) would be accepted by stakeholders, particularly trawl fishers. 
Although the main purpose of mesh size enlargement is to conserve fish stocks, it would 
also provide the benefit in terms of fishing effort reduction. Nonetheless, this project is 
still ongoing and therefore the outcome has not yet be n sufficiently analysed.                 
  
Overall, fisheries management based on input controls generally relies on the 
assumption that technical interactions are inflexible and they not within the control of 
the fishers. If that is not the case, fishers may adapt to management regulations by 
modifying fishing gears or changing their fishing strategies that may result in the 
change in markets. Changing target stocks or stock c mponents could affect the fishing 
mortality rates and restrict the intended conservation benefits of the management 
measure.218 If the technical interactions are not flexible, then effort regulation affects all 
                                                                                                                                    
alleviate fishing competition in congested fishing ground by organizing collective fishing operation on the 
set net, and to develop common policy concept of fishery management for fishing gear occupying wide 
fishing ground such as the set net.’ See, Pattaratjit Kaewnuratchadasorn, Narumo Thapthim and 
Phattareeya Suanrattanachai, 'The Implication of Set Net Fisheries to Coastal Fisheries Management - 
Introduction of Set-Net Fishing to Develop Sustainable Coastal Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia:
Case study in Thailand, 2003-2005' (TD/RS/121, SEAFDEC, January 2008) 3. 
216 Prachuab Kirikhan Provincial Fishereis Office, *,ก ก./ก*=)ก*/	 [Project: Community-based 
fishery management for set net] <http://www.fisheries.go.th/fpo-
prachuap/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33&Itemid=163>. 
217 There are no particular restrictions on the mesh size of any trawl nets. The fishers, however, generally 
use the trawl net with 2.5 centimetres of cod end mesh size.  
218 Commission of the European Communities, 'Report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic 
Committee for Fisheries, Mixed Fisheries' (6-10 November 2006) 
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stocks in the fisheries without consideration of the individual stocks.219 As a result, 
effort regulation can reduce fishing effort effectively. However, the most productive 
stocks might remain underexploited, so that the optimal utilisation of the biological 
productivity might not be achieved.220       
 
Another concern that should be taken into consideration is that if only input regulations 
are implemented as the management measure, the fishing effort might be decreased 
greatly in the short term, CPUE might increase, and harvesting cost might also decrease. 
Consequently, the increase of profit and resource rent might be obtained. This, however, 
could create more incentives for investment in the fisheries sector.221 There might also 
be the substitution of restricted input by unrestricted ones, such as the number of fishing 
days with the horsepower of the vessel, the amount f fishing gears, or the number of 
crews. In the long term, if input substitution is not protected effectively, input 
regulations may lead to capital stuffing, reduced profit and resource rent, increased 
fishing mortality, and a deteriorated resource.222 
 
In short, it can be clearly seen that effort or input regulations alone are not sufficient to 
achieve sustainable and efficient controls of fishing capacity.223 However, combining 
effective input and output regulations (e.g., effective buyback scheme and effective 
TACs scheme)224 should be able to control fishing capacity at the optimal level for 
sustainable fisheries. 
 
4.3.1.2 Output Regulations 
 
Output regulations that directly control the amount of catch obtained from the fisheries 
are basically applied in order to give the stock resource a chance to reproduce or to 
protect the stock resource from declining. However, output restrictions imply the limits 
                                                                                                                                    
<http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/122924/06-11_SG-RST+06-04-05+Mixed+fisheries.pdf> 
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219 Symes, above n 72, 184. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid 184-5. 
222 Ibid. 
223 OECD, Towards Sustainable Fisheries: Economic Aspects of the Management of Living Marine 
Resources (OECD, 1997) 185. 
224 Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 23. 
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of fishing effort that may be used to harvest fish, and they, therefore, limit the utilisation 
of inputs. The limitations on outputs may control the excessive catch of the stock, or 
overfishing, but they may concurrently create excess capacity at current stock levels as 
well. This is due to the fact that open access motive still exists for any single vessel to 
increase its fishing effort as much as possible profits can be created (average income is 
more than the average cost).225 Output regulations, which could be referred to as 
production measures,226 can be used to set catch quotas either for an entire fishery such 
as TACs that are often adopted based on MSY,227 or for particular vessels and the sum 
of these quotas is equivalent to TACs of the entire fishery.228 However, the output 
control used to significantly address overcapacity is by setting vessel catch limits. 
 
4.3.1.2.1 Vessel Catch Limits 
 
Vessel catch limits control the landing catch of a vessel, either on a per-trip basis, or a 
per-time period basis, such as per day, week, or month.229 The former does not limit the 
number of fishing trips, which a vessel can spend, whereas the latter does not limit the 
number of fishing time periods, which a vessel can spend.230 These limitations aim to 
increase the fisheries resource. Thus, after implementing this vessel catch limits 
program, there may, or may not, be a great number of vessels getting out from the 
fishery during the initial stage.231 Vessel catch limits are applied in some States, for 
example, in Belgium, the Flemish government have maxi um catches per calendar day 
implemented in sole, plaice and cod fisheries. The quota allocation is divided by taking 
into consideration the engine power of the vessels.232  
 
Theoretically, applying the vessel catch limits scheme, which partly addresses the 
property rights issue,233 will decrease the race for fish and capital stuffing, and therefore 
                                                
225 Pascoe et al, above n 7, 23. 
226 FAO, above n 3, 44. 
227 Colin R Townsend, Michael Begon and John L Harper, Essentials of Ecology (Blackwell, 2008). 
228 Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas National Research Council, above n 156, 119. 
229 Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 27. 
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231 Ibid. 
232 FAO, Information on Fisheries Management in the Kingdom of Belgium (January 2005) 
<http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/BEL/body.htm>. 
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overcapacity problem will be lessened.234 This scheme is usually used to combine with 
other control measures, and its effectiveness in mitigat ng capacity will depend upon 
other measures combined with it. For example, if combined with effort quotas, vessel 
catch limits will have the same effect as individual h rvest quotas (IQs) scheme. This 
combination, however, is less effective than true IQs scheme, especially the transferable 
IQs. Furthermore, when this scheme is combined withTACs, it creates a little effect on 
the alleviation of overcapitalisation, which is commonly associated with regulated open 
access.235 Similar to other output controls, the success of vessel catch limits relies on the 
ability to monitor the total catch as the shortcoming of this scheme is that fishers could 
cheat by landing fish out of the ports and misreport to the authority. Therefore, in order 
to overcome this problem, vessel catch limits are suggested to be applied in community-
based fisheries where landing places are restricted236 and have reliable landing records. 
Alternatively, this scheme should be applied when the actual total catch can be 
measured by observers at sea or from verifiable logbo k data.237  
 
Apart from implementation at national level, vessel catch limits are also applied in the 
RFMO competent areas. For instance, the Internationl Pacific Halibut Commission 
(IPHC) has imposed the regulation of fishing period limit, which refers to ‘the 
maximum amount of halibut that may be kept and landed by a vessel during one fishing 
period’, to commercial fishing for halibuts in their competent areas.238 Additionally, 
vessel catch limit schemes have been used in recreational fishing. For instance, the 
IPHC has applied a daily bag limit, referring to ‘the maximum number of halibut a 
person may take in any calendar day from Convention waters,’ to sport fishing in the 
Convention area.239 Australia has also widely imposed vessel catch limits, daily bag and 
boat limits in particular, to recreational fishing of many species. For example, the 
government of South Australia has imposed the regulation of bag and boat limits on 
species, such as abalone, Australian herring, blue swimming crab and mud cockle.240 
                                                
234 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 73. 
235 Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 27. 
236 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 76. 
237 Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas National Research Council, above n 156, 119-20. 
238 Pacific Halibut Fishery Regulations 2012, section 12. 
239 Pacific Halibut Fishery Regulations 2012, section 25. 
240 Government of South Australia, Fishing Limits (2005) 
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The results likely show the success, particularly on abalone, as its stock status suggests 
that it is sustainably fished.241   
 
4.3.1.2.2 Vessel Catch Limits Scheme in Thailand’s Context 
 
The discussion in the previous sections show that traditional fisheries management of 
marine fisheries in Thailand has been based exclusively on the control of fishing effort 
or input controls, gear and vessel restrictions, in particular. This is mainly due to the 
multi-species nature of Thai fisheries and the large numbers of vessels dispersed along 
the coasts which make any attempts to implement catch controls as complementary 
measures very difficult and costly. Therefore, Thailand has implemented neither vessel 
catch limits nor TACs schemes in marine capture fisheries. The imposition of output 
controls on fishing capacity is unlikely to be a practical measure in the Thai fisheries 
context.  
 
In sum, incentive blocking measures are basically designed to support the market 
adjustment of excess capacity.242 But it is important to stress that these measures have 
only temporary impacts on limiting or reducing capacity as although these short run 
solutions mitigate capacity build-up by freezing or slowing capacity growth rate, they 
do not adjust the economic incentives of fishers.243 This means the issue of capital 
stuffing can always arise, and thus overcapacity problem would still remain in the 
fisheries. To tackle this issue, incentives adjusting measures and other measures have 
been introduced as alternative tools to address overcapacity problem in fisheries. The 
incentive adjusting measures and supplementary management measures are discussed in 
greater detail in succeeding chapters.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
241 The Fisheries Division of Primary Industries and Regions South Australia, 'Ecological Assessment of 
the South Australian Abalone Fishery: Reassessment Report' (June 2003) 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/pages/a5b35bda-cd0f-45c2-acf1-
1fafb5bed65c/files/application-2013.pdf> 18. 
242 Ward and Metzner, above n 63, 74. 
243 Ibid. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter first described the measurement and assessment of overcapacity in 
fisheries, which can be determined according to the methods used. The quantitative 
measures determine overcapacity as either the differenc  or ratio of the potential level to 
the target level, and either on an input or output bases, according to a number of 
indicators. Qualitative indications, on the other hand, can be used to determine 
overcapacity in a fishery or fisheries, where required information may not be promptly 
available, particularly in open access or regulated open access fisheries. However, it is 
essential to use a combination of qualitative indicators, and not only one, in a careful 
manner and with the necessary technical expertise.  
 
The second part of this chapter provided standard tools that can be implemented to 
control fishing capacity, focusing on incentive blocking measures. These measures are 
categorised into two main groups, namely, input andoutput regulations. Significant 
input regulations consist of limited licensing, indivi ual effort quota, and gear and 
vessel restriction, whereas vessel catch limits scheme was discussed as output 
regulations. Thailand has implemented a number of input regulations but no output 
regulations due to constraints in terms of its tropical fisheries nature, which are multi-
species and multi-gear type. Overall, it was concluded that implementing each of 
incentive blocking measures alone is not adequate to address overcapacity issue as it 
makes a minimal effect on capital stuffing, which is the core problem of regulated open 
access fisheries such as Thai fisheries. Therefore, alt rnative management measures, 
such as incentive adjusting measures, should be considered to have a more effective 
outcome in solving the problem of overcapacity.     
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CHAPTER 5 INCENTIVE ADJUSTING MEASURES FOR MANAGING 
FISHING CAPACITY AND IMPLEMENTATION BY THAILAND 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
Apart from incentive blocking measures discussed in the previous chapter, there are also 
incentive adjusting measures used to manage fishing capacity worldwide. This chapter 
analyses a set of incentive adjusting measures, includi g individual harvest quotas, 
territorial use rights in fisheries, co-management a d community-based fisheries 
management, taxes, and subsidies. The effect of each measure on capacity control is 
analysed. The implementation of a particular measure by Thailand is also examined.   
 
5.2   Incentive Adjusting Measures 
 
Incentive adjusting measures are basically designed to liminate or mitigate the fishers’ 
tendencies towards overexploitation and overcapitalization1 by attempting to address 
property rights issues2 and allowing the market to assist in reducing overcapacity.3 It is 
simply put that incentive adjusting measures correct overcapacity by creating market 
incentives that decrease capacity levels in a fishery.4 These measures are considered as 
long run solutions to address overcapacity problem.5 
 
                                                
1 Dominique Greboval and Gordon Munro, 'Overcapitalization and Excess Capacity in World Fisheries: 
Underlying Economics and Methods of Control' in Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing 
Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts and Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 386 
(FAO, 1999) 206, 28. 
2 ‘Rights’ in a fishing context is defined as an interest that an individual or a group of entities canlaim to 
harvest a stock of fish. This interest can be indicated in law (e.g., common, statute, or administrative law) 
or characterised in social and political structure, which does not have a formal form of law. See, Nina 
Mollett, Philip A Neher and Ragnar Arnason (eds), Rights Based Fishing (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1989) 5. However, there is no definite reason to confirm that having property rights developed will 
automatically result in marine resource utilisation in a more sustainable way. See, Eleanor J Milner-
Gulland and Ruth Mace, Conservation of Biological Resources (Blackwell Science, 1998) 159. 
3 John M Ward et al, Measuring and Assessing Capacity in Fisheries: 1. Basic Concepts and 
Management Options (FAO, 2004) 25. 
4 John M Ward and Rebecca Metzner, 'Fish Harvesting Capacity, Excess Capacity, and Overcapacity: A 
Synthesis of Measurement Studies and Management Strategies' (FAO, 2002) 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y8169e/y8169e00.pdf> 76. 
5 Ibid 74. 
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Incentive adjusting measures can be categorized into two subgroups. The first subgroup 
is created to generate full, or partial, property rights over fishery resources for fishers,6 
so that they are willing to harvest the resources within appropriate conservation limits.7 
Consequently, overcapacity is expected to be removed from the fishery.8 The measures 
falling into this subgroup include individual harvest quotas, territorial use rights in 
fisheries, co-management and community-based fisheries management. The second 
subgroup includes measures that adjust economic incentives in the fishery. The 
significant measures presented here are taxes, and subsidies. 
 
5.2.1   Individual Harvest Quotas 
 
Individual harvest quotas (IQs) are defined as quotas that provide an individual 
producer (an individual or a legal entity, such as a firm) the right to harvest a specified 
amount and species of aquatic resources in a particul r place during a particular time 
period.9 An IQ is usually presented as an individual portion of a total quota or TAC,10 
which is generally set by the resource management authorities. The IQ can be a fixed 
amount or a percentage of TAC.11 Most of current IQ systems, however, are found as a
form of percentage of TAC.12 For example, IQs in New Zealand, who is the world 
leader in using IQs, have been dominated as percentag s of the total allowable 
commercial catch (TACC).13 In many cases, the quotas are allocated to fishers based on 
their historic fishing patterns. For instance, EU, under EU Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP), allocates TACs to each Member State according to its historic fishing records.14 
                                                
6 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 28.  
7 Rebecca Metzner, Fisheries and Aquaculture Topics. Regulating Fishing Capacity. Topics Fact Sheets. 
(27 May 2005) FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14857/en>. 
8 Ward and Metzner, above n 4, 76-7. 
9 OECD, Individual [Fishing] Quota (6 March 2003) 
<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1333>. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 22. 
12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'Synthesis Report for the Study on the 
Economic Aspects of the Management of Marine Living Resources' (AGR/FI (96) 12, OECD, 1996). 
13 Lock Kelly and Leslie Stefan, 'New Zealand's Quota M nagement System: A History of the First 20 
Years' (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, April 2007) <http://motu-
www.motu.org.nz/wpapers/07_02.pdf> 17. 
14 John Andersen, 'Right Based Management in the United Kingdom - the Shetland Experience' in Colin 
Ralph Townsend, Ross Shotton and Hirotsugu Uchida (e s), Case Studies in Fisheries Self-governance 
(2008) 54.  
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The advantages of IQ scheme are that operators with IQs ave the flexibility to increase 
their profit by finding the most efficient way to harvest fish with less cost and gain 
highest revenues, such as spreading their effort optimally across the entire season and 
selling their products when prices in markets are higher.15  
 
The IQs can be considered as property. In case they can be transferred (ITQs), then they 
may be purchased, sold, leased and exchanged as same as other types of property.16 
ITQs are also known as individual fishing quotas (IFQs) that are allowed to be 
transferred.17 When quotas can be transferred with no limits, individual fishers or a 
company can adjust their fishing operations by purchasing or selling quota. Thus, the 
price mechanism that controls the quota market willcause quota redistribution, and 
therefore quotas would finally be consolidated to the most efficient operators.18 ITQs 
can fundamentally change incentives in the fishery because their value depends upon 
the status of fish stock, fishers, therefore, are more motivated to protect the stock, to 
self-monitor, and to collaborate.19 Hence, at the same time ITQs are capable to address 
both biological and economic goals.20 In many fisheries where ITQs have been 
implemented, remarkable decline in capacity has been found over time,21 thus they are 
able to address the issue of overfishing and overcapacity.22 During year 1950 to 2003, 
there were 148 out of 11,135 commercial fisheries that have been managed under ITQs 
scheme,23 and those having well designed catch share system howed the results in 
                                                
15 Ikerne del Valle et al, 'Right-Based Fisheries Management' in Lorenzo Motos and Douglas Clyde 
Wilson (eds), The Knowledge Base for Fisheries Management (ELSEVIER, 2006) 55, 56-7. 
16 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 32. 
17 South Atlantic Fishery Management Council, IFQs/ITQs An Overview 
<http://www.safmc.net/Portals/6/SocioEcon/IFQs/IFQfactsheet_eng.pdf>. 
18 del Valle et al, above n 15, 57. 
19 Gary D Libecap, 'Allocation Issues in Rights-Based Management of Fisheries: Lessons from Other 
Resources' in R Quentin Grafton et al (eds), Marine Fisheries Conservation and Management (Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 572, 572-3. In many ITQ systems, fishery industries have supported conservation 
activities and research programs. See, Colin W Clark, 'Fisheries Bioeconomics: Why is It so Widely 
Misunderstood?' (2006) 48(2) Population Ecology 95, 97.  
20 del Valle et al, above n 15, 55. 
21 Ward and Metzner, above n 4, 77. 
22 Colin W Clark, The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries Economic Models and Human Behavior (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 4. 
23 Christopher Costello, Steven D Gaines and John Lynham, Number of Fisheries Managed with 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) 
<http://fiesta.bren.ucsb.edu/~costello/research/CatchShares/ITQ_Managed_Fisheries_List_Map.pdf>. 
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preventing fishery collapse.24 Currently, there are at least 18 States25 worldwide 
implementing ITQ systems to manage their fish stocks, accounting 249 species in 
total.26   
 
In sum, the core characteristics of ITQs include: (i) exclusivity: quota owners are given 
the property rights to freely harvest resources; (ii) durability : quotas are allocated for 
the owners as long as they want or in perpetuity; (iii) security or quality of title : quota 
owners have capability to maintain their property right; and (iv) transferability : quota 
owners can freely transfer their property right to o hers, meaning quotas can be bought 
and sold.27 Based on these characteristics, which are the essential components of 
managing fishing capacity, FAO has therefore acknowledged this rights-based fisheries 
management scheme as the best approach for fishing capacity management.28 As a 
result, ITQs have been strongly suggested as a technical tool for fishing capacity 
management in many significant fisheries.29  
  
With an ITQ scheme, a buyback program may become a useful supplement instrument. 
When applying the buyback scheme with limited entry scheme, it may not achieve the 
successful outcome because of two factors. Firstly, as the economic incentives in 
fishery are still the same, fishing capacity tends to return to the fishery after capacity 
elimination through the buyback program.30 Secondly, as the buyback program 
proceeds, the anticipated rent from the fishery will consequently increase the value of 
                                                
24 Christopher Costello, Steven D Gaines and John Lynham, 'Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries 
Collapse?' (2008) 321(5896) Science (New York, N.Y.) 1678, 1680. 
25 These 18 States include Argentina, Australia, Canad , Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Falkland Islands, 
Greenland, Iceland, Italy, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, 
South Africa, and the United States. See, Cindy Chu, 'Thirty Years Later: the Global Growth of ITQs and 
their Influence on Stock Status in Marine Fisheries' (2009) 10(2) Fish and Fisheries 217, 220. 
26 The species are, for examples, herring, plaice, sole, Greenland halibut, whiting, rock lobster, spiny 
lobster, sablefish, Canadian cod, Canadian haddock, Southern bluefin tuna, orange roughy, and Pollock. 
See, ibid, 221. 
27 Ragnar Arnason, 'Property Rights in Fisheries: Iceland’s Experience with ITQs' (2005) 15(3) Reviews 
in Fish Biology and Fisheries 243, 246-7. 
28 FAO APFIC, 'APFIC Regional Consultative Workshop Managing Fishing Capacity and IUU Fishing in 
the Asian Region, Phuket, Thailand, 13-15 June 2007' (RAP Publication2007/18, FAO/RAP, 2007) 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ah999e/ah999e00.pdf> 14.  
29 Steffen Hentrich and Markus Salomon, 'Flexible Management of Fishing Rights and a Sustainable 
Fisheries Industry in Europe' (2006) 30(6) Marine Policy 712, 712.  
30 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 32. 
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the vessel licenses. Subsequently, the buyback program is very costly for authorities.31 
But under the ITQ scheme, the incentives have been corrected. Besides, the future 
resources rent from expected capitals is comprehended in the value of ITQs, rather than 
in the value of the vessel licences. Thus, buyback programs can stimulate and facilitate 
the transfer of ITQs from high to low cost producers, as well as to remove vessels from 
the fishery.32  
 
ITQ systems have been carried out with favourable outcomes in many States including 
New Zealand, Australia, Iceland, the United States and Canada.33 However, the quota 
management system (QMS), which is the world largest ITQ based system34 firstly 
implemented in 1986 by New Zealand, is considered as one of the best examples. QMS 
has been used to manage all significant commercial species in New Zealand with 
successful results.35 The key factor of this achievement is that the government is capable 
to ‘determine the spatial scale that species are managed at (and how adjustments are 
made to these areas), the process for setting sustainable harvest levels, the allocation of 
catch between the different fishing sectors and the definition of quota.’36 In terms of 
quota management areas (QMAs), which refer to ‘geographic areas within which fish 
stocks are managed in the EEZ37 of New Zealand, they are determined according to the 
biological information of stock distributions of each species. Managing species stocks 
in QMAs will therefore allow the authorities to put controls to sustain these 
populations.38 QMAs were originally divided in accordance with the ten fisheries 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Liz Neeley, New Study Offers Solution to Global Fisheries Collapse: 'Catch Shares' End Race-to-fish, 
Rescue Failing Fisheries, Protect the Ocean <http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2008-09/s-
nso091208.php>; Chu, above n 25, 219-20. 
34 Richard G Newell, James N Sanchirico and Suzi Kerr, 'Fishing Quota Markets' (2005) 49(3) Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 437, 459. 
35 Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 1. Currently, there a  97 species (or species groupings) managed by 
QMS. These species are divided into 629 separate stocks. Each stock is managed independently to assure 
the fishery sustainability. See, Ministry for Primary Industries, Commercial Fishing (8 October 2013) 
<http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-
nz/Commercial/default.htm?wbc_purpose=basic&WBCMODE=presentationunpublished%23MainConte
ntAnchor>. 
36 Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 3. 
37 Ministry of Fisheries, Report from the Fishery Assessment Plenary, May 2007: Stock Assessments and 
Yield Estimates (Ministry of Fisheries, 2007) 12. 
38 Ministry for Primary Industries, Quota Management System: New Zealand's Quota Management 
System (QMS) (4 June 2014) <http://fs.fish.govt.nz/Page.aspx?pk=81&tk=248>. 
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management areas (FMAs) within the EEZ of New Zealand39 and the boundaries of 
QMAs for each species could not be changed.40 Later, due to the purpose to ensure the 
perpetual sustainability of stocks, boundaries of QMAs can be altered by government if 
the change is necessary according to a number of factors, e.g., ‘the biological 
characteristics of a particular stock that would be impacted by the recommendation’,41 
and ‘non-commercial fishing activities in the impacted area’.42 However, the 
government needs to consult with stakeholders involving in the relevant QMA before 
any changes can be done.43     
 
In terms of species managed under the QMS,44 although most species are managed 
independently, some groups of species (i.e., similar species that are difficult for fishers 
to identify, and species that are often caught together) are considered and managed as 
they are a single species. Thus, a group of stock ppulation can include only a single or 
group of species within the designated area of the QMS. For example, based on their 
similarity of two species of arrow squid (i.e., Nototodarus sloanii and N. gouldi), they 
are defined as a single species group, whereas the eig t species of flatfish45 are managed 
together due to the easiness of management.46 For sustainable harvest levels of each 
species, government, by the Minister of the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI),47 is 
responsible to set the harvest levels or TACs that ensure to maintain fish stocks at or 
                                                
39 Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 3. 
40 Ibid 5. 
41 Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999 section 25(3)(a)(ii).   
42 Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999 section 25(3)(a)(i). 
43 Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999 section 25(3)(b). It provides that ‘(b) consult the persons and 
organisations considered by the Minister to be representative of those classes of persons having an 
interest in the relevant quota management area, includi g Maori, recreational, commercial, and 
environmental interests;’  
44 New Zealand currently has 100 species (or species groupings) subject to the QMS. See, Ministry for 
Primary Industries, above n 38. 
45 They include the yellow-belly flounder (Rhombosolea leporine); sand flounder (Rhombosolea 
plebeian); black flounder (Rhombosolea retiaria); greenback flounder (Rhombosolea tapirina); lemon 
sole (Pelotretis flavilatus); New Zealand sole (Peltorhamphus novaezeelandiae); brill (Colistium 
guntheri); and turbot (Colistium nudipinnis). See, Ministry for Primary Industries, Fisheries Assessment 
Plenary, May 2013: Stock Assessments and Yield Estimates, Volume 1: Introductory Sections to Jack 
Mackerel (Fisheries Science Group, Ministry for Primary Industries, 2003) 247.    
46 Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 6. 
47 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Fisheries were combined to form a single 
Ministry on 1 July 2011. On 30 April 2012, this new ministry was named as the Ministry for Primary 
Industries. See, Ministry for Primary Industries, About MPI (14 November 2012) 
<http://www.mpi.govt.nz/about-mpi>. 
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over a level producing the MSY,48 or keep the biomass49 at the level, which can support 
the harvest of MSY (BMSY).50 Nonetheless, due to difficulties in determining the 
actual value of BMSY or MSY with limited information about fish population dynamics 
of particular species,51 the proxy measures for MSY could be statistic measure 
(maximum constant yield, MCY) and a dynamic measure (current annual yield, 
CAY).52 The estimates of MCY and CAY of each species, where it is possible, are 
reported every year.53 These estimates, together with other relevant information, and a 
risk assessment, will be used by the government to determine the TAC in such 
particular year. The TAC will consider all amount of harvest from commercial, 
customary and recreational (or sport) fishing. However, the guideline provided in the 
Plenary Report is not necessary to be taken. Thus, for ome species, it takes many years 
before the recommended TACs are accepted by stakeholders.54 
 
In terms of quota allocation to fishers, New Zealand government used a consultation 
mechanism before concluding the criteria for allocation in the law.55 The criteria used to 
allocate the quotas were different between inshore quotas and deepwater quotas due to 
more complexity and greater catch levels and fishing capacity needed to be reduced of 
                                                
48 Fisheries Act 1996 section 13(2)(a). 
49 The biomass in fisheries context means ‘the total weight of a stock or biological unit of fish or a 
defined fraction of it.’ See, Ministry of Fisheries, A Brief Explanation of Biomass and Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) (July 2006) 
<http://www.option4.co.nz/FAQs/documents/AnexplanationofbiomassandMSY.pdf>. 
50 Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 7. 
51 It is because there are several factors contributing to the systematic analysis of species’ MSY. They 
include ‘how fast they grow, when and how they reproduce and the pattern of harvesting in the fishery.’ 
Furthermore, the MSY is typically variable over time due to productivity and environmental factors 
changed. See, Ministry of Fisheries, above n 49. 
52 MCY is ‘a constant catch level that is estimated to be sustainable, with and acceptable level of risk, at 
all probable future levels of biomass.’ As MCY is a constant figure, it must be specified adequately low 
to make certain that the viability of the stock is not affected, especially when the abundance of stock is 
low. CAY is yearly determined by incorporating fluct ations of factors, such as interspecies interactions, 
changes of environment, and human fishing pressure. Thus, CAY will give a time varying estimate of the 
MSY that still remains a fixed proportion of the fish ng population. See, Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 7.   
53 Ministry-led working groups convene to assess fishstocks, and technical information obtained for 
particular fishery is summarized in a report of working group and published yearly in the Fishery 
Assessment Plenary. See, Ministry for Primary Industrie , Departmental Output Expense - Fisheries 
Information (16 November 2007) <http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-
nz/Publications/Annual+Reports/Annual+Report+2007/Performance/Departmental+Output+Expense
+-+Fisheries+Information.htm>.   
54 Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 8. 
55 Ibid 11. 
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inshore fisheries.56 Deepwater quotas have been allocated to companies that are capable 
to access the fishery and process their catch.57 For inshore quota allocation, it was 
determined by considering the commitment of the fisher  to fishery industry or a 
vessel’s catch history.58 Thus, those who were not qualified to be commercial fishers 
were automatically removed from fisheries as they could not receive the fishing permits. 
Although this arrangement resulted in fishing capacity reduction of inshore fisheries, it 
also created socio-economic problems for removed part-time fishers which majority was 
Maori59 living in rural areas where commercial fishing, based on its definition, was not 
easy to conduct. Nonetheless, this inequity issue was later settled by the two 
legislations, i.e., the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 and the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
Claims) Settlement Act 1992. At present anybody who ants to fish for a purpose of 
trading is required to obtain a commercial fishing permit, which is granted for a period 
of between one and five years. All permits are entitl d to catch for most species. 
However, in order to conduct commercial fishing permit holders are required to comply 
with a number of regulations, such as fishing from a registered fishing; keeping records 
of catch, effort and landings; reporting their effort and landings to the Ministry 
regularly; and not discarding their fish (with limited exceptions).60 
 
Currently the New Zealand government also identifies the sufficient allowance catch 
from each stock for recreational and customary uses, as well as all other sources of 
fishing.61 The rest of that stock will be available for commercial fishing as the TACC of 
particular fishing year.62 The TACC has to be set at the beginning of fishing year for 
                                                
56 R Connor, 'Initial Allocation of Individual Transferable Quota in New Zealand Fisheries' in Ross 
Shotton (ed), Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries (FAO, 2001) vol 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 411, 373. 
57 Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 12. 
58 According to Section 64 of the Fisheries Act 1983 of New Zealand, commercial fishers needed to earn 
at least NZD10,000 from fishing or to gain more than 80 per cent of their revenue from fishing or to earn 
a vital part of subsistence income (i.e., NZD6,400) from fishing. See, Randall Bess, 'Expanding New 
Zealand's Quota Management System' (2005) 29(4) Marine Policy 339, 341. However, these 
requirements were later repealed by the Fisheries Act 1996 that focused on sustainability and utilisation 
rather than the commitment and dependence factors. See, Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 19.   
59 Maori are New Zealand’s indigenous people. 
60 Ministry for Primary Industries, Quota Management System: Permitting of Commercial Fishers (23 
July 2009) <http://fs.fish.govt.nz/Page.aspx?pk=81&tk=250>. 
61 Ministry for Primary Industries, Quota Management System: Determining the Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC) (1 September 2009) <http://fs.fish.govt.nz/Page.aspx?pk=81&tk=400>. 
62 The fishing year is mostly from 1 October to 30 September.  For rock lobster and southern blue 
whiting, and some other minor stocks, however, their fishing year is from 1 April to 30 March. Besides, 
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that particular year and subsequent fishing years until it needs to be changed.63 For the 
quota of each stock, it represents as shares, which can be purchased and sold. The total 
number of quota shares for all fish stocks is always 100 million shares, and the value of 
one share equals one hundred-millionth of the TACC.64 There are aggregation limits on 
quota shares that can be held by an individual.65 When the TACC is already set, the 
kilogram equivalent of particualr quota share is analysed and transferred to the quota 
owner on the first fishing day of each year as annul catch entitlements (ACE). ACE, 
therefore, represents the quantity of fish (tonnes), which the quota owner can fish within 
the fishing year.66 There are no restrictions on the aggregation limits of ACE, and ACE 
is also freely tradable.67 The implementation of QMS by New Zealand is then capable to 
address fishing capacity both in output (e.g., TACC) and input (e.g., fishing permits, 
fishing vessels) aspects. The study on fish quota markets in New Zealand also suggests 
that these markets are operating well.68 Thus, the QMS can be considered as an effective 
ITQ tool to manage not only fishing capacity but also fisheries as a whole. 
 
In addition to New Zealand, Iceland also has the success in implementing ITQs. Iceland 
has used ITQs as the fundamental measure to manage their fisheries, particularly on fish 
stocks harvested by commercial fisheries. Licensed fishing vessels are allocated a fixed 
quota share of fish stocks subject to TAC, which is determined by the Ministry of 
Fisheries and in line with the suggestion from the Marine Research Institute (MRI).69 
The quotas were primary allocated to fishing vessels based on their catch history before 
ITQs introduced. Fishing vessels may hold permanent quo a shares in the TAC for any 
species. Currently 24 species, accounting 95 per cent of total catch and more than 97 per 
                                                                                                                                    
the fishing year for Lake Ellesmere eels is from 1 February to 31 January. See, Ministry for Primary 
Industries, above n 38. 
63 Ministry for Primary Industries, above n 61. 
64 The holdings of quota shares are ‘guaranteed by the Crown and are able to have mortgaged and other 
securities registered against them.’ See, Ministry for Primary Industries, Quota Management System: 
Quota (1 September 2009) <http://fs.fish.govt.nz/Page.aspx?pk=81&tk=423>. 
65 For example, any person cannot have more than 10 per cent of quota shares of spiny rock lobster for 
any QMA. See, OECD, 'Country Note on National Fisheries Management Systems-New Zealand' (11 
February 2005) <http://www.oecd.org/newzealand/34430857.pdf>.  
66 Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 18. Aggregating limits forbid any person from holding more than a 
specified amount of quota shares but they do not apply to ACE. See, Ministry for Primary Industries, 
above n 64. 
67 OECD, above n 65. 
68 Newell, Sanchirico and Kerr, above n 34, 437. 
69 OECD, 'Country Note on National Fisheries Management Systems-Iceland' (11 February 2005) 
<http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/fisheries/34429527.pdf> 14. 
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cent of total value from EEZ fisheries, have been managed by TAC and ITQs.70 These 
species are, for instance, cod, Greenland halibut, haddock, herring, redfish, blue 
whiting, shrimp, scallops, and lobster. However, apart from ITQs, Iceland has 
additionally used other controls on fishing capacity, such as mesh size and gear 
restrictions, closure of fishing areas.71 
 
For other States, such as the United States, they have implemented ITQ or IFQ program 
on only some fisheries stocks. In 1995, the United States have implemented IFQ 
program on the federal fixed gear commercial halibut and sablefish fisheries in Alaska, 
aiming to limit fishery access, address overcapacity and conservation and management 
issues because of open access fisheries.72 This program has also explicitly addressed the 
unintended socioeconomic impacts on small fisheries communities by linking quotas to 
vessel size classes.73 The favourable result of this program has been achieved.74 
  
Although ITQs have been strongly recommended becaus they can reduce the race for 
the fish and the capital stuffing,75 a number of difficulties are also found.76 For example, 
ITQs may have limited applicability, particularly in tropical inshore fisheries where 
have multi-species but lack precise data for analysis.77 It is due to the fact that to 
effectively determine TACs or quotas in multi-species fisheries, a set of reliable data of 
individual species, especially target species, is required. Furthermore, it might not be 
easy to determine quotas for many species that are usually caught at the same time since 
compliance and enforcement practices by official authorities corresponded with the 
operational practices of fishing vessels must be also considered.78 For instance, beam 
                                                
70 Ibid 15. 
71 Ibid 14.  
72 Courtney Carothers, Daniel K Lew and Jennifer Sepez, 'Fishing Rights and Small Communities: Alaska 
Halibut IFQ Transfer Patterns' (2010) 53(9) Ocean & Coastal Management 518, 518. 
73 Ibid. 
74 FAO, 'Report of the National Seminar on the Reduction and Management of Commercial Fishing 
Capacity in Thailand. Cha-Am, Thailand, 11-14 May 2004.' (FIP/FCR13, FAO, 2005) 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/j6419e/j6419e00.htm> 54. 
75 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 32; Christopher Costell , Steven D Gaines and John Lynham, 'New 
Study Offers Solution To Global Fisheries Collapse' (2008) 49(11) Sea Technology 62, 62; Gary R 
Morgan, Individual Quota Management in Fisheries - Methodolgies for Determining Catch Quotas and 
Initial Quota Allocation (Rome, 1997) iv. 
76 Clark, above n 22, 23. 
77 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 33. 
78 Morgan, above n 75, 11. 
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trawl fisheries in Netherland that generally catch a combination of three main species, 
i.e., cod, sole and plaice, had been granted individual quotas of each particular species. 
It caused difficulties in practice because beam trawl fishers could not catch for only one 
species that they had quotas. Hence, they tended to ither discard non-quota species or 
misreported their catch.79 The strict enforcement by having on board fisheries inspectors 
was therefore put in place to address this issue. But, due to the inadequacy of the 
inspectors, the problem in enforcement was remained. If on-board inspector is all times 
available to monitor the catch and discards (e.g., mortality of marketable fish), this 
problem would be potentially lessened. For instance, after the implementation of full 
on-board observer coverage in the British Columbia groundfish fishery, the discards 
from this fishery (both marketable discards and total discards) reduced for most 
species.80 Nonetheless, it is also significant to note that in many cases the well-designed 
ITQ system fails to give fishers incentives to protect marine habitat due to the fishing 
gears allowed,81 for example, to protect the damage of sea bottom fl or and ecosystem 
from trawlers.          
 
Additionally, determination TACs for the ITQ system might need to consider economic 
efficiency of the fishery, requiring information not nly on the biological status of fish 
stock but also on the fish price, the fishing operation cost, and the levels of discards.82 
The ITQ system may not provide favourable outcomes otherwise. For instance, the 
south east trawl fishery of Australia, which is a multi-species and multi-gear fishery, has 
been managed with a combination of ITQs and input con rols (i.e., fishing gear and area 
restrictions, limited fishing licenses) but some quota species (e.g., orange roughy) 83 are 
currently overfished and real net returns in the fishery are low. To address this issue 
Australian government conducted the study suggesting that the TACs for key species 
should be determined by using economic efficiency criteria, and thus an integrated bio-
economic model that incorporates both the biological nformation of the stock and 
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economic information (i.e., costs and revenues of fishing operation) would help to set 
such TACs that provide favourable outcomes for both biological and economic goals.84  
 
Within a TAC regulation system fishers have vast incentives to misreport in cases of 
constraining catch quotas and bycatch. Once the race for fish is finished, fishers may try 
to maximise the net value from their quota by keeping the best quality of fish and 
discarding the lesser quality ones.85 This possibly distorts the information of inputs used 
for the biological advice. Such problem is aggravated in the valuable fisheries or in 
fisheries with a high CPUE that reliable information is most needed in the stock 
assessments.86 Discarded bycatch (e.g., non-target species) can also result in overfishing 
of these populations. To address this issue, ITQ-based fisheries generally use on-board 
observers, whom are usually paid by the vessel owners, in order to ensure the accurate 
reporting of total catch and discards.87 This demonstrates that although ITQ systems 
have been considered as the best approach to manage fishing capacity, the strict 
monitoring and enforcement are essential needed for the effective implication of this 
scheme.  
 
The equity issue in society cannot be avoided to consider under ITQ implementation. 
As a well-designed and well-operated ITQ system can m ke profitable fisheries in a 
long run, the individual quotas might have high values. Therefore, this could lead to a 
question concerning the fairness among fishers since the government creates a system 
that provides wealth-creating chances to a chosen group of people.88 Additionally, due 
to the high cost of buying quota, it is unlikely for young people to afford.89 The similar 
issue could also happen to small-scale fishers who may not be able to pay for quota fees 
and then would have to leave the fishery. Furthermore, when the initial quota allocation 
was depended on catch records, it was provided to the vessel owner rather than the 
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crews. This can also be biased against part-time fishers.90 Hence, unless this inequity 
issue has been properly addressed, it can be an obstacle in implementation of ITQ 
scheme.91 However, it is important to note also that even though some ITQ programs 
are designed to mitigate an inequity issue by distributing fishing quotas to all levels of 
fisheries (e.g., small-scale fisheries), unintended r sults could be still obtained. For 
instance, small indigenous fishery communities in Alaska have disproportionately lost 
fishing rights on halibut and sablefish fisheries as they are more likely to sell than buy 
quotas.92 
 
In many cases the initial quotas have been purchased by fishers, who are not actually 
active in fishing. Then, the quotas might be leased back to other fishers by auction. It 
means almost entire economic rents accrue to the new quotas owners or to the original 
owners who got a quick profit by selling off their quotas.93 Consequently, only minimal 
or zero rents go to the active fishers. This kind of arrangements removes the incentives 
in conservation from the fishers as they gain a little from conserving the resources.94 
Thus, the advantages of ITQ scheme are weakened or gone. In order to prevent the 
concentration of quota ownership, some ITQ systems require quota owners to be active 
fishers.95 In this case, the least efficient fishers, gaining too low income from catching 
their quotas, may also decide to sell their quotas and leave fishery industry.96 This will 
result in capacity reduction. Nonetheless, the restriction on quota owners that must be 
active in fishing could be difficult to enforce. 
 
Apart from the difficulties aforesaid, States also need to take into account traditional 
rights (e.g., indigenous rights), if they exist, befor  implementing ITQ systems. It is 
important to make sure that such rights are explicitly onsidered, otherwise the conflicts 
between quota holders and local people, who have fished traditionally for a long time, 
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could be arisen.97 For example, New Zealand government assumed that te 
establishment of the QMS would put no impact on Maori fishing rights that have been 
provided under the Treaty of Waitangi. But the claims and reports made by the 
Waitangi Tribunal subsequently disputed this QMS arrangement, which resulted in a 
long process of issue settlement between Maori and the Crown.98 
 
Taking all difficulties into consideration, it is unsurprising that although ITQ scheme 
has proved to effectively address overcapacity problem in many fisheries, it has not yet 
been universally accepted. Furthermore, there has been controversy about its 
effectiveness on resources conservation as some fish stocks continued to decline after 
the implementation of ITQs.99 This negative effect could happen due to a number of 
factors both external factors, such as too high TACs, lack of monitoring and 
enforcement, and intra-specific factors, such as naturally mortality of the stock.100    
 
To implement ITQs successfully, it may depend on specific cultural and socio-
economic conditions.101 Furthermore, alternative controls on fishing capacity, such as 
gear and mesh size restrictions, closed fishing areas, may be needed to combine with 
ITQs. Additionally, some forms of licensing program (e.g., licensing to fish)102 would 
be necessary to implement in concurrence with ITQs. Fi hing capacity on non-quota 
species should be simultaneously managed as well.103 
 
In terms of highly migratory species, currently RFMOs have attempted to implement 
IQs to manage highly migratory fish stocks in their competent areas. For example, the 
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Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)104 have managed 
the stock of Southern Bluefin Tuna in their mandate area by using the TAC. The 
CCSBT has allocated TAC to Members105 and Cooperating Non-Members106 based on 
the Management Procedure (MP).107 The TAC for 2014 was 12,449 tonnes, whereas the 
TAC for each year of 2015-2017 will be 14,647 tonnes.108 
 
5.2.2   Individual Harvest Quotas Scheme in Thailand’s Context 
 
Similar to many States having tropical multi-species fisheries, Thailand has not 
implemented any IQs systems on marine fisheries. The obstacles are not only the 
difficulties in obtaining a great amount of information concerning fishery biology of 
each target species, which is essential in determination the TAC of each stock, but also 
the constraint of limited ability in enforcement of authorities, taking into account a huge 
number of fishing landing sites largely scattering  Thailand. In terms of setting the 
TACs in particular, although many ITQs programs are currently used to manage multi-
species fisheries as mentioned earlier, the level of complexity of such fisheries varies 
the effectiveness of such TACs. For example, in a large marine ecosystem with a big 
number of species and stocks involved, there is higher possibility that the determined 
TACs may not correspond with the actual state of concerned stocks, and/or harvesting 
some non-quota species may affect the catch amount of quota species. Furthermore, 
another complexity could be a wide range of the difference of specie lift history (e.g., 
mature age of each species), which affects the pattern of fishing mortality of the 
species.109 Thus, to implement IQ programs on multi-species fisheries, the appropriate 
balance between the risk of overexploitation (of each species), the economic benefits, 
and administrative costs must be critically considere .110 Given these mentioned factors, 
                                                
104 CCSBT, Total Allowable Catch (2015) <http://www.ccsbt.org/site/total_allowable_catch.php>. 
105 Members include Australia, the Fishing Entity of Taiwan, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea and 
New Zealand. See, CCSBT, The Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) (2015) 
<http://www.ccsbt.org/site/index.php>. 
106 Cooperating Non-Members consist of the Philippines, South Africa and the European Union. See, ibid. 
107 Resolution on the Allocation of the Global Total Allowable Catch (1), adopted at the Eighteenth 
Annual Meeting on 10-13 October 2011. 
108 CCSBT, above n 104. 
109 James N Sanchirico et al, 'Catch-quota Balancing in Multispecies Individual Fishing Quotas' (2006) 
30(6) Marine Policy 767, 783. 
110 Ibid 784. 
186 
 
implementing IQs on high degree multi-species fisheries, such as the tropical fisheries 
in Southeast Asia, is unlikely an achievable option for fishing capacity management. 
 
5.2.3   Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries 
 
Even though ITQs have been strongly recommended as an effective tool to control 
fishing capacity, difficulties in implementation, particularly territorial use rights in 
fisheries (TURFs), have increasingly used as an alterna ive tool.111 A TURF is a 
measure to control fishing capacity by removing the condition of common property112 
from fisheries. This measure causes fishers to perform as if property rights for such 
fishing ground or territory exist.113 When fishers consider the given territories as their 
property, they, therefore, have more positive attitude towards conservation of marine 
resources within such areas. The property rights granted often include the right to 
restrict or control access to the territory, the right to set the amount and type of 
utilisation within the territory, the right to obtain the benefits from resource utilisation 
within the territory, and the right to capture a satisf ctory return from the use of the 
territory.114 Thus, the ownership of a TURF is not on resources within the territory but 
on a right to use such resources (i.e., fishing rights). The actual ownership on resources 
within TURFs still belongs to the territorial country. In some TURFs the right granted 
can be used to harvest all marine resources within the territory, whereas some TURFs 
grant the right for harvesting only a single resource or specified resources. The territory 
of TURFs may include any zones from the surface to the bottom of the sea.115 For 
instance, some countries lease tidal and subtidal zones to fishers to harvest mussels 
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and/or oysters.116 A TURF owner can be a person, a company, a group of persons (e.g., 
a cooperative, an fishers’ association or a fisheries community), a political subdivision 
(e.g., a city or a province), a national government, or a multinational organisations.117 
Based on this clarification, the EEZs could then be considered as a type of TURFs, 
which are managed by States.118 However, most of TURFs are implemented in marine 
coastal areas.119  
 
TURFs can be helpful in controlling fishing capacity for a number of ways. Mainly, 
they control the inputs employed and outputs generated within the territory. In terms of 
input controls, TURFs limit fishery entry by protecing the access of outsiders.120 They 
also control the use of labour and capital (e.g., fishing gears and methods, fishing 
vessels), as well as control the fishing effort (e.g., fishing hours, days at sea) employed 
within the area. In some TURFs, they further place restrictions on outputs by setting the 
TACs.121 Additionally, they help to enhance future return of benefits by giving 
incentives to conserve marine resources and avoid overexploitation.122 
 
In order to achieve the great success of any TURFs, a number of conditions are to be 
considered. First, the most benefits can be achieved where the highest level of 
exclusivity of the ownership is given.123 This is due to the fact that issuing exclusive 
rights to a closed group of users provide incentives to such users to harvest fish without 
‘race for fish’, as well as prevent the entry of non-members.124  Furthermore, such rights 
come with TURFs must be long and stable enough to give the users confidence in 
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getting benefits from their investment.125 The conditions of natural resource attributes, 
delimitation of boundaries, technology applied, wealth distribution impacts, government 
systems, as well as legal and institutional frameworks are also needed to take into 
account.126 
 
In terms of natural resource attributes, it has been found that sedentary resources, such 
as mussels, oysters, and seaweeds, can easily be managed by TURFs. Species that can 
grow in an enclosed space, e.g., fish pens and cages, or species that are attracted to, and 
aggregate around, artificial devices, such as fish aggregating devices (FADs), are 
favourable for TURFs as well.127 On the other hand, it may not be easy to effectively 
implement TURFs on marine stocks that migrate along the coastline, particularly highly 
migratory species, unless imposing adequate controls through cooperation among those 
who have neighbouring territorial rights.128 
 
With regard to boundaries, territoriality is intensly affected by the level to which the 
boundaries can easily define and protected.129 For instance, boundaries can be easily 
delimitated with a river mouth, a small island or reef, or a lagoon. However, 
communities or individuals can also define marine territories along beaches, out to 
coastal area where can be observed easily, and around artificial devices placed on the 
sea surface.130 The size of TURFs is important as it should be large enough to provide 
profits from investment. In terms of the technology used, especially fishing gears and 
techniques, stationary gears that can be fixed on the sea floor, such as pots, traps, set 
nets, bottom long lines, can be managed by TURFs on a permanent or seasonal basis, 
whereas it can be difficult to implement TURFs with mobile fishing gears or techniques 
that need large areas of the sea to operate, such a trawlers and purse seines.131 
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As TURFS directly affect the income of the owner, eith r individuals or community, the 
redistribution of wealth is likely the most importan  factor for government to consider 
when creating TURFs.132 Besides, the government must have efficient authority to 
protect and enforce TURFs. Alternatively, the users (e.g., community) may be 
empowered to enforce their own TURFs.133 Thus, there must be legal, administrative 
and institutional arrangements that allow government to exercise such authority134 or 
convey the authority to users. There would be a tendency for TURFs to break down 
otherwise.  
 
There are several States that have used TURFs for the purpose of managing their marine 
resources and fishing capacity. However, TURFs widely applied in coastal fisheries of 
Chile and Japan is often raised in many studies as the uccessful measures,135 and then 
could possibly be a model for other States.136 Particularly in Japan, TURFs have been 
implemented for centuries. They were started in the sixteenth century when coastal 
communities were provided exclusive rights to harvest marine resources in coastal areas 
nearby their villages. It was because they had no la d for growing rice and fishing was 
the only source of their livelihood.137 These groups of fishers, therefore, formed fishery 
societies in order to protect their responsible areas from outsiders.138 These specific 
fishing rights were later legalized as TURFs in 190 with the promulgation of the 
Fishery Law.139 In 1933 when Japan encountered great recession, government 
established fishery infrastructure (e.g., fishing ports, fishing market places, ice factories, 
cold storage) in fishery communities in order to improve living conditions of local 
fishers. These infrastructures facilitated many loca  fishery societies to get involved 
with fish marketing auctions and afterward these fihery societies were transformed to 
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fishery cooperative associations (FCAs) based on the Old Fishery Law. Subsequently 
the 1948 Fishery Cooperative Law granted FCAs the acc ss rights and responsibilities 
to manage TURFs.140 
 
These fishing rights are granted to only inshore fisheries, whereas offshore and high sea 
fisheries are managed with a license system by either t e central or the prefecture 
government of Japan. The fishing rights are divided into three categories, i.e., (i) 
common fishing rights; (ii) large scale set net fishing rights; and (iii) coastal aquaculture 
rights.141 The first category is only granted to FCAs with ten year term, whereas the 
other two categories are granted to FCAs and individuals with five year term.142 There 
are more than 1,600 FCAs presently managing TURF zones in Japan.143 Typically 
FCAs are granted responsibilities to manage all fishery resources within their territory. 
Such resources are including sedentary benthic species (e.g., clams, mussels, sea urchin, 
abalone, lobsters) and mobile species (e.g., pelagic fish like mackerel, bonito and 
groundfish like flatfish, rockfish).144 Furthermore, FCAs govern across a broad range of 
fixed fishing gears (e.g., gill nets, bag net) and mobile fishing gears (e.g., purse seines, 
small trawlers, dredges).145 Members of FCAs are mainly fishing households and small 
fishing companies.146 Each FCA has individual administrative structure and operation 
ways to manage the fisheries within its territory. FCAs also have functions to take 
responsibilities in purchasing inputs for fishing operation (e.g., fuel, ice, boxes) and 
providing insurance and credits to members. Besides, they keep catch records of 
members and provide them to government authority as sources of official statistics.147        
 
Generally FCAs have sub-organisations called fishery management organisations 
(FMOs) to carry out the operational management.148 An FMO is typically a group of 
fishers who operate in the same fishing area and/or the same type of fishery and are 
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jointly involved with coastal fisheries management in terms of fishery resources, fishing 
efforts and fishing grounds according to mutually agreed rules.149 Nonetheless, if an 
FCA has a small number of types of fisheries and fishing gears, and targeted species 
needed to be controlled, the FCA itself can take responsibilities in terms of fisheries 
management, as an FMO. On the other hand, if an FCAis big in terms of those 
mentioned, fishers often establish a subgroup by type of gear, target species or fisheries 
for more effective management.150 FMOs implement a wide range of capacity 
management, including setting limits of fishing effort (e.g., days at sea, fishing hours), 
fishing gear and fishing vessel restrictions, using TACs,151 closed seasons and areas, 
and fishing ground rotation.152 
 
Nonetheless, although TURFs in Japan generally produce favourable outcomes, they 
have also had some disadvantages in terms of insuffcient scientific information to 
support multi-species and inter-boundary management.153 It is because their 
management is more single species-based management on market species. Furthermore, 
due to the lack of such information, there are difficulties in managing migratory species 
stocks that are found in several territories.154 To overcome these difficulties, 
collaboration between fishers in areas concerned and adequacy of scientific information 
provided by authorities are needed.            
 
In sum, it is clearly seen that although TURFS can remove or mitigate the condition of 
common property from fisheries resources, this can only be achieved to a certain level 
in marine environment. TURFS, therefore, can relatively control on fishing capacity of 
marine fisheries.155 Moreover, even though TURFS can potentially enhance the welfare 
of fishers, particularly in small-scale fishing communities, they may not be desirable 
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based on political viewpoint due to the equity issue between who should be given the 
right to fish and who is not. Theoretically some compensation could be provided to 
fishers or fishing communities for the loss of resource access, but in practice it is 
unlikely that such compensation would be economically dequate.156 Furthermore, 
where government grants authority and responsibility to local fishers in some cases, this 
self-governing system may delay the implementation of management measures. For 
example, it could take long time for fishers to deci  about what species they should 
prioritize on the management, or what type of fishing gears they should firstly 
control.157 However, TURFs that are well-managed (e.g., those legalized and 
implemented in Japan) could be used or adapted as alternative tools to control fishing 
capacity. Although the coordination cost occurred from operating activities within 
TURFs cannot be avoided, TURFs could still be practic l as long as the benefits given 
to members and environment are sufficient.  
 
5.2.4   Territorial Use Rights of Fisheries in Thailand’s Context 
 
Similar to Japan, Thailand has developed and implemented TURFs as a right-based 
measure for community-based fisheries management. It is due to the fact that Thailand 
has followed Japan in adopting such measure. TURFs in Thai fisheries have been 
granted by government to fishing communities rather an individuals, and these fishing 
communities have responsibilities to manage fishery r sources and control fishing 
capacity employed within the granted territories. Thus, the succeeding discussion about 
the implementation of TURFs by Thailand is carried out within the context of co-
management and community-based fisheries management as well. 
 
In 1995, TURFs commenced in Thailand when the Thai government, by the Department 
of Fisheries, attempted to introduce a fishing right system in coastal fisheries through 
the project titled “Pramong Na Ban”, which means “fi hing in front of the village”.158 
This project was established based on the country’s policy of decentralization, which 
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was pushed by the political crisis in 1992.159 Decentralisation, however, was not 
legalised until the 1997 Constitution was promulgated. The Constitution aimed to 
promote the participation of people in the governance under democratic system, both at 
local and national level.160 It decentralised the power to local government by granting 
localities the right to form their own self-government,161 and all local government 
organisations had liberty to issue the policy framework for their governance, 
administration, personnel administration, finance.162 After the enactment of the 1997 
Constitution, there were a number of new laws issued and law amend ents made in 
order to fulfil the stipulations of the Constitution in terms of decentralization.163 
Nonetheless, “Pramong Na Ban” project did not substantially achieve its goal as many 
fishing communities were reluctant to adopt the project. It was due to the reason that the 
definition of the use right boundaries was not clearly clarified, and thus, based on the 
name of the project, most of fishers in communities understood that their fishing areas 
would be restricted to only the areas in front of their communities.164 Later, the 
Department of Fisheries has reattempted to promote TURFs as an approach for 
community-based fisheries management via pilot projects. The two noteworthy projects 
                                                
159 This political crisis has been known as the 1992 Black May, which is referred to the incident of public 
protest against General Suchinda Kraprayoon who took he premiership forced by the military and led 
Thailand into the turmoil. See, Orathai Kokpol, 'Decentralization Process in 1990-2010 In Case of 
Thailand' (The King Prajadhipok’s Institute,  
<http://www.kpi.ac.th/kpien/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=526> 1.    
160 Ibid 4-5. 
161 The 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, section 283. It provided that ‘Any locality which 
meets the conditions of self- government shall have the right to be formed as a local government 
organisation as provided by law. The supervision of a local government organisation must be exercised in 
so far as it is necessary as provided by law but must be for protecting local interests or the interests of the 
country as a whole; provided, however, that it shall not substantially affect the principle of self-
government according to the will of the people in the locality otherwise than as provided by law.’ 
162 The 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailandibid, section 284. It suggested that ‘All local 
government organisations shall enjoy autonomy in laying down policies for their governance, 
administration, personnel administration, finance and shall have powers and duties particularly on their 
own part. The delineation of powers and duties betwe n the State and a local government organisation 
and among local government organisations themselves shall be in accordance with the provisions of the 
law, having particular regard to the promotion of decentralisation...’  
163 Such new laws included Determining Plans and Process of Decentralization Act of 1999, Local 
Government Personnel Management of 1999, Pattaya Administration Act of 1999, Subscription for 
Proposal of Local Ordinance Act of 1999, Voting forthe Removal from Office of Local Executives and 
Members of Assembly of 1999, and Election of Member of Local Assembly and Local Executives Act of 
2002. For law amendments made to harmonize with the 1997 Constitution, they were, for instances, 
Changing the Status of Sanitary Committee to Municipality Act of 1999, Provincial Administration 
Organisation (No.2) Act of 1999, Municipal Administration Act (No.10) of 1999, Tambol Council and 
Tambol Administrative Organisation (No.3) Act of 1999, and Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
(No.4) Act of 1992. See, Kokpol, above n 159, 7-8.       
164 Anuchiracheeva et al, above n 158, 1060-1. 
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were the project of community-based fisheries management implemented in Bang 
Saphan Bay and the project of integrated coastal fisher es management implemented in 
Pathew District. These projects will be discussed in great details as case studies of 
TURFs implemented in Thai fisheries. 
 
The Bang Saphan Bay pilot project was commenced in 1999 by the Department of 
Fisheries (under the responsibility of the Provincial Fisheries Office) in order to 
promote the right-based approach (i.e., TURFs) to community-based fisheries 
management. This project was established to also support the policy given by the Eight 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001) of Thailand that aims to 
provide ‘legal guarantees of the rights of local communities and small fishermen to 
participate in coastal resource management, as well as the conservation, rehabilitation 
and maintenance of mangrove forests, sea grass and coral reefs, to ensure sustainable 
use of coastal resources, especially those related to the fishing industry.’165 The project 
site covered 240 square kilometres in coastal waters (five kilometres from the shoreline) 
of the Gulf of Thailand within the areas of Mae Ramphung and Phong Prasart Sub-
districts (Tambons) of Bang Saphan District, and Bang Saphan, Pak Praek and Sai 
Thong Sub-districts of Bang Saphan Noi District in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province 
(Figure 5.1). The majority (68 per cent) of the total of 400 fishing households in this 
area was small-scale fishers. There were nine local fisher groups participating in this 
project.166 These groups generally operated small-scale fishing within the project area. 
This project had an initial purpose to address the problem of illegal fishing conducted 
by large-scale fishing vessels within prohibited coastal zone that resulted in the conflicts 
between such large-scale fishers and small-scale fishers in that area. TURFs created 
under this project, therefore, provided these fisher groups the fishing rights and the 
                                                
165 National Economic and Social Development Board Office of the Prime Minister, The Eight National 
Economic and Social Development Plan 1997-2001 (1996) section VI, chapter 3(3.3). The Eighth 
National Economic and Social Development Plan was the first plan that had the guiding principles on 
people-centred progress and participation, and these principles have been adopted in all National 
Economic and Social Development Plans onward, including the current one (the Eleventh National 
Economic and Social Development Plan 2012-2016). See, National Economic and Social Development 
Board Office of the Prime Minister, The Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan 
2012-2016 (2011) viii.   
166 These groups included the groups of Bang Ao-yang, Bang Pak Long Bang Saphan in Mae Ramphung 
Sub-district, the group of Ban Fai Tha in Phong Prase t Sub-district, the groups of Ban Nong Samed, Ban 
Pak Klong Bang Saphan Noi in Bang Saphan Sub-district, the group of Ban Kake in Pak Praek Sub-
district, and the groups of Ban Chai Thalay, Ban Fag Dang, Ban Bang Berd in Sai Thong Sub-district. 
See, Anuchiracheeva et al, above n 158, 1052. 
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rights to manage fishery resources within the territory based on legal framework 
established by the Department of Fisheries. Thus, the fisher groups formed a network to 
manage fishery resources over this area. The management put in place was, for 
example, using limited entry scheme by banning trawlers, push netters, blood cockle 
cast nets and purse seines (except anchovy purse seines operating in day time) in the 
territory. Further, with the cooperation of the Department of Fisheries, fisher groups 
volunteered to monitor illegal fishing in the area. They also implemented conservation 
activities, such as building cages to keep gravid blue swimming crabs until they 
spawned the eggs for the purpose of reproduction,167 and planting mangroves.168       
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Marine territory of Bang Saphan Bay Project in Prachuap Khiri Khan 
Province 
Source of map: Nopparat Nasuchon and Anthony Charles, 'Community I volvement in 
Fisheries Management: Experiences in the Gulf of Thailand Countries' (2010) 34(1) 
Marine Policy 163, 166. 
 
                                                
167 Necessary equipments for building cages were provided by the FAO. This activity is widely called 
‘crab bank’.   
168 Nopparat Nasuchon and Anthony Charles, 'Community Involvement in Fisheries Management: 
Experiences in the Gulf of Thailand Countries' (2010) 34(1) Marine Policy 163, 166. 
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This project provided favourable results, particularly in terms of settlement of fisheries 
conflicts through public hearing process, and restrictions imposed on fishing gears in 
the area.169 However, based on the fact that this TURF was carried out by the fisher 
groups with a great assistance from the Department of Fisheries,170 eventually this 
arrangement turned to be an obstacle to achieve the successful outcome in long term. 
Unless TURFs could be solely (or substantially) runby fisher groups, the sustainability 
of TURF becomes questionable.171  
 
Another case study of TURFs implementation in Thailand is the project of Integrated 
Coastal Fisheries Management in Pathew District (ICFM-PD). This project was jointly 
conducted by the Department of Fisheries and Training Department of the Southeast 
Asia Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC-TD) during October 2001 to September 
2006.172 The main objectives of this project were: (i) to implement sustainable coastal 
resources management at the local level; (ii) to resto  the coastal fishery resources; and 
(iii) to mitigate poverty in coastal fishing communities.173 Based on experiences gained 
from the Bang Saphan Bay Project, the territory of this project site was demarcated by 
consultation process among stakeholders in local communities. This process was 
organised by Chumphon Provincial Fisheries Office.174 The agreed project area covered 
a distance of three kilometres of coastal areas of Pakklong Sub-district of Pathew 
District, Chumphon Province (Figure 5.2) as it also aimed to resolve the conflict 
                                                
169 For example, through this process the dispute overthe same fishing ground between daytime anchovy 
purse seiners and light luring anchovy fishing vessels was resolved by arranging different fishing 
schedule for both groups. According to the outstanding performances, Ban Nong Samed group was given 
a national reward in 2007, whereas Ban Bang Berd group was given the same reward in 2008. See, ibid.   
170 For instance, the administrative work, including recording technical data, such as fishing production, 
fishing effort in project areas, was entirely done by the Department of Fisheries. See, ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 After December 2006, this project has been solely conducted by the Department of Fisheries and had 
financial support from the Royal Project Council. See, Department of Fisheries, Locally-based Coastal 
Resources Management in Pathew District, Chumphon Province (19 June 2012) 
<http://extension.fisheries.go.th/royal_fisheries/index.php?name=project&file=readproject&id=61>; Sei 
Etoh, 'Fostering the Integrated Coastal Resources Management Approach in Southeast Asia' (2008) 6(1) 
Fish for the People 49, 17. 
173 Etoh, above n 172, 11. 
174 Phattareeya Suanrattanachai, Jinda Petchkamnerd and Jir pa Kamhongsa, 'The Traditional Practice of 
Fishery Governance in Coastal Zone Management: the Case of Chumphon Province, Thailand' 
(TD/RES/124, ICRM-PD No.50, SEAFDEC, June 2008) 4. 
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between small-scale fishers and large-scale fishers (e.g., trawl and push net fishers) who 
are not allowed to fish within the areas of three kilometres from shoreline.175 
 
           
Figure 5.2: Marine territory of the Integrated Coastal Fisheries Management Project in 
Pathew District, Chumphon Province  
Source of map: Phattareeya Suanrattanachai, Jinda Petchkamnerd and Jirapa 
Kamhongsa, 'The Traditional Practice of Fishery Governance in Coastal Zone 
Management: the Case of Chumphon Province, Thailand' (TD/RES/124, ICRM-PD 
No.50, SEAFDEC, June 2008) 4. 
 
With a consensus of stakeholders, the Pakklong Tambon Council and Tambon 
Administrative Organisation (TAO)176 subsequently approved the demarcated area of 
the project.177 Later, this area was officially recognized with the proclamation of zone 
                                                
175 It is based on the Notification of the Ministry ofAgriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of 
Areas in which Fishing Appliances, i.e., Trawls, and Push Nets used with Motor Vessels, are Prohibited, 
given on 20 July B.E. 2515 (1972). 
176 Tambon (Sub-district) Council and Tambon Administrative Organisation (TAO) are originally formed 
under the promulgation of the Tambon Council and Tambon Administrative Organisation (TAO) Act of 
1994. This Act aims to support decentralization policy of government by empowering locals (Tambon) to 
have self-governance. Nonetheless, in order to harmonize with the 1997 Constitution and improve for 
more effective decentralization, this Act got amended for a number of times, i.e., in 1995, 1999, 2003 (2 
times), and 2009. See, Kokpol, above n 159, 7. 
177 One of responsibilities of the Tambon Council is to safeguard natural resources and environment. See, 
The Tambon Council and Tambon Administrative Organis tion Act of 1994, section 23(4).     
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demarcation made by the Governor of Chumphon Province i  October 2002.178 Trawls, 
push nets and dredges with motor vessels are prohibited to operate within the area. The 
project area was divided into two zones (Figure 5.2).179 Afterward, for the purpose to 
resolve the conflicts over fishing areas in Zone II, the zones for aquaculture (e.g., sea 
bass and blue swimming crab aquaculture), for fishing vessels sheltering during severe 
weather conditions, and for fishing ground of blue swimming crab fisheries (e.g., crab 
traps and crab gill nets)180 were demarcated through the process of public hearings. 
 
Under this project, a local fisher group namely the Pakklong Fisheries Group (PFG)181 
was legally established. This group played an significant role in coastal resource 
management within the project area. The management asures implemented were, for 
instance, using less destructive fishing gears (e.g., crab traps with bigger mesh size) to 
catch blue swimming crabs and building crab bank for these crabs. The PFG has also 
formed the Local Enforcement Unit to pursue MCS activities within the project area. 
Nonetheless, as the PFG (or any fisher groups in Thailand) do not have the legal power 
to arrest the intruders (e.g., trawlers and push netters) it can be difficult in practice 
hence. Furthermore, although various fisheries management plans were implemented by 
locals within project’s demarcated area, such area is not considered as fully exclusive 
use rights area. It was due to the fact that non-local small-scale fishers were also 
allowed to fish within the project area as long as there was no conflict arisen.182 More 
importantly, the local small-scale fishers still wanted to have a freedom to fish outside 
the project area. This same attitude of local fisher  is likely found when government 
attempts to promote fishing rights within demarcated area,183 which, if not corrected, it 
could undermine the success of TURFs implementation. However, according to the 
project evaluation conducted by outsourced consultant, it was concluded that this 
project achieved significant outcomes, particularly in terms of the establishment of local 
                                                
178 The Governor of Chumphon Province issued the Notifica on of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives Re: the Prohibition of Certain Kind of Fishing Application in the Determination of Areas of 
the Locality of Chumphon Province, given on 4 October B.E. 2545 (2002). 
179 Zone I covers 46 square kilometres from Bang Bird Mt. to Khao Lamyai Mt., whereas Zone II covers 
70  square kilometres from Khao Lamyai Mt. to Khao Bang Jak Mt. See, Suanrattanachai, Petchkamnerd 
and Kamhongsa, above n 174, 5. 
180 Etoh, above n 172, 13. 
181 It has about 100 members from different fisheries. 
182 Suanrattanachai, Petchkamnerd and Kamhongsa, aboven 174, 5. 
183 It was also happened when the Department of Fisheries attempted to implement ‘Pramong Na Ban’ 
project as mentioned earlier. 
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fisher group, improvement of people living conditions, improvement of the capacity of 
people and organisation in resource management and development of community by 
participatory process.184 Additionally, similar to the Bang Saphan Bay Project, this 
project also supported the capacity management by strengthening the implementation of 
limited entry and gear restrictions schemes at local level. These two projects further 
provided the effective way to settle the fisheries disputes arising in fishing communities.   
 
Based on the favourable outcomes of the two projects aforementioned, the Thai 
government by the Department of Fisheries have adopte  this effective management 
approach (i.e., TURFs and community-based fisheries management) into the Master 
Plan on Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand. Such approach is heavily stated 
under the Strategy 1, effectively improving the system of marine fisheries management 
and the co-management, of the Master Plan, focusing on ‘the modernisation of legal 
parameters pertaining to the management of marine fisheries,185 the demarcation of 
fishing grounds, right-based fisheries, fisheries co-management, and fishing capacity 
controls.’186 However, the participation of fishers and fishing communities is critically 
required in order to pursue this approach effectively. 
 
Particularly the demarcation of fishing grounds, it is essential to clearly demarcate the 
area with equity through the consultation process participated by stakeholders including 
local administrative and fisheries organisations. It is also needed to demarcate the 
provincial maritime boundaries in order to facilitate the fisheries management 
implemented by province or a group of provinces that ving similar maritime 
ecosystem.187 These clear boundaries would chiefly support the implementation of 
right-based fisheries management, TURFs in particular. Additionally, as an effective 
approach for right-based fisheries management, the Master Plan strongly encourages 
local administrative organisations, fisher organisations and coastal communities to 
actively participate in the co-management, including the operation of MCS supported 
by the government.188 
                                                
184 Etoh, above n 172, 12. 
185 In terms of the modernisation of legislation, the Master Plan requires reviewing and revising the 
outdated fisheries laws and regulations, as well as strengthening the enforcement of such legislation.  
186 The Master Plan, strategy 1. 
187 The Master Plan, strategy 1, measure 2. 
188 The Master Plan, strategy 1, measure 3. 
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To achieve such goal, since 2007 the Department of Fisheries, by Fisheries 
Administration and Management Bureau, has conducted a project of developing a 
fishing community prototype for fisheries management, aiming to establish effective 
mechanism for fishers to participate in community-based fisheries management (e.g., 
through consultation process) and MCS activities (with government support) in selected 
fishing communities. Successful fishing communities will be used as a model to apply 
for other fishing communities in Thailand.189 This project has attempted to promote the 
property right concept on fisheries resources within fishing community areas, and then 
fishing communities should be able to manage their own fisheries resources.190 
Participation process is used for all activities under the project. 
 
The procedure of the project implementation consisted of four main activities including: 
(i) selecting fishing communities that have potential in supporting community-based 
fisheries management. For example, there are existing fishers groups in such fishing 
communities, or fishers in fishing communities are willing to work together as a group; 
(ii) seeking fishing communities’ needs in terms of activities for fisheries resources 
management in their communities and selecting committees for particular activity 
through consultation process;191 (iii) preparing action plan for each activity; (iv) 
pursuing action plan of each activity; and (v) conducting evaluation and report of each 
activity.192 In parallel, the trainings in coastal fisheries management have been 
                                                
189 The Master Plan, strategy 1, measure 3, project 1; Fisheries Administration and Management Bureau 
Department of Fisheries, 'กกก	
	ก	ก	 [Project of Building Model Fishing 
Communities for Fisheries Management]' (2008). 
190 The total of 200 fishing communities (both freshwater and coastal fishing communities) was targeted 
to participate by 2011. See, ibid.  
191 It was found that selected fishing communities generally had similar needs, such as zone demarcation 
for fisheries resource management within their community areas, establishment of crab banks, 
cooperation in fisheries enforcement (patrolling) between government officers and fishing communities, 
fisheries resource enhancement by releasing fish finger ngs, and increasing habitats for marine species. 
See, ibid.   
192 Fisheries Administration and Management Bureau Department of Fisheries, 'ก	
	ก	ก	
 		ก		
	  6 
 (	 2553-	 2554) [Project of Building Model Fishing 
Communities for Fisheries Management: 6 Month Progress Report (October 2010-March 2011)]' (2011); 
Fisheries Administration and Management Bureau Department of Fisheries, 'ก		
ก	
	ก	
ก		 
 	! 2553 [Report of Project of Building Model Fishing Communities for 
Fisheries Management Year 2010]' (2011); Fisheries Administration and Management Bureau 
Department of Fisheries, 'ก		
ก	
	ก	ก	 	!	" 2552 [Report of 
Project of Building Model Fishing Communities for Fisheries Management Year 2009]' (2010) 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/management/marine_management/webpage/final_tonbab52/%E0%B8%AA
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organized for the officers of local administrative organisations, so that they will be able 
to support the implementation of such management at loc l level.          
Generally the evaluation of the project suggested the favourable outcomes including 
increased income of fishers in participated fishing communities due to the enhanced 
fisheries resources within project area; awareness of autonomous community builded 
among fishers; unity created through participatory p ocesses; and social conflicts 
mitigated by complying with agreed rules. Nonetheless, there were a number of 
difficulties confronted too. For example, it took some time for stakeholders to 
understand the concept of participation process, reulting in the delay of project 
activities. Further, in terms of rule enforcement, as fishing communities were not 
empowered to solely do it, limited government budget and manpower undermined the 
effectiveness of this activity.193          
 
In conclusion, Thailand has adopted the concept of TURFs into marine coastal fisheries 
and been implementing the projects to promote TURFs, focusing on small-scale fishing 
communities. Generally, the projects suggested the positive results including 
strengthening the input controls of fishing capacity n local areas. However, 
improvements, such as strengthening enforcement, increasing participation of local 
organisations (e.g., TAO), urging the collaboration among nearby communities, are still 
needed in order to achieve the success in long term. Furthermore, legal framework that 
supports TURFs establishment is also required. 
 
5.2.5   Co-management and Community-based Fisheries Management 
 
Although the definition of “co-management” is not definite,194 it, however, covers a 
wide range of possible systems that involves the sharing of management responsibilities 
between States and communities.195 In other words, it means that the authorities share 
                                                                                                                                    
%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B8%E0%B8%9B%E0%B8%9C%E0%B8%A5%E0%B89B%E0%B8%B55
2.htm>. 
193 Department of Fisheries, above n 192. 
194 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 12. 
195 Steve Cunningham and Dominique Greboval, Managing Fishing Capacity: A Review of Policy and 
Technical Issues (FAO, 2001) 28; Robert S Pomeroy and Meryl J Williams, Fisheries Co-Management 
and Small-scale Fisheries: A Policy Brief (ICLARM, 1994) 7.  Community can be defined geographically 
by political or resource boundaries or socially as a community of individuals with common interests. For 
example, the geographical community is usually a village, which is the lowest governmental 
administrative unit; a social community can be a group of fishers using the same fishing gear or a fisher 
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some of their powers in resource management with user groups (Figure 5.3). This 
sharing can be in a wide range from very limited power sharing to community-based 
management systems,196 which is a fundamental component of co-management.197 
 
        
Figure 5.3: The hierarchy of co-management arrangements  
Source of figure: Fikret Berkes, 'Co-management: Bridging the Two Solitudes' (1994) 
22(2-3) Northern Perspectives 18. 
 
Co-management has been increasingly adopted in many States as fisheries managers 
realise that cooperation of stakeholders is the keyfactor of the success of any 
management measure implementation.198 Further, it helps to reduce transaction costs199 
                                                                                                                                    
organisation. See, Robert S Pomeroy and Rebecca Rivera-Guieb, Fishery Co-Management : A Practical 
Handbook (CAB International, 2005) 9. 
196 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 34.  
197 Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, above n 195, 16. 
198 Pomeroy and Williams, above n 195, 3. 
199 In this case transaction costs refer to the costs ccurred when community applies ownership rights 
over resources and enforces such exclusive rights. See, Ruangrai Tokrisna, Pongpat Boonchuwong and 
Penporn Janekarnkij, 'A Review on Fisheries and Coastal Community-based Co-management Regime 
in Thailand' (Paper presented at the The Internatiol Workshop on Fisheries Co-management, Penang, 
Malaysia, 23-28 August 1999) 
<http://www.worldfishcenter.org/Pubs/Way%20Forward/15%20tokrisna.pdf>.Management transaction 
costs within fisheries can be categorised into fourgroups: ‘(i) information costs (data collection, stock 
and fisheries assessment, research and distribution of information); (ii) decision-making costs (rule-
making, including allocation of fishing rights and implementation of regulations); (iii) operational 
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in fisheries resource management shouldered by government.200 It also becomes clear 
that the government, usually with limited budget and manpower, cannot address all 
fisheries problems alone. Local communities, therefore, must play an important role in 
solving local problems. In doing so, communities must be authorised to decide and take 
actions to address such problems.201 In fisheries, community-based management refers 
to the establishment of partnership in community among local resources users (i.e., 
fishers, formal or informal fisher organisations), government (e.g., local government 
agencies), other stakeholders (e.g., vessel owners, fish traders) and external agents (e.g., 
academic, NGOs) for the purpose of sharing responsibilities and authorities in 
managing such fisheries resources.202 To compliment community-based fisheries 
management (CBFM) systems, there are many factors needed to be considered, for 
examples, how to establish user groups; what rights and responsibilities are being 
transferred to each group; how they should operate; what mechanism needed to settle 
the disputes between and within groups; what to do if a group does not represent the 
best management approach.203 
 
Thus, in order to effectively implement CBFM scheme, in given community there 
should be/have:204 (i) an exclusivity over the resources. For example, fishing areas for 
the resources should be demarcated; (ii) a high degree of dependence on the resources 
by community members. It is because if the resources ar  the only source of income, 
community members or local fishers will realise theimportance of the resources and are 
willing to involve in the CBFM in order to enhance and protect such resources; (iii) 
community members’ ability to declare the rights in management on either formal or 
informal bases.205 Such rights, however, must be clear, certainty, exclusive, enforceable, 
                                                                                                                                    
costs (the costs of undertaking the fishing activities); and (iv) monitoring, control and enforcement 
costs (determined by the complexity of the regulations and geographical distribution of fishing 
activities and how fishers perceive the legitimacy of the regulations).’ See, Jesper N Raakjær, 'An 
Analytical Framework for Studying: Compliance and Legitimacy in Fisheries Management' (2003) 
27(5) Marine Policy 425, 429. 
200 Douglas C Wilson et al, 'Cross-scale Linkages and Adaptive Management: Fisheries Co-management 
in Asia' (2006) 30(5) (Sep) Marine Policy 523, 525. 
201 Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, above n 195, 4. 
202 Ibid 8. 
203 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 195, 28. 
204 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 34. 
205 Ibid. Also, it is essential that the community right can be enforced. If the transaction costs are not too 
high, community-based management may be effectively implemented. On the other hand, if the costs are 
too high, the effective outcomes may be undermined. S e, Ward and Metzner, above n 4, 77-8. 
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and legal recognition and protection;206 (iv) respect for the group’s leadership by all 
community members.207 Where the local organisation is weak, additional costs are 
needed to strengthen and develop management capability of community, which may 
take a long time. The state of fishery resources could be worsen in the meantime;208 and 
(v) supportive agencies, both government and nongovernment. Particularly, government 
agencies should consider establishing legal framework that grants community the 
legitimate power.209 Additionally, appropriate political groups in local level, such as 
fishers’ cooperative, should be encouraged to establi h.210 This cooperative will provide 
an automatic incentive favouring stewardship of the resource to fishers within 
community.211 
 
A formal agreement is developed by the stakeholders participating in the co-
management through consultation and negotiation process. Therefore, co-management 
can also be called ‘participatory, joint, stakeholder, multi-party or collaborative 
management’. 212 Co-management is a participatory management strategy, providing 
‘forum or structure for action on empowerment, rule making, conflict management, 
power sharing, social learning, dialogue and communication, and development among 
the partners’.213 Consensus-driven process is the core of co-management, by taking into 
account ‘the differences of values, needs, concerns and interests’ concerned in resources 
management.214 Partnerships, duties and responsibilities of stakeholders are also carried 
                                                
206 Jonathan M Lindsay, 'Creating a Legal Framework fo C mmunity-based Management: Principles and 
Dilemmas' in S A Dembner and A Perlis (eds), Unasylva - No. 199 - Decentralization and Devolution n 
Forestry (1999) . Commonly, the strong local support for co-management is found in community where 
members want the government to develop property rights in order to exclude outsiders. In some States, 
such as Bangladesh, the fishers preferred to cooperate with the government when they were given a 
greater role in resource management, the government still significantly involved in allocating and 
enforcing rights though. See, Wilson et al, above n 200, 524-5. 
207 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 195, 28. 
208 Tokrisna, Boonchuwong and Janekarnkij, above n 199, 3. However, it should also be careful that 
where local political structures are weak, the locally influential individuals, who claim to represent the 
community, may take advantages of community’s benefits. See, Milner-Gulland and Mace, above n 2, 
163. 
209 Tokrisna, Boonchuwong and Janekarnkij, above n 199, 5. 
210 Milner-Gulland and Mace, above n 2, 163. 
211 Clark, above n 22, 9. 
212 Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, above n 195, 8. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid 10. 
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out along the process. Due to the broad scope of co-management, its implementation 
can then be complicated, expensive, and time-consumi g.215        
 
The implementation of CBFM can be considered as an approach to address an issue of 
common property since a well-developed CBFM refers to the grant of property rights 
over the resources for the community’s members on acollective base.216 This scheme 
has many characteristics similar with those found in ITQ schemes-corporate fisheries. 
For instance, both schemes provide the rights to fish for fishers. Thus, the consequences 
of this scheme to fishing capacity control are expected the same as ITQs’.217 In order to 
gain the most benefit from the fishery, the community should put an effort to not only 
conserve the resources, but also reduce the economic loss arisen from excessive 
capacity. However, as the objectives of user groups in community could be in 
conflict,218 it is important that all user groups are represented in the process in order to 
set the management objectives with consensus of alluser groups.219 Incentive-blocking 
measures can be used to address capacity problem within CBFM,220 but, as CBFM 
commonly has a wide scope of interests, the capacity issue may not adequately 
addressed.   
 
The systems of co-management and CBFM have been applied in many States with a 
desirable result in controlling and reducing capacity,221 such as in Japan and the United 
Kingdom (UK). As greatly discussed in Section 5.2.2, TURFs in Japan have played an 
important role in not only controlling fishing capacity but also supporting the CBFM.222 
                                                
215 Ibid. 
216 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 34. 
217 Ibid. 
218 For example, some groups may have goal to increase the employment in fisheries, whereas other 
groups may want to control fishing capacity. 
219 Symes, above n 86, 185. 
220 Ward and Metzner, above n 4, 78. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Japan is one of the countries who has the oldest and the most successful fishery co-management 
regimes. The key points in the evolution of its present fisheries institutions and management consists of: 
‘(i) the early feudal era (1603-about 1700), communities controlled adjacent coastal areas and were 
responsible for establishing rules for exploitation n these areas. The offshore areas were open access for 
anyone; (ii) late feudal era (about 1700-1868), fisheries became labour intensive and capitalized. Fisheries 
were controlled by a few wealthy operators. Large scale operators exploited offshore areas with their own 
rules; (iii) modernisation (1868-1901), government tried to introduce top down management systems but 
failed. They returned to have customary arrangements with communities controlling adjacent coastal 
areas; (iv) Meiji fisheries law (1901-1945), fishing rights were granted to local societies and individuals. 
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For the UK, on the other hand, community-based management has been implemented as 
a form of catch allocation called Fixed Quota Allocation (FQA), which was evolved 
from Sectoral Quota (SQ), and managed by Producers Organisations (POs). The FQA is 
a percentage allotment of all quotas for a single species that can be harvested within a 
specific area. It was determined by considering history records of vessels during 1994-
1996. Each registered vessel which has recorded its landing of such quota species 
during the reference time period will receive a fixed number of FQAs. POs firstly 
managed fish stocks subject to TAC restrictions in 1985. Currently, there are 19 POs in 
the UK that are responsible to distribute fishing quota to 95 per cent of the UK vessels 
on behalf of the government. Pooled or individual quotas (IQs) are two main systems in 
managing quotas by POs in the UK.223 Thus, based on experiences of Japan and the UK, 
it can be seen that to successfully implement CBFM for the purpose of capacity controls 
may require the implementation of other schemes (e.g., IQs) to support.  
 
The co-management system does not always guarantee the successful outcome in 
controlling fishing capacity. For instance, the co-management system implemented by 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Fisheries Management Council of 
the United States has not resulted in the success of controlling capacity in domestic 
fisheries.224 
 
However, taking the aforesaid benefits into account, the effective co-management and 
CBFM should be considered as an alternate tool to deter excess fishing capacity, 
particularly in inshore-coastal fisheries, such as small-scale artisanal fisheries where 
having strong and efficient community organisations.225 Commonly, the rights of small-
scale fishers are allocated in terms of space as community incentives for co-
management are usually based on the degree of fisherie  resources protection from 
                                                                                                                                    
Offshore licenses were given to both individuals and representatives; (v) current fisheries law, fishing 
rights were granted to both Fisheries Cooperative Associations and individuals to exploit coastal areas. 
Fishing licenses are granted to individuals for exploiting offshore areas.’ See, Mitsutaku Makino and 
Hiroyuki Matsuda, 'Co-management in Japanese Coastal Fi heries: Institutional Features and Transaction 
Costs' (2005) 29(5) Marine Policy 441, 442. 
223 Andersen, above n 14, 55-6. 
224 But, there is a number of fishery groups in the United States successfully adopting capacity corrected 
measures, such as the wreckfish fishery in the southeas ern region, the halibut and sablefish fisheries in 
the northwest and Alaskan fisheries, as well as the surf clam fishery in the mid-Atlantic region. See, Ward 
and Metzner, above n 4, 78. 
225 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 34. 
207 
 
outsiders.226 But, in case of fisheries stocks expanding to more than one community’s 
area, all concerned communities will need to cooperate. Otherwise, allocating catch 
rights instead of, or in addition to, spatial rights to fishers might be preferable.227 For 
some States where co-management scheme may not be feasible, it is also useful to carry 
out a research project aimed to find out what situation this scheme can be a sustainable 
and efficient management measure, as well as how it can be implemented effectively for 
each given State.228 Nonetheless, it is essential to note that co-management and CBFM 
can be successfully implemented only when supportive legislation, policies, rights and 
authority structure are addressed appropriately.229 
 
5.2.6   Co-management and Community-based Fisheries Management in 
Thailand’s Context 
 
Clearly, the nature of open access of Thai fisheries has led to coastal fisheries resources 
depletion and substantially affected small-scale fishers as they have less capability to 
compete over fisheries resources with large-scale fishers. Although the Thai 
government has attempted to implement several management programs in order to 
address issues about fisheries resources depletion and conflicts among fishers, the 
successful outcomes were unsustainably obtained. This is due to not only the nature of 
common property of fisheries resources as mentioned, but also the inadequacy of 
effective monitoring and enforcement conducted by government, which is mainly 
because government cannot afford the high cost of such operations over the long coastal 
line of Thailand.230 According to the failures of fishery management programs 
implemented in the past, Thailand has adopted co-management, CBFM in particular, as 
an alternate tool to solve such fisheries issues. Specifically, the CBFM approach has 
been used to rehabilitate coastal fisheries; settle the conflicts between small and large-
scale fishers; promote the unity within fisheries community; assure the sustainable 
incomes for coastal fisheries communities; and also transfer the cost of enforcement 
                                                
226 Wilson et al, above n 200, 523. 
227 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 195, 28. 
228 Robert S Pomeroy, Brenda M Katon and Ingvild Harkes, 'Conditions Affecting the Success of 
Fisheries Co-management: Lessons from Asia' (2001) 25(3) (May) Marine Policy 197, 198. 
229 Ibid 199. 
230 Tokrisna, Boonchuwong and Janekarnkij, above n 199, 6-7. 
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from government to the beneficiaries, particularly in terms of fishing capacity controls 
within the community area.231 
 
Additionally, as the 1997 Constitution has substantially provided the decentralised 
power to the local level in Thai society, a number of new laws and law amendments 
have been issued to support and harmonize the Constitution. People at the local level are 
also encouraged to participate in the governance or having self-government. CBFM 
scheme is therefore promoted accordingly. Further, the Thai government included 
CBFM in the Eight National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001) for 
the first time. This National Plan has been the guideline for afterward fishery policy of 
Thailand.232 Nonetheless, the 1997 Constitution, the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) and 
relevant fisheries regulations do not grant fisheries communities explicit enforcement 
authority. This, therefore, induces difficulties in CBFM implementation.        
 
To address this issue, in 2007 the Department of Fisher es submitted the new fisheries 
law to the Cabinet233 in order to replace the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947), which is 
out-of-date and does not support the co-management concept. After many years of 
consideration, the proposed fisheries law has been finally approved, and become the 
Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015).234 This new Act requires the establishment of the 
Provincial Fisheries Committees, consisting of representatives from government and 
local private sectors, which include fisheries community associations in particular 
province.235 These committees have a main task to consider and propose a fishery 
policy or management and conservation measures, which are needed to govern the 
fisheries resources in their competent area, to the National Fisheries Policy 
Committee236 and the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives Ministry to consider.237 
                                                
231 Donna J Nickerson (ed), Community-based Fisheries Management in Phang-nga Bay, Thailand. 
Proceedings of the National Workshop on Community-based Fisheries Management Organized by the 
Department of Fisheries of Thailand, FAO and the Bay of Bengal Programme, Phuket, Thailand, 14-16 
February 1996 (FAO, 1998) 2. 
232 Ibid 3. 
233 This Fisheries Bill was firstly drafted in 1999 but it took many years for being considered by the 
Cabinet due to several changes of the Thai government.  
234 The enactment of the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) is also discussed in details in Chapter 2 Section 
2.5.2. 
235 Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 19(1). 
236 Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 13. 
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In order to support this arrangement, the Act also requires the Department of Fisheries 
to encourage and support the establishment of fisheries community associations.238 
Furthermore, the Act empowers the Minister to appoint representatives of fisheries 
community associations as the assistants of fisheries officers to enforce the Fisheries 
Act.239 Therefore, these provisions, for the first time, provide fisheries communities the 
legitimate power to govern fisheries resources management in their areas, which greatly 
support the implementation of co-management and CBFM in Thai fisheries. 
Nonetheless, although the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) has been approved recently as 
a new fundamental fisheries law, subordinate legislation is still needed. Thus, to issue 
appropriate subordinate legislation is essential to be carried out as soon as possible.         
 
In the past two decades, a number of CBFM programs have been established in 
Thailand by government and non-government agencies. Apart from the pilot projects 
aforesaid under TURF scheme, a remarkable CBFM program established by the 
Department of Fisheries is the DOF/BOBP Community-based Fisheries Management 
Project in Phang-nga Bay. It was conducted during 1995-1999 under the Bay of Bengal 
Program and funded by the FAO.240 This project aimed to promote the approach of co-
management for integrated coastal fisheries management in Phang-nga Bay,241 where 
the natural resources have been deteriorated by overfishing and pollution and the 
conflicts between small-scale and large-scale fishers over the same fishing grounds have 
been arisen for a long time. In the early 1990s, the Department of Fisheries firstly 
addressed these problems by implementing the project of small-scale fisheries 
                                                                                                                                    
237 Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 20(1)(2). In fact, the Fisheries Bill B.E. 2555 (2012) originally 
contained provisions of the establishment of the local fisheries committees that were empowered to issue 
fisheries regulations used to govern fisheries resources at local level. However, these concerned 
provisions were later removed by the Council of State of Thailand based on the reason that such 
provisions did not clearly prescribe the process carried out to issue the fisheries regulations. Instead, the 
Council of State of Thailand suggested the Departmen  of Fisheries to support the participation of 
fisheries communities in preparing the policy of fisheries development in Thai waters, as well as to 
educate and assist fisheries communities in sustainably managing, maintaining, conserving, rehabilitatng 
and utilizing resources in their area.  
238 Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 9(2). 
239 Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) section 12. 
240 Donna J Nickerson-Tietze, 'Community-based Management for Sustainable Fisheries Resources in 
Phang-nga Bay, Thailand' (2000) 28(1) COASTAL MANAGEMENT 65. 
241 Phang-nga Bay is located on the Andaman Coast of Thailand and surrounded by three provinces, i.e., 
Krabi, Phuket and Phang-nga. This 1,960 square kilometres Bay is considered as one of the most 
significant bay of the world due to its abundance of natural resources. See, Kee-Chai Chong, Somsak 
Chullasorn and Jate Pimoljinda, Successful Co-Management of Phang-nga Bay Fisheries through 
Fisheries Community Bonding (26 January) <http://srdis.ciesin.columbia.edu/cases/india-001.html>.             
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development in all small-scale fishing communities along the bay. The activities of this 
project included providing community amenities, such as power and supply system, fish 
landing sites, vessel engine repair and maintenance place; installing artificial reefs; 
promoting the use of non-destructive fishing gears, supporting investment in coastal 
aquaculture and cage culture; and forming the community organisation by educating 
and training fishers to have necessary skills for being self-organized. But, due to the 
lack of participatory approach in these activities, the anticipated outcomes of the project 
were inadequately obtained. Based on these lessons learned, the Department of 
Fisheries has therefore modified their approach from the conventional government 
driven top-down approach to the community-based fisheries management system as it 
was used for the DOF/BOBP Project in Phang-nga Bay.242  
 
This DOF/BOBP project was started by identifying and prioritising the issues for 
management at the national workshop on community-based fisheries management in 
Phang-nga Bay. This workshop was attended by local fishers, socio-economic and 
fishery scientists of the Department of Fisheries, institutions, NGOs,243 and 
representatives of BOBP and FAO. The factors contributing to decreasing incomes of 
fishers and increasing social problems in communities were identified as: (i) operation 
of destructive fishing gears, particularly trawlers and push netters; (ii) conflicts between 
small-scale and large-scale fishers over fisheries resources; (iii) deterioration of coral 
reef areas, sea grass beds, and mangrove forests; (iv) overexploitation of living marine 
resources; and (v) more poor water quality.244 Thus, based on the workshop outcome, 
the DOF/BOBP project implemented CBFM activities focusing on not only fisheries 
problems (e.g., overfishing, destructive fishing gears, fisheries conflicts among fishers), 
but also the environmental components that put the impact on the abundance of fisheries 
resources, such as the deterioration of mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass beds, and water 
quality.245     
 
                                                
242 Ibid.             
243 The remarkable NGO was the NGO “Yad Fon” or Raindrop Association, who has involved in the 
protection of local marine resources in the bay for years. See, Nickerson-Tietze, above n 240, 67. 
244 Nickerson, above n 231.     
245 Nickerson-Tietze, above n 240, 68. 
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Principally, the DOF/BOBP project aimed to build necessary skills of resource 
management to fisheries communities in order to eventually transfer them the fisheries 
management responsibilities, such as granting fishing permit to eligible fishers, fishing 
zoning, and for the long term, exercising enforcement power. Initially, the local 
management structure or working village committees w re established in 11 villages in 
Phang-nga and Phuket Provinces with the assistance of the project, and later expanded 
in more than 35 villages. The committees consisted of fishers and village leaders, who 
had an important role in dispute settlement among fishers. The committees had 
responsibilities in making a decision on the implementation of fisheries management 
measures, allocation of budget and, in some villages, administering revolving funds, 
whereas the Department of Fisheries and academics provided them technical knowledge 
in terms of fisheries resources and socio-economic status in Phang-nga Bay areas. 
Village committees had monthly meetings and they had bimonthly meetings with 
project partners, i.e., the Department of Fisheries, academics, local NGOs, and the 
FAO. These meetings were served as a forum to share scientific data and information 
and discuss about any progress of the project.246 
 
This CBFM project activities further included replanting mangrove and seagrass, 
establishment of conservation areas, as well as educating fishers and school children 
about resource conservation and management in order to ensure the effective 
compliance (particularly in terms of banning push netters and trawlers), and monitor the 
changes of fisheries and habitat in Phang-nga Bay. Specifically, the ban of push netters 
and trawlers was the first collaborative management activity between government and 
the communities along the bay under this project. The Governor of each province 
surrounding the bay issued the notification that put the ban of push netters and trawlers 
into force.247 This regulation supports the ministerial regulations governing the fisheries 
in Phang-nga Bay, which providing that any motorized-trawlers, push netters248 and 
purse seiners249 are prohibited to operate within the areas of Phang-nga Bay. 
                                                
246 Ibid 69. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Demarcation of prohibited area for 
fishing operation of trawls and push nets in Phang-nga Bay, given on 14 December B.E. 2541 (1998). 
249 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas of Satun 
Province in which fishing appliances, i.e., trawls, and push nets used with motor vessels, are prohibited, 
given on 29 January B.E. 2551 (2008). 
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There were a number of valuable lessons gained fromthis DOF/BOBP project. Most 
importantly, it was found that a combination of rest ictions was essentially required to 
achieve the effective result of project activities, particularly banning trawlers and push 
netters in the bay. Such combination included the increased enforcement by officers as 
fishers or communities have not been granted the authority to arrest the violators; a 
campaign for enhancing intensive awareness and education; and economic incentives, 
such as a subsidy program for substituting push nets with gill nets.250 Additionally, the 
result suggested that the governance process, which stakeholders have a solid working 
partnership will be able to effectively overcome conflicts arisen, as well as assure the 
project planning, management and implementation that will achieve the project goals 
and adjectives.251  
 
In short, the project results affirmed that the leve  of fisheries enforcement is a 
fundamental factor of the effectiveness of fishing capacity controls, particularly input 
control. As such, to empower enforcement authority to fishers and fisheries 
communities could be considered as an option to streng hen the enforcement in coastal 
fisheries. Nonetheless, it is essential to be aware that granting power to execute and 
enforce fisheries regulations to fisheries communities can be done only when legal and 
political environment is supportive. Thus, this issue could be addressed when the 
Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) is put into force, and its supplementary laws are issued.         
 
There was another significant co-management project recently conducted in Thailand, 
namely the Coastal Habitats and Resources Management project (CHARM). It was a 
five-year (25 November 2002 to 24 November 2007) collab rative project of the 
European Union (EU) and the government of Thailand by the Department of 
Fisheries.252 This project was established in two areas, i.e., Ban Don Bay in the Gulf of 
Thailand253 and Phang-nga Bay in the Andaman Sea.254 A total of 24 Sub-districts 
                                                
250 Nickerson-Tietze, above n 240, 69. 
251 Ibid 71. 
252 The overall work plan of this project consisted of three phases including Phase I: Preparation (2003); 
Phase II: Implementation (2004-2007); and Phase III: Consolidation (2007). See, CHARM, 'Successes 
and Lessons Learned for Future Coastal Resource Co-Management from CHARM’s End-of-Project 
Workshop' (22-24 August 2007) <http://www.charmproject.org/cms/Final_work/EOPWSproc.pdf> 3.  
253 Ban Don Bay was selected as it has very productive ecosystems but with limited protection interest. 
The protection issues are basically related to sustainable production, such as conservation of breeding 
areas. See, CHARM, 'CHARM Achievements Summary' (February 2008) 4.   
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(Tambon) located in Surat Thani, Phang-nga, Phuket, Krabi and Trang Provinces 
participated in the project. Both project areas have not only important ecosystems but 
also problems regarding ‘natural resources allocatin, weak local organisations, 
overlapping responsibilities and conflicting jurisdiction of coastal resources among key 
government agencies’.255 Therefore, this project aimed to develop and impleent the 
coastal habitats co-management framework and scheme for these areas, which can also 
be a model for other areas of Thailand.256 Simply put, it targeted to change the 
perceptions and attitudes of fishers or fisheries communities from being a user to a 
fisheries manager through the operational measures of participation, resource co-
management, and lessons learned.257  
 
Overall, the CHARM project supported hundreds of loca  groups in project sites to 
carry out fisheries projects, coastal resource management activities, livelihood 
endeavours, MCS, and environmental conservation. For examples, they supported 167 
groups for aquaculture projects, 38 groups for fisheries development, 65 groups for 
changing destructive fishing gears, and 51 groups in MCS.258 One of the valuable 
outcomes of this project was the enhancement of the s ate of fisheries resources in 
Phang-nga Bay, which has gradually risen during 1997-2005 after the banned area for 
trawlers and push netters has been expanded in 1998.259 This improvement was 
substantially contributed by the strengthened MCS with the collaboration between 
government officers and the local groups supported by the CHARM project. 
Consequently, the fishing capacity in project areas, particularly Phang-nga Bay, has 
been controlled more effectively.       
 
Thailand has promoted CBFM by not only implementing pilot projects mentioned 
above, but also conducting training projects for capacity building, for instance, a 2007 
training project on Promotion of Community-based Fishery Resources Management by 
                                                                                                                                    
254 Phang-nga Bay was selected as this area hasan area having important protection interest because there 
are several national parks and wildlife sanctuaries in the area. See, ibid. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Ibid 3. 
257 CHARM, above n 252, 43. 
258 CHARM, above n 253, 9. 
259 Ibid 7. 
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coastal small-scale fishers.260 The project was financially supported by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Government of Japan to the International 
Cooperative Alliance (ICA)261 and implemented by the International Cooperative 
Fisheries Organisation (ICFO).262 The project aimed to promote ‘community-based 
fisheries resource management by small-scale fishers, who have greatly involved in 
coastal fisheries and by relevant organisations (i.e., fisheries cooperatives), strengthen 
their activities, and assist contribute to ensuring sustainable production, creation of 
employment opportunities and poverty alleviation.’ This project consisted of three 
stages: (i) dispatch of experts to Thailand;263 (ii) study visit on fisheries resource 
management in Japan;264 and (iii) terminal project seminar in Thailand, namely the 
‘Promotion of Community-based Fisheries Resource Management by Coastal Small-
                                                
260 This project was implemented in selected Asian country every year during 2006-2010. Thailand was 
chosen to be a project site in 2007. 
261 ICA is an organisation that ‘helps individuals, government authorities and regional and international 
institutions understand the co-operative model of enterprise. It channels specific information to 
institutions and the media showing the importance of co-operatives to a wide range of economic and 
social issues.’ It is based in Geneva, Switzerland. See, International Co-operative Alliance, Basics 
<http://ica.coop/en/what-we-do>. 
262 ICFO is ‘a sectoral organisation of the International Co-operative Alliance. It exists to safeguard the
interests of its member organisations, to pursue res arch into the latest developments in the agricultural 
co-operative movement, to promote mutual understanding and economic collaboration between the 
agricultural co-operatives on the one hand and the farmer and other types of co-operatives (e.g., 
consumers', fisheries, insurance, housing, etc.) on the other, both worldwide and at local level.’ This 
organisation is located in Tokyo, Japan. ICFO select d one country from Asia every year to implement 
this training project. See, International Co-operative Alliance, ICA Sectoral Organisations: International 
Co-operative Agricultural Organisation (ICAO) <http://ica.coop/en/ica-sectoral-organisations>. 
263 During 16-24 July 2007, the experts came to study he status of current fisheries resource management 
in Thailand by having meetings with staffs of partne  organisations, such as the Cooperative League of 
Thailand, staffs of the applicable Ministries/Departments (e.g., the Department of Fisheries, the 
Cooperative Promotion Department), institutes (e.g., Kasetsart University), fishers, fisheries 
organisations, and NGOs. The experts also had a study trip in many provinces, including Bangkok, 
Samutsakorn, Samutsongkram, Prachuapkirikhan, Suratthani and Phuket. See, Yugraj Singh Yadava, 
'Training Project for Promotion of Community-based Fishery Resource Management by Coastal Small-
scale Fishers in Thailand, Report of Phase One (16-24 July 2007) International Cooperative Fisheries 
Organisation of the International Cooperative Alliance & the Cooperative League of Thailand' (Bay of 
Bengal Programme, Inter-Governmental Organisation, 2007). 
264 Nine participants who were representatives of the Department of Fisheries, the Cooperative Promotion 
Department, the Cooperative League of Thailand, Fisher es and Aquaculture Cooperatives and Fish 
Marketing Organisation, had fieldtrips during 15-29 September 2007 in Tokyo, Hokkaido, Sapporo, 
Notsuke and Shibetsu. They visited fish markets, fih landing centres and institutes, as well as had 
meetings and discussions concerning CBFM with staffs of the central government, the prefecture 
government and FCAs. These field trips aimed to help participants understand the framework of CBFM, 
co-management and FCAs in Japan, and then would be able to form a policy framework and programs 
with regard to fisheries resources management in Thailand based on the understanding gained, as well as 
strengthen and empower fisheries cooperatives in Thailand. See, Yugraj Singh Yadava, 'Training Project 
for Promotion of Community-based Fishery Resource Management by Coastal Small-scale Fishers in 
Thailand, Report of Phase Two (15-29 September 2007) International Cooperative Fisheries Organisation 
of the International Cooperative Alliance & the Cooperative League of Thailand' (Bay of Bengal 
Programme, Inter-Governmental Organisation, 2007). 
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scale Fishers in Thailand’.265 At this seminar, participants have unanimously adopted 
the “Bangkok Resolutions”,266 which is a set of recommendations obtained from the 
group discussions.267 These resolutions are expected to support the co-management and 
CBFM in marine fisheries sector of Thailand. For instance, the resolutions urge the 
government to enhance the participation of people in natural resource management; to 
implement coastal zone management plans; to replace open access fisheries with 
regulated open access fisheries and later right-based fi heries; to collaborate with 
coastal communities to effectively conduct MCS in coastal marine waters; and to create 
chances and enabling environment that support fishers and their cooperatives to 
participate in all stages of resource management, including the initiation, preparation 
and implementation stages. Generally, this training project achieved its objectives to 
promote the CBFM among small-scale fishers in Thailand. It also affirmed that 
Thailand needs to improve legal environment to support the implementation of the co-
management and the CBRF schemes.268           
 
Based on the discussions abovementioned, the two fundamental elements required for 
the CBFM are the legislative framework and the fisheries associations and/or 
organisations. The law will grant the property right over resources to a community via 
its association or organisation, e.g., fisheries cooperatives. Therefore, strengthening the 
fisheries co-operatives within the community should be considered when implementing 
CBFM. To address these issues, the Master Plan has conducted the project aimed to 
support the issue of new regulations, which harmonise the new Fisheries Act in terms of 
                                                
265 The seminar was aimed to provide capacity building in terms of promoting community-based fisheries 
resource management to fisheries cooperative leaders and strengthen their connections with concerned 
government staffs and other stakeholders. The seminar was held in Bangkok during 24-26 February 2008 
and attended by 59 people, representing from the concerned Ministries/Departments, academic bodies, 
fisheries and aquaculture cooperatives, advisors of the project from Japan and BOBP, and observers. See, 
Yugraj Singh Yadava, 'Training Project for Promotion of Community-based Fishery Resource 
Management by Coastal Small-scale Fishers in Thailand, Report of Phase Three (22-27 February 2008) 
International Cooperative Fisheries Organisation of the International Cooperative Alliance & the 
Cooperative League of Thailand' (Bay of Bengal Programme, Inter-Governmental Organisation, 2008) iii. 
266 See, ibid 21. 
267 “The Bangkok Resolution” (adopted on 26 February 2008) was finalized based on the results of the 
four group discussions on: ‘(i) Policy and Legal Support to Coastal Resources Management (CRM); (ii) 
Sustainable Use of Coastal Resources and their Management; (iii) Institutions and their Role in CRM; 
and (iv) Livelihoods, Security Nets and Human Resources Development in CRM.’ See, ibid 11.    
268 It strongly suggested Thailand to reform the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) and enact fishery 
cooperative law to empower fishery cooperatives in fisheries resource management and conservation. The 
right-based fisheries management also needs to be widely promoted. The Department of Fisheries and the 
Cooperatives Promotion Department are therefore needed to enhance necessary skills and capacities of 
the small-scale fishers and communities Yadava, above n 265, 73. 
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supporting active participations of fisheries communities in marine fisheries 
management.269 The Master Plan has also adopted the projects that develop fisheries 
organisations and communities for coastal resources management,270 set up the 
regulations and areas for fisheries management in communities,271 as well as develop 
capacity building of concerned sectors (e.g., government offices, fishers, fisheries 
communities) in terms of marine resources conservation and management.272 
Especially, the Department of Fisheries has conducte  the project to promote the 
prototype of marine fishing community management in all coastal provinces of 
Thailand since 2007.273            
 
In sum, it is clearly seen that in the past decades Thailand has attempted to introduce 
and implement the co-management and the CBFM schemes through pilot projects and 
trainings, aiming to better manage coastal fisheries esources and fishing capacity. 
Nonetheless, based on the lessons gained from theseprojects, they all suggested that 
Thailand has lacked the necessary legal and institutional frameworks. In this sense, the 
Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) recently enacted could be a legal tool to tackle these 
issues. Supportive legal and institutional arrangements, however, would still be 
required. 
 
5.2.7   Taxes 
 
Using taxes is a tradition way that economists tend to apply to counter undesirable 
incentive in society.274 The significant advantage in economist’s viewpoint in using 
taxes is when the tax rate has been applied, the resou ce users themselves will decide 
about how much they will produce, instead of being centralised to the regulatory 
agency.275 Theoretically, using taxes in fisheries is simple, that the authority should 
impose taxes on fish landings, or efforts, at the level that perceives the bionomic 
                                                
269 The Master Plan, strategy 1, measure 1, project 1. 
270 The Master Plan, strategy 2, measure 3, project 1. 
271 The Master Plan, strategy 2, measure 3, project 2. 
272 The Master Plan, strategy 2, measure 5. 
273 Detailed of this particular project is greatly discu sed under Section 5.2.2. 
274 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 28. 
275 Milner-Gulland and Mace, above n 2, 151. 
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equilibrium for the vessels.276 On other words, the government claims the ownership of 
the resources and charges the users accordingly. By imposing the appropriate tax rate, 
the government can, in principle, control the fisheries to operate in the sustainable 
manner since the economic incentive for overfishing by the fishers will be reduced.277 
For example, taxing on capital could be imposed as a yearly lump sum taxation of a 
vessel’s insurance value, then capital taxation would encourage the vessels having low 
capacity utilisation (e.g., fishing days) and less profitable to leave the fisheries,278 as 
well as reduce the problem of capital stuffing.279 Therefore, many economists have 
believed that the introduction of tax measures in fisheries can achieve the management 
goals more economically than other approaches.280 In contrary, using tax will increase 
the total costs of fishing from fishers’ viewpoint. Society’s viewpoint considers taxes as 
transfers though.281 Taxing landings and efforts are theoretically equivalent but in 
practice it is generally easier to tax the landings.282 There are some existing options for 
taxing landings or catches, such as taxing at the point of landing, at some point in the 
processing chian or at the point of export.283  
 
Nonetheless, to control excess capacity in fisheries through taxes has been objected 
easily at the domestic level because of many reasons. Firstly, in order to advise an 
optimal tax system it needs to have a big set of ecnomic data, which is generally not 
available.284 Furthermore, defining an optimal tax rate applied to a fishery at a particular 
time is quite complicated. It is due to the fact that the level of fishing capacity depends 
upon many factors, such as the fish abundance, the fis  price when landing,285 and the 
                                                
276 Clark, above n 22, 1-2; Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 28. 
277 Clark, above n 22, 9. 
278 Carsten Lynge Jensen, 'Reduction of the Fishing Capacity in "Common Pool" Fisheries' (2002) 26(3) 
Marine Policy 155, 156. 
279 Ibid 157. 
280 John R Beddington and R Bruce Rettig, Approaches to the Regulation of Fishing Effort (FAO, 1984) 
19. 
281 Inma Astorkiza et al, 'Financial Instruments' in Lorenzo Motos and Douglas Clyde Wilson (eds), The 
Knowledge Base for Fisheries Management (ELSEVIER, 2006) 109, 110. 
282 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 195, 29. 
283 However, it is important to assure that such export taxes will be used to enhance conservation and 
economically rational exploit the resources. See, ibid.  
284 Ibid 30. 
285 It is also called “ex-vessel price”.  
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unit cost of fishing effort at a particular time.286 These factors also fluctuate. To 
optimally control capacity by taxing, it, therefore, needs to be adjusted accordingly on a 
regular basis.287 However, if the fact that taxes will never be optimal and need to be 
revised on a trial-and-error basis in order to achieve the satisfying level is accepted, this 
objection can possibly be overcome.288 
 
The second objection, which is more serious in practice, concerns political 
acceptability.289 In fisheries with overcapacity problem, fishing industry is often in poor 
economic society, so that government may find it difficult to implement taxation.290 
Government authorities, particularly in Asian countries, would prefer to have reliable 
information on catch production for the purpose of better fisheries management, rather 
than a poor tax system.291 Besides, the attempts to impose taxes on fish landings would 
result in the protests amongst small scale fishers and general consumers who expected 
the taxes to be passed on in a form of higher prices of fish products.292 Unsurprisingly, 
the tax system is deemed to be politically unacceptable and the fishers would never 
tolerate it. 
 
In addition, using taxes as a major approach to regulate fishing capacity is not often 
attempted by fishery managers293 because taxes are usually imposed for other reasons, 
and administered by other government agencies.294 Furthermore, if taxing landings in 
different rates based on species, it can be costly in terms of enforcement since species 
identification must be checked to ensure that the sal s records are correct. Besides, taxes 
give a strong incentive to fishers to misreport the landings, particularly when the tax is 
perceived as unfair by them.295 In case there are many landing sites, or having fish 
                                                
286 Ward and Metzner, above n 4, 77. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 195, 30. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid 29. 
291 FAO, 'Report of the FAO Technical Working Group on the Management of Fishing Capacity. La Jolla, 
United States of America, 15-18 April 1998' (FAO Fisheries Report. No. 586, FAO, 1998) 
<http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/006/X0488E/X0488E00.HTM>. 
292 Ibid. 
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294 Beddington and Rettig, above n 280, 19. 
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processed on fishing vessels, or transferring fish between vessels to vessel at sea, 
enforcement can also be problematic.296  
 
However, there is no definite reason why taxation culd not be used to mitigate 
overcapacity. Although short term variations in taxr tes might not be broadly useful in 
practice,297 this system could be an alternative measure to control capacity, particularly 
in places where ITQs are simply not feasible (e.g., multi-fisheries).298 For example, 
African States legally apply taxation to national fishing companies for rent extraction. 
This system may not show a significant outcome in terms of reducing incentives of fleet 
growth, but it is increasingly used for a management purpose of fishing license 
limitation.299 Cephalopod fisheries in Mauritania can be one of god examples as 
imposing export taxes on these fisheries could holdback capacity growth.300 
Furthermore, such tax was gone back to improve infrastructure and organisations of 
small-scale producers. This arrangement substantially contributed to the quality 
enhancement of small-scale fishery products, and thus t e livelihoods of the small-scale 
fishers in Mauritania.301  
 
Taxation has been commonly applied to foreign vessels seeking access to national EEZ 
of developing States. Originally, taxation was taken as government incomes, that the 
access rights were established based on geopolitical consideration.302 Presently, many of 
those States have also developed their own fleets, through joint-venture agreements at 
the beginning stage, and later as fully-owned natiol companies. As a consequence, 
taxation with a high tax rate has continued to be applied to foreign vessels for limiting 
their entry into national waters.303 
 
                                                
296 Beddington and Rettig, above n  280, 20. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 29. 
299 Ibid 31. 
300 FAO, above n 291. 
301 Agriculture and Rural Development Department of the World Bank, 'Saving Fish and Fishers: Toward 
Sustainable and Equitable Governance of the Global Fishing Sector' (Report No. 29090-GLB, May 2004) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/SavingFishandFishers.pdf> 72. 
302 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 30-1. 
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Further, the incentives of most fishing vessels operating on the high seas are financially 
motivated. Thus, imposing taxes could theoretically reduce activities of such vessels, 
which eventually reducing fishing capacity on the high seas.304 In this sense, taxes could 
be applied on both ‘upstream’, such as goods and services needed by high sea fisheries 
and ‘downstream’, such as fish and fish products obained from such fisheries.305    
 
Royalties can provide a similar effect as taxes in terms of reducing fishing capacity.306 
A fee paid per fish weight of landed fish or on quota shares will apparently decrease the 
ex-vessel price obtained by fishers and then will decrease the growth rate of fishing 
capacity. Some States, such as the United States and New Zealand have implemented 
this method.307  
 
In sum, although imposing taxes might not create a large effect on fishing effort in short 
term but it will provide a significant long-term eff ct.308 Thus, fisheries authorities may 
consider using taxes as an alternate measure to conrol fishing capacity. 
 
5.2.8   Taxes Scheme in Thailand’s Context 
 
Fees and taxes are applied in many ways in Thai fisheries. For examples, fees are 
imposed on vessel regulations, gear licenses,309 and fish landed at fishing ports. Taxes 
are also imposed on fishers or fishing companies based on the level of their incomes 
(i.e., income tax). Originally, fees and taxes have be n imposed in Thai fisheries as a 
source of revenue to offset administrative and enforcement costs, as well as to support 
the activities for product marketing. However, such initial purposes are less significant 
due to the small value of such fees and taxes for present economy, particularly fees and 
taxes imposed on small-scale fisheries which are the majority of Thai fisheries.310 Thus, 
to increase these rates would be unfavourable and coul  easily be problematic in Thai 
                                                
304 Rebecca Metzner, 'Fishing Aspirations and Fishing Capacity: Two Key Management Issues' (2005) 
20(3-4) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 459, 461. 
305 Ibid. 
306 FAO, Fisheries Management: 3. Managing Fishing Capacity (FAO, 2008) 101. 
307 Ward and Metzner, above n 4, 77. 
308 van der Burg, above n 96, 49. 
309 Details are discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. 
310 The new Fisheries Act has already adjusted the fee rat s, but these new fees are still low, particularly 
fees on small-scale fisheries. It is mainly because small-scale fishers are considered poor.   
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fisheries. Due to this reason, taxation has never be n imposed in Thai fisheries for the 
purpose of fishing capacity controls. However, if socio-economic information of all 
groups in Thai fisheries is taken into consideration very carefully, using fees or taxes 
system as a supplementary tool to control fishing capa ity could be possible.  
 
5.2.9   Subsidies 
 
It has been found that even in the fisheries that are successfully managed from a 
biological standpoint, fishers often earn minimal incomes, particularly small-scale 
fishers who have limited opportunities of alternative incomes. To address this issue, 
governments have often provided the subsidies to support fishing industry.311 The 
subsidies, which impact on fishing capacity the most, are those supporting the 
construction, acquirement and modification of fishing vessels, and those contributing in 
operating cost reduction.312 Subsidies include fishing gears provided, vessel 
construction assistance, low interest loans, price supports, seasonal unemployment 
benefits,313 subsidised fuel and so on. They can also take many forms including 
‘budgeted grants, subsidised lending, tax and fiscal preferences’.314 For present 
fisheries, subsidised lending and tax preferences ar  likely more important than 
budgeted subsidies.315 
 
A vessel and license buyback program is a form of fisheries subsidies that has been 
adopted more as a management tool to eliminate excess capacity worldwide, such as in 
the European Community, the United States, Canada, Norway, Australia, Japan, and 
Taiwan.316 However, as discussed in great details under Section 4.3.1.1.1 of Chapter 4, 
the issues of the renewed incentives for capacity expansion and capital stuffing after the 
implementation of the buyback program317 need to be carefully considered. To achieve 
sustainable capacity reduction, the appropriate design of buyback program for a given 
fishery is therefore essential. 
                                                
311 Clark, above n 22, 20-1. 
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Based on the fact that harmful fisheries subsidies contributing to heavy fishing effort 
that leads to fish stocks depletion worldwide,318 to address this issue the WTO Members 
are obliged to propose their notifications of subsidies to the WTO for review every 
year.319 Such subsidies include those defined under Article 1(1.1) of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) as shown below:  
‘1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within 
the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “agreement”), i.e., 
where: 
 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, 
and equity infusion), potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan 
guarantees); 
 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foreg ne or not collected (e.g., 
fiscal incentives such as tax credits); 
 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other an general infrastructure, or 
purchase goods; 
 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs 
a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to 
(iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in 
no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments; or 
 
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of 
GATT 1994;320 and 
 
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.’ 
Nonetheless, only about one half of the WTO Members have reported their subsidies to 
the WTO. This clearly weakens the effectiveness of the ASCM. The under-reporting 
                                                
318 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/177 in 2008 deplored the fact that fish stocks in 
many parts of the world are overfished or subject to sparsely regulated and heavy fishing efforts, as a 
result of, inter alia, IUU fishing, inadequate flag State control and enforcement, including MCS measures, 
inadequate regulatory measures, harmful fisheries subsidies and overcapacity. See, 62/177 Resolution 
Adopted by the General Assembly: Sustainable Fisheries, Including Through the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments 2. 
319 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measur s art 25. 
320 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art XVI. It provides that ‘Section A - Subsidies in 
General: 1. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income or 
price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce 
imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the contracting parties in writing of the extent and 
nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected 
product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the 
subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any 
other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party granting 
the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the or contracting party or parties concerned, or with the 
contracting parties, the possibility of limiting the subsidization.’… 
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States blame that there is the workload in notifying all specific subsidies.321 To tackle 
this difficulty, the Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) of the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD) has created a template for notifying subsidies to the 
WTO in order to standardize the format of the notifications from the WTO Members, as 
well as to facilitate the WTO Members in notifying such information to the WTO.322 
But, to enhance transparency and decrease the task of notifying subsidies may create the 
fear of self-incrimination.323 This could be the reason of increasing per cent of members 
who did not make any notification in the past decad.324 Therefore, it is likely that the 
system of subsidy notification needs to be further improved. Thailand, however, has 
submitted notifications under Article 25.12325 and 32.6326 of the SCM Agreement.327 
 
The subsidy programs of fishing industry, for distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) in 
particular, can be used as a tool to eliminate or mitigate the fishers’ tendencies towards 
overexploitation and overcapitalisation in their national waters. Where resource 
managers have faced the problem of gross overexploitation by fleets in national waters, 
it could be less costly for the authorities (both in terms of political and economic 
aspects) to encourage those fleets, through subsidy programs, to operate outside the 
national waters.328 However, it is critical to ensure that such fishing capacity will not 
generate overcapacity problem in the new fishing grounds.  
 
In conclusion, although the effect of subsidies in fisheries can easily be predicted that 
they might lead to higher effort levels and greater d pletion of fish stocks, subsidies 
                                                
321 Michael Thone and Stephan Dobroschke, WTO Subsidy Notifications: Assessing German Subsidies 
under the GSI Notification Template Proposed for the WTO (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 2008) 1. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid 24. 
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in 2001 to 53 per cent in 2011. See, ibid 4.   
325 The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art 25.12. It provides that ‘Each 
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investigations referred to in Article 11 and (b) its domestic procedures governing the initiation and 
conduct of such investigations.’ 
326 The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art 32.6. It provides that ‘Each 
Member shall inform the Committee of any changes in its laws and regulations relevant to this Agreement 
and in the administration of such laws and regulations.’ 
327 The per cent of the WTO members that did not make any notification has increased from 46 per cent in 
2001 to 53 per cent in 2011. See, Thone and Dobroschke, above n 321, 34.   
328 Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 18. 
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may not automatically generate situations of overcapa ity,329 particularly when 
subsidies are properly designed to urge fishers to permanently leave the industry rather 
than to stay and increase the fishing effort. Combining subsidies with taxes could also 
decrease the renewed incentives generated from the common-property characteristic of 
fisheries stocks.330 
 
5.2.10  Subsidies Scheme in Thailand’s Context 
 
Thailand has provided subsidies to marine fisheries sector in several forms, including 
fishing gears supplied, vessel construction assistance, infrastructure provided, price 
supports, subsidized fuel and vessel buyback. But, as he fisheries subsidy in terms of 
buyback programs are already discussed in great detils under Section 4.3.1.1.1 of 
Chapter 4,331 this section will therefore focus on other types of subsidies, particularly 
subsidized fuel, which is also the main fisheries subsidy given by the Thai government. 
 
As the cost of fuel is the substantial component of he operational costs of fishing 
vessels, the fuel crisis happened worldwide since 2001 has caused many Thai fishers to 
stop fishing and lose their subsistence income, particularly small-scale fishers who 
normally have to buy expensive fuel sold in their rural communities.332 They therefore 
sought help from the government. The Thai government by the Department of Fisheries 
has then taken the controversial step333 by establishing the two projects of subsidized 
fuel for fishing vessels, i.e., the Green Fuel Program and the Purple Fuel Program. The 
Green Fuel Program supplied tax free fuel for commercial fishing vessels. There were 
approximately 1,000 fishing vessels participating i this program with over 1,700 
million litres of fuel supplied per year. On the contrary, the Purple Fuel Program 
supplied a special type of fuel (containing lower sulphur dioxide) that is suitable for 
                                                
329 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 195, 20. 
330 Milner-Gulland and Mace, above n 2, 155. 
331 They are buyback programs for the main purpose of push net reduction in Thai fisheries.  
332 The cost of fuel accounts more than 50 per cent of operational cost of small-scale fishing vessels. See, 
Sampan Panjarat, 'Sustainable Fisheries in the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' (Division of Ocean Affair 
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333 Theo Ebbers and Rick Gregory, 'Capacity Development for Improving the Knowledge Base for 
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<http://www.apfic.org/uploads/wfd_124079351849f50185b51a1--capacity.pdf> 42. 
225 
 
vessel engines to small-scale fishing vessels with lower price than market price.334 
Undoubtedly, although this arrangement could lessen th  problem of fuel crisis in 
fisheries, it also raised a question whether this could also be considered as a support to 
maintain the overcapacity problem in Thailand.       
 
To address the fuel issue more environmental friendly and economically, the Thai 
government has conducted a pilot project to promote using sails with fibre-glass vessels 
for small-scale fishing (e.g., gill net fishing) in2007. This project was financially 
supported by the Chaipattana Foundation335 and initially aimed to assist small-scale 
fishers in the Andaman coast of Thailand who have suffered from the fuel crisis and the 
Tsunami attacked in 2004. The project result suggested that using sails for only one way 
of fishing trip could significantly save the cost of fuel for small-scale fishing vessels, 
and then it would be worth investing in long term.336 Based on this successful outcome, 
using sails for small-scale fishing have been promoted along the coasts of Thailand by 
not only government agencies but also the regional fisheries body, i.e., SEAFDEC.337 
The promotion of wind energy to propel small-scale fishing vessels could therefore be 
                                                
334 Panjarat, above n 332, 43. 
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such development work will not repeat the work that s been conducted by government organisations, it 
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337 Under the Project on Responsible Fishing Technologies and Practices (Fishing in harmony with the 
nature), SEAFDEC has conducted activities to promote an alternative of energy sources for coastal 
fisheries in ASEAN countries, in collaboration with applicable SEAFDEC Member Countries. The 
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Use in Fisheries in Southeast Asia', Advance Fisheries Technology (Bangkok), Jan-Apr 2011. 
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an alternative way to provide fishers the subsidy, which is not harmful to environment 
and the state of fishing capacity in Thailand. 
   
In addition to subsidies provided to domestic fisheries, the Thai government has 
provided subsidies for distant water fisheries (i.e., fisheries operated in other State EEZs 
and the high seas) in order to encourage and support fishers to leave domestic fisheries, 
which will consequently alleviate overcapacity problem in Thai waters. To tackle this 
issue more explicitly, the Department of Fisheries has adopted the strategy on 
‘Promotion and Development of Distant Water Fisheries’ under the Master Plan.338 
Under this strategy, a number of projects have been carrying out with objectives, for 
instance, to establish a joint public-private sector c mmittee on distant water fishing 
development;339 to establish distant water fisheries development fu d; to promote and 
support fishing cooperation with foreign countries; to promote and strengthen the sea 
worthiness and fishing capability of Thai distant water fishing operations; and to 
support activities of regional fisheries management organisations and other relevant 
agencies. Importantly, there are the projects concerning the change of using trawl nets 
to alternate fishing gears that are internationally ccepted as less destructive fishing 
gears, such as vertical long lines and traps, as well as converting trawlers to tuna long 
line vessels for high seas fisheries.340 
 
It is clearly seen that Thailand has greatly subsidised marine fisheries sector for a long 
time. However, these establishments, particularly in terms of subsidised fuel and 
buyback programs for push netters, have unlikely tackled overcapacity problem in Thai 
fisheries. More effective approaches, such as a buyback program with appropriate 
design for the nature of Thai fisheries, need to be seriously considered. The projects to 
subsidise distant water fisheries for Thai fishers also need to be supported continuously.            
 
 
 
 
                                                
338 The Master Plan, strategy 5. 
339 The committee will facilitate joint venture negotiation with coastal countries and safeguard Thai 
interest.  
340 The Master Plan, strategy 5, measure 2, project 6-7. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed about incentive adjusting measur s that are significantly 
implemented to control fishing capacity in present fisheries. These measures are 
designed to either generate property rights over fisheries resources for fishers (i.e., 
individual harvest quotas, TURFS, co-management and CBFM) or adjust economic 
incentives in fisheries (i.e., taxes, subsidies). However, it was found that although the 
implementation of these measures results in adjusting incentives of capacity expansion 
of fishers, its effectiveness might vary in different circumstances. For favourable 
outcome in capacity control, the combination of measures might need to be considered. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of particular measure greatly depends upon a number of 
factors, including appropriate legal and institutional environments of given fisheries. In 
case of Thailand, it has implemented incentive adjusting measures (except individual 
harvest quotas) and likely obtained the positive outc me from TURFs, co-management 
and CBFM projects, which aim to provide fishers theproperty rights over fisheries 
resources. Thailand, however, still needs the legislative framework to support such 
implementation, particularly in terms of enforcement at local level, in order to achieve 
the sustainable success on capacity controls. For the implementation of tax and 
subsidies (on fuel in particular), they have unlikely provided any positive effect on 
capacity controls for Thailand.   
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CHAPTER 6 SUPPLEMENTARY MANAGEMENT MEASURES FOR 
FISHING CAPACITY AND IMPLEMENTATION BY THAILAND 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
In addition to the measures for fishing capacity management that can change the 
incentives of fishers, i.e., incentive blocking measures and incentive adjusting measures, 
there are some supplementary measures that can also be applied to control fishing 
capacity in the indirect way. This chapter discusses such some supplementary measures, 
which include ecosystem-based fishery and multispeces fisheries management, and 
closed seasons and closed areas. The implementation of these measures by Thailand is 
analysed as well.    
 
6.2 Supplementary Management Measures 
 
Although some fishery management measures are implemented mainly to conserve 
marine resources and/or marine ecosystem, they additionally provide the effect of 
capacity controls. Such notable measures include ecosystem-based fishery and 
multispecies fisheries management, and closed seasons and closed areas measures. The 
former two measures have been increasingly used in modern fisheries, whereas the 
latter ones have been widely applied worldwide for decades. Details of these measures 
are discussed as follows.    
   
6.2.1 Ecosystem-based Fishery and Multispecies Fisheries Management 
 
Presently, fisheries management has growingly concerned on environment and 
biodiversity as there are progressive evidences of the negative impacts of fishing on not 
only fisheries resources but also marine ecosystems.1 The evolution of ecosystem-
related provisions within the international instruments, particularly the 1982 UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement and the CCRF, has affirmed this trend. The Fish Stocks Agreement 
imposes obligations on member States to safeguard marine environment and 
biodiversity, as well as requires States to implement measures to ensure the 
                                                
1 Michael Sinclair et al, 'Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem' (2002) 58(3) Fisheries Research 
255, 256. 
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sustainability of fish stocks in long term by promoting the optimum use of such fish 
stocks. States are further required to adopt the precautionary approach and take 
necessary measures to conserve or restore other specie  belonging to the same 
ecosystem.2 Similarly, the CCRF urges States to adopt the precautionary approach for 
conservation, exploitation and management of living resources and preserve the aquatic 
environment.3 
 
Concurrently, the management of ecosystem has begun to take social and economic 
aspects into consideration. It is based on the fact tha  humans are accepted as an 
important component of the ecosystem, thus humans’ ba ic requirements (i.e., human 
welfare)4 are unavoidable for sustainability and conservation.5 Ecosystem-based fishery 
and multispecies fisheries management are therefore progressively adopted as fishery 
management tools.6 
 
Ecosystem-based fishery management (EBFM) is introduced as an alternative 
management approach that gives management priorities to rather ecosystem7 than target 
species of fishing.8 EBFM is different from ecosystem-based management (EBM) as 
EBM is applied to manage cross-sectors in a broader context, whereas the EBFM is 
applied to manage more on fishery sector.9 The definition of EBFM varies. The US 
National Research Council defines it as ‘an approach that takes major ecosystem 
                                                
2 Fish Stocks Agreement art 5. 
3 CCRF art 7.5.1. 
4 United Nations Environment Programme, 'Green Economy in a Blue World' (2012) 
<http://www.unep.org/pdf/green_economy_blue.pdf> 23. 
5 FAO, The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries: Issues, Terminology, Principles, Institutional Foundations, 
Implementation and Outlook (Rome, 2003) 48. 
6 At present, EBFM is a common topic in the discussion  on fisheries policy and management. See, 
Richard J Marasco et al, 'Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management: Some Practical Suggestions' (2007) 
64(6) (June) Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 928, 929. 
7 An ecosystem refers to ‘a biological environment comprising all living organisms or biotic components, 
in a certain area, and the nonliving, or abiotic comp nents that living organisms interact with, for 
example, air, soil, water and sunshine.’ See, Neil A Campbell et al, Biology: Concepts & Connections, 
Sixth Edition (Benjamin Cummings, 2009). Technically ecosystem cannot be managed, thus fisheries 
scientists and managers have put the effort to manage fisheries by concerning the importance of 
ecosystem. See, Jason S Link, 'What Does Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management Mean?' (2002) 27(4) 
Fisheries 18. 
8 Ellen K Pikitch et al, 'Ecosystem-based Fishery Management' (2004) 305(5682) Science 346. 
9 Although EBM and EBFM are different, they are complementary. See, Karen L McLeod et al, 
'Scientific Consensus Statement on Marine Ecosystem-Based Management. Signed by 217 academic 
scientists and policy experts with relevant expertis  and publish by the Communication Partnership for 
Science and the Sea' (2005) <http://compassonline.org/?q=EBM> 6. 
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components and services-both structural and functioal-into account in managing 
fisheries... It values habitat, embraces a multispecies perspective, and is committed to 
understanding ecosystem processes’.10 Some scientists, however, define EBFM as 
‘ecosystem-based fishery management recognizes the physical, biological, economic, 
and social interactions among the affected components of the ecosystem and attempts to 
manage fisheries to achieve a stipulated spectrum of social goals, some of which may be 
in competition’.11 This new approach has been developed due to the fact th t the 
traditional management approaches focusing on single species or stocks have often 
failed because of the lack in consideration of other factors that significantly impact 
marine resources,12 such as interactions between species, biomass distribution, the 
modification of structure and/or function of ecosystem, biodiversity, non-target species, 
and gear impacts on habitat.13 On other words, actual populations interact with their 
environment and other species, and therefore may be strongly influences by them. These 
factors can add the complexity and uncertainty to the fisheries management.14 
 
The goals of EBFM are to maintain healthy marine ecosystem by rehabilitating and 
sustaining species populations and biological enviro ment in marine ecosystem with the 
purpose of keeping productivity and biological diversity at a high level,15 at the same 
time, maintain the sustainability of fisheries.16 Reducing excessive levels of bycatch and 
                                                
10 Fisheries National Research Council Committee on Ecosystem Management for Sustainable Marine, 
Sustaining Marine Fisheries (National Academy Press, 1999) 2. However, the term of EBFM did not 
meet with consensus at the FAO Technical Consultation on Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management that 
was organised during 16-19 September 2002 in Reykjavik. It could be because some States perceived 
ecosystem as a new basis of fisheries management. In this sense, the environmental considerations would 
be above the social and economic considerations, which creating questions in terms of equity, political 
and socio-economic costs and the feasibility of imple entation. Thus, the term of ‘Ecosystem Approach 
to Fisheries (EAF)’ was used instead. See, FAO, above n 5, 6. EAF refers to ‘an ecosystem approach to 
fisheries strives to balance diverse societal objectiv s, by taking into account the knowledge and 
uncertainties about biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems and their interactions and 
applying an integrated approach to fisheries within ecologically meaningful boundaries.’ See, FAO, 
Fisheries Management: 2. The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (FAO, 2003) 6. 
11 Marasco et al, above n 6, 930. 
12 Lisa T Ballance and Tara Whitty, 'Ecosystem-Based Management for the Oceans' (2010) 18(5) 
Restoration Ecology 780; Pikitch et al, above n 8. 
13 Link, above n 7, 19; Colin W Clark, 'Fisheries Bioec nomics: Why is It so Widely Misunderstood?' 
(2006) 48(2) Population Ecology 95, 98. 
14 Clark, above n 13, 98. 
15 National Research Council Committee on Ecosystem Management for Sustainable Marine, above n 10, 
2. 
16 Link, above n 7; Pikitch et al, above n 8. 
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discards is a goal of EBFM as well.17 To achieve these goals, the objectives of EBFM 
should be:18 to avoid the deterioration of ecosystem; to reduce the risk of permanent 
damage of natural biological groups of ecosystem; to sustain socioeconomic benefits 
without ruining ecosystem; and to educate people to understand the impacts of human 
actions on ecosystem. Local and traditional knowledge often provide unique 
perspectives used to assess EBFM. Also, legal and political scenarios should be 
considered before implementing EBFM.19 
 
In case the necessary knowledge is inadequate, precautionary fishery management 
measures should be adopted by simply using history and common knowledge.20 For 
instance, precautionary measures can be the implementation of larger closed area and 
the reduction of catch limits,21 which technically control fishing capacity. Some levels 
of precautionary measures are required for EBFM in order to shift the burden of proof. 
In this sense, destructive fishing practices should not be allowed, so that essential 
habitat and other key components of ecosystem will be protected.22 Therefore, ocean 
zoning with spatial and temporal characteristics is an important element of EBFM,23 as 
well as monitoring, research, and modelling are necessary to build successful EBFM.24 
Further, as the complexity and uncertainty limit the extent to which the effects of 
fishing can be understand or predicted, the risk management strategy should be 
                                                
17 At global level, the estimated amount of discards in commercial fisheries is approximately 27.0 million 
tonnes, which is about one-fourth of the world’s marine fish catch. See, Dayton L Alverson, 'Global 
Assessment of Bycatch and Discards: a Summary Overview' in Ellen K Pikitch, Daniel D Huppert and 
Michael P Sissenwine (eds), Global Trends: Fisheries Management (AFS Symposium 20) (American 
Fisheries Society Publication, 1997) 115. 
18 Karen McLeod and Heather Leslie (eds), Ecosystem-Based Management for the Oceans (Island Press, 
2009) 310. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Pikitch et al, above n 8. 
21 Ibid 347. 
22 Keith J Sainsbury et al, 'Experimental Management of an Australian Multispecies Fishery: Examining 
the Possibility of Trawl-Induced Habitat Modification' in Ellen K Pikitch, Daniel D Huppert and Michael 
P Sissenwine (eds), Global Trends: Fisheries Management (AFS Symposium 20) (American Fisheries 
Society Publication, 1997) 107; Callum M Roberts et al, 'Effects of Marine Reserves on Adjacent 
Fisheries' (2001) 294(5548) (30 November) Science (New York, N.Y.) 1920. 
23 Pikitch et al, above n 8; David Witherell, Clarenc Pautzke and David Fluharty, 'An ecosystem-based 
approach for Alaska groundfish fisheries' (2000) 57(3) ICES Journal of Marine Science 771. 
24 Les Kaufman, Leah Bunce Karrer and Charles H Peterson, 'Monitoring and Evaluation' in Karen 
McLeod and Heather Leslie (eds), Ecosystem-based Management for the Oceans (Island Press, 2009) 
115. 
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applied.25 Taking these factors into consideration, a marine protected area (MPA) has 
been suggested as a measure used for required precautionary approach.26 
 
MPAs are areas regulated by zoning system that may include marine reserves and areas 
where a variety of uses are permitted.27 MPAs are a form of time-area closures but 
usually found as year-round closures.28 These marine reserves (e.g., ‘no-take’ areas) are 
expected to help control fishing mortality and then mi imise the uncertainty and the risk 
of fisheries collapse29 by providing safeguard for some or all natural resources within 
the areas.30 Also, banning some mobile gears (e.g., trawl gears) in MPAs may reduce 
the negative impact of these gears on sea-floor habitat and ecosystem.31 In this sense, 
MPAs can also assist in controlling fishing capacity of such fishing gears in concerned 
areas. However, it should be aware that, unless proper controls are also implemented in 
surrounding areas, MPAs may increase or sustain fishery yields and fishing capacity in 
such areas.32 Further, MPAs might not give a desired reference point for resources 
sustainability in some situations, since both fishing and non-fishing areas in the MPAs 
could be deteriorated over a period of time because of factors involved when operating 
at large space.33 More importantly, MPAs should be established with good monitoring 
(before and after establishment, within and outside MPAs) and evaluation procedures to 
                                                
25 Clark, above n 13, 98. 
26 Ibid; Michael P Sissenwine and Pamela M Mace, 'Governance for Responsible Fisheries: An 
Ecosystem Approach' (Paper presented at the Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the 
Marine Ecosystem, Reykjavik, Iceland, 1-4 October 2001) 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/document/reykjavik/pdf/21sissenwine.PDF> 11. 
27 Keith Sainsbury and Ussif R Sumaila, 'Incorporating Ecosystem Objectives into Management of 
Sustainable Marine Fisheries, including 'Best Practice' Reference Points and Use of Marine Protected 
Areas' (Paper presented at the Reykjavik Conference o  Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem, 
Reykjavik, Iceland, 1-4 October 2001) <ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/document/reykjavik/pdf/20Sainsbury.pdf> 3. 
28 Sissenwine and Mace, above n 26, 11. 
29 James A Bohnsack, 'Maintenance and Recovery of Reef Fishery Productivity' in Nicholas V C Polunin 
and Callum M Roberts (eds), Reef Fisheries (Chapman and Hall, 1996) 283. 
30 The South Atlantic Fishery Management Council, Marine Protected Areas 
<http://www.safmc.net/managed-areas/marine-protected-ar as>. 
31 Les Watling and Elliott A Norse, 'Disturbance of the Seabed by Mobile Fishing Gear: A Comparison to 
Forest Clearcutting' (1998) 12(6) Conservation Biology 1180; Henrik Gislason et al, 'Symposium 
Overview: Incorporating Ecosystem Objectives within F sheries Management' (2000) 57(3) ICES Journal 
of Marine Science 468. 
32 MPAs provide the most benefits in terms of species enhancement when adult stage of such species is 
relatively sedentary, while their larvae widely spread. See, Sainsbury and Sumaila, above n 27, 13. 
33 Ibid 11. 
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ensure the achievement of their ecological, economic34 or social objectives.35 As these 
objectives are varying, MPAs, therefore, can be greatly different in terms of type, size 
and shape.36 These objectives, however, need to be identified as early as possible37 and 
truly concern local characteristics.38 Active support and involvement of public and local 
communities are also essential for the success of MPAs,39 particularly in terms of 
enforcement at a local level. 
 
There are many examples of MPAs implementation worldwide. For instance, the South 
Atlantic Fishery Management Council40 has established eight deepwater MPAs in the 
South Atlantic areas under the application of Amendment 14 to the Snapper Grouper 
Fishery Management Plan. These MPAs aim to safeguard some of long-lived snapper 
grouper species living in deepwater, including snowy grouper, blueline tilefish, and 
speckled hind.41 The regulations imposed within these MPAs include: ‘(i) no catching 
or possession of any snapper grouper species; (ii) no use of shark bottom longline gear; 
(iii) vessels (both commercial and recreational types) may transit (direct, non-stop 
progression) through the MPAs with snapper grouper s cies on the vessels with fishing 
gear properly put away; and (iv) trolling for pelagic species, e.g., tuna, mackerel, 
billfish, and dolphin is permitted within the MPAs’.42 
 
                                                
34 For example, economic benefits can be determined from the increase of non-consumptive benefits, e.g.,
‘dolphin watch’ within the areas of MPAs. See, ibid 13. 
35 In reality, many MPAs have been established withou these requirements though. See, ibid. 
36 Nadine Heck, Philip Dearden and Adrian McDonald, 'Stakeholders’ Expectations Towards a Proposed 
Marine Protected Area: A Multi-criteria Analysis ofMPA Performance Criteria' (2011) 54(9) Ocean and 
Coastal Management 687, 687. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ussif R Sumaila et al, 'Addressing Ecosystem Effects of Fishing Using Marine Protected Areas' (2000) 
57(3) ICES Journal of Marine Science 752; Heck, Dearden and McDonald, above n 36, 687. 
40 The South Atlantic Fishery Management Council has the responsibility to conserve and manage fish 
stocks within the federal 200-mile limit of the Atlantic off the coasts of North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia and east Florida to Key West. Under their jur sdiction, MPAs refer to ‘a network of specific are s 
of marine environments reserved and managed for the primary purpose of aiding in the recovery of 
overfished stocks and to ensure the persistence of h althy fish stocks, fisheries, and associated habitats. 
Such areas may include naturally occurring or artificial bottom and water column habitats, and may 
include prohibition of harvest on seasonal or permanent time periods to achieve desired fishery 
conservation and management goals’. See, The South Atlantic Fishery Management Council, About Us 
<http://www.safmc.net/AboutUs/AboutSAFMC/tabid/361/Default.aspx>. 
41 The South Atlantic Fishery Management Council, above n 30. 
42 Ibid. 
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Apart from MPAs that are repeatedly suggested as an effective instrument for 
ecosystem-based fisheries management, other technical tools, such as fish quotas, 
limitations of fishing effort, gear restrictions, closed areas and closed seasons, could 
also be applied to address ecosystem concerns.43 For instance, closed areas could be 
used to safeguard not only spawning areas and juveniles but also benthic habitat.44 On 
the other hand, with some situation that right-based management measures (e.g., ITQs) 
may not be sufficient to address the problem of resource management, the EBFM plan 
could be implemented in order to obtain the better outcome. For example, although 
ITQs was applied on orange roughy fisheries in 1986, their catch continued to decrease 
due to the problems of overfishing, damaged benthic habitat from trawling practices, 
particularly bottom trawlers, and prey unavailability.45 Thus, the EBFM plan, which 
concerns the changes of trophic level, conditions of environment, and ecological 
processes, is needed for managing this stock.46   
 
Although EBFM must manage target species by considering the overall state of 
ecosystem indicators,47 reference points48 and performance measures obtained from 
single species approach are still required49 but will need to be modified in the context of 
ecosystem.50 In fact, the single-species approach implicitly or indirectly incorporate 
some ecosystem features. For example, within single-species assessment models, some 
properties of ecosystems can be captured by letting he weight of species to change 
                                                
43 Sinclair et al, above n 1, 263. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Malcolm Clark, 'Fisheries for Orange Roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus) on Seamounts in New Zealand' 
(1999) 22(6) Oceanologica Acta 593; M R L Jones, 'Historic Trawl Data and Recent Information Infers 
Temporal Change in the Occurrence of Squid in the Diet of Orange Roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus 
Collett) in New Zealand' (2007) 17(2) REVIEWS IN FISH BIOLOGY AND FISHERIES 493. 
46 Marasco et al, above n 6. 
47 Indicator is something that is measured (not necessarily numerically) and used to track an operation 
objective. See, Sainsbury and Sumaila, above n 27, 4. 
48 Reference point is a standard value of an indicator, often in connection to the operational objective, 
e.g., expected targets, undesirable limits or stimulator for specified management reactions. A target 
reference point can be set as an objective for operation. See, ibid. For the development and evaluation of 
precautionary management strategies, limit reference points for biological conservation are the most 
important. See, Andrew A Rosenberg, 'Precautionary Management Reference Points and Management 
Strategies' in FAO (ed), Precautionary Approach to Fisheries. Part 2: Scientific Papers. Prepared for the 
Technical Consultation on the Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries (Including Species 
Introductions). Lysekil, Sweden, 6–13 June 1995, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 350/2 (FAO, 1996) 
210, 130. 
49 More methodologies are available for single species approach and they are usually much cheaper. See, 
Link, above n 7, 19-20. 
50 Pikitch et al, above n 8, 347; Sainsbury and Sumaila, bove n 27, 3. 
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according to age over time and by estimating annual recruitments.51 But, it is essential 
to note that indicators and biological reference points (e.g., MSY) obtained from single-
species based analysis need to be used with careful manner as the sum of MSY of each 
particular species is usually larger than the MSY for the overall system.52 Thus, 
overfishing under the ecosystem plan (or called ecosystem overfishing) possibly exists 
when it might not be considered overfishing in terms of a single-species stock.53 
Accordingly, the reduction of fishing capacity and mortality might still need to be 
considered.54 
 
Clearly, it is challenging to include ecosystem-relat d objectives into fisheries 
management because to identify the influential factors of environment and ecology, 
such as oceanographic and whether conditions, and to understand their processes and 
interactions are not easy.55 Besides, there are a number of issues needed to consider 
when making decisions on management, and evaluating management performance. 
Some practical methods are proposed to address these issues, including methods to 
support: ‘(i) systematic and transparent selection of issues to address fishery 
sustainability in an ecosystem context; (ii) quantit tive risk-based testing and 
identification of appropriate sustainability indicators and performance measures for key 
issues; and (iii) quantitative risk-based testing of the likely performance and level of 
precaution of management strategies in the context of the whole management system.’56 
 
It should be noticed that during the period of changing to EBFM, the management plans 
might be the same as the plans currently used, such as single-species based 
management.57 New management strategies, particularly by using ecosystem models, 
can be later used when a number of relevant models give consistent results and the 
evaluation of new management strategies shows good performance.58 Furthermore, the 
                                                
51 Marasco et al, above n 6, 933; Kerim Y Aydin, 'Age Structure or Functional Response? Reconciling the 
Energetics of Surplus Production Between Single-species Models and ECOSIM' (2004) 26(1) African 
Journal of Marine Science 289. 
52 Link, above n 7, 19-20. 
53 Pikitch et al, above n 8, 347. 
54 Link, above n 7, 20. 
55 Marasco et al, above n 6, 934.  
56 Sainsbury and Sumaila, above n 27, 15. 
57 Marasco et al, above n 6, 934. 
58 Ibid. 
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transition to EBFM needs to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.59 In this sense, 
some serious problems are needed to be timely solved, i.e., overfishing and excess 
capacity. Such evolution should involve three stages, including (i) assessments of the 
state of concerned species and their predators and preys; (ii) evaluation of the 
environmental effects on target species and fishing activities concerned; and (iii) 
integrated assessments of the environment conditions, concerned stock and its predators 
and prey before proper catch limits and other management measures are implemented.60 
In a consequence, multispecies fisheries management approach is developed. This 
new approach will use multispecies models designed by using yield information, and 
structured by merging the effects of ecological process among involved populations.61 
In other words, this approach moves from using models concerning only single species 
to models concerning the overall community, which taking food web into 
consideration.62 
 
There is a number of multispecies models developed in the past years, including 
multispecies production models (MSP),63 multispecies virtual population analysis 
(MSVPA),64 Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE),65 and multispecies bioenergetics models 
(MSBE).66 For example, MSVPA, which has been developed continuously, is an 
approach to measure the level of interactions between predator and prey, and evaluate 
the predation mortality rate for exploited fish stocks, whereas an extended MSVPA 
(MSVPA-X) is an improved version with increased flexibility of model in terms of 
predator-prey interactions due to seasonal dynamics.67 MSVPA-X is also more flexible 
                                                
59 Ibid. 
60 Daniel Goodman et al, 'Scientific Review of the Harvest Strategy Currently Used in the BSAI and 
GOA Groundfish Fishery Management Plans' (North Pacific Fishery Management Council, 21 November 
2002) <ftp://ftp.afsc.noaa.gov/afsc/public../CIE_Rockfish/docs/GoodmanF40Report.pdf>.   
61 Robert J Latour, Mark J Brush and Christopher F Bonzek, 'Toward Ecosystem-Based Fisheries 
Management' (2003) 28(9) Fisheries 10. 
62 Marasco et al, above n 6, 936. 
63 Latour, Brush and Bonzek, above n 61, 11. 
64 Kjartan G Magnússon, 'An Overview of the Multispecies VPA-Theory and Aapplications' (1995) 5(2) 
REVIEWS IN FISH BIOLOGY AND FISHERIES 195; Robert J Magnus and Kjartan G Magnusson, 
'Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions to the Multispecies Virtual Population Analysis Equations' (1987) 
4(3) IMA journal of mathematics applied in medicine and biology 247; Hans Lassen and Paul Medley, 
Virtual Population Analysis - A Practical Manual for Stock Assessment (FAO, 2000) 19. 
65 Latour, Brush and Bonzek, above n 61, 13. 
66 Ibid 14. 
67 Lance P Garrison et al, 'An Expansion of the MSVPA Approach for Quantifying Predator-prey 
Interactions in Exploited Fish Communities' (2010) 67(5) ICES Journal of Marine Science 856. 
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in terms of feeding model. The MSVPA-X model has been applied on the fish 
community in a western Atlantic area, particularly on Atlantic menhaden and its main 
fish predators.68 
 
Some spatial models concerning fish motion and spatial differences in biological 
parameters are also developed. In this matter, a number of methods, i.e., tagging 
techniques, genetic markers, and geographic information systems (GIS), are conducted 
and combined to facilitate spatial based fisheries management.69 However, they are 
rarely used in stock assessments due to their complexity.70  
 
Before using these models to make either quantitative or qualitative management 
predictions, model validation is needed. The results generated by the model must be 
evaluated with independent time series data (such as abundance and biomass), which 
are not applied in model calibration.71 Usually, TACs have been determined by using 
single-species models of population dynamics, which have been criticized that they 
ignore important features of marine ecosystem. Therefore, if provided data is 
available,72 management decisions, particularly in catch limits, should be based on 
multispecies or ecosystem models.73 Nonetheless, it is quite challenging in terms of 
application as existing data is subject to bias and misinterpretation.74 Also, it should be 
aware that such models can account only the factors ncerned by developers. More 
importantly, due to the variation of environmental inf uence on stock recruitment, long-
                                                
68 Ibid. 
69 Marasco et al, above n 6, 931. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Latour, Brush and Bonzek, above n 61. If the model’s predictions are in line with the data, it implies 
that this model is appropriately used. See, Eleanor J Milner-Gulland and Ruth Mace, Conservation of 
Biological Resources (Blackwell Science, 1998) 13. Furthermore, it is now very important to take into 
account burden of proof. The experimental examples of consumption expressed by non-human predators 
suggest the sustainable options better than harvest ates obtained from models that ineffectively explain 
complicated systems. Foe example, MSY rates derived from population dynamic models are often higher 
than the average of experimental examples of consumption rates amongst non-human species. However, 
fishery manager might not be able to wait until receiving perfect data before implementing management 
measures to ensure resources sustainability. Improving required data through researches should therefor  
be emphasised. See, C W Fowler, 'Management of Multi-species Fisheries: from Overfishing to 
Sustainability' (1999) 56(6) ICES Journal of Marine Science 927, 931. 
72 Latour, Brush and Bonzek, above n 61. 
73 Colin W Clark, The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries Economic Models and Human Behavior (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 26. 
74 Fowler, above n 71, 931. 
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term predictions from either single-species or multispecies models are still unstable.75 
Additionally, management will often require commercial fisheries to substantially 
reduce their harvests in order to meet sustainability requirement, which will definitely 
challenge in all institutional, social, economic and political perspectives.76  
 
Some States have adopted the ecosystem-based approach to their national legal 
framework for ocean management. Australia’s Oceans Policy (AOP) is one of the good 
examples. The AOP, which was issued by the Federal Government of Australia in 
December 1998, is an attempt to promote and support an integrated and ecosystem-
based approach for conservation and management of the cean.77 The goals of the AOP 
are ‘to understand and protect Australia’s marine biological diversity, the ocean 
environment and its resources, and ensure ocean uses are ecologically sustainable; to 
promote ecologically sustainable economic development and job creation; to establish 
integrated oceans planning and management arrangemets.’78 An integrated and 
ecosystem-based planning and management for ocean is therefore a key element of the 
AOP. The development of industry sectors with the concern on ecological sustainability 
that conduces to socio-economic welfare has been processed as one of initial actions. In 
terms of fisheries, sustainable fisheries management is a goal, and the measures to 
eliminate excess capacity from fisheries within country are continuously undertaken.79 
In terms of conservation of marine biological diversity, the development of the National 
Representative System of Marine Protected Areas (NRSMPA) is an important activity 
suggested under the AOP.80 Since the AOP and its institutions and implementation 
methods were considered as a new world policy establi hment of this kind, they have 
become a source of information and lessons for other States (e.g., Canada and New 
Zealand) to learn in order to establish their own ocean policies.81 Nonetheless, as similar 
                                                
75 Anne B Hollowed et al, 'Are Multispecies Models anImprovement on Single-species Models for 
Measuring Fishing Impacts on Marine Ecosystems?' (2000) 57(3) ICES Journal of Marine Science 707. 
76 Fowler, above n 71, 932. 
77 Transform Aqorau, 'Obligations to Protect Marine Ecosystems under International Conventions and 
Other Legal Instruments' (Paper presented at the Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the 
Marine Ecosystem, Reykjavik, Iceland, 1-4 October 2001) 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/document/reykjavik/pdf/02Aqorau.pdf> 8. 
78 Australia's Ocean Policy, 4. 
79 Australia's Ocean Policy, 25. 
80 Australia's Ocean Policy, 23. 
81 Joanna Vince, 'Ten Years of Implementing Australia's Oceans Policy: From an Integrated Approach to 
an Environmental Policy Focus' (2008) (159) Maritime Studies 1, 8. 
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as other new policy establishments, the process of AOP development is complex and 
timely. Thus, the prolonged commitment of the government on such policy 
implementation is truly essential. EBFM can be implemented in both developing and 
developed States.82 
 
In summary, the EBFM is increasingly important in present fisheries and its 
development has been made substantially.83 However, there are remained gaps in terms 
of necessary information to support such management due to the complexity and 
uncertainty of ecosystem. This consequently causes difficulties in choosing proper 
indicators and reference points for given ecosystem.84 To conceive the complexity of 
ecological, social and economic environments of concer ed fisheries is therefore the 
key of success, and the additional funding and resources will be needed for relevant 
researches. Clearly, it is difficult to effectively implement EBFM. Also, it is unlikely 
easy to use multispecies models. However, the potential benefits of EBFM including 
fishing capacity controls, particularly when applying MPAs with the combination of 
others tools (e.g., gear restrictions) could be as big as, unless more than, the possible 
consequences of not implementing any measures.85   
 
6.2.2 Ecosystem-based Fishery and Multispecies Fisheries Management in 
Thailand’s Context 
 
According to the dramatic increase of the marine resources abundance in Thai waters 
due to overexploitation by destructive fishing vessel , particularly trawlers and push 
netters, Thailand has imposed a number of Notificatons to demarcate the areas in which 
such fishing vessels are forbidden to operate.86 These zones are the areas covering three 
kilometres or three nautical miles87 from the coastline because these areas are 
considered as nursery grounds for marine resources. Although these regulations have 
rather concerned on marine resources conservation than ecosystem protection, the effect 
                                                
82 Sinclair et al, above n 1, 263. 
83 Chang Ik Zhang et al, 'An Ecosystem-based Fisheries Assessment Approach for Korean Fisheries' 
(2009) 100(1) Fisheries Research 26, 37. 
84 The identification of proper management indicators and reference points for assessment has been 
greatly taken into account by researchers. See, ibid 28.  
85 Pikitch et al, above n 8, 347. 
86 These Notifications are also discussed in Section 4.3.1.1.3 of Chapter 4.  
87 Only Trang, Krabi, Prachuab Kirikhan, Rayong, Narathiwat, Pattani, Satun and Nakhon Si Thammarat 
Provinces have three nautical mile reserve zones. 
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of these enforcements also mitigates the damage on coastal environment, particularly 
the seafloor, by trawlers and push netters. 
 
Later, due to the scientific evidences showing thate nursery grounds of most marine 
species covering the area farer than three kilometres f om the coastline, the Thai 
government has put the effort to expand such restricted area nationwide. It has resulted 
in the establishment of coastal fisheries zone (i.e., ar as within three nautical miles from 
shore line or, if necessary in some areas, within 12 nautical miles from shore line) by 
the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015).88 Fisheries regulations will be particularly imposed 
on this fisheries zone, for example, to specify types, sizes, numbers and components of 
fishing gears that are prohibited to operate in this zone. In this sense, the coastal 
fisheries zone can technically be considered as marine reserves established nationwide.  
 
In terms of applying ecosystem model, Thailand has made an attempt to use it to 
evaluate possible fishery management measures. For instance, under the European 
Union project aimed to evaluate the social cost of fishing, the Department of Fisheries 
used an ecosystem model called the Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE) approach and software 
to compare the fishery status of year 1973, 2005 and predict for year 2010.89 EwE 
consists of three components, i.e., ‘Ecopath - a static, mass-balanced snapshot of the 
system; Ecosim - a time dynamic simulation module for policy exploration; 
and Ecospace - a spatial and temporal dynamic module primarily designed for exploring 
impact and placement of protected areas.’90 Ecosim in particular, incorporates the time 
series data on indices of resource abundance (such as survey data, CPUE data), absolute 
abundance estimates, catch production, effort of fishing vessels, operation rates, and the 
estimates of total mortality. With the analysis by using this data, Ecosim can provide 
policy exploration simulations in four areas of objectives, including: ‘ i) maximize fisheries rent; 
ii) maximize social benefits; iii) maximize mandated rebuilding of species; and iv) maximize 
                                                
88 There are three fisheries zones, i.e., coastal fisheries zone, offshore fisheries zone, and freshwater 
fisheries zone, established under the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015). Details of this establishment are 
discussed under Section 4.3.1.1.3 of Chapter 4.  
89 Data series including time series of CPUE of a number of fish groups and fishing effort of six types of 
fleets (i.e., pair trawlers, otter board trawlers, beam trawlers, push netters, purse seiners and others) from 
the year 1973 to 2005 were used in analysis. See, Mala Supongpan, Ratanawalee Poonsawat and Villy 
Christensen, 'Introducing Ecosystem-based Management in the Gulf of Thailand' (Project No. 003711, 
2005) 2. 
90 Ecopath with Ecosim, About the Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE) Approach (2015) 
<http://www.ecopath.org/about>. 
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ecosystem structure or ‘health’.’ For ecosystem structure optimization in particular, it usually 
suggests the reduction of fishing effort for all main types of fishing vessels that target concerned 
species. Thus, the estimates of time-series number of concerned fishing vessels that are 
beneficial the most to ecosystem structure would help in managing fishing effort or fishing 
capacity.91 However, there was no clear evidence showing that the results obtained from the 
analysis have been significantly used in fisheries management of Thailand. The complexity of 
fisheries ecosystem of Thailand could probably be an obstacle in application. 
 
6.2.3 Closed Seasons and Closed Areas 
 
Closed seasons and closed areas are the management measures widely used for the 
purpose of biological conservation on marine resources. They, however, can also be 
applied to restrict fishing mortality on a stock.92 
 
For closed seasons, there are two effective methods to implement this scheme. The first 
method, which is more popular, is to ban fishing activities during particular periods of 
the year in order to protect particular life history stages of a stock (e.g., juveniles or 
small fish) or during spawning season.93 Nonetheless, using this measure alone as a 
main measure to control fishing capacity could be a problem. It is because the catch rate 
is expected to be very high outside the closed seasons, and this economic incentive will 
encourage fishers to increase fishing capacity in the fisheries for the most benefits.94 
The second method is to implement closed seasons based on the effect from fishing. For 
example, the fishing season will be closed when the catch rate decreases to a certain 
level.95 This method, however, truly relies on the direct relationship between CPUE and 
stock abundance, so that it is not suitable for fisheries stocks that don’t have such a 
strong relationship.96 Furthermore, similar to the first method, this type of closed 
seasons tends to cause overcapitalization as fishers tempt to heavily invest at the 
beginning of the fishing season in order to get the most shares of the resources before 
                                                
91 Ibid. 
92 John R Beddington and R Bruce Rettig, Approaches to the Regulation of Fishing Effort (FAO, 1984) 
11. 
93 Steve Cunningham and Dominique Greboval, Managing Fishing Capacity: A Review of Policy and 
Technical Issues (FAO, 2001) 38. 
94 Beddington and Rettig, above n 92, 11. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
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the fishing season is closed.97 The typical consequence is that the length of the fishing 
season declines over time. Thus, unless the effective measures for capacity controls are 
concurrently implemented, the period of closed season for building the stock size could 
become longer.98 Additionally, the issue of discontinuities of fish upply for the market 
should not be neglected when applying close season measure.99   
 
Closed seasons are widely implemented on several species in the United States. For 
example, the commercial fishing for gray triggerfish n areas of North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia and Florida States is closed during 7 July to 31 December 2013,100 
whereas the commercial fishing for spiny lobster is prohibited during 4 January to 8 
May in the areas of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida States.101 In 
some countries, however, fishing season is differently applied on the basis of sexuality 
of species. For instance, in Tasmania, Australia, the fishing season for male giant crabs 
is opened throughout 2013, while the fishing season for female giant crabs is opened 
only from 15 November 2012 to 31 May 2013.102   
 
Similarly, closed areas are used to control fishing mortality of certain life history stages 
of species by, instead of setting closed periods, allocating a particular location as a 
closed area for fishing to shelter them.103 In some cases, having protected areas is 
greatly useful in terms of protecting the portions of spawning stocks. However, to 
protect particular life history stages of species could result in the increased fishing effort 
on other age groups of species.104 Therefore, closed areas should not be singly 
implemented to regulate fishing capacity.105 
 
                                                
97 Ibid 12. 
98 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 93, 38. 
99 Beddington and Rettig, above n 92, 11. 
100 South Atlantic Fishery Management Council, South Atlantic Snapper Grouper Complex Commercial 
Regulations (22 July) <http://www.safmc.net/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=iDSeeRPraZk%3d&tabid=248>. 
101 Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Commercial Fishing Regulations for Gulf of Mexico 
Federal Waters (20 May 2013) 
<http://www.gulfcouncil.org/Beta/GMFMCWeb/downloads/Commercial%20Brochure%202013.pdf>. 
102 Parks Department of Primary Industries, Water and E vironment, Commercial Fishing Seasons (1 
August) <http://www.dpiw.tas.gov.au/inter/nsf/WebPages/HMUY-5V26QL?open>. 
103 Beddington and Rettig, above n 92, 12. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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A particular application of closed areas called ‘Coastal Belt’ has been adopted by a 
number of developing States. It aims to protect artis nal or small scale fishers from 
competition in fishing with more efficient vessels, uch as trawlers, by allocating 
particular coastal areas exclusively for these fisher . Strong MCS, however, will be 
required in order to reach the goal.106 Another popular kind of closed areas is a marine 
reserve. It is often used when alternative management measures are difficult to be 
implemented. It is also aimed to conserve part of fishery stock. The effect of a closed  
area on fishing capacity is similar to a closed season.107 
 
Many States have implemented closed areas as a fishery management tool. For instance, 
the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council of the Unites States has implemented 
marine sanctuaries and area closures for all fishing along the west-central coast of 
Florida from 1 November to 30 April. Such areas are located in federal waters, which 
begin three to nine nautical miles offshore to 200 nautical mile limit of the Gulf of 
Mexico.108  
 
Another example is closed areas implemented in New England waters, i.e., three large 
areas on Georges Bank and in Southern New England (17,000 square kilometres in 
total), which are important for groundfish spawning and juvenile production. After five 
consecutive year closure of these areas to any gears used to catch groundfish (e.g., 
trawls, gill nets, hook fishing) the result showed the significant decrease of fishing 
mortality of depleted groundfish stocks.109 
 
In sum, although closed seasons and closed areas, by themselves, are generally 
implemented for the main purpose of marine resources conservation and  do not provide 
the substantial benefits in controlling capacity,110 these measures can be implemented as 
supportive measures with other fishing capacity controls. Alternatively, they can be 
                                                
106 Ibid. 
107 Cunningham and Greboval, above n 93, 38-9. 
108 Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, above n 101. 
109 Steven A Murawski et al, 'Large-scale Closed Areas as a Fishery-management Tool in Temperate 
Marine Systems: The Georges Bank Experience' (2000) 66(3) Bulletin of marine science 775. 
110 Dominique Greboval and Gordon Munro, 'Overcapitalization and Excess Capacity in World Fisheries: 
Underlying Economics and Methods of Control' in Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing 
Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts and Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 386 
(FAO, 1999) 206, 35. 
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applied as an initial measure for fisheries management since they are relatively easy to 
enforce, particularly for where suggested measures (e.g., right-based measures) are 
difficult to use. Indian government, for example, has increasingly used time-zoning for 
capture fisheries as other measures are unlikely practical.111 The results, particularly at 
Tamil Nadu, showed the success.112 
 
6.2.4 Closed Seasons and Closed Areas in Thailand’s Context 
 
Thailand has implemented closed seasons and closed areas of fisheries for decades. 
There are two significant areas seasonally closed in Thai waters, i.e., some certain area 
of Prachuab Kirikhan, Chumphon and Surat Thani Provinces (along the Gulf of 
Thailand) with the total area of 26,400 square kilometres (Figure 6.1)113 and some 
certain area of Krabi, Pang-nga, Phuket and Trang Provinces (along the Andaman Sea) 
with a total area of 4,696 square kilometres (Figure 6.2).114 The former area is closed 
during 15 February to 15 May,115 whereas the latter area is closed during 1 April to 1 
June of every year.116 These two closures have the same main objective that to protect 
                                                
111 Maarten Bavinck et al, 'Time-zoning for the Safe-guarding of Capture Fisheries: A Closed Season in 
Tamil Nadu, India' (2008) 32(3) Marine Policy 369, 369. 
112 Ibid 377. 
113 '	
 3  

 [Close the Gulf of Thailand for 3 Months for Fish Enha cement]', Daily 
News (Bangkok, Thailand), 15 March 2013 <http://www.dailynews.co.th/agriculture/184633>. 
114 Deapartment of Fisheries, ก   	!"# #$%"ก 2 	 31 !! !
 ก&'!
!ก 3 
 [The measure of closed area of the Andaman Sea increased more than a double of marine resources, 
the Department of Fisheries will close the area again on 31 March for 3 months] (22 March 2011) 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/secretary/pr_old/news_detail.php?news_id=264>. 
115 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Prohibition of certain kinds of fishing 
appliances in spawning and breeding seasons in some localities of Prachuab Kirikhan, Chumphon and 
Surat Thani Provinces, given on 24 January B.E. 2550 (2007). It states that ‘...Clause 2. Spawning and 
breeding seasons shall begin from 15 February to 15 May of every year. Clause 3. During the specified 
period under clause 2, no person shall use fishing appliances as follows: (1) Every kind of trawls used 
with motor vessels except trawls used with only onemotor vessel of which the length is not more than 16 
meters and fishing only on night time (during sunset and sunrise); (2) Gill Nets and Entangling Nets used 
with a motor vessel in fishing by method of entangling for catching mackerel or by other similar method; 
(3) Every kind of gill nets used with motored vessel  xcept with longtail motored vessels...; (4) Every 
kind of surrounding nets used with motored vessels; (5) Falling Nets or lift nets used with an electrici y 
generator (or dynamo) in fishing of anchovies; (6) Push nets used with a motor vessel of more than 14 
meters in length...’.    
116 Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Prohibition of certain kinds of fishing 
appliance in spawning and breeding seasons in some l calities of Phuket, Phang-nga, Krabi and Trang 
Provinces during specified period, given on 24 October B.E. 2551 (2008). It states that ‘…Clause 2. 
Spawning and breeding seasons (conservation season of y ung fish) shall begin from 1 April to 30 June 
of every year. Clause 3. During the specified period under clause 2, no person shall use fishing 
appliances, i.e., all kinds and all sized of trawls used with a motored vessel, surrounding nets and gill nets 
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the resource stocks from being caught, particularly the stocks of Indo-Pacific mackerels 
that have spawning and breeding seasons in these particular areas and periods. In the 
attempt to better protect these spawning areas, fishers in adjacent areas of the closed 
areas (e.g., fishers in Satun Province, which is connected to Trang Province)117 are also 
encouraged to stop fishing during the indicated periods. 
 
                  
Figure 6.1: Marine territory of the closed area in Prachuab Kirikhan, Chumphon and 
Surat Thani Provinces 
Source of map: Nopparat Nasuchon, The Challenge of Fisheries Management in Thailand, 
a Case Study of Closed Areas and Season in Prachub K irikhan, Chumphon and Surat 
Thani Provinces (2013) <https://www.idmarch.org/document/Anti-aircraft+warfare/n3ad-
show/The+Challenge+of+Fisheries+Management+in+Thailand%2C+a+Case+Study+of+Cl
                                                                                                                                    
and entangling nets, of which their meshes are smaller than 4.7 centimeters in width, in fishing in some 
areas of Phuket, Phang-nga, Krabi and Trang Provinces...’  
117 ASTV Manager Online, '&'($)&*$'	&'+($' ') .
.-%.
. ! [Satun Fisheries Officers Suggest 
Fishers to Stop Fishing during Spawning Season fromApril to Jun]', Manager Online (Bangkok, Thailand), 
17 February 2012 <http://www.manager.co.th/Local/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9550000022223>. 
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osed+Areas+and+Season+in+Prachub+Khirikhan%2C+Chumpon+and+Surat+Thani+Pro
vinces+BY>. 
 
             
Figure 6.2: Marine territory of the closed area in the Andaman Sea 
Source of map: Sampan Panjarat, Sustainable Fisheries in the Andaman Sea Coast of 
Thailand (2008) <http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows 
_pages/fellows_papers/panjarat_0708_thailand_PPT.pdf>. 
 
After implementing these closures, the results clearly show the positive impact on both 
marine stocks abundance and fishers’ income. Marine stocks in the Gulf of Thailand are 
significantly enhanced during closed season (2.33 times) and after closed season (1.98 
times). For the Andaman Sea, the catch value increases 40 per cent at the end of closed 
season118 and the CPUE increases to the level of 300-400 kilogram/hour.119 Based on 
                                                
118 Naew Na, '‘ก&'’ ).'#$ 	
- %"/	 ($0ก1 300 $1	 [Department of Fisheries 
stated that closing the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea resulted in the double of marine resources 
valued almost THB300 Million]', 27 July 2012 <http://www.naewna.com/local/15797>. 
119 Department of Fisheries, ก&'*&' 0&' .	)	''	
 ( ก '2342(	
ก 
[Department of Fisheries Cooperate with Fishers and Fisheries Associations in Preparing the Approach 
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the prolonged benefits of these closures, another closed area in the Gulf of Thailand has 
been recently established in 2014. This new closed ar a is part of the inner Gulf of 
Thailand located in seven provinces (i.e., Samut Sakhon, Samut Songkhram, Samut 
Prakan, Phetchaburi, Chonburi, Chachoengsao, and Prachuab Kirikhan) with a total area 
of 4,900 square kilometres (Figure 6.3). This closure is annu lly applied during 1 June 
to 31 July and aims for marine stock reservation as this area is an important nursery 
ground for juveniles of Indo-Pacific mackerels.120 
 
                      
Figure 6.3: Marine territory of the closed area in the inner Gulf of Thailand 
Source of map: Department of Fisheries, The Closed Area in the Inner Gulf of 
Thailand (18 July 2013) http://www.fisheries.go.th/mf-umdec/. 
                                                                                                                                    
to Close the Inner Gulf of Thailand for Marine Resources Rehabilitation] (8 March) 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/secretary/pr_old/news_detail.php?news_id=258>. 
120 Upper Gulf Marine Fisheries Research and Development C nter, 05')	'กก61%7
	
 ( ก) [Background of Marine Resources Conservation in the Ar a of the Inner Gulf of 
Thailand] <http://www.fisheries.go.th/mf-umdec/>. 
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But, the benefit of closed seasons and closed areasin terms of fishing capacity reduction 
is relatively small. It is because in reality fishing vessels do not stop operating during 
closed seasons, but move to operate in other fishing grounds outside the closed areas. 
For example, fishing vessels that normally operate in the Gulf of Thailand mostly move 
to fish in the Andaman Sea during closed season of the Gulf. These vessels therefore 
increase the capacity allocated in the Andaman Sea during such period and worsen the 
problem of overfishing in that area. As soon as the Gulf is opened, they move back to 
race for fish in their usual fishing grounds. The problem of overcapitalization has 
therefore remained. To address this issue more effectively, Thailand should consider 
issuing fishing licenses that subjecting to not only fishing gears but also fishing areas 
(e.g., based on provincial area). 
 
Apart from the closures mentioned above, coastal fisheries zone recently established by 
the new Fisheries Act could be considered as closed ar as or ‘Costal Belt’ along the 
entire coasts of Thailand. Supplementary regulations e forced within this zone are still 
needed to issue though. 
 
Similar to other management measures implemented in Thailand, the MCS is a 
fundamental factor for the success of closed seasons and closed areas. To strengthen 
MCS in marine fisheries, the Master Plan has also adopted the project to improve the 
effectiveness of MCS by installation the VMS on commercial fishing vessels operating 
in Thai waters.121 Furthermore, as the community-based fisheries management is 
progressively adopted in Thai fisheries, the cooperation between fisheries communities 
and government officers, particularly in terms of MCS, is increased. The raised number 
of prosecution during closed seasons suggests better surveillance due to such increased 
cooperation. This also strengthens the awareness on marine resource reservation of 
fishers in the communities.122 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented some management measures, i.e., ecosystem-based fishery and  
                                                
121 The Master Plan, strategy 3, measure 2, project 6. 
122 Naew Na, above n 118. 
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multispecies fisheries management, closed seasons and closed areas, which can be used 
as supplementary measures for fishing capacity controls. Generally, the main purposes 
of these measures are for marine resources conservation or rehabilitation, and they are 
implemented on the basis of zone establishment. These measures unlikely provide 
substantial benefits on fishing capacity reduction. Nonetheless, as these measures 
appear not to be complicated to implement (e.g., MPAs, time-area closure) they are 
often suggested to be initial measures for fisheries management, particularly when more 
complicated measures (e.g., right-based management asures) are not feasible. Thus, 
despite the fact that Thailand has adopted these measur s, particularly closed seasons 
and closed areas, for a long time and unlikely obtained the explicit benefits in terms of 
capacity reduction, they remain useful in Thai fisheries context (i.e., multi-gear, multi-
species fisheries). These measures should therefore be promoted to implement in wider 
areas of Thai waters, but probably with a better design. However, as similar as most of 
management measures, the effective MCS is a critical factor for the success of the 
implementation of these measures. 
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CHAPTER 7 LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND POLICY 
OPTIONS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE FISHING CAPACITY MANAGEM ENT          
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Taking all the findings in previous chapters into consideration, particularly the criteria 
analysed in Chapter 3 and discussions in Chapters 4-6, this chapter identifies the gaps 
and challenges in the legal and institutional framework to manage fishing capacity in 
Thailand. This chapter subsequently proposes options a d recommendations for 
Thailand to effectively manage fishing capacity in order to ensure sustainable fisheries 
within and beyond its EEZ. The options concern legal, policy, institutional and 
management tools. 
 
7.2 Gaps and Challenges in Managing Fishing Capacity in Thailand 
 
According to the discussions in earlier chapters, it is clearly seen that Thailand has 
confronted the severe problem of overcapacity in marine fisheries and greatly attempted 
to address the problem, but it is unlikely that their effort made the desirable outcome as 
such problem still exists. Gaps and challenges of Thailand in managing fishing capacity 
are examined based on the findings, particularly the criteria for fishing capacity 
management derived in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3.1 These gaps and challenges are 
identified as follows:-   
 
 
                                                
1 Details of criteria are presented in Table 3.1 under Chapter 3. A series of actions for States to take in 
order to sustainably  manage their fishing capacity are concluded as the following: 
‘1. States should determine their current fishing capacity by implementing systematic measurement plan
in their national policy framework; 
2. States should assess the level of their fishing capacity whether there is excess capacity and/or 
overcapacity problem, as well as examine the factors c ntributing to it;  
3. Where excess capacity and/or overcapacity exist, States should immediately address the problem by 
implementing proper management tools; 
4. Where overcapacity issues have not yet arisen, precautionary management tools should be 
implemented in order to prevent their occurrence. States should develop national plans of action for 
fishing capacity management; and 
5. State should participate in relevant international agreements and cooperate with other States throug  
regional fisheries management organisations or arrangements to address overcapacity problems.’ 
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7.2.1 Outdated, Impractical and Inadequate Legal and Policy 
Arrangements Supporting the Management of Fishing Capacity 
 
According to the criteria and series of actions for fishing capacity management that 
States should determine their current fishing capacity, assess such level of capacity 
whether excess capacity and/or overcapacity exists, and address it accordingly, States, 
therefore, must have appropriate legal and policy framework that adequately supports 
such actions.  
 
However, based on the analysis in previous chapters, it clearly shows that the legal 
framework for fishing capacity management in Thailand is insufficient, inefficient and 
fragmented. It is mainly because the national legisation, particularly the principle 
fisheries law and supporting laws and regulations, are outdated for present fisheries of 
Thailand. Before the enactment of the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) in January 2015, 
Thailand had only one principal fisheries law, which is the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 
(1947) promulgated more than 65 years ago with the main purposes of collecting 
fisheries taxes and managing freshwater fisheries. Its provisions do not significantly 
concern on fishing capacity management as either ovcapacity or overfishing was not 
an issue of Thai fisheries (or even world fisheries) during that time. Thus, provisions 
supporting the implementation of capacity controls are not adequately provided. 
Although this Act empowers the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives or the 
Provincial Governor to govern fisheries activities (e.g., through the Ministerial 
Regulations, the Departmental Regulations), which to some extent is believed adequate 
to manage the current fisheries situation in Thailand. But, in reality there are loopholes 
in many aspects. 
  
Due to the inadequacy of necessary fishery policy, there is a lack of systematically 
determination of fishing capacity of Thai fisheries within and beyond the areas of 
national jurisdiction. Even though Thailand has attempted to measure input-based 
capacity (i.e., the number of fishing vessels and fishing gears) through the projects 
under the Master Plan, the measurement does not cover all existing fishing vessels and 
fishing gears due to a number of difficulties. For instance, small-scale fishing vessels, 
which are majority of Thai fishing vessels, disperse widely in fishing villages along the 
coastal areas of the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, and thus it is difficult to 
252 
 
obtain the accurate number of these vessels. Furthermor , based on the provision within 
the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) those small-scale fishing vessels, which are non-
powered and smaller than six GT, are not obliged to register, so that a numerous number 
of them is omitted from national fisheries statistic . Furthermore, under this Act all 
types of fishing gears are categorized into two groups, i.e., (i) license fishing 
implement: fishing gears of this group are specified in the ministerial Regulation. They 
are legally required to register and pay endorsement fe  upon registration; and (ii) non-
license fishing implement: all fishing gears that are not fallen into the first group belong 
to this group and are not required to register. Fisher  can use these gears without the 
fishing license. Thus, fishing gears in the second group are not included in the official 
records of fishing gears currently used in Thailand.  Moreover, the majority of fishing 
vessels that operate outside Thai waters are under fishing arrangements between private 
sectors of concerned countries, which are difficult to be monitored by the Department of 
Fisheries. Clearly, these loopholes should be addressed by making legal requirement for 
all types of fishing vessels and fishing gears to be registered or recorded systematically 
with reasonable endorsement fee, both those operating in national waters and overseas.  
 
In terms of co-management and community-based fisheries management systems, there 
are several national laws facilitating the implementation of these systems in Thai 
fisheries. The principle legislation was the formal 1997 Constitution, which aimed ‘to 
promote the participation of people in the governance under democratic system at local 
and national level.’ The Constitution granted local people the right to establish their 
own self-government, and the local government organisations could issue policies for 
their governance, administration, personnel administrat on, and finance. A number of 
laws were enacted to support and harmonise the Constitution, particularly in terms of 
decentralization.2 The National Economic and Social Development Plans further 
support the concept and the implementation of CBFM scheme.3 Nonetheless, the 
outcomes of pilot projects conducted by the Department of Fisheries4 demonstrated the 
                                                
2 They are including Determining Plans and Process of Decentralization Act of 1999, and Local 
Government Personnel Management of 1999, Pattaya Administration Act of 1999, Subscription for 
Proposal of Local Ordinance Act of 1999, Voting forthe Removal from Office of Local Executives and 
Members of Assembly of 1999, and Election of Member of Local Assembly and Local Executives Act of 
2002. 
3 Thai government firstly included CBFM in the Eight National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1997-2001). 
4 Details of pilot projects are discussed under Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. 
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inadequacy of legal arrangements and administrative supports to facilitate the co-
management and CBFM systems in Thailand. For example, in terms of legal 
enforcement, fishers or fisheries communities are not granted a legitimate power to 
protect their coastal areas from the intruders.5 Some national laws have still reflected the 
centred approach to resource management and the resricted property rights, which have 
constrained people to involve in the community-based ystems. Especially, the outdated 
Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) did not provide any provisions concerning either co-
management or fishing right based concepts. It could be because these concepts did not 
exist during such period. This Act granted only the right to persons to fish in concession 
and reserved fisheries, which can be viewed as individual fishing right. Besides, none of 
the recognition of fisher groups or fisheries communities was prescribed under this Act. 
Moreover, there was none of legislative arrangement on fisheries organisations or 
fisheries cooperatives. Although Provincial Administration Organisation and Tambol 
Administrative Organisation have been later established and played the leading role in 
developing and managing the projects and activities at local levels, they, especially 
during the initial stage of these organisations’ establishment, put the priority concerns 
on the capacity of infrastructure within their responsible areas rather than the activities 
of fisheries management. Thus, it is essential that t e laws that recognise the fishing 
rights and promote the CBFM for local fishers, fisheries communities and fisheries 
organisations are truly required. The mechanisms for these people to participate to the 
systems and for the systems to sustain are also needed under the new laws. Unless these 
issues are addressed properly, the CBFM system cannot provide the ultimate outcome in 
terms of fishing capacity controls for Thai fisheries. 
 
The Master Plan for Marine Fisheries of Thailand which supports the issues of new laws 
and regulations that harmonising the new Fisheries Act, has become the important 
policy arrangement for capacity reduction in Thai fisheries. Under the five strategies of 
the Master Plan,6 fisheries projects have been designed to support the objectives of each 
                                                
5 Details concerning this issue are already presented under Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5.  
6 The Master Plan formulates five strategies to address components in marine fisheries management, i.e., 
‘(i) effectively improving the system of marine fisheries management and the co-management; (ii) 
strengthening structure and capability of fisheries organisations; (iii) developing and promoting 
responsible and sustainable utilisation of marine fsheries resources; (iv) rehabilitating marine ecosystem 
and fishing grounds in order to safeguard biodiversty and marine environmental quality; and (v) 
promoting and developing distant water fisheries.’ Details of strategies concerning fishing capacity 
management are already discussed in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2. 
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strategy. The capacity reduction-related issues, such as improved fishing gear 
registration, fishing capacity for sustainable fisheries, trawlers and push netters 
reduction and the development of alternative employment opportunities for fisheries 
stakeholders are clearly stated under the first stra egy of the Master Plan. However, no 
explicit reference point of capacity reduction has been set as an objective within the 
Master Plan. Thailand has conducted neither the detrmination of national fishing 
capacity nor the development of the reference point set for the capacity control. 
Therefore, Thailand needs to adopt the national agenda on the fishing capacity 
determination and reduction, particularly of marine fisheries. The National Plan of 
Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity of Thailand (Thailand NPOA-Capacity) 
must be developed accordingly. 
 
In terms of law enforcement, difficulties are regularly found due to the fact that the 
relevant legislation is impractical or unclear for fisheries enforcement in some 
circumstances. A significant issue is that any cases of fisheries law violation must be 
submitted to the civil court of competent province within 48 hours, which is quite a 
short period. It means that the suspension of fishing operation during the court’s 
prosecution is also short, and thus the fishers and fishing vessels can return to operate 
quickly. Furthermore, the sea boundary of provinces in Thailand is not all clear as only 
some provinces have the explicit line of provincial boundary in the sea. When the law 
violation is happened at sea, it causes uncertainty for the officers to decide about which 
provincial court is responsible for such case. Besid s, when the case of violation is 
prosecuted at the Court, the fishing gear and the fishing vessel involved are separately 
investigated based on a Thai law. Based on Section 33 of the Criminal Code of Thailand 
states that: 
‘For the forfeiture of a property, the Court shall, besides having the 
power of forfeit under the law as specially provided for that purpose, 
have the power to forfeit the following properties al o, namely: 
(i) A property used or possessed for use in the commission of an offence 
by a person; or 
(ii) A property acquired by a person through the commission of an 
offence. 
Unless such property belongs to the other person who does not connive 
at the commission of the offence.’ 
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The fishers, therefore, take advantage of this looph le by renting a fishing vessel from 
the owner, as when they violate the fisheries law, the Court cannot forfeit the fishing 
vessel. Such fishing vessel can continue operating in the sea. 
 
Additionally, as discussed earlier under Section 5.2.4 of Chapter 5 (TURFs section), the 
enactment of the 1997 Constitution has greatly given the decentralized power to local 
sector of Thai society. New laws and law amendments have been promulgated to 
support and harmonize the Constitution. At local level, people are urged to take part in 
the governance or establish self-government. Also, the CBFM was firstly included in 
the Eight National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001). This National 
Plan has given the guidelines for fishery policy establishment later conducted.7 But, it is 
important to note that the Constitution and relevant fisheries regulations do not grant 
any management and/or enforcement authority within eir coastal areas to fisheries 
communities (e.g., legitimate power to detain violat rs). This constraint can induce the 
difficulties in CBFM implementation.8 
 
7.2.2 Lack of Proper Technical Support in Setting Reference Points 
 
Apart from difficulties in determining the present fishing capacity, there are also 
obstacles for Thailand to obtain the accurate reference point, i.e., biological reference 
point, used to assess the fishing capacity level whether it is at the state of excess 
capacity and/or overcapacity. 
 
Although some qualitative indicators for overcapacity have been clearly detected in 
Thai fisheries,9 an explicit biological reference point (i.e., MSY) is still required to 
enable decision makers to develop appropriate harvest strategies to ensure sustainability 
of fishing activities and fishery resources. But, due to the nature of tropical fisheries of 
Thailand, which has multi-gear and multi-species characteristics to conduct scientific 
researches in order to obtain accurate data and information required for MSY analysis is 
                                                
7 Donna J Nickerson (ed), Community-based Fisheries Management in Phang-nga Bay, Thailand. 
Proceedings of the National Workshop on Community-based Fisheries Management Organized by the 
Department of Fisheries of Thailand, FAO and the Bay of Bengal Programme, Phuket, Thailand, 14-16 
February 1996 (FAO, 1998) 3. 
8 The new Fisheries Act has attempted to address thi issue by empowering fisheries communities in 
governing fisheries management in their areas.  
9 Details can be viewed in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1. 
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not easy to achieve. For example, same species may be caught across fishing gears or 
some species may be targeted at multiple life history stages by different fishing gears 
(e.g., juvenile shrimps are targeted inshore by push netters, whereas the adult shrimps 
are targeted offshore by trawlers). This nature of fisheries limits the efficiency in 
collecting comprehensive fisheries data, especially fishing effort, catch landings and 
catch composition that are essential in MSY analysis. Therefore, technical and financial 
supports are truly required for effective analysis of MSY. The public costs from 
conducting data collection and researches could raise a question of worthiness, 
particularly in developing countries, which having limited budget like Thailand.  
 
In addition, the models for analysing MSY have been criticized against as they likely 
have limited application on multi-species fisheries of tropical or subtropical areas. It 
could be due to the fact that such models have beenorigi ally developed by concerning 
temperate stocks, which are much less complicated in nature than the tropical or 
subtropical stocks.10 Besides, stock assessments basically depend on assumptions and 
subjective decisions, thus the result may vary depending upon which stock assessment 
model is applied, as well as the accuracy and completely of information gathered.11 
Uncertainty could also be underestimated if the only model is used.12 
 
However, similar to other tropical countries, Thailand has made a number of attempts to 
carry out researches aimed for obtaining initial MSY of important economic species.13 
But, it is unlikely that such MSY(s) has been used as a biological reference point for 
fisheries management since it is problematic in practice due to open access system of 
multi-gear and multi-species fisheries of Thailand.14 For instance, fishing vessels 
equipped with less selective fishing gears (e.g., trawlers and push nets) basically catch 
numerous species15 at different sizes, thus it could be problematic to limit the catch 
amount of each species (of particular size) as at its different sustainable level. Further, 
                                                
10 Robert S Pomeroy and Meryl J Williams, Fisheries Co-Management and Small-scale Fisheries: A 
Policy Brief (ICLARM, 1994) 3. 
11 For example, the MSY in the Gulf of Thailand analysed with the historical catch data up to 1995 by 
using the estimation of the Gordon - Schaefer Model and Fox Model were different. See, FAO, 'Report of 
the National Seminar on the Reduction and Management of Commercial Fishing Capacity in Thailand. 
Cha-Am, Thailand, 11-14 May 2004.' (FIP/FCR13, FAO, 2005) 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/j6419e/j6419e00.htm> 39. 
12 Timothy E Essington, 'The Precautionary Approach in F sheries Management: the Devil is in the 
Details' (2001) 16(3) Trends in Ecology & Evolution 121. 
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unacceptable level of discards might be made by fishers in order to meet the allowable 
catch. Nonetheless, to apply the MSY (or MEY) of overall stock to the fishery by 
optimizing the MSY (or MEY) across all key species n the same group (e.g., demersal 
fish) could be done. But, adjusting such MSY (or MEY) to favour all important species 
is very challenging and must be carried out with care and expertise.  
 
To address this issue, using procedures of direct data-based assessment could be more 
adaptable than using indirect methods that more depend on complicated mathematic 
models.16 To properly manage the stocks (and the fishing capa ity concerned) by taking 
into account the limitations of the fishery science, particularly in terms of fishery stock 
analysis or models, are also necessary.17   
 
7.2.3 Inadequacy of Effective Measures Used to Manage Fishing Capacity 
 
As heavily discussed in Chapter 4 (incentive blocking measures), Chapter 5 (incentive 
adjusting measures) and Chapter 6 (supplementary management measures), Thailand 
has already implemented various types of measures that either directly or indirectly 
manage fishing capacity. Most of these measures however emphasise on the purpose of 
rather marine resources conservation than fishing capa ity controls. For example, 
                                                                                                                                    
13 The most recent attempts to estimate the MSY of important economical species in Thai waters were 
conducted in 2007. See, Amnuay Kongprom et al, Stock Assessment of Purple-Spotted Bigeye 
(Priacanthus tayenus Richardson, 1846) in the Gulf of Thailand (the Department of Fisheries, 2010); 
Sonthaya Boonsuk et al, 'Stock Assessment of Round Sca Decapterus maruadsi (Temminck & Schlegel, 
1843) along the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' (Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 
Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2010); Amnuay Kongprom et al, 
'Stock Assessment of Mitre Squid (Photololigo chinensis) and Indian Squid (P. duvaucelii) in the Gulf of 
Thailand' (Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2010); Montri Sumontha et al, 'Stock Assessment of Indian Mackerel 
(Rastrelliger kanagurta (Cuvier, 1816)) along the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' (Marine Fisheries 
Research and Development Bureau, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
2010); Sonthaya Boonsuk et al, 'Stock Assessment of Anchovies (Encrasicholina devisi (Whitley, 1940), 
E. punctifer Fowler, 1938 and E. heteroloba (Ruppell, 1837) along the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' 
(Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives, 2010). 
14 About a decade ago, the Department of Fisheries att mp ed to estimate the MSY of fish stocks and 
commensurate fishing labour in the Gulf of Thailand by using the Gordon-Schaefer Model, which 
suggested that the fishing labour should be reduced for 40 per cent in order to meet the sustainable lev l. 
For anchovy stock in particular, the research suggested that the fishing labour for anchovy fishery should 
be reduced from 25 to 30 per cent. But it is likely that these findings have never been significantly applied 
into the national fishery policy of Thailand. See, FAO, above n 11, 45.  
15 They are including demersal fish, pelagic fish, cephalopods, shrimps, and crabs. 
16 Essington, above n 12. 
17 John R Beddington and R Bruce Rettig, Approaches to the Regulation of Fishing Effort (FAO, 1984) 
33. 
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Thailand has implemented closed seasons in the mainspawning grounds of the Indo-
Pacific mackerels in the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea in order to conserve 
these stocks, but the number of fishing gears mainly used to harvest such species (e.g., 
purse seines, gill nets) has never been controlled. The economic importance of fisheries 
industry in Thailand, particularly canned fish industry that requires the huge amount of 
raw fish supply, causes a big challenge for Thailand to balance the concerns among 
marine resources conservation, fishing capacity controls and fisheries production for 
industry supply.              
 
According to the discussion under Section 4.3.1.1 of Chapter 4, it demonstrated that 
input controls alone (e.g., mesh size regulations ad gear restrictions, limitation the 
number of push netters and trawlers) might be insufficient to effectively manage fishing 
capacity in Thai fisheries as these measures, in their effect, do not decrease the 
incentives to harvest fish of fishers. On the other and, they could increase incentives of 
fishers to invest for more profits. Therefore, Thailand should seriously consider 
implementing the output controls concurrently with the input controls currently used. 
 
Another issue that should be strictly addressed is the inconsistency of national fisheries 
policy in terms of the limitation of the number of destructive fishing gears, particularly 
trawlers. One of the explicit examples is when the Department of Fisheries made the 
attempt to grant amnesty to more than two thousands u registered trawlers in 2012 due 
to the big pressure from fishing export industry. This action was viewed against the 
government’s prolonged policy in freezing the number of registered trawlers.18 This 
policy uncertainty not only lessens the effectiveness of implemented fishing capacity 
controls but also creates conflicts in fisheries society, between small-scale fishers and 
trawl fishers in particular. Moreover, the issue of transparency of the authority 
concerned (i.e., the Department of Fisheries) could probably be questioned by 
stakeholders, particularly small-scale fishers.      
 
The lack of follow-up activities after the implementation of management measures is 
also continuously appeared. This indeed undermines th  effect of such measures on 
capacity controls. For instance, after the implementation of the vessel buyback scheme 
                                                
18 More details are presented in Section 4.3.1.1 of Chapter 4. 
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in push net fisheries, it was unlikely that the explicit activities were conducted to 
certainly prevent the return of those push netters. Although the government has 
attempted to develop alternative skills and career opportunities (e.g., aquacultures) for 
these fishers, there is still no guarantee whether these fishers would forever stay out of 
the push net fisheries as such fishing gears and vessels still exist. The fishing capacity 
reduction could therefore be offset by new entrants wi h old fishing gear and vessel.19 
Thus, it is crucial that not only the proper management measures must be implemented, 
but also the appropriate and strict follow-up activities must be carried out to ensure the 
effective and sustainable outcome of capacity controls.        
 
Since socio-economic information is necessary in policy and planning process 
nowadays, the socio-economic aspect cannot be avoided when designing the appropriate 
measures to control fishing capacity, especially for those implemented on small-scale 
fisheries. However, providing small-scale fishers the practical employment and 
livelihood alternatives is not always desirable as, most of the cases, fishers cannot easily 
switch to agriculture or livestock production-orientated livelihoods due to their 
constraints in terms of, for instance, land and knowledge required for alternative 
livelihoods.20 Furthermore, their mindset of “fishing today and not worrying about 
tomorrow” could be an obstacle for them to accept other activities that require long-
term planning.21 Taking these factors into consideration, to properly design and 
implement the capacity measures on small-scale fishries is very challenging and costly 
for the Thai government to meet all required arrangements.22 
 
7.2.4 Inadequacy of Monitoring Control and Surveillance System 
 
Insufficiency of monitoring control and surveillance system is likely a fundamental 
issue for developing countries that have limited buget, manpower and equipment to 
effectively implement such system in their fisheries. Although Thailand has annually 
                                                
19 Theo Ebbers and Rick Gregory, 'Capacity Development for Improving the Knowledge Base for 
Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia - a Regional Initiative, Implemented Locally' (APFIC Ad Hoc 
Publication, FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, 2009) 
<http://www.apfic.org/uploads/wfd_124079351849f50185b51a1--capacity.pdf> 52. 
20 Ibid 51. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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allocated a remarkable budget for enforcement servic s, particularly to marine capture 
fisheries sector,23 the issue of an inadequacy of officers and patrol boats operating along 
the long coastal line (2,614.40 kilometres) still remains. This could also raise a question 
whether the benefits gained from the recovery of fisheries resources would be worth the 
operation cost for law enforcement. 
 
In terms of monitoring system, particularly vessel monitoring system (VMS) 
installation, Thai fishing vessels that operate in Thai waters are not required to install 
VMS based on the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947). This loophole is another obstacle to 
control fishing capacity in Thai fisheries.    
 
7.2.5 Insufficient Cooperation among Relevant Agencies 
 
As obviously seen in the previous chapters, the Department of Fisheries has been the 
principal government agency who plays the most crucial role in developing and 
managing fisheries in Thailand.24 The fundamental responsibilities of the Department of 
Fisheries include: (i) to implement and enforce the laws and regulations that are relevant 
to fisheries, such as the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947), the Wildlife Conservation and 
Production Act B.E. 2535 (1992), the Enhancement Conservation of National 
Environmental Quality Act B.E. 2535 (1992); (ii) to conduct studies, researches and 
experiments in all subjects of fisheries; (iii) to explore, study and analyse fishing 
grounds beyond the areas of national jurisdiction, as well as promote fisheries 
cooperation with other States; (iv) to promote and develop the fisheries careers; and (v) 
                                                
23  Government Financial Transfers (GFTs) in Thailand were USD27 million in 2009; 83.3 per cent to 
aquaculture sector and 16.7 per cent to marine capture sector. GFTs to aquaculture included disaster relief 
payments USD12.1 million, management services USD9.4 million and research services USD1 million. 
GFTs to marine capture fisheries included enforcement s rvices USD3.3 million, management services 
USD0.7 million and research services USD0.5 million. The transfers to marine capture increased by 4.5 
per cent per year, which were for general services only. See, OECD, OECD Review of Fisheries 2011: 
Policies and Summary Statistics (OECD Publishing, 2012) 546. 
24 Department of Aquatic Animal Conservation was established on 21 September B. E. 2469 (1926) and 
was renamed as Department of  Fisheries since 1 January B.E. 2497 (1954). See, Department of Fisheries, 
Brief Background (2014) 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/dof/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=2>. 
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carry out any tasks assigned by laws and the Ministry or the Cabinet.25 The structure of 
the Department of Fisheries is shown in Figure 7.1 below.26  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Organisation Chart of the Department of Fisheries (as of January 2014) 
Source of figure: Department of Fisheries, Brief Background (2014) 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/dof/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1
&Itemid=2>. 
 
                                                
25 Department of Fisheries, Responsibility 
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/dof/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=4>. 
26 The Department of Fisheries reengineered in 2002, is comprised of central and regional 
administrations. The central administration includes the Administrative Offices, six Divisions (Fish 
Inspection and Quality Control Division, Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division, Fishery Technological 
Development Division, Personnel Division, Finance Division, Planning Division), one Centre (Fishery 
Information Technology Centre), one Institute (Aquatic Animal Genetics Research and Development 
Institute), and five Bureaus (Fisheries Administration and Management Bureau, Fishery Technology 
Development and Transfer Bureau, Coastal Aquaculture Research and Development Bureau, Marine 
Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, Inland Fisheries Research and Development Bureau). For 
regional administration, there are 75 provincial offices. Each office is responsible for research, analysis 
and evaluation of fisheries technology to support the fishing industry; issue of certificates in accordance 
with fishing laws and regulations; surveillance of aquatic animals breeding; and provision of knowledge 
and services to fishers and employees. 
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The Department of Fisheries aims to: ‘increase quantity and quality of fishery 
production from both capture fisheries and aquaculture o meet domestic demands and 
international requirements; manage fisheries resources in a sustainable manner by 
fishers, local communities and organisations and the government; accelerate research in 
supporting aquaculture to increase the quality of pr duction and to reduce production 
costs; have fishers and local organisations participate in fisheries management and 
development in line with the overall decentralisation trend in Thailand; increase 
knowledge and skill of fishers to maintain their self-r liance and manage their 
organisations; control and regulate fishing operation in compliance with agreements 
with other coastal States or joint-venture partners; and maintain the status of Thailand as 
one of the top fish producing and exporting countries.’27 These aims, if successfully 
achieved, would result in the sustainable management of Thai fisheries. The Department 
of Fisheries, however, needs to seek for cooperation fr m other agencies to achieve 
these goals. 
 
In order to successfully control fishing capacity in Thai waters, the effective 
cooperation from the Marine Department in terms of the vessel registration controls is 
required. Marine Department, which is under the Ministry of Transport, is a core 
government agency who enforces the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938)28 that governs 
all types of vessels in Thai waters, including fishing vessels.29 The structure of Marine 
Department is presented in Figure 7.2. To control the number of registered fishing 
vessels as at the optimum level for sustainable stat of marine resources, the Department 
of Fisheries and the Marine Department are required to cooperate very closely. 
However, their present cooperation is unlikely sufficient as the new fishing vessels 
equipped with restricted fishing gears, which has been frozen in number by the 
Department of Fisheries can still be built (e.g., trawler). This is occurred due to the fact 
that Thai fishers can build a vessel and apply for fishing vessel registration at Marine 
                                                
27 OECD, Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries 2009: Policies and Summary Statistics (OECD, 2010) 
402. 
28 Details of this Act can be viewed in Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2. 
29 Mission of the Marine Department include: ‘(1) to enforce the Navigation in Thai Waters Act, Thai 
Vessels Act, Prevention of Ship Collision Act, Mercantile Marine Promotion Act and other relevant laws; 
(2) to conduct the study for the development of water transport infrastructure; (3) to regulate water 
transport and shipping industry; (4) to cooperate and coordinate with relevant local and international 
agencies and organisations in the field of water transport and shipping industry including agreements a d 
international conventions; and (5) to carry out other work entrusted by law or the Ministry of Transport or 
the Cabinet.’ 
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Department without any approval from the Department of Fisheries. The Department of 
Fisheries are empowered to govern only the types and number of fishing gears (i.e., 
fishing license). Such big loophole has resulted in uncontrolled number of Thai fishing 
vessels, both operating within and outside Thai waters. 
   
             
Figure 7.2: Organisation Chart of the Marine Department 
Source: Marine Department, Organisation Chart (2006)  
<http://www.md.go.th/eng_page/organisation_eng.php>. 
 
Apart from the inadequacy of cooperation between cetral government agencies, the 
insufficiency of cooperation between local governmet organisations and fisheries 
communities are also found, particularly where CBFM systems are implemented. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, local government organisations, particularly Tambol 
Administrative Organisation, are often found inactively participate in the 
implementation of fisheries management measures in their areas. NGOs, on the other 
hand, tend to work independently with fisheries communities without seeking 
cooperation from local authorities. The lack of cooperation among relevant 
organisations and authorities will certainly lessen the effective outcome of the 
management measures implemented.   
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7.2.6 Lack of Solid Political Will on Fishing Capacity Reduction 
 
Although the current policy of the Department of Fisheries is now put forward to the 
direction of decentralization and fisheries community participation, it still appears to be 
fisheries productivity orientation. It is because one of the main targets set by the Master 
Plan is to maintain the annual production of marine capture fisheries as at 1.7-2.0 
million tonnes consisting of at least 80 per cent of c mmercial species from Thai 
waters, and 1.0-1.6 million tonnes from overseas fisheries by Thai fishing vessels. 
Therefore, it is very challenging to harmonise this target with the policy of capacity 
reduction that Thailand also needs to urgently put in place. Furthermore, the decisions 
made by the policy makers in granting amnesty to illegal trawlers several times in the 
past have already shown the contrast view. It is likely that fishing capacity reduction is 
not favourable issue for politicians to advocate. As long as there is an absence of 
political commitment on capacity controls in Thai fisheries, the problem of overcapacity 
remains and tends to be worse.    
 
7.2.7 Inadequacy of the Application of Relevant International and Regional 
Instruments  
 
To adopt the relevant international and regional agreements, as well as cooperate with 
other States through regional fishery organisations r arrangements in order to address 
overcapacity problem is also an important action. Thailand has adopted and 
implemented a number of international and regional i struments as presented in Table 
7.1. Nonetheless, Thailand has not yet been a partyof the 1993 Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
Vessels on the High Seas or the FAO Compliance Agreement, and the 1995 Agreement 
for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks or the 1995 Fish Stock 
Agreement. These two legal binding instruments are considered as the fundamental tools 
to control fishing capacity on the high seas. Especially the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, 
it clearly requires States to implement measures to de er or get rid of overfishing and 
excess capacity and ensure that the level of fishing effort does not exceed the suitable 
level for the sustainable utilisation of fishery resources on the high seas. This statement 
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can be taken as the principle of fishing capacity management on the high sea and should 
therefore be adopted by any States who fishing on the high seas, particularly where 
there is the absence of strong regulatory framework to control fishing capacity. Hence, 
Thailand, as a distant-water fishing nation, should seriously consider ratifying the 1995 
Fish Stock Agreement, as well as the FAO Compliance Agreement in order to jointly 
control the fishing capacity on the high seas with other States. 
Table 7.1: Summarize of the status of Thailand in ratification or accession of relevant 
international and regional instruments on fishing capacity management 
 
Instruments Legal 
Status 
Status of 
Thailand 
Date of 
Ratification/ 
Accession 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 
Legally 
Binding 
Party 15/05/2011 
The Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the Convention 
Legally 
Binding 
Party 15/05/2011 
The 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance 
with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on 
the High Seas 
Legally 
Binding 
Not 
Party 
 
The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation 
of the Provision of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
Legally 
Binding 
Not 
Party 
 
The 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries 
Voluntary 
Basis 
Adopted  
The International Plans of Action for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity 
Voluntary 
Basis 
Adopted  
SEAFDEC Regional Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries 
Voluntary 
Basis 
Adopted  
Regional Plan of Action to Promote 
Responsible Fishing Practices including 
Combating IUU Fishing in the Region 
Voluntary 
Basis 
Adopted  
Conservation and Management Measures of 
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
Legally 
Binding 
Party 17/03/1997 
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7.2.8 Difficulties for Thai Fishing Fleets in Overseas Fisheries 
 
Due to the severe problem of overcapacity in nationl waters, the Thai government, by 
the Department of Fisheries, has encouraged and supported Thai fishers to go fishing 
overseas. But, there is a number of constraints tha T i fishers have faced as follows:- 
(i) Difficulties in arranging fisheries contracts to exploit other States’ fishing grounds: it 
is because most States have established marine resourc  conservation initiatives that 
brought about the cancellation of foreign boats’ fihing contracts, particularly trawlers 
which are considered as a destructive fishing gear; 
(ii) Lack of cooperation among Thai distant fishing fleets: Thai distant fishing fleets 
generally obtain fishing contracts through different arrangements involving the private 
sectors. Therefore, they tend to compete with each other for resources in the same 
fishing grounds. This situation facilitates the host States to stipulate any conditions to 
Thai fishing fleets; 
(iii) Independent roles played by government agencis: to manage Thai distant fishing 
fleets effectively, compliance with a number of laws implement by various government 
agencies is required. However, since those agencies work independently, effective 
management is hardly achieved. For instance, Thai fishers can build a new vessel for 
overseas fisheries and have it registered as a fishing vessel at Marine Department 
without any consent of the Department of Fisheries. This causes the difficulties in 
controlling and governing Thai fishing vessels operating in overseas or on the high seas. 
IUU fishing possibly conducted by these vessels could also be uncontrolled; and 
(iv) Incapability of Thai distant fishing fleets: majority of Thai fishers are not capable to 
go fishing on the high seas due to the lack the necessary technology and experiences. 
Moreover, going to fish overseas will require high operational cost, which most of Thai 
fishers may not be able to afford. 
 
Thus, in order to support Thai fishing vessels to operate overseas successfully, the 
above challenges need to be addressed in an appropriate way.  
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7.3 Options and Recommendations for Thailand to Effectively Manage Fishing 
Capacity 
 
Based on the analysis and discussions aforementioned, it can be seen that although 
Thailand has put great effort to control their fishing capacity, several gaps and 
challenges in terms of national legislation, institution and technical support are still 
found. Options and recommendations for Thailand to ad pt in order to overcome these 
constraints are proposed in the following sections.  
 
7.3.1 Reformation of the Fisheries Laws and Regulations 
 
According to the discussions distributed in earlier chapters,30 the Fisheries Bill B.E. 
2555 (2012) that has become the new Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) contains a number 
of new provisions supporting the effective management on fishing capacity. The 
remarkable provisions under this Bill are, for instances, setting up three fishing zone 
establishment, namely coastal fisheries zone, offshre fisheries zone, and freshwater 
fisheries zone,31 and supporting regulations imposed in particular fishing zone;32 
encouraging the participation of stakeholders, particularly local fisheries communities, 
on rehabilitation, conservation, management, and sustainable utilisation of coastal 
marine resources;33 and imposing  more reasonable penalties for all fisheries 
violations.34 
 
Additionally, this Bill includes the provision concerning the determination of Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) in Thai waters in order to harmonise the LOSC.35 This legal 
arrangement can be considered as the first attempt of Thailand in putting output control 
measure into the legislation. The TAC would later b translated into the appropriate 
number of fishing licenses for particular fishing gears/vessels. Clearly, the new 
Fisheries Act will be the fundamental legislation for modern fisheries of Thailand. 
                                                
30 For examples, Section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2, Section 4.3.1.1.3 of Chapter 4, Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5, 
Section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 of Chapter 6.  
31 The Fisheries Bill B.E. 2555 (2012) art 29. 
32 The Fisheries Bill B.E. 2555 (2012) art 33-37. 
33 The Fisheries Bill B.E. 2555 (2012) art 8. 
34 The Fisheries Bill B.E. 2555 (2012) art 71-85. 
35 After the ratification on the LOSC on 15 May 2011, Thailand has been under the process of reviewing 
the relevant legislations and reforming them in line with the LOSC.   
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However, the only fundamental legislation is definitely insufficient to effectively 
managing fishing capacity in Thailand. Coordinate legislation, e.g., the Ministerial 
Notifications, are needed to support the new Fisheries Act in order to facilitate the 
implementation of effective measures for managing of fishing capacity and addressing 
the gaps and challenges discussed in Section 7.2. Such management measures and 
activities incorporating with the required legislation are proposed for Thailand in the 
following subsections. 
 
7.3.2 Reduction Program of Fishing Vessels and Fishing Gears 
 
Obviously, Thailand has already had a severe problem of overcapacity in marine 
fisheries. The immediate action that Thailand should seriously take for fishing capacity 
reduction is to reduce the number of fishing vessels and fishing gears currently 
operating in Thai waters (both legally and illegally). This action should be started by 
strictly freezing the number of registered fishing vessels, particularly destructive fishing 
vessels (e.g., trawlers, push netters) as at the present level. Later, the appropriate 
management measures, such as limited licensing and/or buyback schemes, will be 
implemented to withdraw the excess capacity from fisheries by fishing gear type. 
Nonetheless, based on the discussion in great details in Section 4.3.1.1.1 of Chapter 4, 
Thailand has made a number of attempts to implement buyback scheme in trawl and 
push net fisheries with undesirable outcome. Many rounds of amnesty granted to illegal 
trawlers demonstrated the failure of such measure implemented. 
 
To address this issue more effectively, Thailand needs to implement a better designed 
limited licensing program, together with the follow-up activities. For example, after 
Thailand measured the existing level of fishing capacity and analysed the optimum level 
of fishing capacity that is commensurate with the current status of marine resources,   
Thailand should determine the level of excess capacity of particular fisheries (i.e., 
small-scale and large-scale fisheries) and fishing gears (e.g., trawlers, push netters, 
purse seines, gill nets, traps) that must be removed from the fishery industry. Removing 
such fishing capacity, however, must take into account a number of actions. 
 
First, it is essential to assess the status of species stocks in order to know which species 
or group of species are currently harvested beyond the biological reference point, i.e., 
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MSY, as these species are needed to be urgently managed. Therefore, the MSY of key 
species or group of key species and the optimum level of fishing effort for such MSY 
must be prior determined. Second, it is also important o know what are the main fishing 
gears for particular key species and what is the current level of its capacity (i.e., number 
of fishing gears and fishing vessels by sizes, number of fishing days). Subsequently, the 
level of excess capacity for particular species must be evaluated and removed from the 
fisheries. Such capacity reduction can be in terms of a number of fishing vessels that 
must be removed, or a number of fishing days that must be reduced. A fleet reduction 
program of such certain fishing vessels and fishing gears will then be established 
accordingly. The goal and timeframe of the program must be indicated (e.g., the number 
of trawlers aimed to reduce within each year of the project). The evaluation of the 
project must also be conducted. 
 
Indeed, the compensation paid to the fishers who must leave the fisheries is 
unavoidable, either through the establishment of an investment fund or a buyback 
scheme. In terms of buyback program, the benefits and expenses of program depend on 
what types of fishing vessels to buy out of the fisheries. Buying large-scale vessels 
would probably provide more significant benefits than buying small-scale vessels, 
which are majority of Thai fisheries, since the operational costs are lower. Furthermore, 
buying out small-scale vessels from the fisheries might cause a big controversial in 
terms of socio-economic issue as small-scale fisheries are basically considered as 
subsistence fisheries. The compensation money for the owner of legal fishing vessels 
who have to leave the fisheries might obtain from various ways. For instance, it could 
be shouldered solely by the government or by the remaining fishers as they would 
technically gain the benefits from the increased catch  due to the less number of 
competitors over marine resources. The compensation expense could also be shared 
between the government and remaining fishers. Nonetheless, it is crucial that the action 
plans of fleet reduction program, particularly in terms of the mechanism for selecting 
participants and for paying compensation, must be concluded and agreed by 
stakeholders before starting the program. For example, there should be a condition that 
only legal fishing vessels can participate the reduction program, and illegal fishing 
vessels must be removed from the fisheries without any compensation. Furthermore, in 
order to ensure the permanent removal of such excess fishing gears and vessels, they 
must be removed from the fisheries database and, if it is easible, should be scrapped as 
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well. This action aims to protect them to return to fishery industry, which has been a 
main issue of the failure of previous buyback programs in Thailand.   
 
To facilitate all activities aforementioned for a fleet reduction program, a number of 
legislation must be issued. For instance, the Notifica ions or regulations that require the 
determination of TACs and correspond fishing effort  key species or group of species 
(i.e., demersal species, pelagic species). In this sense, the assessment of the biological 
reference point (i.e., MSY) of key species and/or group of key species must be put in 
the national policy of competent authority (i.e., the Department of Fisheries). 
Additionally, the Notifications or regulations that specify the limits of allowed fishing 
gears and vessels, in terms of number and sizes by types, must be declared. Later, the 
legal framework for governing the mechanism of fleet r duction program can be 
established.        
 
However, based on the discussions in Chapter 4-6, it has clearly demonstrated  that one 
single measure cannot solely solve overcapacity problem in Thailand. Combining 
limited licensing program with other management measures, i.e., gear and vessel 
restrictions, closed season and closed areas, and CBFM, are therefore crucial. 
Strengthening MCS system, which often found weak in Thailand, is certainly a key of 
the success of the implementation of these measures. 
 
7.3.3 Promoting and Strengthening Community-based Fisheries 
Management in Thai Fisheries 
 
Undoubtedly, using MSY (or MEY) as a reference point can be applied in capacity 
management of multi-species fisheries.36 But, harvest strategies for multi species are 
needed to determine in conjunction with each particular species. Given the different 
biology and economic characteristics of different species, it is likely to compromise the 
profits of different species. The accuracy of data collection is also a success key in the 
implementation of this measure. Developing countries where having tropical multi-
species fisheries, like Thailand, may have difficulties in providing financial support to 
                                                
36 Some developed countries, such as Australia, use MEY as a reference point for individual harvest quota 
system applied on multi-species fisheries with the successful outcome. See, Anthony D M Smith et al, 
'Experience in Implementing Harvest Strategies in Australia's South-eastern Fisheries' (2008) 94(3) 
Fisheries Research 373. 
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cover all ranges of activities required in setting and evaluation the TACs for harvest 
quota system. CBFM could be considered and simultaneously promoted as an 
management measure. Having said this, the CBFM imple ented in Japan37 could be a 
good model for fisheries management in Thailand. Nonetheless, it is important to note 
that economic, social and political conditions in these two States are quite different and 
thus implementing Japanese model in Thai fisheries context should be carefully done. 
Another issue needed to concern is how to implement the CBFM system in a way that it 
can be self-organised by fisheries community. In most cases, the CBFM projects could 
not be sustained after the assistance provided by government or organisations was 
finished. This is a key factor of the success of CBFM implementation. Further, high 
participation of fisheries communities and other resources users, effective cooperation 
among stakeholders, establishment user rights and legal authority to fisheries 
communities, institutional arrangements and strong political will from both national and 
local levels are also the keys of successful outcome f the CBFM system. 
 
To tackle the above issues, the Thai government by the Department of Fisheries 
proposed the new Fisheries Act, which contains the provisions facilitating the CBFM 
concept. The significant provisions are those concerning the requirement to establish the 
Provincial Fisheries Committees, which also include th  representatives of fisheries 
community associations. These committees will submit a fishery policy or management 
and conservation measures for their areas of competenc  to the National Fisheries 
Policy Committee and the Minister to consider. Furthe more, representatives of fisheries 
community associations can be empowered by the Minister to govern their areas in 
accordance with the new fisheries law. However, it is important to ensure that the 
criteria for the selection of committees, both at provincial and national levels will be 
able to obtain appropriate representatives, who can carry out their tasks effectively.  
Also, the balance of such representatives has to be car fully considered. With 
inequitable arrangement, the controversy in terms of unequal participation of fisheries 
sectors (e.g., small-scale and large-scale sectors) in preparing the policy of fisheries 
development in Thai waters could be arisen. 
 
 
                                                
37 Details are already discussed under Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. 
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7.3.4 Promoting the Formation of Fisheries’ Cooperatives and/or 
Organisations 
 
Clearly, Thailand needs to adopt the more effective measures for capacity management, 
particularly by implementing the right-based management and limited access in 
fisheries. To facilitate these management measures, th  legislative framework on the 
formation of fisheries’ cooperatives and/or organistions must be soonest developed. 
The new legislation (e.g., Fisheries Cooperative Law) will empower fisheries 
cooperatives and/or organisations in fisheries management and marine resource 
conservation and rehabilitation. In addition, the property right for fisheries resources 
must be clearly defined and open access fisheries o regulated open access fisheries 
must be replaced with regulated access fisheries. Ba ed on the findings under Section 
5.2.3 of Chapter 5, Thailand may take Japan as a good example in arranging legislative 
framework for fisheries cooperatives. To support this legal arrangement, however, the 
Department of Fisheries should require all fishers and/or existing fisheries groups to 
register and operate as cooperatives or organisation , as well as assist them to build-up 
the necessary skills needed for operation. 
 
At present, the cooperatives in the fisheries sector of Thailand are already established by 
the fishers nationwide38 with the main purposes of fixing their fishing and marketing 
problems through collective buying and selling, giving loan to members, promoting 
sustainable fisheries and conserving natural resources. Nonetheless, they are not yet 
granted any legitimate power to manage the fisheries in their areas.39 
 
7.3.5 Promoting Closed Seasons and Closed Areas  
 
Thailand has implemented closed seasons and closed areas both in the areas of the Gulf 
of Thailand and the Andaman Sea for the main purpose t  conserve the important 
marine stocks of Thailand, particularly the stocks of Indo-Pacific mackerels. These 
                                                
38 As of 2014, Thailand has 71 fishery cooperatives with a total of 12,035 members. These fishery 
cooperatives can be grouped as: (i) marine fishery cooperatives: there are 23 cooperatives with 4,111 
members who are large-scale fishers (overseas fisherie ), medium-scale fishers (off-shore fisheries) and
small-scale fishers (coastal fisheries within 3,000 metres from shore); (ii) brackish water cooperatives: 
there are 15 cooperatives with 5,547 members, consisti g of shrimp farmers, fish farmers and shellfish 
farmers; and (iii) freshwater cooperatives: there ar  34 cooperatives with 5,547 members, comprising  
freshwater fin fish and shellfish farmers and other aquatic animal farmers. 
39 To some extent, the new Fisheries Act has addressed this issue. 
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closures take place in the area of 26,400 square kilometres along the Gulf of Thailand 
within Prachuab Kirikhan, Chumphon and Surat Thani Provinces (annually closed 
during 15 February to 15 May), and the area of 4,696 square kilometres along the 
Andaman Sea within Krabi, Pang-nga, Phuket and Trang Provinces (annually closed 
during 1 April to 1 June). Based on the scientific researchers conducted before and after 
the period of these closures by the Department of Fisheries, the results have suggested 
the positive impact of this measure on both marine stocks and fishers’ income.40 Later, 
Thailand has expanded the closed area to the inner Gulf of Thailand. This new closure is 
located within Samut Sakhon, Samut Prakan, Samut Songkhram, Phetchaburi, Prachuab 
Kirikhan, Chachoengsao, Chonburi, Provinces, with a total area of 4,900 square 
kilometres, and applied during 1 June to 31 July every year (started in 2014). This new 
closed area is also established to conserve Indo-Pacific mackerel stock as this area is 
another important nursery ground of such species. However, as greatly discussed under 
closed seasons and closed areas section in Section 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 of Chapter 6, the 
impact of these measures on capacity reduction may not be fully obtained as they do not 
adjust the incentive to harvest fish of fishers. Fishing vessels can still go to operate 
elsewhere while waiting for these areas opened. This issue, however, could be 
addressed by only allowing fishing vessels to operate in their assigned area, i.e., only in 
the Gulf of Thailand or the Andaman Sea. The code and colour marking scheme must 
accordingly be introduced to differentiate the fishing vessels based on their fishing 
grounds, particularly the large-scale fishing vessels. In this case, closed seasons and 
closed areas would provide more benefits to Thai fisheries in terms of capacity controls.   
 
Expanding conservation areas along the coastline or ‘Coastal Belt’ is another practical 
option for Thailand to push forward. Presently, Thailand has made the effort to expand 
such ‘Coastal Belt’ from three kilometres to three nautical miles offshore and got 
successful results in a number of provinces.41 As a follow-up activity, the new Fisheries 
Act provides three fisheries zone establishment, including coastal fisheries zone 
covering three nautical miles from the shoreline and to a limit not over 12 nautical 
miles, which will theoretically expand the Coastal Belt nationwide. Nonetheless, 
                                                
40 Details of closed seasons and closed areas implement d by Thailand can be viewed in Section 6.2.4 of 
Chapter 6. 
41 They are Trang, Krabi, Prachuab Kirikhan, Rayong, Narathiwat, Pattani, Satun and Nakhon Si 
Thammarat Provinces. 
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appropriate fishing capacity management within new zones, particularly coastal and 
offshore fisheries zones, are needed to carefully determine. For instance, the 
determination on types and amount of fishing vessels or gears allowed to operate in 
each zone is essential to carry out. Fishing vessels or gears operating in different zone 
should be clearly distinguished, by implementing the code and colour marking scheme. 
 
Although the measures of closed areas and closed seasons may not be the best option in 
terms of capacity controls in Thai fisheries, they can still be used as supplementary 
measures. Implementation of these measures will be useful to where having difficulties 
in implementing other capacity controls as it has already been proofed that these 
measures are accepted by Thai fishers. Nonetheless, it must be aware that the support of 
strong scientific evidences is crucial when implementing this type of measures. 
 
7.3.6 Improving and/or Developing Data Collecting System 
 
The accurate, comprehensive, and updated databases of fisheries data, including fishing 
vessels, fishing gears and state of marine resources (e.g., catch production, CPUE), are 
truly essential for managing capacity management in any fisheries. For example, to 
analyse the MSY it will need a time series of reliable catch data (at least 10 years) and 
updated CPUE data (at least five years) of concerned marine species. Furthermore, in 
order to manage the level of fishing capacity effectiv ly, the accurate number of 
existing fishing vessels and fishing gears must be o tained.42 Besides, the relevant 
information, such as the current number of fishers and people involved in fishery 
industry, the total number of fishing ports or landing sites, must be gathered.43 Thus, 
Thailand needs to improve and/or develop its data collecting system to facilitate the 
implementation of the management measures for controlli g fishing capacity. Such 
system should be established in the way to harmonise w th the international standards 
for the purposes of sharing, exchanging information a d collaboration between 
countries.  
 
In order to make such arrangement, financial support is definitely required from the 
Thai government, which could be an issue due to the budget constraint. Seeking 
                                                
42 The annual fisheries statistics of Thailand is always issued late, few years behind. 
43 The latest marine fisheries census of Thailand was done in 2000.  
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financial assistances from available donors (e.g., Asian Development Bank) or 
conducting collaborative project with other agencies, such as SEAFDEC or FAO, could 
be carried out to address this issue.   
 
7.3.7 Strengthening Monitoring Control and Surveillance System  
 
It is recognised that an effective MCS system is essential for achieving the success in 
controlling fishing capacity. According to the discu sion in Section 7.2.4 above, it was 
found that Thailand has an inadequacy of MCS system and needs to have it 
strengthened. However, due to the financial constraint, Thailand may not be able to 
improve MCS system by substantially increasing either manpower or patrol boats in 
order to cove the long coastline of the country. To address this problem under limited 
budget conditions, law enforcement could be strengthened by empowering fisheries 
communities to exercise the authority in their coastal areas. In this sense, a legitimate 
power needs to be granted to them in an appropriate w y. The legislation that provides 
this arrangement must therefore be put in place. Th new Fisheries Act has attempted to 
address this issue by empowering the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives Ministry 
to appoint the representatives of fisheries community associations as the fisheries 
officers’ assistants to enforce the Act,44 including in terms of MCS. Thailand, however, 
must further issue the legal arrangement that provides the procedure of conducting MCS 
activities by the fisheries community associations. 
 
Using technology is another option to improve MCS system in Thai fisheries. VMS has 
recently been introduced to Thai fishing vessels (e.g., trawlers) by the Department of 
Fisheries through a pilot project with a goal to improve MCS system by using available 
technology. But, using this system is quite costly and needs high maintenance from 
users. Fishers may be reluctant to adopt this technology by voluntary basis. Thus, the 
fisheries law should require the VMS installation on large-scale fishing vessels, such as 
trawlers and purse seines, in order to monitor and control their fishing operation. 
However, as applicable fishers would probably have difficulties to comply with such 
rule due to the high operational cost, the government or fishery industries may need to 
provide the financial support for VMS installation.   
 
                                                
44 Details are discussed under Section 5.2.6 of Chapter 5. 
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Seeking cooperation from neighbouring countries of Thailand could be considered as an 
option to strengthen MCS system, particularly in border areas. Nonetheless, to achieve 
such option will need appropriate arrangement betwen the Thai government and 
concerned government(s). The Association of Southeas  Asian Nations (ASEAN) could 
be the channel in seeking this kind of cooperation among countries in Southeast Asian 
region.        
 
7.3.8 Strengthening Cooperation among Relevant Agencies and 
Stakeholders 
 
Due to the discussion under Section 7.2.5 above, it can be concluded that more effective 
cooperation among government agencies, particularly between the Department of 
Fisheries and the Marine Department, is essentially required in controlling fishing 
capacity, particularly in terms of fishing vessels control. These two agencies should 
together set up a working plan in controlling the number of registered fishing vessels as 
at the appropriate level with the level of sustainable fisheries resources. For example, 
both agencies should set up a regulation that requir s fishers to firstly obtain a fishing 
license from the Department of Fisheries before applying for a permit to build a new 
fishing vessel from the Marine Department. Therefor, the numbers of fishing gears and 
fishing vessels are both controlled accordingly. However, it is essential that the 
competent officers must ensure the accuracy of requir d information, e.g., type, size and 
number of fishing gears or size of fishing vessels, before granting a fishing license or a 
vessel permit. Besides, cooperation on field between these two agencies, such as 
establishing a mobile unit for renewing fishing licenses and vessel permit, should be 
developed to not only facilitate the fishers in remote areas but also be able to obtain the 
updated data of fishing vessels and fishing gears. A memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) for interagency information exchange between the two agencies 
should also be established.   
 
At the local level, closer cooperation among Tambol Administrative Organisations, non-
government organisations (NGOs), and fisheries communities are truly required to 
sustainably achieve the success of fisheries management in their areas. Tambol 
Administrative Organisations should actively support the implementation of fisheries 
management measures within their responsible area, whereas NGOs should seek for 
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cooperation from not only fisheries communities butalso local government agencies 
when implementing fisheries projects in the areas. 
 
Additionally, the Provincial Fisheries Committee (PFC) has been formed in all 
provinces to take action on fisheries issues arisen within fisheries communities in 
competent area. The committee is composed the Provincial Governor (Chair) and 
representatives of the Marine Department, the Office of Industrial Affairs, the Local 
Fisheries Association (both small-scale and large-scale fisheries), the Department of 
Fisheries, and other relevant organisations. This committee is expected to play 
significant role to build cooperation on addressing fisheries issues at provincial level. 
However, it is likely that such role is insufficiently performed in some certain areas, and 
thus it needs to be strengthened.        
 
7.3.9 Developing and Implementing Thailand National Plan of Action for 
the Management of Fishing Capacity 
 
While the amendment of existing legislation suggested above would provide a better 
legal arrangement for fishing capacity controls, an integrated single policy, which is 
developed by focusing on a wide range of issues on fishing capacity management of 
both small-scale and large-scale fisheries, is still required. It is called Thailand National 
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing capacity (Thailand NPOA-Capacity). 
The NPOA must provide the policy guidelines and action plans for stakeholders (e.g., 
fishers, fisheries communities, fisheries organisations, local government organisations, 
and central government) in implementing the measures to deter or eliminate excess 
capacity and ensure that the current level of fishing effort is commensurate with the 
state of marine resources in Thai waters. In this sense, such NPOA should be developed 
by seriously considering the criteria analysed from relevant international and regional 
instruments (Section 3.4 of Chapter 3). Therefore, as aforementioned in Section 7.3.2, 
Thailand should precisely measure its current fishing capacity as soon as possible, both 
in small-scale and large-scale fisheries. The obtained capacity must be accessed whether 
it is larger than the optimum level for sustainable fisheries. Thus, Thailand must 
determine a reference point for the optimum level of fishing capacity that will be used 
to evaluate. The appropriate measures or approaches will be subsequently designed and 
implemented to rectify the level of fishing capacity. However, the success of NPOA 
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implementation will heavily depend upon the commitment from relevant ministries and 
local governments, to endorse and accept this plan as the principle national guideline 
and policy for fishing capacity management. The cooperation of other stakeholders is 
also essential.  
 
7.3.10 Encouraging Overseas Fisheries 
 
As stated in Section 7.2.8 above, in conducting overseas fisheries Thai fishers have 
experienced the problems both in terms of technical issues (e.g., lack of necessary 
knowledge and technology) and fishing arrangement issues (e.g., difficulties in 
obtaining reasonable contract, lack of cooperation among relevant government agencies 
and among fishers). If these problems are overcome, supporting Thai fishers to legally 
operate overseas fisheries in available fishing grounds can be a good option to address 
overcapacity problem in Thai waters. To tackle these problems, however, the Thai 
government needs to take more effective actions, both in terms of authority exercising 
(e.g., seeking for overseas fishing arrangements wih host countries, such as joint 
venture arrangements, and facilitating Thai fishers in signing contracts; promoting 
overseas fisheries by levying tax for Thai fishers; governing Thai fishing vessels to 
operate overseas in a sustainable manner) and capacity building (e.g., providing Thai 
fishers the necessary knowledge and training with rega d to relevant international laws 
and regulations, and relevant measures of the international standards for safety at sea).  
 
Apart from supporting Thai fishing vessels to legally operate in neighbouring States’ 
waters, the Thai government should also consider participating in more regional 
fisheries management organisations (RFMOs),45 particularly where Thai fishing vessels 
have capability to go fishing in their areas of competence. New fishing grounds in the 
Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean should be considered by the Thai government and 
the fishers. Overseas fishing arrangements are not o ly the possible solution for 
overcapacity problem in Thai waters, but also the opportunities for Thailand to access 
foreign markets, which will definitely benefit the fisheries industry of the country. 
    
                                                
45 Currently, Thailand  is a member of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and a cooperating 
non-member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). 
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7.3.11 Ratifying the FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Fish Stock 
Agreement 
 
Apart from reformation of national legislation in order to facilitate and support fishing 
capacity management in the country, Thailand should also ratify and adopt applicable 
international and regional instruments in order to manage its fishing capacity in 
accordance with international standards. Further, to some extent, these instruments will 
provide an applicable framework for Thailand to contr l its fishing capacity outside the 
national jurisdiction, especially fishing capacity on the high seas. Therefore, Thailand 
should strongly consider ratifying the FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Fish 
Stock Agreement that provide a legal framework for States to govern the control over its 
fishing vessels operating on the high seas.46    
 
7.3.12 Building Strong Political Will in Capacity Reduction   
 
The strong political will to push forward the policy on capacity reduction is an essential 
factor to ensure the successful result of the impleentation of fishing capacity 
management in Thailand. Most importantly, the policy makers must recognise that 
overcapacity problem is a direct consequence of free and open access fisheries and 
should carry out the management of fishing capacity in this context.47 Policy makers 
should therefore provide a strong effort to support the implementation of capacity 
controls in Thai fisheries. In this regard, setting the explicit reference point of capacity 
reduction must be seriously considered by the policy makers. The Department of 
Fisheries should continue conducting researches in order to obtain necessary scientific 
information (e.g., the state of marine resources) and relevant data48 required to support 
policy makers in making appropriate decisions on fishing capacity management.    
 
 
 
  
                                                
46 Applicable provisions under these two international instruments are already discussed in Section 
3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3 of Chapter 3. 
47 Steve Cunningham and Dominique Greboval, Managing Fishing Capacity: A Review of Policy and 
Technical Issues (FAO, 2001) 16. 
48 They include, for example, the data of catch production, CPUE, number of fishing vessels/gears. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
 
Firstly, this chapter analysed and identified the gaps and challenges in managing fishing 
capacity in Thai fisheries. The analysis was done in the areas of legal, institutional and 
technical support aspects. Such gaps and challenges i cluded the topics of ‘outdated, 
impractical and inadequate legal arrangements supporting the management of fishing 
capacity’, ‘lack of proper technical supports in setting the sustainable reference point’, 
‘inadequacy of effective measures used to manage fishing capacity’, ‘inadequacy of 
monitoring control and surveillance system’, ‘insufficient of cooperation among 
relevant agencies’, ‘lack of solid political will on fishing capacity reduction’, 
‘inadequacy of the application of relevant international and regional instruments’ and 
‘difficulties for Thai fishing fleets in overseas fi heries’.      
  
In order to address these gaps and challenges identif ed, he second part of this chapter 
provided possible options for Thailand to take for the achievement of effective fishing 
capacity management. These options included ‘reformation of the fisheries laws and 
regulations’, ‘reduction program of fishing vessels and fishing gears’, ‘promoting and 
strengthening community-based fisheries management in Thai fisheries’, ‘promoting the 
formation of fisheries’ cooperatives and/or organistions’, ‘promoting closed seasons 
and closed areas’, ‘improving and/or developing data collecting system’, ‘strengthening 
monitoring control and surveillance system’, ‘strengthening cooperation among relevant 
agencies and stakeholders’, ‘developing and implementing Thailand National Plan of 
Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity’, ‘encouraging overseas fisheries’, 
‘ratifying the FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement’, and 
‘building strong political will in capacity reduction’. 
 
However, it is essential to note that the only single solution is not capable to solve the 
problem of overcapacity, Thailand, therefore, needs to appropriately combine and adopt 
a number of solutions together, which will be varied depending on particular 
circumstances. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
 
Overcapacity is a common problem found in any open access fisheries where the fishers 
attempt to gain the most benefits. Although there has been increasing awareness in 
controlling fishing capacity worldwide, the severe intensity of this issue has been 
growing. Overcapacity mainly results from the fact that States may have limited 
understanding and ability to measure overcapacity and relevant concepts and/or have 
not effectively implemented the appropriate management measures to address such 
problem accordingly. The introductory chapter of the esis presented the fundamental 
principles and concepts with regard to capacity in the context of fisheries, such as 
excess capacity, overcapacity and overfishing. This c apter further summarized the 
concerns on overcapacity at global level and how this problem has created the impact on 
the fisheries in Thailand. 
 
Chapter 2 firstly provided the profile of marine capture fisheries of Thailand in terms of 
catch production, product value and fishing effort. The profile suggested the genuine 
importance of marine capture fisheries, both conducting in national waters (i.e., the Gulf 
of Thailand and the Andaman Sea) and beyond national jurisdiction (i.e., other States’ 
EEZs and the high seas) to Thailand. Small-scale and l rge-scale fisheries profiles 
showed how marine capture fisheries play a crucial role in socio-economic of the 
country, as well as how large of the level of current capacity in Thai fisheries is, 
according to the number of fishing vessels. The indicators of overcapacity (e.g., 
substantially declining of CPUE) also showed the huge magnitude of overcapacity 
problem in Thailand. This chapter later discussed the fundamental legislation (e.g., the 
Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) and the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947)) that has 
governed fishing capacity, particularly fishing vess l , fishing gears in Thailand. With 
the attempt of Thailand to improve the legislation governing their fishing capacity, both 
in Thai waters and overseas, the Master Plan for Maine Fisheries Management of 
Thailand was proposed by the Department of Fisheries. The Master Plan has been 
adopted and played an important role in managing fishing capacity through the 
management projects conducted by the Department of Fisheries. 
 
In Chapter 3, the legislative framework on fishing capacity management in the areas 
under national jurisdiction and on the high seas waanalysed by examining applicable 
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provisions of international and regional instruments. For international instruments, they 
included both legally and non-legally binding instruments. The former instruments 
consisted of the LOSC, the Compliance Agreement, the Fish Stocks Agreement, and the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, whereas the latter 
instruments were composed the CCRF, and the IPOA-Capacity. In terms of regional 
instruments, the IOTC Resolutions (legally binding), SEAFDEC Regional CCRF and 
the RPOA (non-legally binding) were analysed. Based on the examination, a set of 
criteria for the management of fishing capacity within and beyond national jurisdiction 
was developed and summarized. A series of actions derived from the criteria was also 
suggested for States to follow in order to manage their fishing capacity more effectively. 
These criteria were subsequently used as a basis to te t whether Thailand has adequate 
arrangements to control their fishing capacity or address the overcapacity problem. The 
criteria suggest States to conduct the measurement and assessment of their fishing 
capacity and subsequently implement the appropriate management measures based on 
the status of their capacity. The fundamental guidance can be concluded that States 
should implement measures to deter or eliminate overfishing and excess fishing 
capacity and ensure levels of fishing effort do not exceed those commensurate with the 
sustainable utilisation of fishery resources. Such measures (i.e., incentive blocking 
measures, incentive adjusting measures and supplementary management measures), as 
well as the implication of each measure by Thailand, were then analysed and presented 
in Chapter 4-6. For Chapter 7, it firstly determined the gaps and challenges in managing 
fishing capacity of Thailand based on the criteria for fishing capacity management 
derived in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3, and later proposed the options and 
recommendations for Thailand to address such gaps and challenges in order to manage 
fishing capacity more effectively.  
 
Clearly, although Thailand has put great efforts to control and manage its fishing 
capacity, as demonstrated in Chapter 2 and 4-6, such efforts are inadequate for the huge 
magnitude of overcapacity problem in Thailand. The gaps and challenges in managing 
fishing capacity of Thailand can be identified into three main areas, including legal, 
institutional and management measure aspects. The options and recommendations 
corresponding to such gaps and challenges are proposed accordingly.    
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Thailand has the lack of comprehensive legal framework to control and manage its 
fishing capacity. Current legislation is outdated and insufficient for present fisheries. 
The principle fisheries law, i.e., the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947), that has been put 
into force for more than 65 years when overcapacity was not an issue in any fisheries, 
does not adequately control fishing capacity of Thai fisheries. Although the new 
Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) has recently been put into force but the coordinatio  
laws required for improving the fishing capacity contr ls have not yet been issued and 
thus the Ministerial Notifications established under the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) 
are still in effect. To address this issue more effectively, however, the necessary 
coordination laws and regulations need to be urgently developed and put into effect, 
particularly those that govern and facilitate the implementation of activities and 
management measures on fishing capacity controls.         
 
The measurement of fishing capacity in Thailand has been conducted and published in 
terms of national fisheries statistics of the number of registered fishing gears and 
vessels. These statistics, however, do not cover all types and sizes of fishing gears and 
vessels because, based on the Thai law, some of them (e.g., vessels less than six GT) are 
not obliged to register and then not included in the national fisheries statistics. Besides, 
due to the constraint of human resource and budget, th  annual fisheries statistics are 
always published few years behind the corresponding year. These factors contribute to 
the difficulties in obtaining the accuracy of existing level of fishing capacity in 
Thailand. Therefore, Thailand must develop and/or improve its data collecting system to 
ensure the effectiveness, both in terms of quantity (i.e., covering all kinds of fisheries 
data) and quality (i.e., ensuring the accuracy and update of fisheries data).          
 
Prior to April 2015,1 although Thailand has been aware of the overcapacity problem in 
its fisheries, Thailand has never had a national policy that requires the systematically 
assessment of the level of excess capacity. One of the main obstacles is the complex 
nature of Thai fisheries (i.e., multi-species and multi-gear fisheries) that creates 
difficulties in determining the biological reference point (i.e., the MSY recommended 
by the FAO), which is essential for capacity assessm nt. However, Thailand has made a 
number of attempts to analyse the MSY of some key species, but never applied the 
                                                
1 In April 2015, Thailand has received the yellow card from the EU due to the EU’s claim that Thailand 
has inadequately complied with the EU Rules to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.  
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results to its fisheries management. It might be because one single species in Thai 
waters is generally caught with different rate by different types of fishing gears. 
Therefore, it is unlikely feasible to control fishing capacity of each fishing gear 
employed on particular species. In this sense, Thailand might consider to analyse the 
MSY for a group of key species, such as demersal species and pelagic species, and 
manage the fishing capacity employed on each group accordingly. For example, 
Thailand can analyse the MSY for a group of key demersal species, and then determine 
the optimum capacity level, which is corresponding to such MSY. For the determination 
of current capacity level that harvest demersal species, the current capacity of different 
types of trawlers and push netters can be used due to the fact that trawlers and push 
netters are the main fishing gears for demersal species. Based on the capacity 
evaluation, the excess capacity for demersal species will be derived. Subsequently, the 
appropriate management measures will be implemented to remove the excess capacity. 
Fleet reduction program, for instance, should be establi hed, by targeting the removal of 
trawlers and push netters. However, it is crucial to ensure that the removed trawlers and 
push netters will not return to fishery industry. To address this issue, scrapping them 
could be considered as an option. In this case, compensation scheme is also needed to 
put in place. Therefore, legal and institutional arrangements for facilitating all activities 
aforementioned are truly required. 
 
Apart from limited licensing scheme (i.e., fleet reduction program), which is considered 
as an incentive blocking measures, the co-management and CBFM, which are 
considered as incentive adjusting measures should also be promoted to control fishing 
capacity in Thailand.2 The co-management aims that the authorities share some of the 
resource management powers with user groups, whereas th  CBFM means that local 
resource users, government, other stakeholders and external agents share responsibilities 
and authorities in managing such fisheries resources. The goal of these measures is to 
create full or partial, property rights over fisheries resources for users, so that they are 
willing to harvest the resources within appropriate conservation limits. Thus, 
overcapacity is expected to be eliminated in the fishery. The fundamental factors needed 
to consider, particularly when implementing the CBFM, include: ‘how to establish user 
groups; what rights and responsibilities are being transferred to each user group; how 
                                                
2 The discussion on the co-management and CBFM is presented in Section 5.2.5 and 5.2.6 of Chapter 5. 
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user groups should operate; what mechanism needed to settle the disputes between and 
within groups; what to do if a group does not represent the best management approach.’ 
Clearly, the legal and institutional framework is required to address these 
considerations. For Thailand in particular, the government should promote the 
formation of fisheries’ cooperative and/or organisations and share them responsibilities 
and authorities in managing fisheries resources in their local areas. In this sense, the 
legislation that supports the formation of fisheries’ cooperative and/or organisations 
(i.e., Fisheries Cooperative Law), and the legislation hat grants the legitimate power in 
managing fisheries resources to such groups must be promulgated. The Fisheries Act 
B.E. 2558 (2015) that requires the formation of the Provincial Fisheries Committees, 
comprising representatives from government and fisher es community associations, as 
well as empowers the Minister of Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives to appoint 
representatives of fisheries community associations as the assistants of fishery officers 
to enforce the Fisheries Act can fill such gaps. This legal and institutional arrangement 
truly supports the implementation of the co-management and CBFM, which is expected 
to help in addressing overcapacity problem of Thailand. Nonetheless, the coordinate law 
is additionally required, such as the law for establishing the mechanism needed to settle 
the disputes between and within groups, and to transfer some enforcement power to user 
groups. 
 
Another incentive blocking measures, i.e., gear and vessel restriction, and other 
incentive adjusting measures, i.e., TURFs,3 taxes,4 and subsidies5 are also implemented 
by Thailand. Gear and vessel restriction scheme in particular, it has been one of the 
main regulations applied in Thai fisheries for a long time. In terms of vessel restrictions, 
the significant legislation is the Ministerial Notifications that determining the areas in 
which trawls and push nets used with motor vessels are prohibited. The areas cover 
3,000 metres (or three nautical miles in some provinces) from the coast line and 400 
metres surrounding the stationary fishing gears. The ai government has put the effort 
to expand these restricted fishing areas nationwide by proposing the provisions under 
the new Fisheries Act to designate three fisheries zones, namely (i) coastal fisheries 
zone, which is the areas within three nautical miles from shore line or, if appropriate in 
                                                
3 TURFs are greatly discussed in Section 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 of Chapter 5. 
4 Taxes are greatly discussed in Section 5.2.7 and 5.2.8 of Chapter 5. 
5 Subsidies are greatly discussed in Section 5.2.9 and 5.2.10 of Chapter 5. 
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some areas, within 12 nautical miles from shore lin; (ii) offshore fisheries zone, which 
is the areas next to coastal fisheries zone and no further than the areas of national EEZ; 
and (iii) freshwater fisheries zone, which is fishing areas of freshwater fisheries on land. 
The new Fisheries Act also empowers the Minister of Ministry of Agricultre and 
Cooperatives or the Provincial Committee in his jurisdiction with the approval of the 
Minister to issue regulations to govern the fisheries n each fishing zone, such as 
specifying types, sizes, numbers and components of fi hing gears that are allowed and 
banned in each zone. Regarding fishing gear restrictions, for example, a regulation to 
ban any fishing surrounding nets having mesh size smaller than 2.5 centimetres to fish 
at night time, and any fishing gear having mesh size maller than 2.5 centimetres and 
used with electricity generators are prohibited in national waters. Nonetheless, the 
effects of gear and vessel restriction scheme alone on fishing capacity control in 
Thailand are not significant. It is because not only these fisheries restrictions are mainly 
designed for the objective of marine resources conservation, but also there is no output 
controls combined in Thai fisheries. As a result, fishers still have incentives to modify 
their fishing gears or vessels based on the loopholes f current regulations in order to 
increase or maintain their catch. However, gear and vessel restriction scheme might 
provide more effects on capacity control in Thailand when combined with limited 
licensing schemes. 
 
Supplementary management measures that can indirectly control fishing capacity 
consist of ecosystem-based fishery and multispecies fisheries management,6 and closed 
seasons and closed areas.7 Particularly closed seasons and closed areas measures, 
Thailand has implemented these measures for decades with the main purpose of marine 
resources conservation, and they therefore provide a small effect on fishing capacity 
control. However, these measures can still be applied as a supportive measure for other 
fishing capacity controls. In addition, they can be implemented as a primary measure, 
particularly for where right-based measures are difficult to apply. Thus, Thailand should 
continue implementing these measures as supplementary measures for managing fishing 
capacity. Legal arrangement in terms of allocating certain fishing gears for each fishing 
                                                
6 Ecosystem-based fishery and multispecies fisheries management are greatly discussed in Section 6.2.1 
and 6.2.2 of Chapter 6. 
7 Closed seasons and closed areas are greatly discussed in Section 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 of Chapter 6. 
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zone (based on the new Fisheries Act) would increase the effects of closed seasons and 
closed areas measures on fishing capacity controls. 
 
ITQ is an incentive adjusting measure that generates th  effect of capacity reduction in 
many fisheries. With the core characteristics of ITQ, including: (i) exclusivity; (ii) 
durability; (iii) security or quality of title; and (iv) transferability,8 it is therefore 
suggested by FAO as the appropriate approach to manage fishing capacity. However, it 
is unlikely that this scheme can be effectively implemented in Thai fisheries due to not 
only the difficulties in gathering a large amount of information respecting fishery 
biology of each target species, which is essential in determination the TAC of each 
species stock, but also the constraint in terms of enforcement by the authorities, taking 
into consideration an enormous number of fishing landing sites largely scattering along 
the coasts of Thailand. However, Thailand, for the first attempt, has put an output 
control measure (i.e., TAC scheme) into the legislation (i.e., the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 
(2015)). The TAC would later be translated into the approriate number of fishing 
licenses for each fishing gears/vessels. However, th  mechanism for setting TAC and 
allocating such TAC has not yet been designed. Thus, t e legal arrangement for these 
actions is still needed to put in place. 
 
In addition, Thailand has had a number of other gaps nd challenges, including the 
inadequacy of monitoring control and surveillance system mainly due to the financial 
constraint; insufficient cooperation among relevant gencies, particularly between the 
Department of Fisheries and the Marine Department; the lack of solid political will on 
fishing capacity reduction program; the difficulties for conducting overseas fisheries of 
Thai fishing fleets; and the inadequacy of the application of international instruments 
(i.e., the FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement). In order to 
fill these gaps and overcome the challenges, Thailand should take into account the 
options and recommendations, including strengthening monitoring control and 
surveillance system, strengthening the cooperation among applicable agencies and 
stakeholders, building strong political will in capacity reduction, and ratifying the FAO 
Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement. More importantly, 
Thailand must develop the Thailand national plan of action for the management of 
                                                
8 Details are discussed in Section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5.  
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fishing capacity as a comprehensive framework by taking all aspects aforesaid into 
consideration, and implement it as guidelines for fishing capacity management at the 
national level.  
 
In sum, it can be concluded that at present Thailand has had the inadequacy of 
frameworks in legal, policy, institutional and technical arrangement aspects that are 
needed to effectively manage fishing capacity of marine fisheries. However, as long as 
all gaps and challenges previously discussed are properly addressed by taking into 
account the options and recommendations proposed in this thesis, it is likely possible 
for Thailand to overcome the problem of overcapacity, and therefore the sustainable 
fisheries will be achieved.   
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